About the event: For years, development agencies have expanded, perceived as complements to national security with support for their autonomous administration. Today, however, issues of humanitarian aid and development are seen as increasingly linked to concerns about national security and politics, while aid skepticism is growing. The fruits of this shift were made all too clear when, in July 2025, the United States under the second Donald Trump administration merged its Agency for International Development (USAID) into its Department of State, echoing a similar move unfolding in other western donor countries. The merger in the U.S. solidified a global trend following similar mergers in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Norway, Denmark and New Zealand. Indeed, around the world over the past thirty years, many of the world’s wealthiest countries have merged their aid and diplomacy agencies.  Although mergers are trending, are they helping countries advance their security goals? While the U.S. merger is still unfolding with many of its results yet-to-be seen, other global merger experiences offer stories that collectively indicate lessons to be learned about the rising trend to merge development and diplomacy. This presentation presents research from a review of the twenty-year history of global affairs mergers, drawing on interviews with leaders, civil servants, and activists from around the world. Considering rising Chinese development investments, ongoing fallout from COVID-19, crises in Syria, Gaza, Sudan and Ukraine, climate change, and other global challenges, can development and diplomacy truly be integrated, or do these fields require distinction for their effective delivery? How might the U.S. consider the evidence from other aid-diplomacy mergers to inform its efforts to reform global affairs administration to address connected security and development challenges? This research explores the effects of recent mergers of aid and foreign policy agencies in the context of evolving global challenges and discusses the implications for foreign policy agendas moving forward.

About the speaker: Rachel A. George, PhD is a Lecturer in International Relations at Stanford University. She is also a Research Project Lead with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Research Fellow at Georgetown’s Institute for Women, Peace, and Security. Previously, she served as Lecturing Fellow at Duke University’s Sanford School of Public Policy and Visiting Assistant Professor at Duke Kunshan University. She was also Director for Education Content at the Council on Foreign Relations and a Research Fellow at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in London.

Her work focuses on foreign policy, democracy, Middle East politics, international law, women, peace, and security, AI and other emerging technologies, and the connections between development and international security. Her research has been published in a range of outlets, including in Foreign Policy, Just Security, The Washington Quarterly, World Politics Review, The National Interest, CFR.org, Human Rights Review, and as chapters in The Arab Gulf States and the West: Perception and Misperception, Opportunities and Perils, and The Routledge History of Human Rights. She has also served as a contributor for BBC News, CNN and Arise America TV News. She has worked on projects with the UN Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate, Transparency International, The World Bank, Global Affairs Canada, Swedish International Development Agency, UN Development Program, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Packard Foundation, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, among others.

She holds a BA in Politics from Princeton University, an MA in Middle East Studies from Harvard University, and PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics.

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About the event: The Untold Story of China’s Nuclear Weapon Development and Testing offers the most comprehensive account of China’s nuclear weapons development from 1955 to 1996. Hui Zhang examines the purpose and technical specifics of each nuclear test and provides new details about China’s pursuit of warhead miniaturization. Based on a number of new Chinese-language sources that have not previously been analyzed, this book reveals that China has the ability to produce smaller, lighter warheads than some have suggested, as well as more options for missiles that could carry a larger number of warheads.

The book also provides a new framework for understanding China’s efforts to modernize its nuclear arsenal and offers clues about the future of China’s nuclear program. As the international community watches China’s rapid nuclear expansion with concern—and, in particular, as the United States considers whether it will be confronting two peer nuclear-armed adversaries (Russia and China) in the future—this book is a significant contribution to the policy debate over a potential new three-way nuclear arms race.

About the speaker: Hui Zhang is a Senior Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. Hui Zhang is leading a research initiative on China's nuclear policies for the Project on Managing the Atom in the Kennedy School of Government. His research includes verification techniques of nuclear arms control, the control of fissile material, nuclear terrorism, China's nuclear policy, nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation, and policy of nuclear fuel cycle and reprocessing.

Before coming to the Kennedy School in September 1999, he was a post-doctoral fellow at the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University from 1997-1999. Hui Zhang received his Ph.D. in nuclear physics in Beijing in 1996.

Dr. Zhang is the author of several technical reports and book chapters, and dozens of articles in academic journals and the print media including Science and Global Security, Arms Control Today, Bulletin of Atomic Scientist, Disarmament Diplomacy, Disarmament Forum, the Nonproliferation Review, The Washington Quarterly, Journal of Nuclear Materials Management, INESAP, and China Security. Dr. Zhang gives many oral presentations and talks in international conferences and organizations.

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About the event: At the end of the Cold War, donors sought to bolster environmental programs and exchanges to build confidence and trust among scientists and NGOs and to support civil society activity in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In the years after the Soviet Union’s collapse, the United States and European Union channeled financial resources to civil society organizations to empower local civil society actors, which were seen as essential for consolidating democracy in many Eastern European countries and with integration into the European Union. This project revisits efforts during the Cold War and its aftermath to assess the political and environmental impact of linking scientific and environmental efforts to political cooperation and democracy building. In doing so, the project examines the political and environmental impact of these programs along with what lessons can be drawn for current efforts to leverage the environment and natural resources as a tool for peacebuilding.

About the speaker: Erika Weinthal is John O. Blackburn Distinguished Professor of Environmental Policy at Duke University. She is Chair of the Environmental Social Systems Division in the Nicholas School of the Environment and a member of the Bass Society of Fellows. She was a prior Chair of Duke’s Academic Council. Weinthal is the President of the Environmental Peacebuilding Association and an associate editor of its journal, Environment and Security. In 2017, she received the Women Peacebuilders for Water Award under the auspices of “Fondazione Milano per Expo 2015.”  Her most recent book is The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Environmental Politics (2023).

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About the event: Communal disputes over local issues such as land use, cattle herding, and access to scarce resources are a leading cause of conflict across the world. In the coming decades, climate change, forced migration, and violent extremism will exacerbate such disputes in places that are ill equipped to handle them. Local Peace, International Builders examines the conditions under which international interventions mitigate communal violence. The book argues that civilian perceptions of impartiality, driven primarily by the legacies of colonialism, shape interveners’ ability to manage local disputes. Drawing on georeferenced data on the deployment of over 100,000 UN peacekeepers to fragile settings in the twenty-first century as well as a multimethod study of intervention in Mali – where widespread violence is managed by the international community – this book highlights a critical pathway through which interventions can maintain order in the international system.

About the speaker: William G. Nomikos is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara where he directs the Data-driven Analysis of Peace Project (DAPP) lab. His research looks at how domestic political considerations shape the conduct of international interventions in fragile settings. His first book, Local Peace, International Builders: How the UN Builds Peace from the Bottom Up, examines the conditions under which international actors successfully bring order, peace, and stability to fragile settings. His follow up work on this subject examines what peacekeepers can do to mitigate climate change-induced social conflict in weakly institutionalized settings.

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About the event: For almost four decades, the United States has tried to stop North Korea’s attempts to build nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them. Based on more than 300 interviews with officials in Washington, Seoul and Beijing, as well as his own encounters with North Korean government officials over two decades, Joel Wit’s new book, Flashpoint: The Inside Story of How America Failed to Disarm North Korea, tells the up until now untold story of how six American presidents failed to stop Pyongyang. The book uncovers the policy debates, diplomatic gambits, military planning and covert operations that shaped the struggle to halt North Korea’s Manhattan project. He points to Barack Obama and Donald Trump as the two presidents most responsible for that failure. As a result, North Korea’s nuclear armed missiles can now threaten American cities.

About the speaker: Joel S. Wit is a Distinguished Fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center and former director of the 38North program.  As a State Department official, he helped negotiate the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework and was in charge of its implementation until he left government in 2002.  He held countless talks with North Korean officials over the next 15 years. Wit served as a Senior Fellow at the US-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins from 2017-2018 and at the Henry L. Stimson Center until 2022. He is a co-author (with Robert Gallucci and Daniel Poneman) of Going Critical: The First North Korea Nuclear Crisis.

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About the event: A fundamental premise of the nuclear revolution theory (TNR) is the claim of assured destruction—the ability of a state to retaliate with a nuclear second-strike that leads to the destruction of the adversary’s sociopolitical-economic-industrial infrastructure, denying it the ability to survive as a viable modern nation-state. However, as we enter an era of renewed strategic great power competition, emerging technological advances have reanimated questions about the continued relevance of TNR. Can a state employing emerging technologies significantly undermine the assured destruction capabilities of its adversary? Using insights and techniques from Self-Organized Criticality theory, Dr. Sankaran analytically reexamines and models the requirements for assured destruction. He demonstrates that the networked structure of critical infrastructures continues to make advanced industrial states extremely vulnerable to assured destruction—at a fraction of Cold War arsenal requirements. Dr. Sankaran argues that advanced industrial nation-states remain vulnerable to assured destruction retaliatory strikes.

About the speaker: Jaganath “Jay” is an associate professor in the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin and a non-resident fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. He works on problems at the intersection of international security and science & technology. Dr. Sankaran spent the first four years of his career as a defense scientist with the Indian Missile R&D establishment. Dr. Sankaran’s work in weapons design and development led to his interests in missile defenses, space weapons, nuclear weapons, military net assessment, and arms control.

The current focus of his research is the growing strategic and military competition between the major powers. In particular, Dr. Sankaran studies the impact of emerging technological advances on international politics, warfare, and nuclear weapons doctrine. His recent publications examine the impact of five technologies—small satellites, hypersonic weapons, machine learning, cyber weapons, and quantum sensing—on nuclear operations, strategic nuclear stability, and international security. His other recent publications have explored a multitude of national security issues, including the lessons for air power emerging from the Russia-Ukraine War, the politics behind the India-China border crises, and the influence of missile defenses on great power nuclear deterrence.

Dr. Sankaran has held fellowships at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, and the RAND Corporation. He has held visiting positions at the Congressional Budget Office’s National Security Division, the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) at the U.S. Air University, Tsinghua University, and the National Institute for Defense Studies (Tokyo). Dr. Sankaran has served on study groups of the National Academies of Sciences (NAS) and the American Physical Society (APS) Panel on Public Affairs examining missile defenses and strategic stability. Dr. Sankaran’s first book, “Bombing to Provoke: Rockets, Missiles, and Drones as Instruments of Fear and Coercion,” was published by Oxford University Press. He has published in International Security, Contemporary Security Policy, Journal of Strategic Studies, Journal of East Asian Studies, Asian Security, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Arms Control Today, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, and other outlets. The RAND Corporation and the Stimson Center have also published his research.

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About the event: Over the last two decades, the United States has supported a range of militias, rebels, and other armed groups in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Critics have argued that such partnerships have many perils, from enabling human rights abuses to seeding future threats. Is it possible to work with such forces but mitigate some of these risks? In Illusions of Control: Dilemmas in Managing U.S. Proxy Forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, Erica L. Gaston explores U.S. efforts to do just that, drawing on a decade of field research and hundreds of interviews with stakeholders to unpack the dilemmas of attempting to control proxy forces.

The book has been described by reviewers as a "grim but necessary autopsy of America’s policy failures” in the last two decades (Ariel Ahram) and a book that casts light on the "moral hazards and strategic pitfalls of partnerships forged in war" (H.R. McMaster). Gaston’s conclusions not only suggest a greater need for strategic thinking in how risks are managed and weighed in U.S. Security Policy, but also help nuance the academic frameworks and lenses used to understand proxy warfare dynamics. By combining insights and tools from the fields of international relations that incorporate a more diverse set of international actors with domestic bargaining and organizational theory, the book helps to expand the theoretical toolkit for understanding foreign policy generation.

About the speaker: Dr. Erica Gaston is Head of the Conflict Prevention Programme at United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, and an Adjunct Assistant Professor at Columbia University’s SIPA programme. Her most recent book with Columbia University Press, Illusions of Control: Dilemmas of Managing U.S. Proxy Forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, was recently short-listed for the Conflict Research Society’s Book of the Year Prize 2025. Her prior academic articles and book compendiums have considered changing norms and practices within international humanitarian law.

She has a B.A from Stanford University, a juris doctorate from Harvard Law School, and a PhD from Cambridge University.

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About the event: Scholars of nuclear brinkmanship have long debated whether nuclear crises are dominated by a balance of resolve, or whether nuclear superiority may offset that balance in favor of the more technologically advanced competitor. Recent studies indicate the latter, suggesting that the high accuracy of modern strategic weapons may have ushered in a “new era of counterforce dominance.” The state that masters those weapons, they argue, can steel their resolve if they become confident in their ability to eliminate an adversary’s retaliatory nuclear forces in a disarming first strike. Yet these counterforce enthusiasts overlook an important technological headwind: the complexity of advanced weapon systems can confound nuclear planners’ ability to predict their performance in a real nuclear exchange. This challenge is particularly acute for counterforce systems that cannot be tested in operational settings, and whose failure would bring catastrophic consequences on their user. Drawing from scholarship in complexity theory and science and technology studies, Lawrence argues that nuclear competitions are also beset by a balance of nuclear humility: States with more grandiose, technically demanding nuclear doctrines can be less confident in their knowledge, must work harder to retain their capabilities, and can hence be less certain in the success of their nuclear missions. More humble competitors may address their vulnerabilities with relatively modest innovation, and fret less over vagaries of the unknown. Crucially, the advantages and disadvantages of technological humility can run against those traditionally associated with the balances of capability and resolve. Lawrence illustrates this dynamic by constructing a Monte Carlo simulation of a counterforce strike with modern US strategic missiles on China’s silo-based missile force. He shows that small variations in parameters that cannot be known to the attacker with certainty correspond to wide variation in strike outcomes. The resulting uncertainty in costs to the attacker complicates popular strategic theories of damage limitation.

About the speaker: Christopher Lawrence is Assistant Professor of Science, Technology and International Affairs in Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service. He studies the histories of U.S. nonproliferation engagement with North Korea and Iran, as well as the epistemic communities in the West that create knowledge about those countries’ nuclear programs. His academic writing has been published in International Security, Social Studies of Science, Journal of Applied Physics, and IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science. He has also written policy analysis for various online publications, including Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and War on the Rocks.

Prior to Joining SFS, Christopher carried out postdoctoral fellowships at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation; Harvard’s Program on Science, Technology and Society and Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; and Princeton’s Program on Science and Global Security. He carried out his PhD dissertation in Nuclear Science and Engineering at University of Michigan, where he developed novel neutron-spectroscopy techniques for characterizing nuclear warhead components for treaty verification.

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About the event: Nuclear power in Eastern Europe has been framed in various ways depending on political context: as a uranium state-building project, a key element of international decarbonization efforts, a model for reducing energy dependence on Russia, and an environmental risk slated for phase-out. Yet, one crucial aspect remains overlooked: how gendered expertise has sustained Bulgaria’s nuclear industry for decades—and how it remains entangled with the social hierarchies shaping nuclear energy production.

This talk draws on ethnographic and historical research, along with footage from a film-in-progress, to explore the labor, expertise, and social lives of women working in nuclear spaces along the Danube River. It focuses on two key sites: the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant, which continues to expand, and the Belene Nuclear Power Plant, a stalled project since the end of socialism. As laboratory technicians, construction managers, and power plant engineers, these women navigated state socialist labor policies, shifting gender expectations, and the demands of both career and family. Their perspectives offer deeper insight not only into the evolving role of women’s expertise in the nuclear power industry but also into how human labor itself is being reconfigured in relation to aging nuclear infrastructures—whether left to decay or reimagined as part of the “green” energy transition.

About the speaker: Elana Resnick is an Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and leads the Infrastructural Inequalities Research Group. Her published work includes articles in American Anthropologist (2021), American Ethnologist (2024), Cultural Anthropology (2024), Journal of Contemporary Archaeology (2018), and Public Culture (2023). Her forthcoming book, Refusing Sustainability: Race and Environmentalism in a Changing Europe, will be published by Stanford University Press in July 2025.

Resnick’s scholarship has received multiple awards, including the 2022 American Anthropological Association GAD Prize for Exemplary Cross-Field Scholarship, the 2023 Women’s Forum Article Prize from the British Association for Slavonic & East European Studies, and the 2024 Association of Women in Slavic Studies (AWSS) Heldt Prize for the Best Article in Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Women’s and Gender Studies. Her current research focuses on the environmental and social politics surrounding nuclear power development and decommissioning in Europe. She holds a Ph.D. in Anthropology from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and has received research support from the Wilson Center, the Council for European Studies, the School for Advanced Research, the Wenner-Gren Foundation, and the Fulbright Program.

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