About the event: Following the failed 1959 Lhasa Uprising, tens of thousands fled Tibet. Most of these refugees (including the fourteenth Dalai Lama) settled in India, but others ended up in countries such as Australia, Canada, Nepal, Switzerland, and the United States. Drawing on newspapers, multinational archival sources, and assorted secondary works, this talk will explore how and why both governments and civil society assisted the Tibetans as well as the ways in which Cold War considerations shaped their decisions. This talk will also shed light on Chinese reactions to aid for Tibetans and how refugees have been perceived.

About the speaker: Reed Chervin is Associate Professor and Associate Director of the Motwani Jadeja Institute for American Studies at O. P. Jindal University. He was previously a postdoctoral fellow in the Strategy and Policy Department at the U.S. Naval War College. His first book, The Cold War in the Himalayas, was published with Amsterdam University Press/Routledge, and his other work has appeared in The China Quarterly, The Journal of Cold War Studies, and H-Diplo, among other venues. His current book project is on foreign support for Tibetan rebels and refugees from the 1950s through the 1970s.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

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About the event: In the wake of conflict and the rise of authoritarian populist movements, national police are becoming more militarized across the globe. This is in spite of the consolidation of international norms for civilian policing. That state police are more militarized is not necessarily surprising since states are fundamentally concerned with domestic order. Like states, international organizations (IOs) are concerned with domestic security and often participate in domestic police reforms as a result. Do IO police reforms operate as a check on global trends toward police militarization? I argue that IOs, though they make determined attempts to institute civilian and democratic policing norms, often reinforce militarized policing. This occurs through institutional and individual mechanisms. First, IOs view order as a necessary condition for democratic or human rights-based policing. Second, individual bureaucrats reinforce this trend because they see insecure spaces as inherently prone to violence and recommend more militarized policing in response. I evaluate the theory using archival evidence from two United Nations (UN) policing missions in Namibia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and interviews with IO policing experts. I find that police militarization is a persistent problem that lacks clear reform solutions, even when implemented by a well-respected IO like the UN.

About the speaker: Before coming to CISAC, Maya was a Neubauer Family Distinguished Doctoral Fellow at the University of Chicago where she received her Ph.D. in Political Science in July, 2025. Maya holds an M.A. in Political Science from the University of Chicago and B.A. in Global and International Studies and Humanities from the University of Kansas. Maya's research combines critical and mainstream approaches to explore the legacies of empire in conflict dynamics and state-building. Specifically, she is interested in how international organizations and private firms collaborate with states for international security sector reforms in and outside of post-conflict contexts.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

No filming or recording without express permission from speaker.

About the event: Because no nuclear weapon has been used to attack a target since 1945, a tendency to project existing trends into the future could lead people to expect this pattern of nuclear nonuse to continue. But is it possible to have confidence about whether and how far into the future the record of nonuse will continue? In this talk, Dr. Knopf will argue that confidence about avoiding nuclear use is not possible because the probability of a nuclear attack or nuclear exchange cannot be predicted. This unpredictability reflects the nature of strategy and the available evidence about nuclear deterrence. Strategy involves making a prediction that a chosen course of action will lead to outcomes desired by a state. But attempts to make forecasts about nuclear deterrence are beset by uncertainty and trade-offs and by the interaction of those two problems. Using a thought experiment to illustrate, Dr. Knopf will suggest that the problems of uncertainty and trade-offs make it impossible to reliably estimate the likelihood that any given nuclear strategy will prevent nuclear-weapons use. If this analysis is correct, it should motivate greater efforts to reduce the chance of nuclear-weapons use and to find alternatives to nuclear deterrence. Steps that could help advance those objectives include measures to strengthen inhibitions against nuclear use, as well as renewed efforts to move toward nuclear disarmament.

About the speaker: Jeff Knopf is a professor at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where he serves as chair of the MA program in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies. Dr. Knopf received a Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford, and in 2018-19 he spent a sabbatical year at CISAC. Dr. Knopf has published extensively on topics related to deterrence, arms control, nonproliferation, and the defense industry. His most recent book is Coercing Syria on Chemical Weapons, published earlier this year by Oxford University Press in its Bridging the Gap Series.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

No filming or recording without express permission from speaker.

About the event: In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, Kazakhstan inherited the remnants of one of the world’s most contaminated landscapes: the Semipalatinsk Test Site, known locally as the Polygon. Resigned to dispossession, residents have chosen to remain on the abandoned nuclear test site, despite the isolation and the radioactive environment, rather than face marginalization or the rigors of a neoliberal world. Atomic Collective examines this nuclear legacy through a decade-long ethnographic examination of the village of Koian, situated on the border of the test site. Facing residual radiation all around them and isolation, Koianers persist, reshaping their pastoral existence among the ruins and scientific debates surrounding genetic damage.

Drawing on first-hand accounts and archival research, this book explores the resilience and everyday survival strategies of a community left behind to fend for itself in the shadow of nuclear testing. It offers a unique perspective on life in a nuclear zone and poses fundamental questions about human resilience and the impact of historical events on a collective identity. Atomic Collective sheds light on a community overlooked in the larger Cold War histories of atomic testing.

About the speaker: Magdalena Stawkowski is an associate professor in the Department of Anthropology at the University of South Carolina. She earned her PhD from the University of Colorado Boulder in 2014 and has held roles at the Danish Institute for International Studies; the Center for Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill; and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, as a MacArthur and Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow. Specializing in cultural and medical anthropology, Stawkowski focuses on militarized and nuclear spaces, the political economy of health, and the socio-cultural legacies of Soviet era nuclear testing in Kazakhstan, where she has conducted more than a decade of fieldwork. She has collaborated on international projects examining Cold War radioactive legacies in Kazakhstan, the Marshall Islands, and French Polynesia. Currently, she is engaged in collaborative and comparative research on tritium bioaccumulation and biomagnification in the Semipalatinsk Test Site region and the Savannah River Site in South Carolina.

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No filming or recording without express permission from speaker.

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About the event: Amidst momentous geopolitical shifts, changing leaderships, and evolving domestic priorities, the United States and Iran have maintained an antagonistic relationship for nearly half a century. Standard explanations pin the blame for this enduring hostility on Iran and its leaders’ revolutionary ideology and policies at odds with the United States and the West. While Iran bears significant blame for a deeply adversarial relationship—the country often engages in dangerous and repressive activities—this book demonstrates that “it’s them, not us” accounts cannot alone explain America’s posture toward this complicated but critically important country. Dassa Kaye's book explores how America’s Iran policy is made, the people who make it, and the underlying ideas and perceptions that inform it. Dassa Kaye looks back at U.S. policy toward Iran over the past four decades to help us look ahead, offering wider lessons for understanding American foreign policymaking and providing critical insights at a pivotal time of heightened military tensions in and around the Middle East.

About the speaker: Dr. Dalia Dassa Kaye is a senior fellow at the UCLA Burkle Center for International Relations and director of its Initiative on Regional Security Architectures. A life member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Dalia is an internationally recognized expert on geopolitics and Middle East policy. During her fifteen years at the RAND Corporation, Dalia served as a senior political scientist and the director of the Center of Middle East Public Policy.

She has received numerous awards and held previous positions at an array of research and public policy institutions, including as a Fulbright Schuman visiting scholar at Lund University, a fellow at the Wilson Center, an advisor at the Foreign Ministry of The Netherlands, an assistant professor of political science and international affairs at the George Washington University, a research fellow at the Brookings Institution, and a legislative assistant on Capitol Hill.

She is a frequent public speaker and contributor to leading media outlets, including BBC, CNN, NPR, PBS, and Foreign Affairs. She is the author of dozens of articles and policy reports, as well as three books, including most recently Enduring Hostility: The Making of America’s Iran Policy (Stanford University Press, 2026).

Dalia holds her BA, MA, and PhD in political science from the University of California, Berkeley.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

No filming or recording without express permission from speaker.

About the event: “Less autonomy, more humanity.” That is the motto of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, a coalition of 250 human-rights organizations working to negotiate an international treaty that would effectively prohibit states from developing and using autonomous weapons systems. The Campaign’s motto captures the primary legal objection to autonomous weapons: namely, that “killer robots” will never be able to comply with international humanitarian law as well as human soldiers because such compliance requires the kind of judgment, situational awareness, and ability to interpret emotions that only humans possess. This lecture challenges that objection. It begins by showing that those uniquely human traits are far less necessary to IHL compliance than commonly assumed. It then explains why the legal critique of autonomous weapons depends on an idea of “the human” – as fundamentally rational, self-determining, and capable of self-control – that is believed by decades of research into how humans actually make decisions, particularly in dangerous and stressful situations such as combat. And finally, it concludes that the real objection of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots is not that autonomous weapons will make worse soldiers than humans – but that they will make better ones.

About the speaker: Kevin Jon Heller is Professor of International Law and Security at the University of Copenhagen’s Centre for Military Studies and Distinguished RecurringVisiting Professor of Law at Universidad Torcuato di Tella in Buenos Aires. He is an Academic Member of Doughty Street Chambers in London and currently serves as Special Advisor on War Crimes to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, where he led the development of the Office's recently issued Policy on Addressing Environmental Damage Through the Rome Statute. He is also Editor-in-Chief of Opinio Juris, the world's oldest blog dedicated to international law.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

No filming or recording without express permission from speaker.

About the event: When the U.S.-Russia New START treaty expires on February 5, 2026, there will no longer be any guardrails preventing a global nuclear arms race. Yet the erosion of arms control is just one part of a broader trend of rising nuclear dangers. All nuclear-armed states are either poised to begin or are in the process of modernizing and expanding their arsenals. Risks of nuclear conflict are increasing in Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia. Not surprisingly, interest in nuclear weapons is growing in many countries, primarily U.S. allies worried about threats from China, Russia, and North Korea and fearing the United States will abandon them. Between these geopolitical trends and advances in relevant technologies, proliferation risks are rising, with broad implications for U.S. and global security. How should the United States navigate the dangers of a more nuclearized world? Can it resurrect arms control with Russia and potentially involve China or other countries? How should it manage the potential for proliferation by some of its allies? And, as many countries stand poised to adopt or expand nuclear power, how should it balance proliferation risks and global commercial nuclear energy competition?   

About the speakers:
Mariano-Florentino (Tino) Cuéllar is the tenth president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, an institution created by Andrew Carnegie in 1910 to conduct independent research, support diplomacy, and advise policymakers on international cooperation, conflict, and governance.  A former justice of the Supreme Court of California, Cuéllar has served three U.S. presidents at the White House and in federal agencies and was the Stanley Morrison Professor at Stanford University, where he held appointments in law, political science, and international affairs and led the university’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He serves on the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board and the U.S. Department of State’s Foreign Affairs Policy Board, and chairs the board of the William & Flora Hewlett Foundation.

As director of Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute, he oversaw the university’s major research centers and educational programs focused on governance and development, international security, health policy, climate change and food security, and contemporary Asia and Europe.  Previously, he co-directed Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and led its Honors Program in International Security Studies. During nearly seven years on California’s highest court while continuing to teach at Stanford, he wrote opinions addressing separation of powers, policing and criminal justice, democracy, technology and privacy, international agreements, and climate and environmental policy among other issues, and led the court system’s operations to better meet the needs of millions of limited English speakers.

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Rose Gottemoeller is the William J. Perry Lecturer at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Research Fellow at the Hoover Institute.

Before joining Stanford Gottemoeller was the Deputy Secretary General of NATO from 2016 to 2019, where she helped to drive forward NATO’s adaptation to new security challenges in Europe and in the fight against terrorism.  Prior to NATO, she served for nearly five years as the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the U.S. Department of State, advising the Secretary of State on arms control, nonproliferation and political-military affairs. While Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance in 2009 and 2010, she was the chief U.S. negotiator of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with the Russian Federation.

Prior to her government service, she was a senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, with joint appointments to the Nonproliferation and Russia programs. She served as the Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center from 2006 to 2008, and is currently a nonresident fellow in Carnegie's Nuclear Policy Program.

Scott D. Sagan is Co-Director and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, and the Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education at Stanford University. He also serves as Co-Chair of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences’ Committee on International Security Studies. Before joining the Stanford faculty, Sagan was a lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University and served as special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon.

Sagan is the author of Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton University Press, 1989); The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton University Press, 1993); and, with co-author Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate (W.W. Norton, 2012). He is the co-editor of Insider Threats (Cornell University Press, 2017) with Matthew Bunn; and co-editor of The Fragile Balance of Terror (Cornell University Press, 2022) with Vipin Narang. Sagan was also the guest editor of a two-volume special issue of Daedalus: Ethics, Technology, and War (Fall 2016) and The Changing Rules of War (Winter 2017).

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About the moderator: Toby Dalton is senior fellow and co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Before joining Carnegie, he served in policy advisory positions at the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, as energy attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, and as a professional staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His work focuses on nuclear energy, nuclear security, and international nuclear governance, with a focus on East Asia and South Asia. He is co-author with George Perkovich of Not War, Not Peace? (Oxford University Press) and has published articles and opinion pieces in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Survival, The Washington Quarterly, Dong-A Ilbo, and Dawn, among others. He was a Luce Scholar at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies in Seoul, South Korea. He received a PhD from The George Washington University, MA from the University of Washington, and BA from Occidental College.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

No filming or recording without express permission from speakers.

About the event: International relations scholars have long studied how technological shifts impact the course of wars, especially as armies are forced to innovate on the battlefield. From the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, SpaceX’s Starlink service (a private company) has played a vital infrastructure role for Ukraine’s military, something it was never envisioned or designed to do. In addition, in contrast with past conflicts, Starlink’s major policy choices are primarily controlled by a single individual – Elon Musk –  who has his own political preferences and agenda, distinct from the U.S. or other countries. We leverage a natural experiment to ascertain the effect of Starlink access for Ukrainian forces on battlefield outcomes. We leverage a geographic discontinuity to determine the overall effect of access to Starlink on Ukraine’s territorial control as well as overall volume of munitions and combat activities. The design relies on an idiosyncratic mismatch between SpaceX’s internal system (which uses fixed hexagon shapes) for allocating access and the actual boundaries of the frontline and Ukraine’s provinces. Second, we use a difference-in-differences approach to examine how Starlink access mattered before and after a late 2022 policy change at SpaceX decided personally by Elon Musk to limit Starlink access to Ukrainian forces in certain areas and for certain activities. Initial findings are that Starlink access significantly improves Ukraine’s ability to hold territory, though it appears not to greatly affect the volume of drones, artillery or other munitions. The results suggest Starlink mostly affects quality of strikes rather than quantity. 

Co-authored with Tatsuya Koyama and Yuri Zhukov.

About the speaker: Renard Sexton is a Visiting Scholar at CISAC and an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Emory University.

Sexton studies conflict and development with a focus on local level violence and interventions intended to curb violence. His research covers insurgency, terrorism, social conflict around natural resources, and police crackdowns; he has regional expertise in Afghanistan, Southeast Asia and Andean Latin America. His research has been published in top scholarly journals, including the American Political Science Review and American Journal of Political Science. His policy pieces and commentary have been published by The Washington Post, The New York Times, The Guardian, International Crisis Group, Foreign Policy and other outlets. Before joining Emory, he was a postdoctoral fellow at Princeton University and Economics of Conflict fellow at the International Crisis Group.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

No filming or recording without express permission from speaker.

About the event: The future of European security is at a crossroad. Which road it takes depends on the direction of Russia’s war against Ukraine. The war presents one of the greatest risks for the Europe’s future but at the same time one of the greatest opportunities.

Drawing on their extensive experience in transatlantic defense and diplomacy, the panelists will assess the strategic shifts reshaping Europe’s security landscape, from military deterrence and alliance cohesion to the prospects for long-term stability in the region. The conversation will explore how the conflict continues to redefine NATO’s role, the European Union's approach to security, and Western policy toward Russia and Ukraine.

About the speakers: 

Rose Gottemoeller is the William J. Perry Lecturer at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Research Fellow at the Hoover Institute.

Before joining Stanford Gottemoeller was the Deputy Secretary General of NATO from 2016 to 2019, where she helped to drive forward NATO’s adaptation to new security challenges in Europe and in the fight against terrorism.  Prior to NATO, she served for nearly five years as the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the U.S. Department of State, advising the Secretary of State on arms control, nonproliferation and political-military affairs. While Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance in 2009 and 2010, she was the chief U.S. negotiator of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with the Russian Federation.

Prior to her government service, she was a senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, with joint appointments to the Nonproliferation and Russia programs. She served as the Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center from 2006 to 2008, and is currently a nonresident fellow in Carnegie's Nuclear Policy Program.  

At Stanford, Gottemoeller teaches and mentors students in the Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy program and the CISAC Honors program; contributes to policy research and outreach activities; and convenes workshops, seminars and other events relating to her areas of expertise, including nuclear security, Russian relations, the NATO alliance, EU cooperation and non-proliferation. 

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Colin Kahl is the Steven C. Házy Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). He is also the faculty director of CISAC’s Program on Geopolitics, Technology, and Governance.

From April 2021-July 2023, Dr. Kahl served as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the U.S. Department of Defense. In that role, he was the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense for all matters related to national security and defense policy and represented the Department as a standing member of the National Security Council Deputies’ Committee. He oversaw the writing of the 2022 National Defense Strategy, which focused the Pentagon’s efforts on the “pacing challenge” posed by the PRC, and he led the Department’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and numerous other international crises. During the Obama Administration, Dr. Kahl served as Deputy Assistant to President Obama and National Security Advisor to then Vice President Biden from October 2014 to January 2017.

He received his B.A. in political science from the University of Michigan and his Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University.

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Gabrielius Landsbergis, formerly the minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, is the Bernard and Susan Liautaud Visiting Fellow at FSI, effective September 15, 2025.

As a Liataud Fellow, Landsbergis will be deeply enmeshed in the daily intellectual life of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, (FSI), with simultaneous affiliations with The Europe Center (TEC), and the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL).

Prior to his appointment at Stanford, Landsbergis served as the minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Lithuania. Previously, he was the chairman of the Homeland Union Party while concurrently a member of the Lithuanian Parliament. Before assuming these roles, Landsbergis was also a member of the European Parliament and began his career as a diplomat for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania.

Landsbergis’ tenure serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs was defined by a value-based approach to foreign policy. During his time in office, he cemented deepening transatlantic relations, sustained support for Ukraine, and the elevation of global partnerships as strategic pillars of Lithuania’s foreign policy.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

No filming or recording without express permission from speaker.

Media: please reach out to cisacevents@stanford.edu

About the Event 

Jill Hruby will be this year's Drell Lecturer presenting on, "The Future of Nuclear Deterrence". The Drell Lecture is an annual public event sponsored by CISAC. By tradition, the Drell lecturer addresses a current and critical national or international security issue that has important scientific or technical dimensions.

About the Speaker

Jill Hruby served as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security at the Department of Energy and Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration from July 2021 to January 2025.  Since early 2025, Jill has joined the Lawrence Livermore Board, the Anthropic National Security and Public Sector Advisory Committee, the Science and Security Advisory Board for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, and will join the Atomic Weapons Establishment Board in January 2026.

Prior to being a political appointee, Hruby had a 34-year career at Sandia National Laboratories retiring in 2017 as the Laboratories Director. At Sandia, Hruby held roles of increasing responsibilities in nuclear weapons systems and component design, nuclear non-proliferation, defense and homeland security technologies and systems, renewable energy, materials science, engineering sciences, and microsystems technology.

After retiring from Sandia, Hruby served as the inaugural Sam Nunn Distinguished Fellow at the Nuclear Threat Initiative from 2018-2019 and continued as a nonresident Distinguished Fellow until her appointment. In addition, she was a member of the Defense Science Board and the National Academy Committee for International Security and Arms Control. Hruby earned her bachelor’s degree from Purdue University and her master’s degree from the University of California at Berkeley, both in mechanical engineering. She has received honorary doctorate degrees from Purdue University and Michigan State University. In 2022, she was elected to the National Academy of Engineering. Jill has received the Department of Energy Secretary’s Exceptional Service Award, the National Nuclear Security Administrator’s Distinguished Service Gold Award, and Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Public Service.

Please join us for refreshments in Oksenberg Hall following the conclusion of the lecture from 5:00 - 6:00 PM.  All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.