About the event: Scholars of nuclear brinkmanship have long debated whether nuclear crises are dominated by a balance of resolve, or whether nuclear superiority may offset that balance in favor of the more technologically advanced competitor. Recent studies indicate the latter, suggesting that the high accuracy of modern strategic weapons may have ushered in a “new era of counterforce dominance.” The state that masters those weapons, they argue, can steel their resolve if they become confident in their ability to eliminate an adversary’s retaliatory nuclear forces in a disarming first strike. Yet these counterforce enthusiasts overlook an important technological headwind: the complexity of advanced weapon systems can confound nuclear planners’ ability to predict their performance in a real nuclear exchange. This challenge is particularly acute for counterforce systems that cannot be tested in operational settings, and whose failure would bring catastrophic consequences on their user. Drawing from scholarship in complexity theory and science and technology studies, Lawrence argues that nuclear competitions are also beset by a balance of nuclear humility: States with more grandiose, technically demanding nuclear doctrines can be less confident in their knowledge, must work harder to retain their capabilities, and can hence be less certain in the success of their nuclear missions. More humble competitors may address their vulnerabilities with relatively modest innovation, and fret less over vagaries of the unknown. Crucially, the advantages and disadvantages of technological humility can run against those traditionally associated with the balances of capability and resolve. Lawrence illustrates this dynamic by constructing a Monte Carlo simulation of a counterforce strike with modern US strategic missiles on China’s silo-based missile force. He shows that small variations in parameters that cannot be known to the attacker with certainty correspond to wide variation in strike outcomes. The resulting uncertainty in costs to the attacker complicates popular strategic theories of damage limitation.

About the speaker: Christopher Lawrence is Assistant Professor of Science, Technology and International Affairs in Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service. He studies the histories of U.S. nonproliferation engagement with North Korea and Iran, as well as the epistemic communities in the West that create knowledge about those countries’ nuclear programs. His academic writing has been published in International Security, Social Studies of Science, Journal of Applied Physics, and IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science. He has also written policy analysis for various online publications, including Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and War on the Rocks.

Prior to Joining SFS, Christopher carried out postdoctoral fellowships at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation; Harvard’s Program on Science, Technology and Society and Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; and Princeton’s Program on Science and Global Security. He carried out his PhD dissertation in Nuclear Science and Engineering at University of Michigan, where he developed novel neutron-spectroscopy techniques for characterizing nuclear warhead components for treaty verification.

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