-

About the event: In nearly every country with sizable armed forces, debates persist about the relative effectiveness of military recruitment systems. Conventional wisdom asserts that volunteer armies fight more effectively in battle than conscript armies due to higher levels of training and motivation. I argue instead that conscript forces outperform their volunteer counterparts for several reasons. First, higher domestic political costs of sending draftees into combat incentivize leaders to vet military operations more carefully. Second, the leaders restrict conflicts to those that involve broadly recognized national interests, for which individual conscripts are highly motivated to bear real costs. Third, the average demographic makeup of conscript armies is superior to that of volunteer armies, which translates into advantages in battlefield skill acquisition. Democratic regime type and longer enlistment terms further bolster the battlefield effectiveness of conscript armies. I provide support for these propositions by analyzing cross-national battle-level data as well as American battlefield performance during the Vietnam War. My findings contribute to debates about military recruitment policy and civil–military relations.

About the speaker: Changwook Ju is a Postdoctoral Scholar at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. He specializes in International Relations and security studies, with a focus on military recruitment and effectiveness, China and global politics, and conflict-related sexual violence.

Changwook earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale University in 2024. Before Yale, he received an M.P.P. from the University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy in 2018. In 2015, he graduated from Sungkyunkwan University in Seoul, South Korea, with dual undergraduate degrees in public policy and political science.

From 2011 to 2013, Changwook served in the Republic of Korea Marine Corps, attaining the rank of sergeant.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

William J. Perry Conference Room

0
Affiliate
headshot_1.jpg

Changwook Ju is an Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science at Tulane University. Previously, he was a Postdoctoral Scholar at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and a Hans J. Morgenthau Fellow at the Notre Dame International Security Center. Changwook earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale University in 2024. Before Yale, he received an M.P.P. from the University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy in 2018. In 2015, he graduated from Sungkyunkwan University in Seoul, South Korea, with dual undergraduate degrees in public policy and political science. 

Changwook’s research spans international relations and security studies. He is primarily interested in military recruitment, battlefield effectiveness, civil–military relations, democracy and war, public nuclear attitudes, China and global politics, East Asian security, political violence, and conflict-related sexual violence. His research has been published in the American Journal of Political Science, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Studies Quarterly, International Studies Review, and the Journal of Conflict Resolution. His policy analysis and commentary have appeared in Chicago Policy Review, The Diplomat, and Foreign Policy. 

Prior to his academic career, Changwook served in the Republic of Korea Marine Corps from 2011 to 2013, attaining the rank of sergeant.

Date Label
Changwook Ju
Seminars
Date Label
-

About the event: Scholars have long debated why some conflicts spiral into prolonged cycles of hostility, while others fizzle out. Conventional wisdom suggests that states, when challenged, can demonstrate their resolve by retaliating militarily, thereby deterring future challenges. I argue that the desire for revenge, rather than deterrence concerns, shapes when individuals prefer military retaliation and why such actions provoke cyclical conflicts. Public support for military retaliation is primarily driven by a human desire to balance the suffering inflicted upon one's own ingroup, often without regard for the consequences. Consequently, instead of achieving deterrence, imposing costs on an adversary through military retaliation tends to provoke reciprocal retaliation. I test my theory using a preregistered survey experiment in which China attempts to deter U.S. intervention in a hypothetical Taiwan Strait crisis through retaliation. The results align with the logic of revenge. Rather than deterring the U.S., China's retaliation, which imposes greater suffering on the U.S., increases public support for further escalation, even in scenarios of secret U.S. retaliation with no deterrent benefit. This study contributes to the deterrence versus spiral model debate in two ways. First, it challenges the deterrence model, particularly theories of reputation for resolve. Second, it complements the spiral model by providing an alternative psychological microfoundation for the endogenous emergence of conflict spirals.

About the speaker: X Zhang is a predoctoral fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation and a Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science Department at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Zhang's research interests include the political psychology of interstate conflict, public opinion, and the domestic politics of foreign policy.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

William J. Perry Conference Room

0
Postdoctoral Fellow
X. Zhang Headshot

X received his PhD in the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. Prior to this, he received an MA from the University of Chicago's Committee on International Relations and a BIR from the Australian National University.

X's research focuses on the dynamics of revenge in international conflict. While conventional wisdom and strategic discourse often advocate for retaliation as a means of deterrence, he proposes that the real impetus frequently stems from an intrinsic desire for revenge. He argue that the primary trigger for revenge in international relations is the magnitude of suffering experienced by one’s national ingroup. Consequently, retaliatory actions are less about strategic deterrence and more about inflicting equivalent pain on the adversary, potentially setting off a cycle of revenge. Thus, in security crises and peace settlements, the key to escalation management and rivalry termination lies in reducing adversary suffering and the adversary public's desire for revenge.

As a hobby, X is writing a novel about disinformation and gaslighting in politics.

Date Label
X Zhang
Seminars
Date Label
-

About the event: Modern survey experiments indicate that in the event of a limited nuclear strike, the public in the targeted country, including a great democracy, would demand a decisive response. The implications for crisis stability are dire. Just at the moment when democratic decision makers would struggle to formulate a proportional response, they would also have to contend with an enraged populace shouting for vengeance. Public opinion as recently characterized is anathema to sound crisis management. The same mass sentiment that bolstered democratic resolve in the triumphal years after the Cold War now abandons presidents in the age of nuclear multipolarity to foredoomed strategies that overplay their hand. This, however, is not the whole story. Public opinion in real life also prevents leaders from throwing it all away or allowing crises to slip out of control. The Missiles of October in 1962 threatened international peace under different geopolitical circumstances, but the role of public opinion then has lessons for today. What might be called the Robert McNamara-Brent Scowcroft school still reigns. Rather than preclude crisis management, public opinion on net enables it: amplifying popular demand for peace and motivating extraordinary leader performance to preserve it.

About the speaker: Dr. Damon Coletta served as the endowed Scowcroft Professor of Political Science (2020-2021) at the United States Air Force Academy and director of the department’s Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies (2022-2023).  Damon edits the peer-reviewed e-journal, Space & Defense (2012-2024) and serves as social sciences liaison to USAFA’s nationally recognized Nuclear Weapons & Strategy minor program.  He completed a book on science & technology policy and international security, Courting Science: Securing the Foundation for a Second American Century (Stanford, 2016), and coedited NATO’s Return to Europe (Georgetown, 2017).

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

William J. Perry Conference Room

Damon Coletta
Seminars
Date Label
-

About the event: The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has been invoked over one hundred times since its formal endorsement by the UN General Assembly in 2005. Although R2P was designed to protect populations around the world from mass atrocity, it is selectively applied to societies outside of the North. Cases of inaction are also observed over atrocities in the South that would otherwise qualify for intervention by UN standards. Why does the international community intervene in some cases and not others? I argue that R2P betrays a racialized bias whereby the legal principle of sovereignty is transformed into a conditional privilege withheld from most non-European countries all else equal. Debates over a peoples’ capacity for self-rule are historically framed or even justified by racism. Since R2P restores a similar debate wherein state sovereignty becomes contingent, it can affirm prevailing beliefs about race and capacity for self-governance as a means to political ends. I examine R2P cross-nationally by matching countries on characteristics that likely drive intervention. Using UN resolutions and original data on mass atrocity events, I measure the relationship between country racial majority and the decision to intervene. The results suggest that R2P is disproportionately invoked over societies racialized as non-white. To address variation in R2P invocation over countries in the South, I examine a set of cases qualitatively and show that inaction by the international community is racial as it is strategic. A theory of race deepens understanding of the contradictory values that cohere to shape international law and intervention. 

About the speaker: Bianca Freeman is a 2024-2026 UC President's Postdoctoral Fellow in the Travers Department of Political Science at UC Berkeley. She received her PhD from UC San Diego Political Science in the summer of 2024. Bianca’s research focuses on the politics of race and racism in international law. In her dissertation and book project, she examines norms and agreements between states as legal outcomes of racial hierarchy in world politics. Bianca has published or has work forthcoming in the Annual Review of Political Science, Security Studies, International Studies Review, International Politics, and Politics, Groups, and Identities. 

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

William J. Perry Conference Room

Bianca Freeman
Seminars
Date Label
-

About the event: Questions about the likelihood of conflict between the United States and China have dominated international policy discussion for years. But the leading theory of power transitions between a declining hegemon and a rising rival is based exclusively on European examples, such as the Peloponnesian War, as well as the rise of Germany under Bismarck and the Anglo-German rivalry of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. What lessons does East Asian history offer, for both the power transitions debate and the future of U.S.-China relations?
Examining the rise and fall of East Asian powers over 1,500 years, we point out that East Asia historically has functioned very differently than did Europe; and even today the region has dynamics that are not leading to balancing or competitive behavior. In fact, the East Asian experience underscores domestic risks and constraints on great powers, not relative rise and decline in international competition. The threat of a US-China war from power transition is lower than often recognized, and the East Asian region is more stable than normally recognized.

About the speaker: Xinru Ma is an inaugural research scholar at the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab within the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, where she leads the research track on U.S.-Asia relations. Her work primarily examines nationalism, great power politics, and East Asian security, with a methodological focus on formal and computational methods. Her work is published in the Journal of East Asian Studies, The Washington Quarterly, Journal of Global Security Studies, Journal of European Public Policy, and edited volumes by Palgrave. Her co-authored book, Beyond Power Transition, is published by Columbia University Press.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

William J. Perry Conference Room

Xinru Ma
Seminars
Date Label
-

About the Event: Kim Jong Un’s recent remarks highlighting the goal of exponentially increasing North Korea’s nuclear arsenal underscore the regime’s aggressive pursuit of advanced nuclear capabilities. This growing threat poses a critical concern for global security, particularly amid escalating geopolitical tensions and the burgeoning military cooperation between Russia and North Korea. This study utilizes an integrated methodology, combining satellite imagery, geological analysis, and technical assessments, to evaluate North Korea’s fissile material production capacity and strategic resources availability necessary to fulfill its nuclear ambitions. By examining the evolving state of North Korea's plutonium production and uranium enrichment capacities, as well as its efficiency of mining operations and critical metal reserves, this research provides key insights into the country’s potential for sustained nuclear development, highlighting how control over strategic resources remains a pivotal factor in North Korea’s pursuit of military development and geopolitical leverage.

About the Speaker: Sulgiye Park is a senior scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists, where she specializes in North Korea and China’s nuclear fuel pathway. She received her Ph.D. in Geological Sciences from Stanford University, focusing on nuclear materials in extreme environments. She later worked at the Stanford Institute of Materials and Energy Sciences (SIMES), fabricating nanodiamonds for technological applications, which granted her a Jamieson Award. As a Stanton and MacArthur Fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Dr. Park focused on the critical nexus between natural resource management, strategic supply chains, and nuclear security. Her work highlighted the foundational role of geologic resources in enabling nuclear ambitions, including geologic analyses of North Korea’s uranium and critical metal reserves. She utilized open-source intelligence to monitor nuclear activities, providing insights into nonproliferation challenges. Dr. Park also examined regulatory frameworks for U.S. nuclear waste management and studied rare-earth metal production and critical metal supply chain vulnerabilities, emphasizing their strategic importance for national security and technological innovation.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

William J. Perry Conference Room

Sulgiye Park
Seminars
Date Label
-

About the Event: When and how do nationalist protests at home affect crisis bargaining at the international level? Though plausible, the overall effect and the scope conditions for nationalist protests to influence international crisis bargaining remain unspecified, particularly due to two uncertainties: the host government, which is uncertain whether a protest will escalate into an anti-government mobilization, and the foreign government, which is uncertain whether the observed protest constitutes a genuinely credible constraint or just a strategic misrepresentation of the host government’s preference over the disputed issue. The lack of ex-ante theoretical expectations has led to the proliferation of ad hoc ex-post justifications for nationalist protests’ determinant or indeterminate roles during international crises. Using a two-step modeling approach, this paper shows that the threat to the host government posed by the nationalist protests is a prerequisite for them to exert influence on international crisis bargaining. Moreover, the relationship between the threats to the host government from nationalist protests and the likelihood of bargaining failure is non-monotonic - that is, first decreasing and then increasing in the magnitude of the threat. This result is tested with an in-depth case study of the (in)effective signaling with the 2014 anti-China protest in Vietnam.

About the Speaker: Xinru Ma is an inaugural research scholar at the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab within the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, where she leads the research track on U.S.-Asia relations. Her work primarily examines nationalism, great power politics, and East Asian security, with a methodological focus on formal and computational methods.

More broadly, Xinru’s research encompasses three main objectives: Substantively, she aims to better theorize and enhance cross-country perspectives on critical phenomena such as nationalism and its impact on international security; Methodologically, she strives to improve measurement and causal inference based on careful methodologies, including formal modeling and computational methods; Empirically, she challenges prevailing assumptions that inflate the perceived risk of militarized conflicts in East Asia, by providing original data and analysis rooted in local knowledge and regional perceptions.

Her work is published in the Journal of East Asian Studies, The Washington Quarterly, Journal of Global Security Studies, Journal of European Public Policy, and edited volumes by Palgrave. Her co-authored book, Beyond Power Transition, is published by Columbia University Press.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

William J. Perry Conference Room

Xinru Ma
Seminars
Date Label
-

About the Event: In response to Hamas’s deadly attack against Israel and its citizens on October 7, 2023, Israel launched a significant ground invasion into Gaza in self-defense, aimed at eliminating Hamas’s military capabilities and removing it from political power. Israel’s military operations have generated extensive commentary about its compliance with international humanitarian law, particularly concerning the jus in bello principles of distinction and proportionality. However, there has been much less scrutiny of Israel’s compliance with jus ad bellum proportionality, a well-established principle under international law that considers the overall scope of a state’s use of force and dictates that a war’s means must not be excessive in relation to its aims. Our paper assesses Israel’s compliance with jus ad bellum proportionality. After providing an overview of the jus ad bellum proportionality principle, we rely on novel radar satellite imagery analysis to document the widespread destruction that has resulted from Israel’s military operations in Gaza. Based on these data, we argue that Israel’s use of force is excessive, and that the war Israel is currently waging in Gaza is not in compliance with the principle of jus ad bellum proportionality.

About the Speakers:

Bailey Ulbricht is the founding Executive Director at the Stanford Humanitarian Program, where she works on legal research projects aimed at reducing harm in conflict settings and other insecure environments. She has a particular interest in how technology exacerbates harms, or conversely, how it can be used to document or reduce harms. Before coming to Stanford, she founded the humanitarian ed-tech nonprofit Paper-Airplanes, was a Fulbright English Teaching Assistant in Turkey, and was a humanitarian worker with refugee communities on the Turkish-Syrian border. Bailey has two masters' degrees in Islamic Law and Islamic Studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London, where she was a Marshall Scholar. She received her B.A. in International Relations magna cum laude from Carleton College and her J.D. from Stanford Law School.

Allen S. Weiner, Senior Lecturer in Law at Stanford Law School, is an international legal scholar who focuses primarily on international security and international conflict resolution. He also studies the challenges of online misinformation and disinformation. Weiner is director of the Stanford Program in International and Comparative Law, the Stanford Humanitarian Program, and the Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation.  His scholarship is deeply informed by practice; he served as an international lawyer in the U.S. State Department for more than a decade before joining the Stanford faculty.  He earned his A.B. at Harvard and his J.D. at Stanford.

Jamon Van Den Hoek is an Associate Professor of Geography at Oregon State University where he directs the Conflict Ecology lab. Jamon's research focuses on using satellite and geospatial data to gauge the direct and indirect consequences of armed conflict on vulnerable people and landscapes. Before coming to Oregon State, Jamon was a NASA Postdoctoral Fellow at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center and completed his PhD in Geography at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Corey Scher is a doctoral candidate at the City University of New York Graduate Center in the Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences. Corey studies physical impacts of war and conflict using Earth observation data, geostatistics, and theory from the geosciences. His mapping of damage to urban areas in geographies including Ukraine, Gaza, Israel, and Lebanon has been featured in journalistic and humanitarian publications worldwide. He holds a master's degree in geology from the City College of New York and a bachelor's degree in geology from the University of California, Berkeley.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

William J. Perry Conference Room

Bailey Ulbricht
Allen Weiner
Jamon Van Den Hoek
Corey Scher
Seminars
Date Label
-

About the event: A rigorous understanding of the past provides powerful insights and tools that enable better choices in the present. This is especially true for the extraordinarily consequential worlds of statecraft and strategy. This book proposes ways to apply historical knowledge to understand and navigate the complex, often confusing world around us.

It may seem obvious that we should employ history to improve decision-making, but it is rarely done. History is more often misused, deployed ineffectively, or exploited for problematic and even nefarious purposes. Our times favor other ways of knowing the world over historical thinking. Sadly, historians rarely engage decision-makers, and decision-makers seldom consult historians. This is unfortunate, as good historical work captures, perhaps better than any other discipline, the challenges and complexities the decision-maker faces. The academic discipline of history has not helped: in recent years it has de-emphasized the history of statecraft, strategy, and policy in favor of other subjects.

How can history be better understood and used more effectively? The book explains and deploys two key interconnected concepts: first, a historical sensibility, which is the foundation for the second, the act of thinking historically. Thinking Historically demonstrates how a historical sensibility, married to thinking historically, can generate better insights about the world while improving how we make critical choices facing a complex, uncertain future.

About the speaker: Francis J. Gavin is the Giovanni Agnelli Distinguished Professor and the director of the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins SAIS. Previously, he was the first Frank Stanton Chair in Nuclear Security Policy Studies at MIT and the Tom Slick Professor of International Affairs and the Director of the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law at the University of Texas. From 2005 until 2010, he directed The American Assembly’s multiyear, national initiative, The Next Generation Project: U.S. Global Policy and the Future of International Institutions. He is the founding Chair of the Board of Editors for the Texas National Security Journal. Gavin’s writings include Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958-1971; Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age ; and Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy (Brookings Institution Press), which was named a 2020 Choice Outstanding Academic Title. His IISS-Adelphi book, The Taming of Scarcity and the Problems of Plenty: Rethinking International Relations and American Grand Strategy in a New Era in 2024. Thinking Historically – A Guide to Statecraft and Strategy, will be published by Yale University Press, 2025.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

William J. Perry Conference Room

Francis Gavin
Seminars
Date Label
-

About the Event: In an international security environment marked by the heightened risk of nuclear weapons use and the weakening of the global nuclear order, reviving arms control between the two largest nuclear weapon States—the United States and Russia—is imperative. But under what circumstances might they return to the negotiating table? One school of thought holds that it may take another event like the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis to (re)awaken American and Russian leaders to the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and the need for greater restraint. Yet this claim, and the interpretation of Cold War history on which it rests, have not been subject to rigorous analysis in existing work. Using insights from cognitive psychology on the phenomenon of “wakeup calls,” I fill this gap by testing prevailing assumptions about the role of nuclear crises in driving arms control and assessing what the results mean for theory and practice. I show that these assumptions are not supported empirically and argue that future nuclear crises could have adverse effects on arms control depending on the priors of the leaders in office. These results challenge normative claims promoted in the scholarship on nuclear learning about the kinds of lessons nuclear crises teach and the influence of these events on elite inferential learning. In so doing, they demonstrate why electing leaders into office who have already learned the value of arms control is more likely to precipitate a return to the negotiating table than relying on external events to teach them.

About the Speaker: Sarah Bidgood is a postdoctoral fellow in technology and international security at the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), based in Washington, D.C. Her research focuses on nuclear diplomacy and military innovation in the United States, Russian Federation, and beyond. From 2023-2024, Sarah was a Stanton nuclear security fellow in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Security Studies Program. Prior to this, she served as director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, where she remains a non-resident scholar. Sarah’s work has been published as single and co-authored articles in journals such as International Security, Cold War History, and The Nonproliferation Review, as well as outlets including Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Arms Control Today, and War on the Rocks. She is a coauthor of Death Dust: The Rise, Decline, and Future of Radiological Weapons Programs, which was published by Stanford University Press in December 2023. Sarah received her PhD in Defence Studies from King's College London and holds an M.A. in Russian, East European, and Eurasian studies from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and an M.A. in nonproliferation and terrorism studies from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. She graduated from Wellesley College with a B.A. in Russian.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

William J. Perry Conference Room

Sarah Bidgood
Seminars
Date Label
Subscribe to Seminars