Michael McFaul and Steven Pifer share analysis of where international security seems to be headed, and what it might mean for the U.S., Ukraine, and their partners.
Administration officials have made basic negotiating errors when rolling out their approach that, left uncorrected, will doom their bid to end the war.
As Russia continues to wage its brutal war against Ukraine, calls have increased for Washington, including Donald Trump when he assumes the presidency in January, to force a halt to the fighting in order to save Ukrainian lives.
December 5 marks the 30th anniversary of the Budapest Memorandum of Security Assurances for Ukraine, a key part of the settlement under which Ukraine gave up what was then the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal. Unfortunately, Russia has grossly violated the commitments that it made in the document.
The Russian government has released its new doctrine, which indeed suggests a lower nuclear threshold. However, the Kremlin continues to have reasons not to escalate too far, especially not to the nuclear level, and especially not now.
Russia’s doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons has gone through several evolutions over the past 15 years. Changes in 2010 and 2020 seemed relatively benign. In September 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced additional modifications, which appear more meaningful.
As part of Stanford's 2024 Democracy Day, Michael McFaul and Steven Pifer spoke to students about the war in Ukraine and what the future might bring should Russia be allowed to prevail in its illegal aggression.
While some believe the incursion could be a turning point, that will depend on what additional forces Ukraine’s already-stretched army can commit to the Kursk operation
A growing number of NATO allies support Ukraine’s membership as important for Europe’s security and are ready to extend Kyiv an invitation to join. Other allies, however, are reluctant to take that step now, particularly while Ukraine remains at war with Russia.
The probability that Putin would challenge a NATO member militarily is not high, but his history of miscalculations and overinflated ambition should remind the alliance not to underestimate the risks.
The Kremlin’s nuclear saber-rattling has raised eyebrows in the West since the start of Russia’s full-scale war, but Putin isn’t interested in triggering a nuclear war.
Johnson has expressed support for Ukraine in the past — but done nothing, apparently out of concern for his job. Now, he must act. Ukraine could lose without U.S. help.
"We found them understandably war-weary but resolved to continue the fight, believing they can prevail and drive out the Russian aggressors. We also heard growing exasperation with their most important partner, the United States."
An effort to secure Senate consent to ratification would require a determined push by the White House, but in present circumstances even that would probably fall short given the difficult international climate and domestic US politics.
If Ukraine falls because Republicans block U.S. assistance, they will bear a grotesque responsibility — and will have put the United States and American soldiers in greater jeopardy.
