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There’s no shortage of threats facing the globe, from challenges to democracy to emerging capabilities like artificial intelligence and biotechnology, to ongoing conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, the United States and Iran, and the potential for conflict between China and Taiwan.

At Stanford's 2026 Reunion Homecoming weekend, Colin Kahl led a conversation with a panel of scholars from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies on some of the major challenges currently facing the globe.

Drew Endy highlighted the need to secure the biotechnology frontier, as AI makes it ever more possible for bad actors to bring bioweapons to life. Didi Kuo discussed where democracy is doing well, and what can be done to push back against authoritarianism. Abbas Milani provided personal and scholarly insights into the conflict in Iran and the country's democratic potential. Steven Pifer debunked the idea that Russia is making meaningful progress in its war of aggression against Ukraine, and outlines how the United States can be more effective as a negotiator between the two sides. And Oriana Skylar Mastro shared what people are getting wrong about competition with China, and where more nuance is needed in understanding the U.S.-China relationship. 

While each of these challenges is significant, they are not unsolvable.

“These are not inevitabilities. These are choices," reminds Colin Kahl. "We can choose to engineer a world of abundance and opportunity, or we can create a lot of dangerous things that make life worse. We can choose to defend freedom in the United States and around the world, or we can choose not to. We can choose to wield American power with wisdom and with a degree of restraint, or unwisely with hubris, like an international wrecking ball. We can keep the problems solvable.”

To learn more from these scholars, check out their books:


Watch the full panel discussion in the video above. A podcast version is available in the player below. If you like what you hear, be sure to follow, like and subscribe to World Class on your favorite podcast platform.

TRANSCRIPT:


Kahl: You're listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. I'm your host, Colin Kahl, the director of FSI.

Today I'm bringing you a discussion I had with an amazing group of FSI scholars during Stanford's 2026 Reunion Homecoming weekend. We surveyed many trends and threats facing the world today, including the development of bioweapons, challenges to democracy around the world, the war between Russia and Ukraine, Chinese ambitions against Taiwan, and the U.S.-Iran conflict.

These are complicated issues and the challenges to addressing them are real, but so are the opportunities for resolving them. We're going to hear from Drew Endy, a world-recognized expert on bioengineering and biosecurity; Didi Kuo, who specializes in comparative politics, democracy, and the role of political parties; Abbas Milani, a leading voice in Iranian studies and one of the most authoritative contemporary scholars on what's happening to Iranian society; Steven Pifer, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine and expert on European defense; and finally, Oriana Skylar Mastro, a scholar of the Chinese military and Indo-Pacific security.

It was a great conversation, and I hope you find it as informative as I did. Here's the panel.

[BEGIN EVENT RECORDING]

Kahl: All right, so I'm going start and we're going to go down the line, and then I'll ask another round and we'll go down the line.

So, Drew, starting with you: what's one thing that the world should understand — maybe something they currently don't understand, or maybe they think they understand, but they're getting wrong — about biosecurity, biotechnology, and how it's poised to change everything.

Endy: So let's start with what we know. Somebody died in Russia of a plague. We have soldiers coming back from the front lines in Ukraine with resistant bacteria. We have Ebola in DRC; it's going to be the worst we've seen in a while, that outbreak. And I had COVID two weeks ago for the fourth or fifth time, I've lost track. It's so last decade, but it's going to kill 50,000 Americans this year, plus or minus. You know that, right? Everybody knows that.

I'm as you mentioned from bioengineering, bioengineering is the youngest engineering department at Stanford. We're twenty some years old. The second youngest is Computer Science. When I moved here to Stanford, research was being done—you know, Karl Deisseroth, who got the Nobel Prize recently—put one gene from a bacteria into neurons to use light to control neurons. That was work he did twenty years ago in bioengineering.

What do you think we've been doing? We've been getting better at bioengineering. One thing that's changing is how we manufacture. If you can encode a way of manufacturing something in the DNA, you can grow what you want where you can operate the biology.

When you leave this room, take a look at a leaf on a tree and think about it from an engineer's perspective. It's a solar panel that makes itself and recycles itself. It's pulling 120 terawatts of net energy on the surface of the earth. We have a capability in front of us to change how we make most of the things we need. We had an internet over the last fifty years that got built for communication resilience. We're going to have a “bio net”: download and grow — download DNA code, grow what you want, you can get it encoded where you are, for manufacturing resilience.

I was flying back from Washington on Wednesday. I was on seat 20A in United, window seat exit row, and I decided to design a genome. And so I opened up Claude on my laptop and I started feeding it PDF files of different genetic sequences and we started dancing. And before I landed at SFO and before my battery went to zero, I had designed a synthetic genome for a bacteria. 

What people are sleeping on a little bit is we're making biology engineerable for good reasons. I don't wake up in the morning thinking about how am I gonna make a WMD? But it's a domain that's becoming engineerable and it's a domain we haven't secured yet. And so it's like, hmm.

In so many different dimensions, we are on this journey of profound, profound change.

Kahl: Speaking of things that are radioactive, Didi, our politics. What's one thing that the folks in this room should understand that maybe they aren't currently tracking?

Kuo: So I actually think Americans and Stanford alum really do understand what's going on. Well over 70 to 80% of Americans are concerned about the state of democracy, both at home and abroad. They're concerned about levels of corruption, about attacks on freedom of speech, on attacks on election integrity, sometimes for very different reasons. But I guess I would yes and that sentiment.

First, this is not an American story. This is happening globally. We are almost entering our twentieth year of what our colleague Larry Diamond calls the global democratic recession, which means a lot of the democratization and optimism of the 1990s has either become stagnant or even been undone.

And that is a problem because even in places that were once thought immune from problems of democracy, we see leaders pursuing the same strategies: going after their opponents, weaponizing the state, repressing civil society. So you know that people are unhappy with their governments, which is often why they elect radical leaders in the first place.

But the second thing that I would say — in addition to understanding that this is global and that that's something we need to kind of drill down and investigate — is that there are actually signs of hope from around the world.

We know that democratic backsliding can be reversed. And we've seen some of those strategies be very successful abroad. And I think we've seen signs of them start to be successful here.

First, we know that massive collective action, civil resistance, and nonviolent protest can really work to bring attention to the things that Americans care about and to stop the worst kinds of violence and repression.

The second thing is institutional defenses, when people who are suddenly finding their jobs politicized or trying to be eradicated or undone, and they try to safeguard their jobs and their roles in various positions, whether they're bureaucrats or judges, tax officers, people who work at universities, law firms, et cetera. That also has a huge effect on stopping democratic erosion. 

But the number one thing is to vote in elections. The number one antidote to democratic backsliding is baked into our very system, and that is democracy itself.

We know that leaders often try to attack elections, but that you can actually create these pro-democracy coalitions across people with very different ideological and policy values and alignments and say, we're actually going to protect this fundamental process of democracy so that we can live to fight another day in the future and try to get all of our policy issues sorted out then.

And I think that we've seen the signs of that here in Minnesota earlier this year, and certainly a lot of mobilization and excitement about the midterm elections and about elections happening in Israel and Brazil and in other places around the world, France, are going to have democracy on the line. But people, when they are threatened, will work to protect democracy.

Kahl: All right. Abbas. Few people, seriously, in the world understand the dynamics inside Iran and Iran's impact on the region in the world better than you. What is one thing we could better understand about the conflict in the Middle East or Iran more generally?

Milani: One thing you can understand is that according to some in the Iranian regime, World War Three has already started. It is between Iran and Israel and the United States, and that Iran is winning. That's their version of the reality.

What I think the world doesn't get about Iran is that it is indeed a very paradoxical society. She talked about democratic backsliding. Iran has been a democratically forward sliding society in the last twenty five years.

I would seriously say, and I've written about this several places, that Iran at the societal level is right now arguably the most democratic society in the Muslim Middle East. And every day people are more and more fighting for democracy, from women to minorities to men who are siding with women. Iran has had — in spite of having the most misogynist set of laws on the books — I think arguably has the most active, progressive, prudent women's movement. in the last thirty years.

The Life Women Liberty movement is remarkable. So I think only comparable to the African American movement for civil rights in sixties and seventies in terms of its success.

So you have a paradoxical society, a profoundly despotic society, every day becoming more organized in its despotism. Today we have virtually a military dictatorship in Iran, but at the societal level it is a very dynamic society that wants democracy, women who wants equality.

There are two Irans: the Iran of the Iranian people and the Iran of this regime. And the world policy, U.S. policy doesn't seem to get this very important schism that is at the heart of the Iranian society, the paradox that exists.

Kahl: Steve, unfortunately there's also the largest conflict in Europe since the Second World War. There's been a lot of news on Ukraine. There is always every week, but it seems like the last week has been pretty newsworthy. What should we be understanding more about the current war?

Pifer: Well, I would say Russia is not winning the war on the battlefield in Ukraine, and the campaign now is shifting to target Ukrainian cities and Ukrainian civilians. Ukraine's pretty much stabilized the battlefront.

As they developed over the last two years, drones that can strike more deeply into Russia, they focused on Russian oil refineries. And they've probably . . . I think the IAES estimate was about thirty percent of Russian refining capability now has been taken offline. Now the Russians rebuild it, the Ukrainians attack it again. But that's a legitimate military target.

I mean, those fuels go to power the drones, they go to power the planes, they go to power the Russian tanks. It hasn't yet pushed the Russians to the point where the Russians have begun to negotiate in any more serious way, but it was increasing economic pressure on Russia.

Over the last nine and a half months since January 1st, Russia's gained a net total of about a hundred square kilometers of Ukrainian territory. For perspective, that's less than the size of the city of San Francisco. Ukraine is the size of Texas.

And to do that, the Russians are paying an enormous cost. Thirty to forty thousand Russian soldiers are either killed or severely wounded every single month. And given that failure on the battlefield, what you see is that the Russians are now shifting the campaign to Ukrainian cities. And the hope is that they can weaponize winter, winter's cold against the Ukrainians and break their will. So they target electric power plants, they target large steam facilities that heat the major cities, they target water facilities.

And they do a lot that's simply harassment. So I have on my phone here when I was in Kyiv about two years ago, I downloaded an air raid app. In the last several weeks for Kyiv, they're getting six to ten air raids every single day. And when that goes off at four o'clock in the morning, somebody has to say, do I drag my family down to the bomb shelter for the third time tonight, or do I tell them to sleep and we play the odds?

Now it's going to be a difficult winner for Ukraine. But I think Ukrainians have shown they're resilient. I think the Russian effort's going to fail, and this war unfortunately is going to continue well into 2027.

And the unfortunate thing here is that President Trump has significant leverage that he could use to push the Russians to negotiate a settlement to this war. And he has chosen not to use it. In fact, we've seen even last night by waiving new sanctions on Russia, he's actually gone over to the Russian side. And I think that's going to be a very dark stain on Americans' global reputation.

Kahl: There's conflict of instability in the Middle East, horrible events in Europe. For years, folks in Washington have wanted to pivot to Asia or the Indo-Pacific to focus on the emerging challenges there.

Oriana, what could we better understand about the storm clouds that might be gathering (or not) in the Indo-Pacific, especially across the Taiwan Strait?

Mastro: So I'm gonna cheat a little bit and say everything. I do a lot of research and writing about China, Taiwan, about the Indo-Pacific security, and China is such a complex place. And we have to have nuanced understandings about what is happening there, what is happening across the Taiwan Strait. And in most of the public debate, you either get an extremely dovish view or an extremely hawkish view, and the reality is somewhere in the middle.

For example, it is true that the United States is now distracted with wars in Ukraine and Iran and elsewhere. We have spent 147% of China's full military budget on those conflicts already. So it's very hard to compete with China conventionally in the military sphere when we are being less disciplined about how we're spending our time and effort.

At the same token, it is not the case that because we are distracted today, China has a higher likelihood of taking Taiwan by force. What convinces the Chinese whether to do that or not is not so much whether the United States is distracted in another part of the world, but on their own military competency.

Xi Jinping just did a huge purge of the most senior military leaders there that are currently either missing or at house arrest. So it's not the case that they're waiting for a moment, a window of opportunity.

It's the same thing when you look at China and Russia and what that means for Taiwan. Should we be concerned about China-Russia? Of course we should, but not because these two countries are going to fight a war together. That kind of misses the mark.

Instead, they help each other in peacetime build up their militaries in ways that makes it really hard for us to deter China from using force and if there's a conflict to compel China to stop fighting. I think we see that already in Ukraine; a little bit of Chinese support can go a really long way.

And the last example I will give about this nuanced balance is about the economy. It is true that the Chinese economy is not doing well. But there's no evidence to suggest that that convinces the Communist Party that they have to do some sort of wag-the-dog maneuver to use force in a Taiwan contingency to distract the public. If anything, their strategic culture goes the opposite way; when they have problems at home, they focus inward.

So all of this is to say I'm very vocal about my concerns about the likelihood of conflict over the Taiwan Strait. I think the Chinese have been very clear that they're preparing, they're building their military, they don't want to wait forever to solve this issue. And it's an issue that cannot be solved without force.

But not for all the reasons that potentially we hear in the news for why we should be concerned.

Kahl: Thank you very much. I think one of the things, the common threads across is the urgency around all of these issues. Dynamics in Washington may change a bit, but the reality is whether one loves President Trump or doesn't particularly like what he's doing, he's the president for the next two years. And a lot of really important decisions that impact the world will happen in that two year period.

So, Drew: if you had five minutes with the president on your issue, what would you try to get the president to do that he's maybe not doing enough of, or get him to stop doing what he's doing too much of?

Endy: A couple of things I'd like him to do, but on on this topic today, I'd say, Mr. President, there's never been a better time to secure biology. We could actually know what airborne viruses are in this room right now. We'd need a little machine with a box about the size of that podium and we'd be running it and doing air sampling. Now's the time to secure biology.

I'd pick on his statement from the UNGA over a year ago, where in the middle of a speech he declared that all nations should stand together to end the scourge of bioweapons. I'll take that.

I'd like the president of China and the President of the United States to duet. If I had the magic teleprompter, they should be saying that together, because that by itself will be insufficient. We need to get a duty to notify in place, a hotline for bio threats. If you have the emergence of a pandemic potential outbreak, we talk to each other. Never again do we have the Wuhan ambiguity. And we probably need that biodefense hotline with Moscow as well.

What does that look like operationally? With nuclear security, we've got the NNSA, the National Nuclear Security Agency Administration. $30 billion dollars a year. That, through the weapons lab, gets our nuclear force ready to go.

I'd argue we should have an NBSA: a National Biosecurity Agency. It would be about $10 billion dollars a year. It's not going to run on the high side. We don't put it in the weapons lab, because that'd be really bad. We do it in the public to the greatest extent possible.

So, Mr. President, there's never been a better time to secure biology. We can do it. It can be an enduring legacy. The returns are amazing. I have some other things I need him to do, but like on this topic, we can secure biology.

Kahl: All right. Didi, five minutes with the president.

Kuo: I doubt I would have any impact, but I would make appeals to two things that seem to matter to him. One is money. Okay. So he really likes to make money off of public office. That's called corruption.

But putting that aside, I would probably say something like capitalism is a source of American entrepreneurialism and growth, and that slowing down the rate of democracy, undermining the impartiality and rule of law, and undermining our administrative state, not funding science, stopping immigration of talented PhD students are going to be bad for American capitalism in the long run.

We know that democracy and capitalism flourish and do well when they go together. And I'm not sure that that would have an impact, But I would say that the rise in patrimonialism, transactionalism, and wheeling and dealing that we see around the world is one that's going to make the world inherently less safe. There will be far less inclusive growth and rising inequality is just going to lead to massive instability around the world, as we've already seen.

The second thing I would appeal to, like Drew, is legacy. I would actually say go focus on the arch and on the ballroom because liberal democracy is the single greatest achievement of this American project over the past 250 years. Liberal democracy is historically very hard won and rare. Most people have lived and died under something like empires.

Second of all, it's the result of massive decades, if not centuries, of popular mobilization of the kind we are now seeing in Iran.

And third, it has provided tremendous hope and inspiration to people around the world who want to live in freedom and try to secure it. That is what makes America great.

We have adapted and been flexible about what our democratic values are over time to expand to become a truly multiracial democracy. And he is messing it up a little bit.

And so I would say, sir, please go golf, go enjoy your life. And your legacy can be a positive one if you just stop attacking the thing that makes us the best country in the world.

Kahl: Play more golf and it makes America great again. Abbas, five minutes with the president on Iran.

Milani: I would say that you might think you can solve other problems instinctively with the instincts of a gambler. With Iran you can't. It is an old, complicated problem. Every administration has tried to solve this problem for the last forty-five years and it is not that simple. You can't bomb your way out of Iran's nuclear problem. You cannot bomb your way into a democracy in Iran. Iranian democracy has to be made by the people of Iran.

Don't threaten to destroy the civilization of Iran, which is one of the greatest civilizations in the world. If you destroy Iranian civilization, you are destroying part of the greatest legacy that we have, which is wisdom, which is prudence, which is philosophy. So these kinds of threats work against the people of Iran ridding themselves of this regime.

The only way we are going to have peace in the Middle East is if we understand how powerful that desire for democracy, the desire for amity with the United States is amongst the people of Iran. These kinds of politics, these kind of rhetorics, placing the decisions about this into hands that know nothing about this area, who are financially involved in this area. And they are dealing with people who know all too well how to use financial weaknesses of leaders to get what they want.

Look at what that kind of money has done to soccer.

That same thing is happening to American foreign policy. That is a dead end, Mr. President. Allow the processes that have made this country what this country is, work. Otherwise, that legacy is going to be that you'd fought a regime, you brought a lot of destruction, but you left a regime that is weaker domestically, but regionally has much more power

It controls two of the choke points of the world economy: Bob al-Mandab and the Strait of Hormuz. You went in there without thinking that they would close the Strait of Hormuz. Every indication was that they would do that if you attacked them. And particularly attack killing the top leadership. They were on record that they were going to close the Strait of Hormuz.

I would have told them, read what other administrations have done. Read what Colin Kahl probably told the president when somebody suggested to Biden that they should attack. I wouldn't be surprised if Colin was in the room and said, “Don't do it.”

I would say that you can truly leave a historic legacy if you can bring about the Abrahamic Accord. But to bring about the Abrahamic Accord, you need to convince the Israelis that Palestinians also have a right to a state. Without that, the Abrahamic Accord won't happen. With Abrahamic Accord, I think you will move the needle historically in the Middle East.

Kahl: I will just say: Abbas and I have talked about this a lot. We as Americans, we are a very powerful country and we are also problem solvers and we like to believe that we can solve world problems. We often cannot. It's also the case that some problems are not solvable in the near term. You have to muddle through and manage, which is super unsatisfying. The historical record is that pretty much everything that has happened was not only predictable, it was predicted, which is I think the most unfortunate aspect around a lot of this stuff.

Steve, two years ago, Trump said if he's elected he would solve the Ukraine war in twenty four hours. So we're twenty four months since the last election. If you had five minutes with the president on the Russia Ukraine conflict, what would your advice be?

Pifer: Well, I've written a lot over the last eighteen months about the Trump policy towards Russia-Ukraine. Polls show like eighty-five percent of Americans do not trust, do not like, do not respect Putin. Polls show that Americans support Ukraine. And I think if you actually took a poll in Congress, you would find most in Congress share those views. And I would tell the president, Mr. President, your policy in terms of buying diesel from Russia, not putting more pressure on Russia, and now turning it against Ukraine by cutting off some of the intelligence sharing: it’s wrong.

It's wrong morally. It's wrong strategically. And it's wrong in terms of your effort, your proclaimed desire to try to mediate it into this war. It's wrong morally because Russia is clearly the aggressor. It was Russia that seized Crimea with military force in 2014 and then went on to get involved in fighting in Donbas. It was Russia that launched the invasion in 2022. Ukraine is the victim.

It's wrong strategically, because if Russia prevails in this war, either they win on the battlefield, or perhaps they benefit from a bad peace deal. That's going to embolden Vladimir Putin. And that means a greater Russian threat to Europe and to vital American national security interests. I don't think Mr. Trump understands that at all.

But it's also wrong in terms of his effort to try to mediate a solution. But if you look over the past year, the Ukrainians have indicated readiness to make some pretty painful concessions to achieve peace, including perhaps accepting the de facto loss of a lot of territory. The Russian position has not budged.

Recently Russian officials have said there's been no change in the Russian position since 2024. And part of the problem is Mr. Trump's failure to use his leverage to push the Russians to negotiate. And this is why the decision to start buying diesel fuel from Russia is so bad. We're now basically sending American dollars that are going to feed part of that Russian military machine by releasing some of the financial pressure on Russia that might force them otherwise to adopt a different course.

And what I worry about that is: of course it's bad implications for Russia-Ukraine, but in other places where they look at this, not only in Moscow, but in Beijing, other capitals where they see us as the adversary, they're looking at this as not a sign of American strength. They're seeing it as a sign of American weakness and they're looking at saying, “Gee, look how well people like Putin can play Trump.” That's not good for our foreign policy.

Kahl: So twice this year already, President Trump has met with Xi Jinping. Once in China, once here in the United States, they're likely to meet again at some point this year. Despite all the competition and rhetoric, there does appear to be an effort between the two leaders to have a detente or a pause, a timeout on some of the rougher edges of the relationship. If you had five minutes with the president on China issues or Taiwan issues or China Taiwan issues, what would your recommendations be?

Mastro: This is one area where I think we oversimplify. We think that China's policies are because of Xi Jinping. And that if we had a different leader in China, everything would just be rosy again. But Xi Jinping is a product of the system. So for me, it's not the case that if Xi Jinping left, the next leader would be like, you know what? I think it's better for China to just do everything the United States demands of it and be number two in the world.

I would tell the president that U.S.-China competition is not about the United States or about China. But that power is actually bestowed upon either country by the rest of the world. Whether or not the United States is a great power, whether or not China is a great power, largely depends on how the rest of the world sees these two countries and sees the benefit, or the costs, of one of them having more power than the other.

Now, the United States as a global superpower, this is largely beneficial for many countries in the system. But first, we have to be honest that it's not the best system for everybody. To Didi's point, there's a lot of autocracies out there that would prefer that it wasn't the United States that is in charge.

But secondly, there's a whole part of the world—the majority of the world, the developing world—that the United States has ignored for decades and decades and decades. And that Trump has gone even a step farther by reducing what I would say the little amount of development aid, soft power that we had in this part of the world.

Now, I can tell you one thing for sure: this is a number one priority in China. Xi Jinping wants to be the leader of the developing world. So, are the Chinese wrong or are the Americans wrong to basically decide the value? But I can say in terms of a business sense, this is the area where you're gonna have the most returns.

Now, from my own biases, I am—not here on this stage—but still in the military. I've been in the military for seventeen years. I believe in the effectiveness of the use of force at international politics. Otherwise, I wouldn't dedicate so much of my life to serving uniform.

But that being said, diplomacy, soft power, developmental assistance, all these other things that the United States used to do more of . . . having a U.S. information service . . . these make a huge difference.

And so I would tell him to invest so much more in the other tools of power. China lists twelve types of tools of power, which military power is only one of them. And they're just as serious about the other ones.

And as much as the allies and partners periodically can be annoying about stuff, they are the source of U.S. power. In many respects, the U.S. military cannot project power without them. And so this isn't a favor that the rest of the world is doing for us that over a hundred countries allow U.S. access, bases, and overflight. This is something that the United States needs to maintain its position and to protect its interests abroad.

So don't only meet with Xi Jinping and shake hands and roll out the red carpet and say, “Okay, since I met with him and we have now a comfortably tense relationship, everything is going well.”

Take a look at the rest of the world and figure out how to maintain what has historically been U.S. dominance of the international system, a U.S. led liberal order. How do we go back to being sure that that is something that my kids are going to enjoy afterwards?

Kahl: I want to ask our last lightning questions. Everybody in this room is super committed to Stanford in all sorts of ways. What do you think Stanford could be doing more of, maybe could be doing better to help the world understand or address these issues? Abbas?

Milani: I think we are in one of the most remarkable moments in history. We are in the process of not just gradual incremental change or historic change. We're in the process of what can only be called epochal change. The changes we are about to witness and are witnessing are only, in my view, comparable to Renaissance, where everything about everything changed. We are in the process of experiencing that.

In that first phase of modernity, America, I think, is the most successful example of a democratic secular society. Going into this new phase, that model needs to be saved. American democracy needs to be saved. American democracy can only be saved if it has a more global view, a more inclusive view, and a more tolerant view. We need to begin this at Stanford. We need to teach the culture of tolerance in classes.

It is increasingly difficult to discuss difficult topics in class. I'm not talking about bioengineering. You can get away with anything in bioengineering. But try to have that level of discussion about the Arab Israeli problem, the Iranian problem, American democracy problem, race problem, gender problem. You get into serious difficulties. We need to defend that. Democracy requires defending.

I come from a place that went from an authoritarian regime to a pseudo-totalitarian regime. I came from Iran in 1986, a country that was literally at war with the United States. And twenty-two years, ago I became head of the Iranian studies program at Stanford. That would not be possible anywhere else in the world. I know the value of democracy, and I don't think at Stanford we're doing enough to defend this most valuable cherished gift that we have.

We need to cultivate, strengthen that culture.

Kahl: Didi.

Kuo: Every morning when you wake up and read the news, it can be a bummer. And I will say coming to work makes me feel better. And that's because FSI is a really special place where the approach to these topics is scholarly.

Therefore, we understand, you know, this is a kind of unique historical time, but it's one that we can really try to understand with an interdisciplinary lens and an understanding that our goal is to take academic knowledge and get it out into the world: use it to try to improve outcomes, provide policy recommendations, engage with the media or with thought leaders and people who can actually shape the public understanding of these issues.

And that is something I see creating a lot of purpose among my colleagues and creating special places outside of academic disciplines for those of us who care about engaging with the world to really unite academic knowledge with public understanding.

But the second thing is also focused on students. In California, we are super far from Washington, D.C. So if you go to Georgetown, for example, you have a lot of students who know what government is, they're going to get an internship. Over here, sometimes all the students know is Silicon Valley's over there. They're going to solve the world's problems through the private sector. I don't know, man. We have governments for a reason. AI, climate change, all of these issues are going to need to be tackled through regulation, not just through the moral binds or whatever that the president thinks that we can regulate AI with.

So I think that any way of encouraging public service and engagement with government—whether that's local, national, or international, going to other countries—is super important. And once students get a taste and a flavor of that public service, they get really into it. It's just that it's far for us, geographically, to engage. And I therefore think it's really important to encourage those kinds of opportunities.

Kahl: Amen. Steve?

Pifer: Yeah, well let me start with I some things I think that Stanford does and FSI do well. I think we do a good job on Russia-Ukraine of explaining to students what's going on, why it matters. And it's not just Stanford speakers, but we bring a lot of people in.

So on Wednesday, we had an American and a Ukrainian who are based in Kyiv. They came to talk for an hour and a half on Ukraine's innovative defense culture, where under the pressure of war they're just doing incredible changes in terms of how fast they react to things and get new weapons into the field.

There's a lot of . . . I won't list everybody, but a lot [of us] write, speak, do media on this to try to educate the broader public. We have a law school professor who organized a group of his students to track down and identify American law firms that are helping Russian oligarchs hide their wealth in the United States. And that was part of a broader effort that Stanford was running with the International Working Group on Sanctions, where we did about twenty-six papers advising on how sanctions on Russians could be tightened. So I think there's a lot of things that are being done that are good.

The more difficult challenge I think we have is how do we talk to the U.S. government? When people like Colin were in during the Biden administration, I think we had a lot of access. The administration didn't agree with everything we asked them to do, but there was a dialogue there.

I'm not sure anybody FSI has on the Russia Ukraine thing any kind of contact with people who matter in the Trump administration. So it's difficult to have the kind of conversation where you might suggest here are some ways to move forward. But I think that's going to be one of the real challenges is how can we affect government policy directly?

Kahl: And I think this is a really important point because I think this can be interpreted as basically saying, well, okay, when Democrats are in, people can have access. But it's not actually about partisan politics. It's about this particular administration's approach to outside expertise and which voices they tend to listen to. One can agree with it or disagree with it. It's it just is a thing, which is traditionally places like universities and think tanks and other sources of analysis outside of government are just not prioritized in this

Pifer: After I left the government in 2004, we had lots of access as outsiders to the Bush administration. They welcomed that dialogue. I don't think this administration does.

Kahl: Oriana.

Mastro: That's a perfect segue to what I wanted to say about policy impact about how do we talk to the U.S. government? It's not only the U.S. government. As someone who works on China, the amount of which professors and students are engaging with China is less and less over time because all of these things have become politically difficult.

And to me, Stanford is an environment in which you should be able to take those risks. This is a place where you can have dialogues with the Chinese. This is a place where policy, political officials should feel like they can come and talk and engage with these issues.

And so to try to have that kind of interconnectivity in May, I launched this policy lab on the Indo-Pacific. I call it “policy-guided.” What that means is instead of sort of doing all this research and then writing an op-ed and hoping someone reads it and then maybe it has some impact, I identify the decision makers that have influence on that research area early on in the process, and I engage with them throughout the whole process so that they have a stake in making sure that they're getting the information they need when they need it.

And part of that is educating students not only on the substance on Indo-Pacific, but also skill sets. So part of that is we just launched something called the Commander Series, where I bring combatant commanders—so these are four-star generals who are in charge of every region of the world—to campus every quarter. They give a big public talk, which again, given the political environment, given everything, did come with some convincing. We now have three lined up for this year. But it's possible. It's possible to continue to engage. And then in addition to the public talks, ask them to do private master classes with the students.

Like having that exposure to students to do kind of the real world work and to have that direct policy impact, is it harder? Yes. Is it still possible at a place like Stanford? Absolutely.

Kahl: I want to really foot stomp something because at the intersection of what Oriana and Steve just said: yes, there's a degree to which we're not as plugged into Washington as maybe in previous administrations. But the flip side of that is, actually, Stanford is a safer space for conversations among those parts of Washington that want to have conversations outside of Washington because we are further away.

We are seen as less ideological. We're not seen as particularly partisan. We're seen as a font of technical knowledge because Silicon Valley plays its own role in the current ecosystem for better or worse. So that's also an opportunity, not just a constraint.

Endy: I love this question. We heard that we're in a moment of epochal change not seen since the Renaissance. That's stunning. I'm going to carry that for a long time.

I wonder what Mr. and Mrs. Stanford think of us. If they appeared today and saw what we are now, how would they react? One of the things I go back and read is the purpose they wrote in the charter of the university. And there's a sentence, this really interesting sentence. It says: “to have an influence in behalf of humanity.”

And the first time I read it, I thought it was a typo. I thought it was supposed to be “on” behalf of humanity. But it says “in behalf of,” which really means out there doing stuff. And I think we could do a lot better in that regard.

I think we're pretty good at being Stanford. I think we could do a lot better in behalf of humanity. And FSI and CISAC is very much about that. But what does that look like? And and so I'll check some things out that may seem adjacent, but I think they're important. Number one.

I used to be chair of undergraduate admissions and financial aid for the university. We're not need-blind for international applicants. We are for domestic, but not for international. We could do it, but we always manage to not do it. This would be a good year to do it.

The second thing I think we need to do is we need to bring Stanford out into the United States. I used to teach a version of Introduction to Bioengineering to five hundred high school students in Title I high schools. And they were registered as Stanford students as high school students in low income high schools throughout the country.

I think we could have a service requirement for undergraduates where they're teaching fellows in high schools as upperclassmen helping with this. We could have five thousand extra students a year as high school students. So I think there's some macro moves the university could make that would amplify what FSI and other places are doing, and we need to get on with it.

Kahl: This is such a great place to end because the panel today was global threats and essentially what we can do about them. And I think what you heard, and frankly, where I think FSI is unique, not only at Stanford, but in the world in many respects, is that so many of the things that we read about or that we watch on YouTube are at the cross currents of these huge geopolitical changes, these world changing technological developments, and contentious domestic politics in the future of democracy here and around the world. Like these are the things that all of us care about.

Just as people as Americans, we are deeply invested at FSI. And I think what you've heard is like we can choose to engineer a world of abundance and opportunity, or we can create a lot of dangerous things that make life worse. We can choose to defend freedom in the United States and around the world, or we can choose not to. We can choose to wield American power with wisdom and with a degree of restraint, or unwisely with hubris, like an international wrecking ball. 

These are choices. These are not inevitabilities. These are choices. And I think at FSI, we believe we can help empower the right choices, especially by empowering our students. The thing that keeps me most optimistic when we have conversations like this — I think everybody up here would agree — is how awesome our students are, and how much more incredible they are at, you know, as twenty-year-olds than we were as twenty year olds.

And what I often say is smart and incredible as all these people on stage and all the other people you encounter, all the people in this room are, we're not going to solve the world's problems.

The best we can do is keep the problems solvable and empower our students to solve our problems. And the good news is our students are completely capable of doing that.

So thank you very much, and thanks again to our panelists.

[END EVENT RECORDING]

Kahl: You've been listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. If you like what you're hearing, please leave us a review and be sure to subscribe on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts to stay up to date on what's happening in the world, and why.

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At Stanford's 2026 Reunion Homecoming, a panel of scholars from the Freeman Spogli Institute discussed challenges to democracy, the potential and dangers of biotechnology, the Russia-Ukraine and U.S.-Iran conflicts, and the U.S.-China relationship.

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There are a lot of changes happening in the world, from the "rupture" in the global order to a new host of the World Class podcast.

For almost a decade, Michael McFaul, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, has helped listeners understand what's happening in the world, and why, by bringing them in-depth conversations with scholars working across FSI's nine research centers. Now Colin Kahl, the new director of FSI, is taking on the role of podcast host to carry on the tradition.

In this episode, Kahl and McFaul discuss how institutions like FSI can better study and contribute understanding about the rapidly changing world and how alliances and partnerships — whether across academic departments or between nations — create better, stronger outcomes.

Listen to the episode below. World Class is also available on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and other major podcast platforms.

TRANSCRIPT


McFaul: Hey everyone, you're listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanfo rd University. I'm your host, or maybe I should say I'm your co-host, or maybe I should say this is the last time I'll be hosting World Class from Stanford University. Because as listeners and followers of FSI’s news may know, after eleven years, I just stepped down as the director a few weeks ago and I've handed the baton to my guest today, Colin Kahl, who's the brand new director of the Freeman Spogli Institute.

And it is fantastic, Colin, that you agreed to take on this assignment. This is another form, I consider, of public service just like what you've done for the U.S. government and the United States of America.

Colin, as you're going to hear in a few minutes, is the perfect mix of scholar and practitioner that we so value here at FSI. And we are really lucky that you are taking up this assignment.

So Colin, welcome to World Class where everybody will be listening to you forthcoming for, I hope, many, many years.

Kahl: Thanks Mike, it's a real pleasure to be with you and most especially thank you for your tremendous decade plus—eleven years—of service to FSI and the Stanford community. And I look forward to continuing to work with you as you transition to the next thing. And we should talk about that too. But it's great to be on the pod with you.

McFaul: Glad to be here. And just so everybody knows, I stepped down from FSI, but I'm not retiring from Stanford. I still have my various day jobs here. We can come back to that a little bit later.

But Colin, why don't you just tell our listeners and our viewers a little bit about your road to this present position.

Kahl: Yeah, sure. So I grew up in the Bay Area. I grew up in the East Bay in Richmond, California. I applied to Stanford as an undergrad, didn't get in. Applied again as a graduate student, didn't get in. So I got educated elsewhere. I went to the University of Michigan, which is a great school.

McFaul: Very fine institution.

Kahl: And then I went to Columbia University where I got my PhD in political science, focused on international relations and conflict studies. I did my PhD work in the 90s when the field of international relations was trying to figure out what the field even meant after the end of the Cold War.

So it was an exciting and very kind of plastic moment to be doing scholarly work.

I then started my first teaching job at the University of Minnesota in 2000. And of course, a year after that, 9/11 happened. And it was a terrible event for the United States and for the world. For those of us who lived in New York City—I did my graduate work there—it was especially painful.

And it really drove me to want to figure out a way to both do the academic side of understanding the world, but also see if there was a way to engage in public service. So my fifth year at the University of Minnesota, I actually got a fellowship through the Council on Foreign Relations . . .

McFaul: Right.

Kahl: . . . that put me at the Pentagon for a year and a half. This was during the George W. Bush administration. Don Rumsfeld was still the Secretary of Defense. I worked there for a year and a half. I kind of caught the bug, the Washington bug.

McFaul: What was your portfolio back then, Colin? Just remind everybody.

Kahl: So I worked in a small office called the Stability Operations Office. It was only 24 of us. worked within the office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. It had historically been called the Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs Office

McFaul: Right, right, I remember that. They changed it, right.

Kahl: But Rumsfeld was not a fan of peacekeeping, so they changed it to ‘stability operations.’

But at the time, most of what our office did was try to help the U.S. military reform itself in the face of the struggles that the U.S. military was facing in Iraq and Afghanistan with the stabilization missions there.

There's a lot of dark humor at the Pentagon, but we sometimes joked that the 24 of us were doing stability operations while the other 24,000 people in the building were doing instability operations.

McFaul: [laughing] Instability operations, yeah, that’s right.

Kahl: But anyway, it was totally exciting. You know, we were there when when U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine was being revised and a bunch of other things.

So that was 2005, 2006. I kind of caught the bug and decided to try to stay in Washington. So I actually took a job at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service where they were kind enough to give me tenure and I taught in the security studies program there for a decade.

McFaul: Let's just . . . hold on, hold on. Let's be clear. They were not ‘kind enough’ to give you tenure; you earned tenure. Nobody gives tenure anywhere. Congratulations that you landed that job.

Kahl: So, I was in the security studies program there for ten years, about a half that time I served in the Obama administration. We served together . . .

McFaul: Together, yes!

Kahl: . . . in the first few years. I was back at the Pentagon as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East during the drawdown of our forces from Iraq during the Arab Spring.

McFaul: Right.

Kahl: During the first flare up of Israel-Iran tensions over Iran's nuclear program. By the way, none of that was my fault, but I was there when all that stuff happened.

And then I went back to Georgetown for a few years and then I got pulled back into the Obama administration at the end to work at the White House as a deputy assistant to the president and as then-vice president Biden's national security advisor. So I was there for Russia's first invasion of Ukraine . . .

McFaul: Right.

Kahl: . . . and the Central American migration crisis and tensions in the South China Sea and the campaign against the Islamic State and the Iran nuclear deal. A lot of interesting things.

And then, when Trump was elected the first time, Mike, you reached out to me with this amazing opportunity at Stanford, the Steven C. Házy Senior Fellow chair that I currently occupy. Applied for the job and got it. It was an opportunity to come back to Stanford. I’ve sat at CISAC, the Center for International Security and Cooperation here at FSI. And I was the co-director of CISAC for a couple of years.

And then last but not least, when Biden was elected president, he asked me to serve as the undersecretary of defense for policy back at DoD, which is essentially the number three civilian and senior policy advisor to the secretary. And I did that for the two first two and a half years of the Biden administration.

Also also very interesting times: fall of Afghanistan . . .

McFaul: Yes.

Kahl: . . . Russia's further invasion of Ukraine, rising tensions with China, dealing with the aftermath of COVID, lot of changes in the world.

So anyway, I'm glad to be back at Stanford. I've been back since the summer of 2023, and I'm excited to try to fill the very big shoes that you've left at FSI after eleven years.

McFaul: Well, let's talk about the future in a minute, but just two follow-up questions on your history. You've had lots of government jobs you just described. I can't think of anybody that's had a more diversified set of experiences in national security. We are lucky to have you here.

Tell us about the best day of any of those jobs and tell us about the worst day and maybe reverse that. Worst day first, best day second.

Kahl: So first of all, I'm fortunate to have had the opportunity to serve my country. I believe in it strongly. I've served in Republican administrations and Democratic administrations. I've worked for two Republican secretaries of defense and two Democratic secretaries of defense. So I think I've demonstrated my nonpartisan bona fides in how I've served my country.

And I just want to mention that because I think it's important.

McFaul: Yes, it is important.

Kahl: Because, of course, FSI is a nonpartisan place.

Worst day and best day: in a sense, it's almost the same. There was no more harrowing experience than the collapse of Kabul.

I was actually at the NIH getting a medical treatment when I got a text message from the secretary's chief of staff that I needed to hurry back to the Pentagon. So I literally pulled an IV out of my arm and raced back to the Pentagon because Kabul fell.

And obviously that was a tremendously terrible event for Afghanistan. It was a particularly harrowing way for the 20-year U.S. involvement in Afghanistan to end. But it also put us on the clock. You know, we had basically 17 days before the deadline for all American forces to be out of Afghanistan, and we suddenly had to do a lot of things.

We had to flood forces back into the country to occupy an airport that was now in hostile Taliban territory when the Taliban took over Kabul. We had to secure that airport. We sent five or six thousand soldiers and Marines to that airfield. We had postured them in the region previously to be able to do that, but we had to get them there.

McFaul: Right.

Kahl: And then we then had to oversee the evacuation of 125,000 human beings in two weeks, which had never happened in human history and no other country in the history of the world would have been capable of doing. And it was pretty horrible.

McFaul: Yeah.

Kahl: A lot of terrible human tragedies. Obviously, we got a lot of people out. A lot of people weren't able to get out. There was the terrible ISIS bombing that killed 13 of our brave service members. Toward the end of the evacuation, there was an errant U.S. strike on what we thought was an ISIS operator that turned out to be an aid worker and his kids. It was horrible.

But I'm also incredibly proud of what we were able to do. I mean, in the macro sense, because we were able to project our power back into Afghanistan, lock down that airfield and get all of those people to safety, including the family members of some Afghans who worked for me. We were able to get a lot of people out.

We were able to bring them to bases and facilities that didn't even exist when the crisis . . . I mean the bases existed, but the facilities to house these people in the Gulf and in Europe and back here in the continental United States . . . the amount of diplomacy that required, the amount of logistics by the U.S. military that it required. It was an unbelievable operation.

And so it was terrible. But it was also an extraordinary demonstration of what the United States was capable of doing even at these dark moments.

McFaul: That's a great way to put it together. I would guess we would not have been able to do that if we did not have NATO allies and bases in that part of the world, or is that incorrect? I don't know the logistics of that part of the world.

Kahl: If anything, it's an understatement. I think one of the things that distinguishes the United States from every other superpower or global power in history is the depth and breadth of our network of allies and partners. At the heart of that are our treaty allies in the NATO alliance, but also in the Indo-Pacific region, so think South Korea, Japan, Australia.

McFaul: All of them, right.

Kahl: But we also have very close security partnerships in the Middle East. And so literally it would not have been possible to fly aircraft into Afghanistan, fly people out from Afghanistan into places like Qatar, Bahrain, UAE, Saudi Arabia. But then we brought them to Germany and Spain and other U.S. bases in Europe. And then we brought them back to bases here in the United States.

And that network, literally that network made it possible. And had we not had those allies and partners when that happened, we couldn't have done what we did. We couldn't have done any of it. We couldn't have gotten any of our people out.

And so that really is like some of the secret sauce to America's power and influence in the world. And it remains the case that we have more allies and partners than any other country in history.

But it's also the case that those alliances and partnerships are probably more strained than they've been in my lifetime.

McFaul: So, one other historical question about you. Why did you come to Stanford? I mean, you've got this great job at Georgetown. You obviously are connected to the policy community. We're far away out here. Tell us about that decision.

Kahl: Part of it is I grew up in the Bay Area. Part of it is that, mean, Georgetown is a remarkable place, but Stanford's one of the two or three best universities in the world. We had a great community of scholars out here. And a lot of the issues that I'm particularly passionate about now—especially the intersection of technology and geopolitics— I mean, this is ground zero for a lot of that.

And so it was for a mix of kind of lifestyle reasons and professional reasons. And it's been awesome.

McFaul: Well, that's a great segue to what I wanted to ask you next, which is about the big agenda items. I mean, FSI has a lot going on: we have lots of centers here, as our listeners know, because we've had many guests from all, I think all of our centers over the time I've been here.

But you've got some particular things that you want to focus on. I know, because I talked to people that were part of the selection committee, that that was what was most impressive about you, is that you have a big agenda. Tell us about that agenda, Colin.

Kahl: As your longtime listeners undoubtedly know, FSI is an interesting place because FSI Central, where you were the director until three weeks ago, and now I sit, essentially sits over nine main research centers that cover everything from democracy to international security to regions like Asia and Europe to issues like technology and defense innovation, food security, global health.

And the breadth of this place is extraordinary. But it's also a highly decentralized place. Yes, we oversee the centers, but in many respects, the centers are kind of quasi-autonomous nation states.

McFaul: Exactly, exactly.

Kahl: So this isn't about trying to micro-manage our centers; that would be a fool's errand. It is actually, though, trying to look for ways to have the whole of FSI add up to more than the sum of its parts. And to look for synergies across our centers on really big questions.

You took the helm of FSI, I believe, back in 2015?

McFaul: Yes.

Kahl: To state the obvious, the world in 2026 is a lot different than it was in 2015. And so, FSI has to adapt to that world. And I think there are four really big questions of the moment that I think FSI really needs to be impactful on.

One is that we're in this new age of geopolitics. And it's become kind of trite to note that, you know, we have a resurgence of great power politics and competition between the United States and China and Russia and other major powers. But it actually runs deeper than that.

The distribution of power in general across the world is fundamentally different than it was 15, 20 years ago, let alone 50 years ago. The United States remains the world's most consequential actor, but China is nipping at our heels as a global superpower. And while Russia can't dominate the world, Russia can blow up the world. And we also know that countries like China, Russia, North Korea, Iran are working more closely together.

At the same time, the traditional role that the United States has played in the world since World War II or since the end of the Cold War is changing. And our relationship with our traditional allies is changing. And I think anybody who kind of paid attention to the World Economic Forum in Davos over the last few days heard speeches from the Prime Minister of Canada referring to the rupture in the international order.

And there's just the sense that things are fundamentally changing. And some of that may be a direct reaction to some of the policies of President Trump. But frankly, I think a lot of it is structural, that the policies of the current administration are as much an artifact as they are a cause even if they are accelerating some of the structural dynamics.

And then of course, there's big chunks of the world that doesn't want to be on anybody's team.

McFaul: Right.

Kahl: That wants to be non-aligned and multi-aligned. A lot of countries in the so-called ‘global south’ fall in that category. So we should be studying this new era of geopolitics

I would encourage you to say more about how you plan to study it, because I know you have a really fascinating project in this space that brings FSI and Hoover scholars together on some of these questions.

Kahl: So, one issue is the new geopolitics. The other though is what I call the new techno politics. It's actually a term I think Ian Bremmer coined.

But it's not just the notion that technologies like AI, biotech, quantum, space, clean energy are transforming our world, but also that the actors at the heart of these innovations are these multinational corporations that if their market cap was translated into GDP,

they would rank as G20 nations, right? When you're Nvidia and you have $5 trillion

McFaul: That's a great point.

Kahl: Like that would be the top half of the G20. But it's not just that. They have global presence. And for a lot of these companies, they have near sovereign control over the environments through which we live our lives.

McFaul: That's a great point.

Kahl: So, think cloud service providers, social media platforms, but also the infrastructure: undersea cables, low earth orbit constellations. And all of these things are under regulated spaces. So, it's not just that the technology is changing the world, but the companies are international actors. And again, where else should we be studying that but here at Stanford?

McFaul: Right.

Kahl: The third thing is there's a broader category of what people might refer to as existential risk. Nuclear weapons and the salience of nuclear weapons are back with a vengeance. For the first time, we're entering a world in which there are not two but three nuclear peers as China quadruples its nuclear arsenal. India and Pakistan are at loggerheads. They both have nuclear weapons. Israel and Iran are at loggerheads over Iran's quest for nuclear weapons. North Korea is expanding its arsenal. And arms control is breaking down.

So we know that the nuclear age is back with a vengeance. Simultaneously, we're facing the climate crisis. We all lived through COVID. It won't be the last pandemic, unfortunately, I think, in our lifetimes. There are other biosecurity risks emanating from emerging technologies. And then there's also the possibility that technologies like AI will produce their own existential externalities in the form of things like rogue super intelligence or other things.

So we should be studying those things. And then lastly, I think we have to be studying the future of global democracy because democracy is under siege around the world from revisionist authoritarian powers like Russia and China. But it's also eroding in many traditional democracies that are becoming increasingly illiberal.

And advanced democracies no longer agree on what democracy is. A big divide between the United States and Europe at the moment is both laying claim to being democratic, but in fundamentally different ways.

And so the point just is, we have 150 researchers at FSI, 50 of them are tenured faculty, many of them were working at the intersection of these issues. I want to support that and I also want them to do more together.

McFaul: That sounds fantastic. That is the agenda for our moment. And I think you're right that we have some people that work on some of those things, but we have holes to fill. And I wish you success in doing that to compliment what we have here, but also to try to get these different scholars that work on these different pieces to understand how they are intertwined, right?

The future of global democracy is also highly impactful on geopolitics and vice versa. I think that is a great agenda for FSI for the future.

I mean, on my own piece: I would just say in terms of what I want to work on, I have a lot of interests, but the main research one is I just did finish this book, as listeners will know, called Autocrats vs. Democrats, China, Russia . . .

Kahl: Available now!

McFaul: Available now! Available while you're listening on your phone. You can get it, and it's highly discounted now. And I'm going to tell you a little story about that actually, Colin. I don't think we've talked about it. The original title was ‘American Renewal.’ That was like two or three years ago. Then it switched the title to ‘Autocrats vs. Democrats.’ But the subtitle, until just a few months ago was ‘China, Russia and the New Global Order.’ The now title is ‘China, Russia, America and the New Global Disorder,’ reflecting a year ago what I thought was going to be a pretty tumultuous time. And I think I underestimated how tumultuous it is and your agenda is addressing that.

But I would say two things that I want to do here at FSI. One is, when I was working on this book, I knew a lot about the Cold War, so there's a debate, are we in the Cold War or not? And I addressed that. My answer is yes and no.

But I knew a lot about the Cold War. I know quite a bit about Russia. I know a fair bit about America and America's place in the world, both from teaching and being in the government. But I had to learn a lot about China. And I've been going to China for three decades, but I'm not an expert. It took me a long time. That's why it took me eight years to finish this book

But there were two big gaps that I saw at the end of it. One is we have a lot of great people working on capabilities of these various great powers. We have a really great literature on intentions of America, Russia, and China. And big debates, by the way, on the intentions, especially on the China side. I would say comparing the debate in the Russia field to China field, there's a lot more consensus in the Russia field about intentions of Putin's Russia than there is of Xi's China, and that's a good thing. I think that debate is unsettled and we should keep interrogating our hypotheses.

But what I was really struck by is very little examination. And with some exceptions, I'm looking at my shelf. There's some really great books. But there's not that many books that look at impact of this competition on other countries in the world. And when you do find great books—there's a great one on China and Zambia, for instance—it's just China and its impact on Zambia. There's no Europe in that story. There's no Russia in that story. There's no America in that story. So that's the academic kind of research project that I want to do here with Liz Economy from the Hoover Institution, Jim Goldgeier—he's going to cover the European part. And that'll take many, many years because we want to really get into the nitty gritty of these countries. And we want to find country experts to be the main people that write that.

The second part in my book—you know, my book looks at the debate, examines where we're at, and then has these three prescriptive chapters. And even had Vice President Harris won the election last year, the structural things that you identified would have been still a part of our trying to figure out where we're going and the debate about international order and how to manage the decline of democracy, technology and the global order, that would all been there. But to your other point you made earlier, it's been accelerated by President Trump.

And in my public policy life, I want to keep engaging that debate because yes, the old order is broken. We're not going to go back to it. But the idea that we have to just go back to some Hobbesian jungle that Trump seems to want to fight in, I don't accept that as an inevitable consequence. And even if it is analytically, and I'm wrong about that, I want to do everything I can to avoid it, even if it's going to be in failure. In a way, Trump has moved us in a different direction and I want to be part of that debate.

And one of the things I would add to that is part of the reason liberal internationalists like myself have lost that debate is because we lost the American people on it. And we didn't focus enough on trying to explain why being a NATO is in our interest or explain why it's better off to have a foot in even something like the United Nations than to pull out. Why we're better off to support ideas of democracy and freedom rather than just think that it's just all about power.

And so I'm going to be spending a lot of time speaking, not just in Silicon Valley—I'm still doing that—and not just Washington and New York or Brussels and Beijing, but my next stop for my book tour is Boise, Idaho. And I've done this for a while and not everybody agrees with me. I even had a few people walk out before I even said a word because they saw that I'd worked for Barack Obama.

But what I can tell you and report is people are curious. All my talks are sold out. And the agenda you just outlined, Colin, is an agenda I think that when we have things to say with our scholars, we should bring those ideas through things like World Class. I think there's a demand and a thirst for trying to figure out this new world order/disorder that we're in, and FSI has a great role to play in that.

Kahl: Hard agree. And also I'm thrilled that this is going to  be so much of your focus.

I would just say on the alliance piece: my view is that as the distribution of power changes, it's clearer than ever that foreign policy is a team sport.

McFaul: Yes.

Kahl: I used to make this reference: Michael Jordan, probably the best basketball player who ever lived. Although I'm sure there are people who claim it's LeBron or Kobe or somebody else. But if you believe that Michael Jordan was the best basketball player who ever lived, he still needed four other Bulls to win championships.

And as we go around, and address every problem that I've ever encountered as a policymaker, whether it's the rise of the Islamic state or the invasion of Ukraine, we need our team.

McFaul: Exactly.

Kahl: And our allies and partners are our team. So I think we have to tell that story. We also, as we enter this new world, have to figure out a way to re-anchor our alliances in a way that are politically sustainable on all sides, and that actually deliver benefits for the American people.

So it's not just telling a better story. There's an interesting example of this. Recently the Trump administration agreed to help South Korea with their submarine program. But South Korea in exchange is making tens of billions of dollars of investments in American shipyards . . .

McFaul: Right.

Kahl: . . . to build up our capacity. And I do think these ideas about joint industrial capacity across the free world might be a way to generate jobs, to generate political incentives on all sides to keep those alliances intact and give some people confidence on both sides of our alliances that we're not going to have these violent swings every four to eight years.

McFaul: I could not agree more. And that example you gave is a great example. And we have to be more creative about re-anchoring and win-win for everybody. I think that's a great idea.

Colin, I'm going to hand this over to you. We've already gone longer than we should have because you're so interesting. Tell us a few of the guests you have coming up on World Class.

Kahl: First of all, not only big shoes to fill on the FSI director position, but big shoes to fill as the host of World Class. We're going to try to start off with a bang in the near future. So stay tuned. We hope to have a great conversation involving H.R. McMaster, who is at Hoover, but as many of your listeners will know, was President Trump's national security adviser at the beginning of the first Trump administration.

And we're going to pair H.R. with Jake Sullivan, who was Joe Biden's national security advisor.

McFaul: Wow! Both on the same show?

Kahl: On the same show!

McFaul: Oh my God, that's fantastic!

Kahl: And the idea is to ask two of the smartest minds on different parts of the political spectrum to help get us smarter about the state of the world and where things are going for the rest of 2026. I have to say for the rest of 2026, because like we're not even a month in and we had Venezuela and Greenland and Iran, and Iran could come back and like, we're three weeks in.

But people should stay tuned because that's going to be an awesome conversation.

And then without naming names, I'm very hopeful to bring on leaders from the tech community here in Silicon Valley to interface with our scholars about some of these technology trends we talked about earlier.

McFaul: Great, excellent.

Kahl: So it's gonna be great. If you're a geopolitical nerd, you're going to love it. If you're into technology, you're going love it. And we're gonna find ways I think to both highlight the extraordinary work being done here at Stanford, but also Stanford's role in the broader ecosystem. It’s going to be fun.

McFaul: Sounds exciting, Colin. Well, first of all, thank you for taking on the role of leading FSI. We need you because of all the things you just described. Second, thanks for taking on World Class. And third, just with that teaser, I know that World Class is going to get a lot more interesting in the weeks and months to come. So congratulations.

Kahl: Thanks, Mike.

McFaul: You've been listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. If you like what you're hearing, please leave us review and be sure to subscribe on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts to stay tuned, to stay up to date on what's happening in the world and why.

And for the last time, this is Michael McFaul signing off as your host of World Class. Stay tuned for the next episode hosted by Colin Kahl.

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On the World Class podcast, Michael McFaul officially hands the hosting baton over to FSI's new director, Colin Kahl, who makes the case for why alliances and partnerships — whether across academic departments or between nations — create better, stronger outcomes.

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Were the United States and NATO enlargement to blame for Russia’s invasions of Ukraine? The authors argue that NATO was just one irritant among many in the US-Russian relationship; that Ukraine was not close to joining NATO in 2021 when Putin made the decision for full-scale war; and that Russian fear of NATO was not a major factor in the march to war. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, they conclude, was primarily about Putin’s imperial beliefs, not great power politics. 

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Were the United States and NATO enlargement to blame for Russia’s invasions of Ukraine?

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The Washington Quarterly
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James Goldgeier
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Issue 4, Winter 2026
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On August 15, President Donald Trump welcomed Vladimir Putin to the Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska. It was the first time since their sideline meeting in 2019 at the G20 meeting in Osaka, Japan that the two leaders have met, and the first time Putin has traveled to the United States since the United Nations General Assembly in New York in 2015.

While President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine met with President Trump in Washington, DC the following  week, some observers have expressed trepidation over the prospect of a deal being made between Russia and the United States without the input of Ukraine.

Writing for Brookings ahead of the summit, Steven Pifer, an affiliate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and The Europe Center, and a former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine warned:

“Putin will seek to trap Trump into endorsing a position that incorporates the major elements of long-standing Russian demands. If Trump agrees, he will suffer unflattering comparisons to Neville Chamberlain, who agreed to surrender a large part of Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany in 1938. While the Czechoslovakian government concluded it had no choice and accepted the territorial loss, the Ukrainians will say no. They will not embrace their own capitulation.”

So how did the meeting in Anchorage actually play out?

In commentary on social media, FSI Director and former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul summarized the talks in the context of the Yalta Conference, an agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union made in the waning months of WWII that quickly fell apart when Joseph Stalin broke promises made to Western leaders to maintain and support democratic elections in Eastern Europe.

Speaking on NPR’s Morning Edition, McFaul elaborated on his concerns: 

“What I think the worst outcome would be is if President Trump starts negotiating on behalf of the Ukrainians without the Ukrainians in the room. Trump needs something tangible, and I hope that doesn't make him too anxious to start negotiating on behalf of the Ukrainians because that would be a disaster. If he jams President Zelenskyy with something he can't accept, that would be the worst of all outcomes.”

Pifer echoed his relief about the lack of discussion over particulars about Ukraine between the two leaders, but also pointed out that the broadest goal of the meeting also hadn’t been met.

“The good news is, President Trump didn’t give away the store. I was concerned he might get into bargaining on details about Ukraine without the Ukrainians there, which would be to their detriment. But it seems Mr. Trump failed in his stated goal to achieve a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine,” said Pifer. 

But even without a concrete policy outcome, Pifer says the Alaska meeting was an optical victory for Russia: 

“The significance for Vladimir Putin is that the meeting happened in the first place. Since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine back in 2022, there’s been a boycott by Western leaders of any kind of face-to-face meeting with Putin. And by hosting him in Alaska, Trump broke that boycott. That is being played up in Moscow as a huge victory that Putin has been legitimized again.”

On Monday, August 18, President Zelenskyy and a cadre of other European leaders met with President Trump at the White House to discuss the Friday meeting and reinforce Europe’s positions and redlines against capitulation to Russian demands.

In analysis for Foreign Policy, Pifer outlined the stakes of this follow-up meeting for the European delegation:

“Zelenskyy and his European colleagues face a tricky challenge. They have to diplomatically offer suggestions to walk Trump back from a position that he does not appear to understand would be bad for Ukraine, bad for Europe, and bad for American interests. And they have to do so without setting off an explosion that could disrupt U.S.-Ukrainian and U.S.-European relations.”

McFaul is also cautious about the tone and tack of the discussions moving forward:

“I think it’s a good thing [the Europeans and Trump] are talking about security guarantees,“ he told Alex Witt on MSNBC. “But the devil is in the details. We keep hearing something about ‘NATO-like security guarantees.’ Why not just NATO security guarantees?"

The argument for building a lasting ceasefire in Ukraine based on NATO membership is a proposal McFaul has long supported.

“This notion that these guarantees are going to be something like NATO but less than NATO . . . if I were the Ukrainians, that would make me nervous. They had guarantees like that in 1994 called the Budapest Memorandum, and it meant nothing. It didn’t stop Putin from invading in 2014, and it didn’t stop him from launching a full-scale war in 2022,” McFaul reminded viewers.

“To me,” he argues, “it has to be NATO, not NATO-lite. The only way to do real, credible security guarantees for Ukraine is membership in NATO.”

In assessing the White House meeting with President Zelenskyy and European leadership, Rose Gottemoeller, the William J. Perry lecturer at CISAC and former deputy secretary of NATO, is cautiously optimistic. 

“This was a major step along the road, and it was vital that the Europeans were there as well as Ukraine,” she told the CBC.

A seasoned negotiator with direct experience working on high-level diplomacy with Russia, Gottemoeller is no stranger to the long process of dealmaking with the Kremlin.

“There are many steps to get through. We are not there yet. As much as Trump would like to walk out of the Oval Office and say, ‘We got the deal done,’ I think there will be many more hoops to jump through before that is possible.”



Additional insights from our scholars on the Trump-Putin summit and White House meeting with Zelenskyy and other European leaders can be found at the following links:

Russia, Ukraine, and Trump on Katie Couric
Trump Meets with Putin: Experts React in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
There Are No Participation Trophies in High-Stakes Diplomacy on Substack

 

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Displaying Weakness to the Kremlin

For a U.S. administration claiming that it wants to restore American power in order, among other things, to negotiate from a position of strength, the past week has not advanced the cause.
Displaying Weakness to the Kremlin
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Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump in conversation on the tarmac of the Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson on August 15, 2025 in Anchorage, Alaska.
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FSI scholars Michael McFaul, Steven Pifer, and Rose Gottemoeller analyze the Alaska meeting between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin and its implications for Ukraine’s security and sovereignty.

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Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump in conversation on the tarmac of the Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson on August 15, 2025 in Anchorage, Alaska.
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After the Trump-Putin Summit, Is Ending the Ukraine-Russia War Any Closer?
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Three years into Russia's full-scale invasion, Ukraine remains a sovereign democracy. But changes in the U.S. and shifts in the international security landscape could drastically impact the trajectory of the war and Ukraine's future. Steven Pifer, an affiliate at the Center on Security and International Cooperation and The Europe Center, and a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, joins Michael McFaul to discuss what's been happening and how it may affect Kyiv, Europe, and the world order more broadly.

Watch the video version of their conversation above, or listen to the audio below, on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and other major podcast platforms. A full transcript of the episode is also available.



TRANSCRIPT:


McFaul: You’re listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. We bring you in-depth expertise on international affairs from Stanford's campus straight to you.

February 24th marks the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It's a horrific, tragic day. There's a lot of uncertainty right now in Ukraine and among its friends and allies about what the future is going to bring.

There's a lot of pressure right now on President Zelenskyy to negotiate. There’ a lot of concern in Europe over what might happen over the negotiations between the United States and Russia, something that has not happened in three years, and a lot of unanswered questions more generally about America's future leadership in the world and especially in Europe.

And so we could not be luckier than to have Steve Pifer, an affiliate with the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Europe Center here at FSI to be with us today.

Steve not only is a former ambassador to Ukraine, but has spent three decades of his career in diplomacy working on European issues. And is one of the most prolific commentators. I have to say, Steve, it's hard to keep up with you and all your writing. Most people after they retire from the Foreign Service slow down. It seems like you are speeding up. But maybe that has to do with the events that are happening in Europe that require that.

So thanks for coming on our program today, Steve.

Pifer: Thanks for having me, Mike.

McFaul: So originally we were going to have a conversation to start with takeaways from the Munich Security Conference. But so much has happened since that event, which is literally only six days ago, by the way. The negotiations in Saudi Arabia, the trolling between President Trump and response to President Zelenskyy.

Steve, just start at some kind of basic assessment: where do we stand right now in terms of the alleged peace negotiations that have been started? And I'll let you characterize it in any way you want to. Take stock of where we are at right now.

Pifer: Well, Mike, let me just actually step back first and make a couple of observations.

One is: on February 24, 2022, I would not predict we would be having any kind of conversation like this.

McFaul: Great point.

Pifer: Nobody, virtually, expected the Ukrainians to last militarily. Had you asked me, I thought that the Russians would win the force-on-force fight. And then in 2025, what we would be seeing would be a very bloody insurgency by Ukrainians against Russian occupying forces.

McFaul: Right, right.

Pifer: So I think it's a real testament to the Ukrainian military, Ukrainian resilience, that the Ukrainian military is still very active in the field. Even last year in 2024, I have to say the Russians had the momentum. But in that period, over the entire year, they captured maybe 1,500 square miles of Ukrainian territory. That's less than 1% of Ukraine's land.

And they did that at enormous cost. At some points, they were losing 2,000 troops a day, dead and wounded. The British Ministry of Defense now estimates that more than 800,000 casualties on the Russian side. And I'm not saying that Ukraine is winning, but the idea that Russia is on the verge of a great victory, I think, is overblown.

McFaul: Great point to start with. I'm glad we started with that. And I share your assessment. I remember three years ago, I remember talking to you three years ago and the assessments we all had and here we are three years later and it hasn't happened.

Pifer: Yeah. And again, that's a credit to the Ukrainians.

You know, a lot's happened in the last two weeks. I have to say I am thoroughly disappointed in the efforts by the Trump administration to try to broker a solution and this unseemly rush to try to re-engage Vladimir Putin, which I think is a mistake.

I mean, if you look back, there have been, think, three or four wins for Putin in the last 10 days. One is you had Secretary Hegseth in Europe and then the president saying, “Well, Ukraine can't expect to hold onto its territory and Ukraine get into NATO.”

Now, whether or not that's realistic, why are senior officials and the American president saying that when we're going to try to broker a solution? We've already at the beginning made a big lean towards the Russian position.

Then you have President Trump calls Putin and announces he's going to have not one, but several meetings with Putin, breaking with a policy with the Western leaders for the last three years that you do not engage Putin.

The next day he says, let's bring Russia back into the G7 to make it the G8 again.

McFaul: Oh my goodness, I even forgot about that one!

Pifer: If you had a vote right now, I think Trump would lose six to one on that.

McFaul: But he did offer it, yes.

Pifer: And then Secretary Rubio goes to meet with Lavrov. So that looks like that's four pretty big wins for Russia. And I can't see a single thing that the United States has received in return.

And then I would just add, I mean, this unseemly haste to engage Putin, I think Putin looks at this and says, I'm dealing with somebody — Trump — who is very weak. I'm just going to sit back and wait for more concessions. I think they've gotten off to a very bad start that's going to make it much harder to achieve their goal if their goal is to try to broker a just and durable settlement between Russia and Ukraine.

McFaul: Steve, why do you think this is happening the way it is? Let's talk about Trump and then we'll talk about Putin and Zelenskyy separately, but how do you explain it?

Pifer: Trump going back for 10 years has this inexplicable affinity for Putin. You're very hard pressed in the last 10 years to find examples where Trump has criticized Putin or Putin's actions. That's hard to understand because Putin's committed a lot of actions in the last 10 years which deserve to be criticized.

Someone suggested maybe there's a grand chess strategy here. And the idea is perhaps to throw Ukraine under the bus and back away from Europe to peel or to basically cultivate Putin so you could somehow peel Russia away from China, given the administration's focus on China.

But I think that grossly misunderstands the depth of the relationship between Xi and Putin and how dependent Russia is on China now.

McFaul: Yeah.

Pifer: So if that's the objective, I think it's going to fail. But otherwise, if it's not by design, then it simply is incompetence or, as one Republican senator said — he's a bit more diplomatic saying — “rookie mistakes.”

McFaul: Let's just pull on this thread a little bit because first of all, he's not a rookie. He was president for four years. And second, it seems more by design, right?

It seems like he just wants to make a go at a peace treaty. He doesn't really care about the contours of it. Most certainly doesn't care about Ukraine. And then just walk away or is there a bigger deal that he's trying to get?

So one, as you pointed out, might be this China play. And I completely agree with your assessment; that is going to be a loser. If you're Vladimir Putin, you're going to break up the most important relationship you have in the world to take a gamble on President Trump, who then might not be in power in four years time?

Pifer: Exactly.

McFaul: So that makes no sense to me at all. But what about like, maybe there's some kind of economic deal that somehow Trump thinks getting closer to Putin might be good for the United States?

Pifer: Well, reportedly that when Secretary Rubio was in Saudi on the Russian delegation was this Russian oligarch who talked about, I think he said hundreds of billions of dollars that American businesses had lost by not being in Russia over the past three years.

McFaul: Yeah. By the way, his name is Kirill Dmitriev. I used to know him. Has a degree from Stanford and Harvard, by the way. Very savvy guy who runs their investment fund.

But that's a good point. He did say that, and the fact that he was on the delegation is kind of strange too, isn't it?

Pifer: It's very strange. But his numbers . . . I think he said $380 billion. He's talking about American companies lost the equivalent of 5% of Russia's gross domestic product over the last three years? That's a wildly inflated number. And I think he was also talking about oil and gas concessions.

Well, before the Trump administration gets too excited about oil and gas concessions in Russia, they ought to go back and talk to President George W. Bush and his energy people, because there was all this excitement back in 2002 and 2003 about energy cooperation and huge advantages for American companies, which never panned out.

If it's an economic deal we're talking about, I think we're pursuing some pretty false hopes.

First of all, American industry they don't find the business environment there very attractive and it's not been one of their goals over the last 25 years.

McFaul: So let's pivot to President Zelenskyy next and help us think through his options and his situation right now and what he has done and what he might do moving forward.

Pifer: Yeah, well, think, Zelenskyy, first of all, I mean, he's epitomized that resistance and that resilience of Ukrainians in ways that . . . in fact, I think we had a conversation back in January of 2022 with some other Stanford scholars. And the question was, well, if the Russians invade, what kind of a wartime president would Zelenskyy be?

McFaul: Right.

Pifer: And I think we were uncertain. Well, I think Zelenskyy's proven that he was exactly what Ukraine needed at that very difficult time.

But I think you have seen growing war weariness within Ukraine. Polls now suggest that a majority of Ukrainians want negotiations, although we still have a sizable segment of the population that oppose any territorial concessions.

Zelenskyy seemed to show, I think, a bit of flexibility at the end of 2024, where he said, look, we could be prepared in a negotiation to agree that we would not use military means to recover lost territory. We would pursue diplomatic routes.

Now, he tied it to NATO membership for Ukraine. And I think what he's basically saying, If I'm going to give up, temporarily or perhaps longer, Ukrainian land, I need to have a firm security guarantee for the rest of Ukraine.

What he doesn't want to do is broker a deal with Vladimir Putin now, give Putin three or four years to regenerate his military, and then have another invasion to deal with. He's looking for solid security guarantees to prevent that.

And that, to my mind, is as the Trump administration tries to broker the settlement, any settlement is going to be judged on those two factors. One, how much territory remains under Russian control, even if just temporarily. And then two, what kind of security guarantees does Ukraine receive and how solid are they?

McFaul: Those are tough decisions, right? Because he's not getting much of a signal from the American side, at least so far, of anything substantive on the security guarantees. At least not that I've been able to see.

Pifer: No, And when Secretary Hegseth was in Europe 10 days ago, what he talked about was Europe providing either a peacekeeping force or a security force that would be on the ground in Ukraine. But he said there would be no American contribution to that.

And then he went a step further and he said that force would not deploy as a NATO force; it would be outside of NATO and it would not have the coverage of Article 5.

I worry about that because that seems to be a usually tempting opportunity for Vladimir Putin. So say you have 25 or 30,000 Europeans there not as NATO, but there to basically provide that security guarantee. That'd be an opportunity or tempting opportunity for Putin: Well, what if I hit that force? What if I had a pretext? They got too close to the Russian border or they were cooperating too much with the Ukrainians. They're no longer a neutral force.

It wouldn't have to be a big strike. But you kill a few members of this force and there's no then American response. That's going to be a pretty shattering blow to NATO. And I think Putin would be tempted on that.

So, I worry about what they're thinking in terms of how they do involve the Europeans. And I worry that they haven't thought through just how risky that could be ultimately for the underlying NATO relationship, which I still believe is very much in the American security interest.

McFaul: I'm going to get to NATO in a second, but one more question on Zelensky's position and just say parenthetically, that's a very profound thought. I haven't heard anybody talk about the scary scenario that you just laid out.

But let me come back to that in a minute. One more question about Zelenskyy and their government. As you know, and our listeners probably know, there was a floated document that the United States, the Trump administration, gave to President Zelenskyy, first in Kyiv, and then later it was presented and discussed at some detail at the Munich Security Conference when Vice President Vance and President Zelenskyy met.

And to the best of my understanding — maybe you have seen the document by now, I haven't — but I've talked to officials about it. It's a 50% sharing of the profits of all future critical minerals to be mined in Ukraine. Pretty amazing, outlandish, colonial document. And what's mysterious to me is what the Ukrainians get in return.

Having said all that, it's very clear that President Trump thinks this is an important document to be signed. What should President Zelenskyy do?

Pifer: Well, I think he was correct in not signing the document he was given, which as I understand it, it was basically giving America access to perhaps $500 billion worth of rare earth minerals and other minerals in Ukraine as a payment for what the United States had done for Ukraine in the past.

McFaul: So it was for the past, right? See, this is a very important point. Not future?

Pifer: And Trump has this incredibly inflated idea. He thinks that the United States in the past three years has provided Ukraine $350 billion. It's more like $120 billion, which is, not saying that's not a lot of money. But the bulk of that money was actually spent in the United States buying weapons for either the Ukrainian military or buying modern weapons for the U.S. military to replace things — older weapons — they had pulled out of their stocks to send to Ukraine.

And I would argue that that's not a gift to Ukraine; that's also in the American national security interest.

McFaul: Very important point.

Pifer: But I think Zelenskyy had expressed a readiness to allow the United States to help develop these minerals, but he wants something in return. And that agreement gave Ukraine, as far as I can tell, nothing in return.

Now, there was a spokesperson for the National Security Council said, “Well, that would be a secure, you know, that kind of economic relationship would be in effect a security guarantee.”

You know, if I'm in Ukraine, I'm not prepared to take that to the bank. And I think what Zelenskyy wants is he's prepared to allow the U.S. access, but he wants some firmer commitment on the part of the United States to Ukraine's security.

And thus far, that's not been on offer. So I think Zelensky was entirely correct in saying no.

McFaul: Just having some security guards, private security guards at these American mining companies is not going to be enough.

Pifer: That's probably not going to . . . the fact that the United States has companies developing those minerals, that's not going to deter Vladimir Putin from another attack on Ukraine.

McFaul: And the paradox of course, is that, you know, having talked to some of these companies around the world in my career: they're not going to do any of this mining unless they feel like their property rights are secured. So they need a security guarantee from the United States, too. It's not just the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian people. So they've got to figure that out for sure.

Pifer: Exactly. And this is why I think that the administration really hasn't thought through a lot of the ideas that they're putting on the table in this rush to try to get some kind of agreement.

McFaul: Why do you think Trump is in such a hurry?

Pifer: Again, I think it gets back to solving a problem so that he can cultivate Vladimir Putin.

McFaul: That's the end game, right?

Pifer: If I look at this and say it's not incompetence, it's by design, the design is to get back to some kind of relationship with Putin. Trump admires Putin. Trump likes Putin. In some ways Trump would like to be like Putin.

And again, Ukraine is kind of an irritant that he would like to resolve. And that makes me nervous that in our effort to broker a solution, we're not going to give attention to the just positions of the Ukrainian side.

And at the end of the day, he can broker a settlement. But if it's heavily pro-Russian, the Ukrainians at the end of the day can always say, we're sorry, we cannot accept that. We will not accept that.

I think Ukrainians would like the war to end, but they're not prepared to accept a bad peace negotiated largely between the Americans and the Russians.

Zelenskyy has been very clear. He's not prepared to accept a fait accompli that's negotiated bilaterally between Washington and Moscow.

McFaul: And to add to your point: having just spent some time with Ukrainians, including Ukrainian soldiers in Munich, they don't all speak and think the same way.

Even if Zelenskyy wanted to accept a deal that Putin and Trump negotiated, then, you know, sent him an email saying to sign . .  there are other voices there as you know better than anybody, Steve. It's a democratic pluralistic society.

And there's a lot of warriors who have lost a lot of loved ones and a lot of comrades who are not just going to lay down their arms just because of a deal negotiated on the outside, blessed by the president.

I think President Zelenskyy probably understands that, but I'm not sure we in the West understand that. That's, I think, a pretty dangerous situation for Ukraine.

Pifer: And that's why in the sequencing of how you begin to prepare for this brokering, the first visit should have been to Kyiv.

McFaul: Yes.

Pifer: Because you're exactly right, Unlike Putin, Zelenskyy has a domestic constituency. And that may limit his maneuverability and what kind of concessions he can make. We need to have that understanding before we get too far down the road talking to the Russians.

They got the sequencing, I think, completely backwards. It should have been talking to the Ukrainians first, then the Europeans who, again, the American administration hopes will provide a significant force on the ground in Ukraine afterwards.

Then even before talking to Putin, we should have taken steps to build leverage. By virtue of the assistance we've provided to Ukraine over the last three years, we have huge leverage in Kyiv.

If you want to work this brokering right, you need leverage with Moscow. And there things you could have done. You could have tightened sanctions on Russia. As we know from our work in the international sanctions working group, there's a lot that can be done in that area.

Second, we could have gone to the G7 and said, let's take that $300 billion in frozen Russian central bank assets, seize them, and put them in a fund for Ukraine.

He could have even gone and asked the Congress, you know, let's prepare more military assistance for Ukraine. Things that would have confronted Vladimir Putin with the fact that if he does not negotiate . . . and thus far when Putin talks about negotiating, it's always on just his terms, which amount to Ukraine's capitulation.

We've got to move him off of that. I think the way to do that is by confronting Putin with the fact that this war continues, the military, the economic, the political costs for him are only going to increase.

And that they did none of that. They just jumped right into the conversation with the Russians. I think that was a mistake and it decreases the likelihood that this effort to broker a settlement will succeed.

McFaul: Just because you've teased it up, one last question about the American side and then we'll end with the Europeans.

I remember, you know, as we were waiting to see who would be on the new Trump team, I think there were a lot of people that I know — including in Ukraine, by the way — who are pretty excited about the fact that Senator Rubio was chosen to be Secretary of State Rubio. Same with our new National Security Advisor, Mike Waltz.

But I have friends who thought, my goodness, we are so lucky in these two jobs, we have very strong pro-Ukrainian people that understand the autocratic threat, the imperial threat from Putin.

And yet so far, we're not seeing that their voices represented. What's your take on that, Steve? Is it just too early to tell?

Most certainly, you know, they did not do well in their first round to underscore what you already said. When I saw them sitting across the table from Lavrov and Ushakov, people who have been in those jobs for two decades, and they had only been in their jobs for three weeks.

Maybe you could understand they're just getting their feet . . . they're trying to learn how to do this diplomacy. But so I'm struck by the fact that their positions before they joined the administration and now seem different.

Is that going to be the case forevermore or is it too early to tell?

Pifer: No, I've been struck by the same thing and I hope this will not be the continuing position.

I know neither Secretary Rubio nor the National Security Advisor Waltz, but I had the same view that you did. For a Republican president, these are guys who have experience in foreign policy. They've been on the right committees. They know these things. They could be the, quote, “the adults in the room.”

McFaul: Yes.

Pifer: I haven't seen them though, showing that they've been adults or that they've had any impact. And I think Secretary Rubio said a couple of things today that suggested that maybe they're looking back at what's happened over the past 10 days and maybe there's some recognition that this has not been the best way to handle things.

That's why I hope . . . I mean, in this debate of is the Trump administration's approach incompetence or design . . . I hope it's incompetence. Because you can fix incompetence. You can rethink things.

And I hope that they are reassessing and understand that they have mishandled these things. And if they want to succeed . . .

McFaul: And we want them to succeed.

Pifer: I would like to see President Trump broker a just, fair, durable settlement that ends this horrible war, that stops the killing, that brings peace back to that. And he can win his long coveted Nobel Peace Prize.

But everything that they've done, I think, in the last two weeks makes that possibility less and less and less . .

McFaul: Likely. And by the way, footnote to that: there are very few issues where Americans are united. We're a very polarized, split country right now. But a poll that came out this week, the Quinnipiac poll, for those that want to look it up, when Americans were asked, do you trust Putin? 81% said, No. Only 9% said, Yes.

And so President Trump is way ahead of the skis on this one. He is out of touch with the American society. So I think that that's an interesting data point. They have to produce results; they just cannot say, we just want a good relationship with Putin.

But Steve, go ahead and then we're going to get to the Europeans.

Pifer: I just wanted to mention there was one other quick poll that just came out when President Trump just bizarrely said that Russia attacked Ukraine, bizarrely said that Zelenskyy is a dictator, there was a poll I saw that I think was conducted on the 18th or 19th of February. It said 41% of Americans viewed Trump as a dictator, only 22 % of Americans viewed Zelenskyy as a dictator.

McFaul: Wow, I didn't see that one!

Pifer: I think there's a lot to suggest that where Trump is going thus far is very much divorced from where American public opinion is, both on Zelenskyy and on Russia.

McFaul: And Zelenskyy's approval rating actually is significantly higher than President Trump.

Pifer: 57%. And all this nonsense about postponing the elections: Last year in 2024, when they postponed the election, it was widely supported by Ukrainians. Most pro-democracy NGOs supported it. Most of the leaders of the parties in the Ukrainian parliament, with the exception of one, and this included people who would call themselves opponents of Zelenskyy, like Petro Poroshenko, the former president . . . they all agreed the election should be postponed.

And in a poll just conducted in the last couple of weeks, 63% of Ukrainians agree that there should be no elections until after the war is over.

McFaul: Interesting. Thanks for sharing that.

Finally, and I suspect we'll come back to this topic in the coming months, but give me your base reaction to the fissures in the NATO alliance. The vice president gave a pretty provocative speech in Munich.

How worried are you, Steve, that this is the beginning of the end of the alliance? Or is that too premature to think in those terms?

Pifer: You know, there were periodic suggestions during the first term that President Trump wanted to take the United States out of NATO. He actually doesn't have to formally take us out of NATO, but he can do things like reduce the American troop presence in Europe.

He can do things like . . . well, again, Secretary of Defense Hegseth, saying that basically, if you send a European security force into Ukraine, you're on your own. Those will weaken the American commitment to Europe. And they will weaken the confidence that the Europeans have that the United States will be there.

I think NATO has been a big asset for the United States over the past 70 years. I agree with President Trump that Europe has to do more in terms of its own defense spending. But what's interesting now is that in 2014, there was an agreement that by 2044, NATO members would spend 2% of gross domestic product on defense.

And so we went from three countries meeting that standard in 2014 to 23 meeting it last year. The talk now in Europe is they have to do more and they're looking at three to three and a half percent. The Europeans understand that their security situation is very different from what it was 10 years ago, that they have to do more. But that means that they can be stronger partners, stronger allies.

And I fear that if we were to throw NATO under the bus, it's going to mean that America first is going to be America alone. And if we do turn against the Europeans or we end this 76 year long security attache that we've had, do we really think the Europeans would be helpful to us when we're trying to deal with China?

McFaul: Absolutely not.

Pifer: I think at that point, that Europe would be morally preoccupied with Europe and the idea of helping the Americans out against China after we'd abandoned them in Europe . . . I wouldn't expect a lot of European assistance in that regard.

McFaul: That's a great point. Oh, by the way, our NATO allies did go to war with us when we were attacked. The only time Article 5 was invoked. Their soldiers died with us in Afghanistan. And some of our NATO allies went with us into Iraq.

And they never asked us to pay for that. They never asked us to compensate them like we're now doing to other Ukrainians.

And I hope the sounder, more rational people around the president will remind him of those kinds of facts. But Steve, I'm in trouble. I just looked at the clock. We talked much longer than I was supposed to, but that's because there's so much going on in the world.

I think we'll have a lot of news in the coming months, and let's just do this again.

Pifer: Happy to do it. I just hope the news will not be like the news we've seen in the last 10 days.

McFaul: Yeah, me too.

You’ve been listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. If you like what you’re hearing, please leave us a review. And be sure to subscribe on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts, to stay up to date on what’s happening in the world and why.

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President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky speaks during the 61st Munich Security Conference on February 15, 2025 in Munich, Germany.
Commentary

FSI Experts on Russia and Ukraine Weigh in on the Munich Security Conference

Michael McFaul and Steven Pifer share analysis of where international security seems to be headed, and what it might mean for the U.S., Ukraine, and their partners.
FSI Experts on Russia and Ukraine Weigh in on the Munich Security Conference
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Steven Pifer joins Michael McFaul on World Class to discuss how America's relationship with Ukraine and Europe is shifting, and what that means for the future of international security.

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Every year, leaders in politics, industry, and business gather in Germany for the annual Munich Security Conference. Established in 1963 with the goal of building peace through dialogue, the conference is one the world’s premier forums for discussing global security challenges.

At the 2025 conference, the ongoing war in Ukraine, now entering its fourth year, was at the top of the agenda.

FSI Director and former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul was in attendance, while Steven Pifer, a former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine and FSI affiliated scholar, followed the proceedings closely. As the event came to a close, they reflected on the potential negotiations over the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the changing global security landscape.


Prioritizing Ukraine’s Security Needs


In any proposed resolution to Russia’s invasion, Ambassadors Pifer and McFaul agree that Ukraine’s security needs must be front and center. Writing in The Hill, Pifer outlines the high stakes of the negotiations:

“The less territory Ukraine must give up and the stronger the security guarantees it receives, the greater the prospects the agreement will prove durable — and that U.S. mediation would be seen as a victory for Trump’s diplomacy. He might even win the Nobel Peace Prize he covets.”

Pifer continues:

“On the other hand, a U.S.-brokered settlement that requires Kyiv to cede a great deal of territory with only weak guarantees would leave Ukraine vulnerable to future Russia attack. Few would regard that outcome as a triumph of American diplomacy.”

Ambassador McFaul also views robust security guarantees for Ukraine as a foundational piece of a successful peace deal. In an article for Foreign Affairs, he used a recent history lesson as evidence against conceding too much while offering too little.

“The lessons from U.S. negotiations with the Taliban during Trump’s first term should inform the president-elect’s thinking about dealing with Putin. The Taliban and the Trump administration negotiated a deal that was highly favorable to the militant group but that the Biden administration nevertheless honored. Its terms included a cease-fire, a timeline for the departure of American forces, and the promise of a future political settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban. The Taliban, however, did not commit to the agreement; instead, they used that peace plan as a way-station on their path to total victory. Appeasement of the Taliban did not create peace. Appeasement of Putin won’t either. Instead of just giving Putin everything he wants—hardly an example of the president-elect’s much-vaunted prowess in dealmaking—Trump should devise a more sophisticated plan, encouraging Ukraine to nominally relinquish some territory to Russia in exchange for the security that would come with joining NATO. Only such a compromise will produce a permanent peace.”

Comments by U.S. officials at the Munich Security Conference and in the days since has left McFaul deeply concerned about Ukraine's influence on the negotiations. Speaking on WBUR’s Here and Now program, he said:

"Zelenskyy is in the fight of his life right now. He is trying to preserve Ukrainian sovereignty, and he's willing to negotiate. But he is very worried he's going to be sold out by the Americans."

Negotiating with Russia


While Ukraine may be feeling sidelined, the groundwork for peace talks with Russia is already being laid in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

As former diplomats, McFaul and Pifer both have direct experience negotiating with the Russian Federation, and both agree that the Kremlin is an extremely shrewd and difficult negotiating partner that requires careful, strategic handling.

As the U.S. delegation continues to meet with their Russian counterparts, McFaul offered his advice on the basics of successful diplomacy via X.

In a post-Munich article for The National Interest, Pifer expands on that basic diplomatic framework with specific suggestions for the U.S. team:

  • If Washington seeks to play an honest broker, senior American officials should not concede points to the Kremlin at the outset.
     
  • Dismissive treatment of European allies on issues directly affecting their security will hardly increase prospects that they will assist U.S. efforts.
     
  • Trump’s first call on ending the war should have gone to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, not Vladimir Putin, and the second set of calls should have gone to senior European leaders. Eagerness to engage with the Kremlin weakens their hand with their Russian counterparts. 
     
  • Steps to build leverage with Russia by asking Congress to approve new military assistance for Ukraine, working with the G7 to transfer frozen Central Russian Bank assets to a fund for Ukraine, and tightening sanctions on Russia should be taken before engaging directly with Russia.

     

Assessing America on the Global Stage


Both Pifer and McFaul share concerns about how negotiations for the end to the war might impact the standing of the United States as a global leader.

Reacting to Vice President’s J.D. Vance’s keynote address at the Munich Security Conference, McFaul was unconvinced that the administration has accurately assessed the threats to America’s national security.

“For someone to come to Europe and say the biggest threat is censorship and a lack of democracy is just analytically incorrect. The data does not support that hypothesis. The greatest threat to Europe is Russia.” 

Ambassador Pifer echoed similar concerns about the United States’ national security priorities. In a discussion with Ian Masters on the Background Briefing podcast, he said:

“Over the past ten years, Putin has made Russia a major adversary to the United States. And it’s not just about the war in Ukraine; they’re moving across the board to try and challenge American interests. They want to weaken and diminish American influence and power.”

If left unchecked, Pifer warns that a sloppy performance negotiating in Ukraine could have far-reaching consequences for American national security.

“Vladimir Putin wants to have a U.S.-Russia negotiation to divide up spheres of influence in Europe. It would be a horrible mistake for the United States to fall into that trap.”

Taking a broad view of current trends in international security and the ripples flowing from the Munich conference, McFaul cautions against an over-reliance on coercive power, or the ability to influence nations to act vis-à-vis the threat of pain or disruption.

Coercive power, McFaul explains on Substack, tends to produce zero-sum outcomes—the powerful get more, and the weak get less.

In contrast, says McFaul, cooperative power typically produces win-win outcomes.

“Like market transactions in which the buyer and seller both benefit from the exchange, everyone is better off from international cooperation, both the weak and the strong.”

Looking to the coming weeks and months of potential negotiations and what it may signal about American leadership more broadly, McFaul urges policymakers to revisit the long-term, tried and tested benefits of cooperation, outreach, and allyship.

“It’s not too late to rethink this singular focus on coercive foreign policy tactics. The United States is not a monarchy or a country run by gangsters. Hopefully, our democratic institutions and norms will allow the American people to engage in a substantive discussion on the wisdom of only relying on coercive power for our security and prosperity.”

To stay up-to-date on the latest research, commentary, and analysis from our scholars, be sure to follow FSI on Bluesky, Threads, X, and Instagram, and subscribe to our newsletters.

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Steven Pifer and Michael McFaul address a room full of students during Stanford University's 2024 Democracy Day.
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Former U.S. Ambassadors Call for Increased Western Assistance to Ukraine

As part of Stanford's 2024 Democracy Day, Michael McFaul and Steven Pifer spoke to students about the war in Ukraine and what the future might bring should Russia be allowed to prevail in its illegal aggression.
Former U.S. Ambassadors Call for Increased Western Assistance to Ukraine
Vladamir Putin at a Victory Day military parade in the Red Square, Moscow
Commentary

Would Putin Attack a NATO Member?

The probability that Putin would challenge a NATO member militarily is not high, but his history of miscalculations and overinflated ambition should remind the alliance not to underestimate the risks.
Would Putin Attack a NATO Member?
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President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky speaks during the 61st Munich Security Conference on February 15, 2025 in Munich, Germany.
President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky speaks during the 61st Munich Security Conference on February 15, 2025 in Munich, Germany. | Getty
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Michael McFaul and Steven Pifer share analysis of where international security seems to be headed, and what it might mean for the U.S., Ukraine, and their partners.

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A warming planet. Backsliding in democracy at home and abroad. Competition with China. And active war in Europe. Broadening conflicts in the Middle East.

The world today is facing no shortage of overlapping, multilateral challenges. At a recent panel titled, “Global Threats Today: What's At Stake and What We Can Do About It,” scholars from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) had an opportunity to delve deeper into what the data says about how these global threats are evolving, and how we should be thinking about how to address them.

The discussion, which was held as part of Stanford University's 2024 Reunion and Homecoming weekend, was moderated by Michael McFaul, director of the Freeman Spogli Institute, and featured Marshall Burke, Didi Kuo, Amichai Magen, Oriana Skylar Mastro, and Steven Pifer.

In the highlights below, each scholar shares what they wish people understood better about climate change, the war in Ukraine and Russia's aggression, China's strategy for building power, the health of American democracy, and how the fighting between Israel and Hamas fits into the geopolitical struggle between democracies and autocracies.

Their full conversation can be heard on the World Class podcast, and the panel can be watched in its entirety on YouTube.
 

Follow the link for a full transcript of "Global Threats Today: The 2024 Edition."


Illiberal Actors Are on the Move  |  Amichai Magen


Around the world, we are seeing a new axis of influence coalescing. Some have called it the "axis of misery" or the "axis of resistance." It is composed of Russia and Iran and North Korea, with a lot of Chinese involvement as well. It is transforming our international system in unbelievable ways. It is united by the desire to dismantle the liberal international order, and we're starting to see the nature and the interconnectivity of this new axis of chaos much more clearly. 

You see North Korean soldiers fighting for Putin in Ukraine. You see Putin helping the Houthis attack international Western shipping in Yemen. We see North Korean tunnel technology turn up in Lebanon with Hezbollah and then with Hamas in Gaza. The interconnectivity is something that we really need to know much more about.

Historically, emperors, kings, dukes, used to spend 50% of their resources on preparing for war or waging war. But in the post-Second World War era, we built a critical norm that we've called the liberal international order. And the miracle of the liberal international order is that we've managed to take global averages of defense spending from about 50% to a global average of about 7%. And the resulting surplus wealth has allowed us to invest in education, health, and scientific discovery.

What is at stake now is the possibility of a return of a norm where states are destroyed and disappear. And we have currently three states in the international system, at the very least — Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan — that are at risk of annihilation. To that end, we must articulate a positive strategic vision for the Middle East that will strive towards a two state solution, that would give the Palestinian people the dignity and the freedom that they deserve alongside a safe and secure Israel, and that will leverage the new spirit of cooperation that exists in the Middle East.

If we allow the norm of the non-disappearance of state to erode and collapse, we will go back to the law of the jungle, where we will have to spend so much more money on the wrong things. That is what is at stake in Ukraine, in the Middle East, and with Taiwan.
 

Amichai Magen

Amichai Magen

Visiting Fellow in Israel Studies at the Freeman Spogli Institute
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Challenges to Democracy Come From Within |  Didi Kuo


Many people think that the threat to democracy comes from outside our borders, particularly from countries like Russia and China that are asserting themselves in new and aggressive ways.

But the real threat to democracies that we're seeing across the globe is coming from within. Leaders come to power through democratic means, but then they begin to erode power from within. They attack the electoral system and the process of democratic elections, and they take power from other branches of government and aggregate it to themselves within the office of the executive. 

The good news is there are examples of countries like France, Brazil, and Poland where illiberal leaders have been stopped by pro-democracy coalitions of people who came together. These coalitions don't necessarily agree with each other politically, but they've come together and adapted in order to foreclose on these anti-democratic forces. 

That flexibility and adaptability is the reason democracies succeed. We see this over and over again in the the United States. When our institutions have become out of date, we've changed them. We extended suffrage, first to Black Americans who were formerly enslaved, then to women, then to Native Americans. We eliminating poll taxes and rethought what it means to have a multiracial democracy. We have a long track record of making changes.

Today in 2024, some of our democratic institutions are antiquated and don't reflect our contemporary values. This is a moment where we should lean into that flexible strength of democracy and think about institutional reforms that will both strengthen our system against illiberal creep and help us better achieve the ideals that we aspiring to as a people.
 

Didi Kuo

Didi Kuo

Center Fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
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Ukraine Is Not Fated to Lose |  Steven Pifer


There's a narrative that's taking place that Russia is winning the war, Ukraine is losing, and it's only a matter of time. And it is true that Russia has captured a bit more territory than they occupied at the start of the year. But they've only achieved that at enormous cost.

As of September, the Pentagon says Russia had lost 600,000 dead and wounded soldiers. To put that in context, in February of 2022 when this major invasion began, the total Russian military — not just the army, but the total Russian military — was 1.1 million people. And the British Ministry of Defense earlier this week assessed that Russia now is losing 1,200 soldiers killed or severely wounded per day. You have to ask how long that's sustainable.

When I talk to Ukrainians, they still regard this war as existential. They're very determined to win, and we need to do a better job of supporting that. A stable and secure Europe is vital to America's national security interests, and you're not going to have a stable and secure Europe unless there's a stable and secure Ukraine. So we need to both provide them the weapons they need and relieve some of the restrictions we currently have and allow the Ukrainians to use those weapons to strike military targets in Russia.

Because we have to ask ourselves: what does an emboldened Vladimir Putin do if he wins in Ukraine? I don't think his ambitions end with Ukraine, perhaps not even with the post-Soviet space. There's going to be a much darker Russian threat hovering over Europe if Putin wins. So let's not count the Ukrainians out.
 

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Steven Pifer

Affiliate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and The Europe Center
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China Isn't Going Away Anytime Soon  |  Oriana Skylar Mastro


There is a lot of discussion right now about the fact that the economy in China is slowing down and its demography is undergoing significant changes. What I'm here to tell you is that the challenge of China is not over, and is not going to be over any time soon. China has built power in a different way than the United States, and we have to reassess how we understand that power if we want to effectively deter, blunt, and block them from acting out in ways that threaten our partners and allies.

Since the 1990s, China has developed a significant amount of political, economic, and military power. They've gone from having an economy smaller than France’s  to the second largest in the world. They've gone from not being involved in international institutions to a great degree, not even having diplomatic relations with major countries like South Korea, to now having stronger and greater diplomatic networks, especially in Asia, than the United States.

What we really need to understand is that the U.S.-China competition is not about the United States or about China; it's about the rest of the world, and how the rest of the world sees us and how China interacts with us. The balance of power is shifting, and we have to be a lot smarter and a lot faster if we want to make sure it shifts in favor of our interests.

The United States hasn't had a comprehensive strategy towards the developing world in a long time. And we are running out of time to get that balance right in Asia. We don't have the right stuff. We don't have it in the right numbers, and it's not in the right place. Some of this is about deterring war over Taiwan, but it's also about generally maintaining peace and stability in Asia.
 

OSM

Oriana Skylar Mastro

FSI Center Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Research Center and the Center for International Security and Cooperation
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We're Doing Better (But Not Enough) on Climate Change |  Marshall Burke


Many people don't recognize how much progress we're actually making on climate issues. Emissions have fallen by 20% since 2005. We're actually speeding up the amount of substantial progress being made in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and dealing with the core climate change problem, which is the human emission of greenhouse gasses.

In the United States, the Inflation Reduction Act and the subsequent implementation of various rules the Biden administration has championed has given a huge boost in transitioning our economy to greener energy technologies, transportation technologies, and other kinds of infrastructure. We're moving a lot of cash to get that done, and the president is trying to get as much of it out the door as he can before his term ends.

Globally, the progress has been less rapid. Emissions are roughly flat. But overall, we're still making progress. I co-teach an undergraduate class on climate change, and we've had to update our slides on how much warming we're expecting over the next century. We thought it was going to be four degrees Celsius. Now we think it's going to be something between two and three degrees Celsius.

But the flip side of that is that we're still going to get warming of two to three degrees Celsius. We're already experiencing warming of about a degree Celsius, which is about two degrees Fahrenheit, and it's projected that we're going to get another three to five degrees Fahrenheit by the end of the century. That is a lot of warming, and we are not prepared to deal with it. We need to do much more on mitigation and much more on adaptation if we're going to meet the realities of living in a changing climate.

So we've had progress on the one hand, but there's still a lot of work left to do in the coming decades.
 

Marshall Burke

Marshall Burke

Deputy Director of the Center on Food Security and the Environment
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[Left to right]: Michael McFaul, Marshall Burke, Steven Pifer, Oriana Skylar Mastro, Didi Kuo, and Amichai Magen on stage.
Scholars from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies offered their insights on climate change, the war between Russia and Ukraine, China's ambitions, the current conflicts in the Middle East, and the state of global democracy during a panel held at Stanford's Reunion weekend. | Melissa Morgan
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At a panel during Stanford's 2024 Reunion weekend, scholars from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies shared what their research says about climate change, global democracy, Russia and Ukraine, China, and the Middle East.

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President Volodymyr Zelensky had high hopes for the NATO summit in Vilnius and a clear message on Ukraine’s membership. The results fell short, but Ukraine today is closer to membership, which Alliance members seem to view as all but inevitable.

Ukrainians make a strong case for joining NATO. They have met most Alliance criteria for aspiring members and have demonstrated with their blood that Ukraine can contribute to Euro-Atlantic security. Ukrainians regard their struggle against Russia not just as a fight for national survival, but also as a fight on behalf of Europe.

Continue reading at time.com

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Ukraine today is closer to membership, which Alliance members seem to view as all but inevitable.

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From June 23 to 25, the world watched as Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the private militia Wagner Group, ordered his fighters to  seize the military headquarters in the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don, demanded the resignation of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov, and advanced his forces toward  Moscow.

The rebellion posed the most significant threat to President Vladimir Putin’s power in his 23-year tenure as Russia’s leader. While the mutiny was abruptly called off following a deal brokered by Belarusian president Aleksandr Lukashenko, the effects continue to reverberate throughout Russia, Eastern Europe, and beyond.

Much is still unknown about the mutiny, Prigozhin’s exile in Belarus, and internal disputes within the Kremlin. But long-time Putin watchers and Russia experts agree that the events of the weekend have significantly weakened Putin’s image as an authoritarian strongman and sole commander of Russia.  

Below, scholars from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies offer their analysis of how the mutiny may impact Russia, Putin’s power, and the war in Ukraine.



Ongoing Problems for Putin

Kathryn Stoner

Writing in Journal of Democracy, Kathryn Stoner, the Mosbacher DIrector of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, explains how the rebellion is both a symptom and cause of Putin’s instability as a leader:

“Putin’s rule relies on individual loyalties rather than institutionalized, transparent chains of command and responsibility. This allows him to retain unrivaled control over a hierarchy of patron-client relationships and to change policies quickly before any real internal elite opposition can coalesce. But the result of such a system is that it operates at the mercy of shifting loyalties and is therefore inherently fragile. The Prigozhin rebellion, therefore, is a symptom of this latent instability within Putinism.”

Stoner, who has written previously about the conditions that lead to regime changes in autocracies, offered her insights in The Atlantic on how Putin might try to recoup from the embarrassment caused by the rebellion:  

“What does all of this tell us about what might now be going on in Russia and how Putin might pursue the war in Ukraine going forward? While to us Putin may look weak and ineffective, he will undoubtedly use his control over the Russian media to pin the rebellion on Ukraine, NATO, and Russia’s other enemies. He may even take credit for avoiding mass casualties in a civil war by making a deal with Prigozhin. Spinning the story as best he can, Putin himself will survive, although his carefully crafted myth of competence will be damaged. Over time, this might erode elite confidence, although it is unlikely to result in an open coup attempt anytime soon.”

Stoner believes that there is “much still to learn about all that has transpired,” but that one thing is certain: Putin’s ill-considered war in Ukraine has weakened his grip on Russia.

“Although this is not the end of the war or of Putin,” she says, “the Wagner rebellion might yet prove the beginning of the end of both.”

Kathryn Stoner

Kathryn Stoner

Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL)
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Impacts on Russia, Ukraine, and Beyond

Michael McFaul

The implications of the 72-hour mutiny will last much longer and extend much further beyond Rostov and Moscow, says FSI Director and former U.S. ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul.

Speaking with Madeline Brand of KRCW, McFaul outlined the difficult situation Putin now finds himself in.

“This whole series of events has made Putin look a lot weaker than he looked three or four days ago. The very fact that the Wagner group exists is a sign of weakness. Putin needs them because he couldn’t rely on his armed forces.”

Elaborating further on Putin’s dilemma, McFaul says:

“As those mercenaries were getting closer to Moscow, Putin went on TV and sounded very macho, calling Prigozhin’s men traitors and promising to crush them, but then four hours later, he capitulates and starts to negotiate. And now he’s given another speech where it sounds like he’s pleading with these mercenaries to lay down their weapons and join the Russian forces. That clearly shows he hasn’t resolved this Wagner crisis yet.”

McFaul predicts that Putin’s remaining partners are also taking note of his fumbled reaction to the rebellion.

“​​If you’re Xi Jinping watching this, the big bet you made on Putin as a partner in opposing the West is looking really problematic right now.”

What Chinese officials fear most, McFaul explained to MSNBC’s Jonathn Capehart, is instability and dissolution, both internally and amongst their neighbors. Historically, the collapse of the Soviet Union was a catastrophic event for Chinese Communist Party officials, and a lesson the current leadership is loath to repeat.

McFaul asserts that, “The longer Putin’s war in Ukraine goes, the more probable it becomes that Russia becomes more unstable. The longer this war goes on, the more likely it is we could see something like this play out over and over again. So I would hope that Xi Jinping understands that putting pressure on Putin to end the war in Ukraine is the best way to prevent chaos on China's borders.”

There are also important lessons the United States and its allies need to consider when evaluating the kind of support they are willing to give Ukraine as the war wears on.

“Putin capitulated very fast, and I think that says a lot about how he’s going to fight in Ukraine and whether he needs an ‘off ramp’ like we’ve been saying. We’ve heard all of these arguments that if he’s backed into a corner he’ll never negotiate. Well, this weekend Putin was in a corner, and he didn't double down. He didn't escalate. He negotiated,” McFaul observes.

Continuing this thought on his Substack, McFaul emphasized that, “The lesson for the war in Ukraine is clear. Putin is more likely to negotiate and end his war if he is losing on the battlefield, not when there is a stalemate. Those who have argued that Ukraine must not attack Crimea for fear of triggering escalation must now reevaluate that hypothesis. The sooner Putin fears he is losing the war, the faster he will negotiate.”

Or, as McFaul writes in Journal on Democracy, “Anything that weakens Putin is good for Ukraine. It is as simple as that.”  

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Michael McFaul

Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
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Fallout on Nuclear Security and Norms

Rose Gottemoeller

Throughout the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there have been concerns about nuclear sabre rattling by Putin and Kremlin-backed propagandists. Writing in the Financial Times, Rose Gottemoeller, the Steven C. Házy Lecturer at CISAC and former Deputy Secretary of NATO offered this insight:

“The fixation with nuclear apocalypse seems to be the symptom of a wider anxiety that the west is bent on Russian dismemberment because of its aspirations in Ukraine. The Kremlin argues that it only wanted to resume its ancestral right to a Slavic heartland, but that the U.S. and NATO are seeking as punishment Russia’s full and complete destruction as a nation state.”

Gottemoeller has been quick to condemn Putin’s casual threats of nuclear use and clear in her recommendations to the U.S. administration and its allies to find constructive ways to keep nuclear arms talks open despite the war in Ukraine and setbacks like Russia’s suspension of its participation in the New START Treaty.

The Wagner takeover of Rostov-on-Don adds a new layer to the security concerns surrounding Russia’s nuclear posture. Looking at the evolution of Putin’s nuclear rhetoric over the last 18 months, Gottemoeller writes:

“Putin embraced nuclear weapons to keep the United States and its NATO allies off his back and out of his way as he pursued his adventure in Ukraine. It did not work out that way. The United States and NATO were not ready to fight inside Ukraine, but they were willing to do everything else to support Kyiv’s cause — economic, political, security and military assistance to ensure Russia’s defeat. Nuclear weapons failed Putin as a guarantee against external meddling.”

Turning to the events of the last week, Gottemoeller continues:

“We learned on June 24 that they are no help to him internally, either. He could not brandish nuclear weapons in the face of the Wagner Group uprising . . . Nuclear weapons are not the authoritarian’s silver bullet when his power is strained to the breaking point — far from it. In fact, they represent a consummate threat to national and global security if they should fall into the wrong hands in the course of domestic unrest.”

In light of Prigozhin’s mutiny, she urges global leaders to “focus on the problem, stop loose nuclear talk, and put new measures in place to protect, control and account for nuclear weapons and the fissile material that go into them.” 

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Rose Gottemoeller

Steven C. Házy Lecturer at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC)
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The Unknown Unknowns of the Settlement

Steven Pifer

Major questions remain about the deal struck between Putin, Prigozhin, and Lukashenko. While Lukashenko has confirmed that the Wagner boss is now in Belarusian territory, it is unclear — and many feel, unlikely — that he will stay there in quiet retirement. 

Weighing in on Twitter, Steven Pifer, an affiliate at the Center for International Cooperation and Security and The Europe Center, and a former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, acknowledged, “We likely do not know all carrots and/or sticks that were in play to lead to Prigozhin’s decision to end his mutiny . . . Something does not add up.”

Following up in Politico, Pifer added:

“The ‘settlement’ supposedly brokered by President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus leaves Putin, who was invisible during the day except for a short morning TV broadcast, as damaged goods. It provided the impression that all was forgiven, likely because the Russian president feared the prospect of Prigozhin’s troops parading in Moscow — even if they lacked the numbers to take control of the capital. It is harder to understand Prigozhin. His demands went unmet, yet he ordered his troops back to garrison, accepted that they might join the Russian army that he detests, and meekly set off for Belarus. There clearly is more behind this ‘settlement’ than we understand.”

Man smiling

Steven Pifer

Affiliate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and The Europe Center
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Understanding Russia and the War in Ukraine

For more commentary and analysis from FSI scholars about the war in Ukraine and events in Russia, follow the link to our resources page, ‘Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine’

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Crew onboard a 'Terminator' tank support fighting vehicle during a Victory Day military parade in Red Square marking the 75th anniversary of the victory in World War II, on June 24, 2020 in Moscow, Russia.
Crew onboard a 'Terminator' tank support fighting vehicle during a Victory Day military parade in Red Square marking the 75th anniversary of the victory in World War II, on June 24, 2020 in Moscow, Russia. | Getty
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Scholars at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies offer insight on what Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny may signal about Russia, Putin’s power, and the war in Ukraine.

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“It’s a victory when the weapons fall silent and people speak up.” Since Russia’s invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has been especially vocal about victory —and glory—for Ukraine. As Zelenskyy put it, his people will fight “whatever the cost.” The cost so far, according to the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, is 18,000 Ukrainian civilian casualties and up to 13,000 Ukrainian soldiers killed. As of February 2023, the U.S. estimates 200,000 dead or wounded Russian soldiers, but that figure may be as high as 270,000.

As well as the discourse surrounding victory, the war has been soaked with references to ethics and justice. U.S. President Joe Biden, for one, has claimed that support for Ukraine is “a profound moral issue” and “the right thing to do.”

But as the tanks first rolled across the border a year ago, Ukraine’s likelihood of defeating Russian aggression was considered remote. Most analysts expected a swift Russian take-over, seemingly doubting the smaller state’s willingness to fight, let alone triumph. Russia’s military ostensibly dwarfed Ukraine’s. Kyiv was forecast by experts to fall within the week. Two days after the invasion, world leaders urged Zelenskyy to leave and offered him a way out—to which he famously retorted, “I need ammunition, not a ride.” In other words, in the very early days, Ukraine did not seem to have a foreseeable prospect of success—or, to put it plainly, a reasonable chance of winning the war.

Continue reading at lawfareblog.com

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“It’s a victory when the weapons fall silent and people speak up.”

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