Last summer, Russian officials and commentators began hinting darkly at changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine that would lower the threshold for use of nuclear weapons.  Public musings over possible doctrinal revisions aimed in part at drawing a red line to dissuade Western leaders from authorizing Ukraine to use Western-provided missiles to strike targets inside Russia.

That line has now been crossed.  The Russian government has released its new doctrine, which indeed suggests a lower nuclear threshold.  However, the Kremlin continues to have reasons not to escalate too far, especially not to the nuclear level, and especially not now.

ATACMS and Storm Shadow

Russian nuclear doctrine has evolved over the past 15 years.  Moscow-based security experts such as Sergey Karaganov began calling for further changes and lowering the nuclear threshold in 2023.  In June, President Vladimir Putin said the Kremlin was considering possible revisions. In September, he described revisions under consideration, which were reflected in the revised doctrine released two months later (see below).

Speculation about a change in Russian doctrine took place as the Western press reported debates in Washington and London over letting Ukraine use U.S. and British missiles to attack targets in Russia. Since 2023, Ukraine’s missile inventory has included the U.S. Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), with a range of 300 kilometers (190 miles), and the British Storm Shadow, with a range of 250 kilometers (155 miles).  However, Washington and London had told Kyiv to limit their use to targets in Ukraine.

On November 17, press reports said Washington had given Kyiv permission to use ATACMS missiles against targets in Russia (the White House confirmed that on November 25).  The Ukrainians launched the first ATACMS wave against an ammunition depot in Bryansk on November 19.  The next day, the Ukrainians used Storm Shadow missiles in other attacks inside Russia.

New Russian Nuclear Doctrine

On November 19, two days after the press reported the U.S. decision, the Kremlin released Russia’s new nuclear doctrine, signed by Putin himself.  Three revisions stand out:

• First, new language states that “Aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its allies by any non-nuclear state with the participation or support of a nuclear state would be considered as their joint attack.”
• Second, while Russia’s 2020 nuclear doctrine said nuclear use would be considered on “receipt of reliable information on the launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies,” the 2024 doctrine adds a new trigger for possible nuclear use:  “receipt of reliable information about a massive launch of air and space attack weapons (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, drones, hypersonic and other aerial vehicles) and their crossing of the state border of the Russian Federation.”
• Third, while Russia’s 2020 doctrine postulated nuclear use in case of “aggression against the Russian Federation with conventional weapons that places the existence of the state in jeopardy,” that was replaced in the 2024 doctrine by “aggression against the Russian Federation and/or the Republic of Belarus as members of a union state with conventional weapons that creates a critical threat to their sovereignty and/or territorial integrity.” 

“Joint attack” implicates the United States and Britain in Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory.  The addition on a “massive launch of air or space attack weapons” defines such weapons in a way that presumably includes ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles.  The third revision replaces a clear line—putting Russia’s existence in jeopardy—with a fuzzier “critical threat” trigger.  Do ATACMS and Storm Shadow attacks pose a critical threat?

Credibility Question

The Kremlin would like Western leaders to worry that Ukraine’s ATACMS and Storm Shadow attacks raise the risk of nuclear conflict.  They likewise hope their nuclear pronouncements will stir public anxieties in the United States and Europe.

However, the lower nuclear threshold hardly seems credible.  If a conventional assault put Russia’s existence at risk, use of nuclear weapons is believable.  But Ukraine’s employment of ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles against targets inside Russia does not threaten Russia’s existence.  Does it pose a critical threat to Russian sovereignty or territorial integrity?  Kyiv’s war aim is to drive the Russian military out of Ukraine, not destroy or occupy Russia.

The Russian “escalation” on November 21 entailed use of a conventionally-armed intermediate-range ballistic missile, the Oreshnik, against Dnipro, Ukraine.  In a statement that evening, Putin said Russia considered itself entitled to hit military facilities of states that allowed other states to use their weapons against Russia.  Yet the target of Russia’s response was in Ukraine.

Reasons for Caution in Moscow

This suggests that, while Moscow has sought to use nuclear threats to dissuade the West from decisions that support Ukraine or better enable its military operations, a degree of caution prevails. Putin understands that an attack on U.S. facilities (either in America or Europe) or on British facilities would almost certainly draw a military response.  The Russian military has its hands full with Ukraine.  It does not want conflict with NATO.

Putin wants the West to believe he is prepared to risk nuclear war, but he does not want nuclear war.  First, Russian use of nuclear weapons in a war that it unleashed would play very badly with audiences important to Putin and the Kremlin in Beijing, New Delhi and elsewhere.

Second, use of nuclear weapons would open a Pandora’s box full of consequences that would be wholly unpredictable and potentially catastrophic—including for Russia.  Putin wants to win the war he has launched against Ukraine.  However, he could lose that war, and Russia would remain with all its territory under Russian control.  How credible is it that he would chance nuclear conflict, which could result in Russia’s devastation, to avoid a loss against Ukraine? Especially when that loss would not endanger the Russian state’s existence?

One more reason argues that Putin will exercise caution.  In less than two months, Donald Trump will be president of the United States.  Trump has rarely criticized the Russian leader and has said nothing in the past two years to suggest he supports American military and financial assistance for Ukraine.  The president-elect is unpredictable.  Hopefully, he will come to understand what is at stake for U.S. security in supporting Ukraine.  But Putin now has an incentive to play things cautiously and see whether Trump will end U.S. aid to Kyiv, which would complicate Ukraine’s position and enhance the prospects of Russian victory—all without any nuclear risk.