December 5 marks the 30th anniversary of the Budapest Memorandum of Security Assurances for Ukraine, a key part of the settlement under which Ukraine gave up what was then the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal. Unfortunately, Russia has grossly violated the commitments that it made in the document.

After more than ten years of war inflicted upon them by Russia, Ukrainians—understandably—question the decision to give up nuclear arms. However, certain myths have arisen around that decision. One is that the United States and Britain violated their Budapest commitments by not going to war against Russia on Ukraine’s behalf.  A second is that Ukraine could have maintained an independent nuclear arsenal.

Trilateral Process*

When it regained independence in 1991, Ukraine had a large nuclear arsenal on its territory. Eliminating the strategic nuclear weapons in Ukraine was a major U.S. policy objective in the early 1990s. Ukraine had committed to be a non-nuclear weapons state, but it wanted several questions resolved. The January 14, 1994 Trilateral Statement signed by the U.S., Ukrainian, and Russian presidents answered those questions.

First, destroying strategic missiles, missile silos and nuclear-capable bombers in Ukraine would be expensive. The United States agreed to cover the costs.

Second, Ukraine wanted compensation for the highly-enriched uranium in the nuclear warheads transferred to Russia for elimination. The Russians agreed to provide Ukraine fuel rods for nuclear reactors with an equivalent amount of low enriched uranium.

Third, Ukraine sought security guarantees. The United States and Britain were prepared to provide security assurances but not “guarantees,” as the term implied a commitment to use military force. The U.S. government would not provide such a guarantee. In any case, it is doubtful the Senate would have consented to ratification of such an agreement.

U.S. and British Commitments

The Trilateral Statement contained nearly verbatim the text of the December 5, 1994 Budapest Memorandum, promising security assurances once Ukraine acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state (it did so in November 1994). The memorandum committed the United States, Britain and Russia to respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and existing borders and not to use or threaten to use force against Ukraine.

The memorandum committed the United States and Britain to seek UN Security Council assistance for Ukraine, but it did not commit those two countries take to military action with their own forces against Russia if it violated its commitments—as Russia did in 2014, when it seized Crimea and fought in Donbas, and in 2022, when it launched an all-out invasion. In response to Ukrainian questions when negotiating the assurances, U.S. officials said the United States would take action if Russia violated its commitments but that would not include sending American military forces.

The officials did not discuss specific steps Washington would take. That reflected failure, on the part of Americans and Ukrainians, to foresee in 1993-94 what Russia did in 2014 and 2022. Had Ukrainian officials foreseen those actions, Kyiv almost certainly would have sought more solid guarantees, which the United States and Britain were not prepared to give. Negotiations would have been at an impasse. What would have happened then is unclear.

Keeping Nuclear Weapons? At What Cost?

Absent the 1994 agreements, many seem to believe Ukraine could have maintained a nuclear arsenal. In fact, it would have encountered likely insurmountable challenges. Soviet warheads were believed to have a relatively short shelf-life, and most of the infrastructure to build and support the warheads was located in Russia.

To sustain an independent nuclear arsenal, Ukraine would have had to make a huge investment to build the necessary infrastructure at a time when the country’s economy was sharply contracting. Ukrainian officials briefly considered what it would take to retain some strategic nuclear weapons if there were a political decision to abandon the policy of becoming a non-nuclear weapons state. They concluded that Ukraine could not afford the needed infrastructure.

Had Ukraine nevertheless tried to keep nuclear weapons, it would have incurred significant political and economic costs. The deepening of relations with the West—including the 1994 EU-Ukraine partnership and cooperation agreement, 1996 declaration of a U.S.-Ukraine strategic partnership, and 1997 establishment of the NATO-Ukraine distinctive partnership—would not have happened with a nuclear-armed Ukraine.

Moreover, the United States and Europe would not have launched the large-scale assistance programs of the later 1990s to help Ukraine reform, modernize and address specific problems such as shutting down the Chornobyl nuclear plant. Ukraine would have been blocked from low-interest loans from the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Of course, many in Ukraine might now regard these costs as bearable in order to sustain a nuclear arsenal. Alternative histories are by nature speculative. Had Ukraine attempted to keep nuclear arms, would Russia in 1994 have tolerated that? War might well have broken out then, and Ukraine would have faced Russia without Western support.

Moreover, had the conflict threatened to escalate to the nuclear level, Ukraine would have found itself at a disadvantage. Ukraine could have attacked some Russian nuclear weapons systems, but Russia would have retained surviving nuclear forces sufficient to devastate Ukraine. The reverse was not true. A Russian first strike could have destroyed the vast majority of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine, leaving Kyiv little with which to respond.

Conclusion

Ukrainian frustration now over denuclearization 30 years ago is understandable. It should be equally understandable why Washington sought elimination of those strategic weapons: they were designed, built and deployed to incinerate cities and other targets in the United States.

Over the past three years, the U.S. government has provided Ukraine well over $100 billion in military and financial assistance. That is consistent with what U.S. officials told Ukrainians in 1993-94 when they said Washington would act if Russia violated its Budapest commitments.

That said, the United States should have provided, and should provide, more assistance, with the goal of helping Ukraine prevail. That is not due just to U.S.-Ukrainian discussions three decades ago but to the fact that a Russian victory would mean a more dangerous Russian threat to Europe and America.

*For a more detailed discussion of Ukraine’s denuclearization, see “The Trilateral Process:  The United States, Ukraine, Russia and Nuclear Weapons,” https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-trilateral-process-the-united-states-ukraine-russia-and-nuclear-weapons/.