February 24 marks the third anniversary of Russia’s all-out assault on Ukraine. The Kremlin failed in its attempt to achieve a quick victory, and the war has become one of attrition, with neither side making dramatic breakthroughs on the battlefield. Russia had momentum in 2024 but recorded only modest territorial gains and failed to evict Ukrainian forces from Russia’s Kursk region.

President Donald Trump’s bid to broker an end to the fighting has been marked by early missteps. Reaching a durable settlement will require that both sides, particularly the Russians, move off of deeply entrenched positions. Absent a well-conceived strategy for brokering an agreement, the president’s mediation attempt will fail, and the war will continue. What happens matters to the United States. Should the Kremlin win—either on the battlefield or as the result of a shoddy deal—Russia will pose an even larger threat to Europe and to key American interests.

A long and costly conflict

The Russia-Ukraine war, the bloodiest in Europe since World War II, began 11 years ago. Following Ukraine’s Maidan Revolution, Russian forces seized Crimea in early 2014. Russia subsequently became involved in fighting in the Donbas, which left Russian and Russian proxy forces occupying parts of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine.

Russia’s multi-vector invasion on February 24, 2022, appeared to have two objectives: quickly take Kyiv, and occupy the eastern one-half to two-thirds of Ukraine. To the surprise of virtually all, Ukrainian forces stopped the Russian army short of the capital, drove it out of the north, and later launched successful counteroffensives in the east and south. The Ukrainians launched further counteroffensives in 2023, but equipment limitations and extensive Russian defensive fortifications stymied those operations. By early 2024, the war had become one of attrition.

Ukraine’s military, which musters about 900,000 compared to 1.3 million for Russia, has struggled with manpower issues, though it is trying new ways to attract recruits. As they have since 2022, the Ukrainians remain critically dependent on Western weapons and munitions. The Trump administration has not sought new congressional funding for military assistance for Kyiv, which means the flow of U.S. weapons at some point will cease, as it did when funding ran out in late 2023 (that hurt Ukraine). Europe’s defense industrial base would have a difficult time meeting Ukrainian needs on its own.

If one side had momentum in 2024, it was the Russians, but they secured only limited territorial gains. At the beginning of 2025, the Russian military controlled about 18% of Ukraine’s territory. It added 1,500 square miles over the course of 2024, but that amounts to less than 1% of Ukraine. The Russian military has failed to reclaim part of Russia’s Kursk region that the Ukrainian army seized in August.

The Russians have paid an enormous cost over the past three years, by one estimate suffering 172,000 dead and 611,000 wounded, many of them severely. (While the Ukrainians have also suffered heavy casualties, they are believed to be significantly less.) The Russians have also suffered huge equipment losses, including some 14,000 main battle tanks and armored vehicles.

Wide differences separate Russian and Ukrainian conditions for peace

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 2022 decision to invade increasingly looks like an epic blunder, but he has continued the war, despite rising costs that also include sanctions on Russia. He placed his economy on a war footing and believes Russia can outlast Ukraine, given its larger population and economy. He has shown no serious interest in negotiating except on his terms.

Putin fundamentally does not accept Ukraine’s right to exist as a sovereign and independent state. He initially demanded that Ukraine demilitarize, accept neutrality, and recognize Crimea as Russian and the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics” as independent states. In September 2022, Putin supposedly annexed Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson—even though Russian forces did not occupy all of those territories. He made Kyiv’s acceptance of those annexations a condition for a settlement. It is not just land but the people on the land that are under Russian occupation. Those areas have been described as “a totalitarian hell” where “all traces of Ukraine are being expunged.”

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s top demands in 2022 were full Russian withdrawal and restoration of Ukraine’s 1991 borders, compensation for damages in Ukraine, and bringing war criminals to account (that would include Putin, indicted by the International Criminal Court for the removal of Ukrainian children to Russia). Many Ukrainians regard the war as existential, which explains the country’s fierce resistance.

However, recent polls suggest a majority of Ukrainians favor negotiations, though a significant part of the population opposes territorial concessions. That could limit Zelenskyy’s freedom of maneuver in any talks. In late 2024, he appeared to signal some flexibility, saying the fighting could end with the return of Ukrainian lands to be pursued via diplomatic means, provided that Ukraine received membership in NATO.

Trump brokering a settlement?

Trump has long asserted he could quickly broker an end to the war. The main negotiating will have to take place between Ukrainians and Russians, and Europe should be involved. However, Putin will seek to do a deal bilaterally with Trump over the heads of Zelenskyy and European leaders. Such a bilateral negotiation would fail.

The Trump administration began its mediation effort in February, stepping off on the wrong foot. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth termed Ukraine’s goals of recovering all its territory and NATO membership “unrealistic.” Hegseth seemingly conceded two key points to Moscow before sitting down at the bargaining table. That is not the way to negotiate with the Kremlin. Trump later had a phone conversation with Putin, after which he pronounced the Russian leader desirous of peace and said they would soon meet. Trump then called Zelenskyy but told the press he agreed with Hegseth on territory and NATO.

Vice President JD Vance seemingly had a chance at the Munich Security Conference to clean up some of the damage but bizarrely ignored the elephant in the room: Russia’s war on Ukraine.

The abrupt changes in U.S. policy provoked consternation in European capitals, except for Moscow, where they were greeted with jubilation. Zelenskyy said he had hoped to coordinate first with Washington on a plan “to stop Putin” and made clear no deal could be made without Ukraine’s participation. European leaders likewise stressed their need to be involved, with the European Union foreign policy chief saying, “any deal behind our backs will not work.”

Trump first should have spoken with Zelenskyy, the leader of a country that has been an American partner for some 30 years. Trump needs to understand where Zelenskyy does and does not have flexibility before going too far with Putin. Trump next should have spoken to key European leaders. His administration expects Europe to do a lot, including providing peacekeeping or security forces for Ukraine, with no U.S. military involvement.

Instead, the administration charged ahead. Secretary of State Marco Rubio met Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on February 18 for talks that covered the Russia-Ukraine war. The Ukrainians were not present.

Putin will be the most recalcitrant player in a negotiation. Trump should marshal leverage with him by asking Congress for more money for Ukraine, working with the G7 to turn frozen Russian Central Bank assets over to Kyiv, and tightening sanctions—steps that would make clear to Putin that continuing the war instead of compromising will mean greater costs for Russia. So far, however, he has done nothing to gain leverage.

The administration’s first steps will undermine its prospects for success. First, having signaled an eagerness to engage Moscow and agreement with key Kremlin positions, the administration will find it harder to move the Russians to acceptable compromises. Second, it has alienated Europeans whom it hopes will provide military forces to implement a settlement and provide security guarantees to Ukraine. Third, it has raised concerns in Kyiv that the Ukrainians will confront a U.S.-Russian fait accompli.  At the end of the day, success requires that Kyiv as well as Moscow agree to terms.

A darker interpretation of the administration’s unseemly rush to engage Moscow is that these missteps are not accidents or “rookie” mistakes but a deliberate plan that is fully prepared to throw Ukraine (and Europe with it) under the bus in order to curry favor with Putin, perhaps with the goal of peeling Russia off from China. If so, the administration badly misunderstands Putin’s relationship with Xi Jinping and Russia’s dependence on China.

Such a “plan” would fail to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing. It would mean the continuation of the Russia-Ukraine war, with Kyiv’s position badly undercut by the end of U.S. assistance. It would cause Europe to scramble for alternative security arrangements in the face of a growing Russian threat and to be less likely to support the administration’s drive to contain China. Putin would have scored gains, while the United States would have little to show in return. The blame for that foreign policy failure would rest squarely on Trump’s head.

Assuming missteps rather than intent, the administration’s rocky start has made its task as broker more difficult. Failure will mean that Russia and Ukraine continue the war. It will also lay bare Trump’s weakness as a global negotiator. Will he self-correct and create the basis to broker a just and durable peace? If he wants to succeed, he and his administration need to do much better.

Originally posted to brookings.edu