In this study the author examines the ways in which intelligence is being used in order to understand how and why it often goes unused, and what, if anything, can be done about it.
Information warfare is a relatively new rubric, which is receiving increasing attention within the United States from both the government and the general population. Recent studies and Congressional hearings have discussed the vulnerability of the U.S. civil infrastructure to information sabotage, perpetrated by both state and non-state actors. Most recently, President Clinton established the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection to identify vulnerabilities in the nation's overall infrastructure and to recommend policy actions to reduce them. One of the areas that the Commission will investigate is the nation's information infrastructure. For instance, the armed services foresee new uses for digital systems to enhance military capabilities, but they also recognize the growing U.S. vulnerability that might be exploited with the techniques of information warfare.
The existence of softer and perhaps more critical homeland targets is creating interest in information warfare at a strategic level. That interest has two very different themes: new weapons the United States might use against an adversary and, in the hands of others, new threats to U.S. civil information-system-dependent infrastructure. The latter, the defensive concern, is currently receiving the larger measure of public attention.
This paper reviews the activities and accomplishments of the Chinese space community in international cooperation and discusses appropriate ways of further cooperation with other nations. It is part of an effort to study how to enhance China's space industry and to share with the rest of the world the benefits of fair exploitation of outer space, which belongs to all mankind.
How can scholars translate knowledge concerning problems ofpeace and security across the boundaries of academic disciplines and intellectual frameworks? By what standard should one judge such knowledge? In a rich essay, which may be read fruitfully on many levels, David Dessler argues that we must look beyond epistemological differences between positivist and non-positivist approaches and focus on pragmatics: the purposes for which, and context within which, knowledge is generated. Dessler distinguishes between predictive knowledge, which seeks to identify causal relationships with general validity, and reconstructive knowledge, which explores critically the categories, assumptions, and purposes of predictive theory. Neither form of knowledge can claim precedence; both are crucial for a holistic understanding of phenomena from which social scientists can never fully divorce themselves. Dessler substantiates this distinction by showing the utility of six works in the area of peace and security: Jack Snyder's Myths of Empire, Charles Hale's Resistance and Contradiction, Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work, Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer's The Great Arch, James Ferguson's The AntiPolitics Machine, and David Holloway's Stalin and the Bomb.
Dessler concludes with a warning: the social relevance of research can never be fixed since the audience for the research is not under the deterministic control of the scientist. Dessler's essay stands as a beacon for those seeking to forge a broad-based and responsible science of peace and security.
An earlier version of this essay occasioned a workshop, sponsored by the MacArthur Foundation Consortium on International Peace and Cooperation, on "Talking Across Disciplines in the Study of Peace and Security." A summary of the discussion follows the essay.
The Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) at Stanford University convened a workshop that dealt almost exclusively with software groups from the military-industrial complex. It also excludes any examples of software initiatives in Russia that are currently directed at the Russian market; however, it is the author's undocumented impression that there is not yet much commercial activity in this area.
This report is based primarily on the presentations and discussions at the workshop and secondarily on additional case data. The process of selecting cases for the workshop was not geared to find these failures as easily as those cases in which there is an ongoing activity. Nonetheless, the tendency toward success in software ventures versus
manufacturing ventures in the enterprises that are included is compelling.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, global economic competition has come to play an increasingly important role in defining national security and the shape of the future world order. As international conflict shifts from military to economic competitiveness, many nations are now hoping to extract economic advantage from their investments in defense research and production. This volume brings together papers on several key aspects of defense commercialization and attempts to bridge the divide between research on conversion efforts in the United States and studies of transition in post-Communist economies.
The economic, political, and social changes underway in the former Soviet Union are of unprecedented scale and importance. Figures published in March 1993 cite that 839 defense enterprises, employing a total of four million workers, were undergoing conversion; 600 conversion programs were in effect to guide the process, and conversion of 400 of those enterprises was expected to be complete by the end of the year. In this process, 410,000 people, 210,000 of them engineers and technicians, have left the employ of the military industrial complex. These changes will affect all spheres of post-Soviet society, including the economy, social integrity, science, and culture, for decades to come. The complete restructuring of Russia's economic and social life will mandate in turn significant changes in the scientific establishment and its place in post-Soviet society.
This report examines the cost and benefits, both national security and economic, of export controls on certain high-technology, dual-use items including computers, microprocessors, commercial aircraft, and methodsfor data security. We also consider the nature and implications of U.S. unilateral export controls and sanctions, emphasizing the U.S. unilateral embargoes to certain proscribed states, the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI), and u.s. mandatory sanctions policy under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). We analyze a few cases in detail rather than offer a generic, and inherently less thorough, review of all dualuse items. Assessments of the utility of high-technology controls cannot be made independently of a detailed analysis of the specific items and destinations subject to controls.
This report comprises a description, summary, and analysis of an entrepreneurial training workshop for Russian nuclear scientists held at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), May 9-20, 1994. This is the third in a series of such workshops. The first workshop was held in Boston, July, 1992. The second was held in Moscow, June, 1993. The workshop was cosponsored by the U.s. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy (Minatom).
The goals of the workshop were to provide the Russian scientists with academic and practical background in several basic business areas, and then to assist them, in conjunction with American industry representatives, in the preparation of business plans for possible cooperative projects.
