In July 1996, President Clinton established the Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, with a charter to designate critical infrastructures and assess their vulnerabilities, to recommend a comprehensive national policy and implementation strategy for protecting those infrastructures from physical and cyber threats, and to propose statutory or regulatory actions to effect the recommended remedies. The charter gives examples of critical infrastructures (telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil storage and transportation, banking and finance, transportation, water supply systems, emergency services, and continuity of government), and also notes the types of cyber threats of concern (electronic, radio-frequency, or computer-based attacks on the information or communications components that control critical infrastructures).

Some of the critical infrastructures are owned or controlled by the government, and hence the government can, in principle, harden and restructure these systems and control access to achieve a greater degree of robustness. However, the President's executive order recognizes that many of the critical infrastructures are developed, owned, operated, or used by the private sector and that government and private sector cooperation will be required to define acceptable measures for the adequate protection and assurance of continued operation of these infrastructures.

The Stanford Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC), as part of its ongoing Program on Information Technology and National Security, and the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) are conducting workshops to examine many of the issues connected with the work of the Commission. In addition to the questions of vulnerabilities, threats, and possible remedies, we discuss the impact on the marketplace of possible protective actions, cost in terms of capital and functionality, legal constraints, and the probable need for international cooperation.

The first of these jointly sponsored workshops was held March 10-11, 1997, and included participation by members and staff of the Presidential Commission; the Stanford community; the information technology industry; and by security specialists at infrastructure organizations, research companies, and the national laboratories. The results of this two-day meeting are summarized in the following report.

By the end of 1995, China had built the world's ten largest telecommunications networks and the industry was growing at a faster rate than any other sector of the booming Chinese economy. For example, the country's 40 million telephone subscribers with 50 million telephone numbers represented an average annual growth rate of nearly 100 percent over a ten-year period. Internet users served by ChinaNet jumped from 6,000 in 1995 to 53,739 in March 1997. Progress was qualitative as well, as China procured state-of-the-art fiber-optic and satellite technologies and narrowed the gap between itself and the United States and between its own urban and rural areas. The achievement can be attributed to the government's commitment to telecommunications as the key to further development--a commitment backed by preferential policies; to foreign financial and technical support; and to changing attitudes of the Chinese people themselves.

However, China faces some major problems. The gap in living standards between coastal and interior provinces is widening, as people migrate from poor villages to increasingly affluent cities. The government must focus more on developing isolated regions. Rapid development of telecommunications cannot be sustained under a government monopoly, which aids the government's economic and security interests but discourages foreign companies from investing and transferring technology. At the same time, there has been little headway in developing domestic telecommunications products. Management of the industry is chaotic in the absence of clear regulations, and a multilayered bureaucracy encourages wasted resources, duplication, red tape, and corruption. Political problems are likely to emerge as telecommunications continues to help open Chinese society and young Chinese come to embrace Western industrial culture.

Nevertheless, China is destined to become and remain the world's "super market" as long as it remains politically stable in its transition from a plannned to a market economy. Telecommunications will continue to play a key role during this transition.

As a result of the rapid changes following the breakup of the Soviet bloc, there were suddenly new markets of hundreds of millions of people, covering a large portion of the earth, containing large fractions of many of the world's natural resources, possessing extensive research and production capacity, with a highly educated workforce, and utilizing many advanced technologies. Russia contained a large fraction of these factors, especially those oriented toward high technology, and hence it behooves international companies to formulate and implement strategies for doing business in Russia.

This particular study was undertaken because the quest for cooperative ventures has been a major portion of the strategy of many Russian defense enterprises and U.S. companies in addressing these changes. We deemed it important to gain a better understanding of the factors affecting companies' and enterprises' decisions regarding cooperative ventures and some of the determinants of success, as well as to analyze strategies for U.S. companies and Russian enterprises contemplating or participating in cooperative ventures.

The conclusions in this report are based on case-study interviews with companies and enterprises engaged in cooperative ventures. All of the Russian enterprises in our study, with the exception of some start-ups, had been heavily involved in military work; the American companies were from both the military and civilian sectors.

The development of "information warfare" presents international legal issues that will complicate nations' efforts both to execute and to respond to certain information warfare attacks, specifically those using computers, telecommunications, or networks to attack adversary information systems. Some legal constraints will certainly apply to information warfare, either because the constraints explicitly regulate particular actions, or because more general principles of international law govern the effects of those actions. Nevertheless, the novelty of certain information warfare techniques may remove them from application of established legal categories. Furthermore, the ability of signals to travel across international networks, and affect systems in distant countries, conflicts with the long-standing principle of national, territorial sovereignty.

On March 4 and 5, 1996, the Stanford Center for International Security and Arms Control, in conjunction with the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, convened a research planning conference on "Police Reform in States under Transition." The conference was unusual in that its primary purpose was to foster an ongoing discussion between academics working in the area of democratization and police reform, and policymakers running police reform programs in countries such as Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, South Africa, and EI Salvador. Our primary goal for the conference was to construct a research agenda that would allow continued dialogue between scholars and policymakers, and would focus on questions of theory and practice immediately applicable to policymakers in the field.

Participants in the conference included Robert Perito, Special Advisor to the Director of the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), U.S. Department of Justice; Frederick Mecke, Director, Office of International Criminal Justice, U.S. Department of State; Arnstein Overkil, Police Major General of Asker and Baerum Police Headquarters in Norway, and advisor to the Palestinian Authority on policing; Diana Gordon, Chair of the Department of Political Science at City College of New York; Louise Shelley, professor in the Department of Justice, Law and Society at American University; William Stanley from the Department of Political Science at the University of New Mexico; Jeffrey Ian Ross, a fellow at the National Institute of Justice; and faculty and staff from Stanford University and the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.

In this study the author examines the ways in which intelligence is being used in order to understand how and why it often goes unused, and what, if anything, can be done about it.

Information warfare is a relatively new rubric, which is receiving increasing attention within the United States from both the government and the general population. Recent studies and Congressional hearings have discussed the vulnerability of the U.S. civil infrastructure to information sabotage, perpetrated by both state and non-state actors. Most recently, President Clinton established the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection to identify vulnerabilities in the nation's overall infrastructure and to recommend policy actions to reduce them. One of the areas that the Commission will investigate is the nation's information infrastructure. For instance, the armed services foresee new uses for digital systems to enhance military capabilities, but they also recognize the growing U.S. vulnerability that might be exploited with the techniques of information warfare.

The existence of softer and perhaps more critical homeland targets is creating interest in information warfare at a strategic level. That interest has two very different themes: new weapons the United States might use against an adversary and, in the hands of others, new threats to U.S. civil information-system-dependent infrastructure. The latter, the defensive concern, is currently receiving the larger measure of public attention.

This paper reviews the activities and accomplishments of the Chinese space community in international cooperation and discusses appropriate ways of further cooperation with other nations. It is part of an effort to study how to enhance China's space industry and to share with the rest of the world the benefits of fair exploitation of outer space, which belongs to all mankind.

How can scholars translate knowledge concerning problems ofpeace and security across the boundaries of academic disciplines and intellectual frameworks? By what standard should one judge such knowledge? In a rich essay, which may be read fruitfully on many levels, David Dessler argues that we must look beyond epistemological differences between positivist and non-positivist approaches and focus on pragmatics: the purposes for which, and context within which, knowledge is generated. Dessler distinguishes between predictive knowledge, which seeks to identify causal relationships with general validity, and reconstructive knowledge, which explores critically the categories, assumptions, and purposes of predictive theory. Neither form of knowledge can claim precedence; both are crucial for a holistic understanding of phenomena from which social scientists can never fully divorce themselves. Dessler substantiates this distinction by showing the utility of six works in the area of peace and security: Jack Snyder's Myths of Empire, Charles Hale's Resistance and Contradiction, Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work, Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer's The Great Arch, James Ferguson's The AntiPolitics Machine, and David Holloway's Stalin and the Bomb.

Dessler concludes with a warning: the social relevance of research can never be fixed since the audience for the research is not under the deterministic control of the scientist. Dessler's essay stands as a beacon for those seeking to forge a broad-based and responsible science of peace and security.

An earlier version of this essay occasioned a workshop, sponsored by the MacArthur Foundation Consortium on International Peace and Cooperation, on "Talking Across Disciplines in the Study of Peace and Security." A summary of the discussion follows the essay.

The Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) at Stanford University convened a workshop that dealt almost exclusively with software groups from the military-industrial complex. It also excludes any examples of software initiatives in Russia that are currently directed at the Russian market; however, it is the author's undocumented impression that there is not yet much commercial activity in this area.

This report is based primarily on the presentations and discussions at the workshop and secondarily on additional case data. The process of selecting cases for the workshop was not geared to find these failures as easily as those cases in which there is an ongoing activity. Nonetheless, the tendency toward success in software ventures versus
manufacturing ventures in the enterprises that are included is compelling.