Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) started a project in early 1990 following a proposal from Marshal Akhromeyev,specialadvisor to President Gorbachev and Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.  The intent was to bring a delegation of Soviet defense executives, government officials and academicians to the United States. The objectives of the project were to study and assi§t the process of demilitarization through the diversion of military production assets, broadly interpreted (facilities, personnl., technology, etc.), and to building a civilian industry and infrastructure. In spite of changes in the project agenda, the objectives remain the same. These objectives are being addressed by informing the debate in the Russian and American
governments as well as in the international financial institutions, recommending innovative conversion efforts, interacting directly with Russian defense enterprises and American companies interested in cooperative business activities, and participating in scholarly analyses through publications and topical conferences.

The problem of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war has been couched largely in terms of superpower confrontations during a crisis. Whether the focus is on the major powers, or on developing nations with ballistic missiles and probable nuclear weapons capability, stability in those who handle weapons and effective safeguards on use are essential preventive measures. The United States and the USSR have been careful to guard against unauthorized launch. All nuclear nations have been concerned with retaining ultimate control of nuclear weapons in civilian hands; with monitoring the reliability and stability of the forces that handle the weapons; and with preventing weapons from coming into the possession of outsiders. In 1986, an analysis of the sources of human instability in those who handle nuclear weapons concluded that thousands of unstable individuals were involved in "minding our missiles."1 The present paper serves as an update on the problem and links it to potential areas of increasing risk as the world changes.

In recent years, world attention has been drawn to the acquisition by developing countries of delivery systems for nuclear weapons as distinct from the nuclear warheads themselves. In particular, concerns have been raised about the spread of ballistic-missile systems and technologies to areas such as theMiddle East, in which there are strong regional tensions.  The extensive use of ballistic missiles in the "war of the cities" in 1988 during the Iran-Iraq War and the use of Scud missiles by Iraq against Israel and Saudi Arabia during Desert Storm highlighted the rapid proliferation of these weapons, and served as a premonition of worse things to come if and when developing states deploy ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction.  The ballistic missiles of concern have ranges of a hundred to a few thousand kilometers (km) and can carry payloads of up to one or two thousand kilograms (kg). These systems are becoming increasingly prominent in Third World arsenals, and are perceived as threatening stability and regional military balances.

This study examines the impact of ballistic-missile proliferation, focusing on sixteen regional states which have or soon could have ballistic-missile capabilities.  Specifically, the study: (1) evaluates the military effectlveness of ballistic missiles in comparison with advanced strike aircraft, (2) identifies trends in the supply of and demand for ballistic missiles, (3) identifies key technologies and systems whose control is essential to a successful missile non-proliferation regime, (4) reviews the relevancy and effectiveness of present control mechanisms including the MlssiIe Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and (5) offers policy options for strengthening controls on the acquisition by developing states of longer-range ground strike delivery systems, including ballistic missiles and advanced combat aircraft.

In this report, the author addresses:

(1) the basis for federal government intervention in energy markets;
(2) the mechanisms DOE employed to assist in the commercialization of energy technology;
(3) the energy development cycle and the problem of deciding where government support is best allocated; and
(4) his observations about the lessons learned.

For all the time and frustration that humans expend interacting with computers, it is surprising that more attention is not paid to the impact the computers used by armed forces might have on security and peace. The military, like the rest of us, is dependent on its computers and interacts with them unceasingly, often in critical situations. Never before have our armies been so intimately dependent on their tools, certainly not ones as complex, or as apparently capricious as misapplied computers can be. This paper looks at the ways in which this peculiar human involvement with computer systems requires special attention, most critically in the military context, from policymakers and researchers.

It is the American view that Japan has been totally dependent on the United States for its national security, and that this favorable condition has enabled the Japanese to dedicate themselves fully to economic development with no significant military burden. The competitive edge of many U.S. industries, including those of steel, shipbuilding, electrical appliances, motorcycles, office equipment, automobiles, and computers, has eroded considerably since the 1960s, and Japan has taken all the blame for the downfall. The U.S. semiconductor industry is on the verge of falling behind because of aggressive Japanese sales policies.  Moreover, Japan has for years protected its domestic industries so the U.S. industries have struggled in vain to penetrate the Japanese market.  Some U.S. critics argue that the disputes over a huge trade imbalance between the two countries can best be explained by these unfair Japanese advantages. The invisibility of the role of Japanese contribution toward western security has also intensified irritation in the U.S. Congress. The recent controversy over the FS-X (fighter supporter) project of the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) evolved out of these circumstances. The details of and epilogue to this controversy are discussed in this paper.

This report analyzes a simulation, conducted in the spring of 1984 at Stanford University, of a hypothetical U.S.-Soviet crisis in Germany.  The simulation was organized by the Center for International Security and Arms Control as a part of the course, Political Science 138B, "Arms Control and Disarmament Seminar."

The purpose of this study is not to predict whether or not inadvertent war in Europe will occur but to understand how it might possibly occur and how better to avoid it.  The utility of the crisis simulation lies in the insights it provides regarding (1) difficult policy dilemmas likely to be experienced at many points in a crisis and (2) possibilities for misperception, misjudgment, and escalation that inhere in the process of interaction between the two sides in a crisis.