International Law
Authors
Steven Pifer
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

This piece originally appeared at Brookings.

On November 25, Russian border patrol ships attacked and seized three Ukrainian naval vessels attempting to transit from the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov via the Kerch Strait. That violated both maritime law and a 2003 Ukraine-Russia agreement that governs passage through the strait.

The attack foreshadows a Russian bid to establish unilateral control over the Kerch Strait and perhaps blockade Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov. Unfortunately, the United States and Europe have reacted weakly, largely limiting their responses to expressions of concern. The West should make clear that Russia will face concrete consequences if it does not release the Ukrainian naval vessels and crews and allow Ukraine free passage through the strait.

WHAT HAPPENED?

On the morning of November 25, three Ukrainian naval vessels—a tug and two small gunboats—approached the southern entrance to the Kerch Strait. After transiting the Black Sea from Odesa, they sought to pass through the strait to a Ukrainian port on the Sea of Azov, following a course taken by two other Ukrainian gunboats in September. Although they were military vessels, the Ukrainian ships had a right of innocent passage. Moreover, a 2003 agreement between Ukraine and Russia states that Ukrainian- and Russian-flagged ships, both merchant ships and state non-commercial vessels, have a right to free navigation in the Strait of Kerch and Sea of Azov, which the sides consider the internal waters of Ukraine and Russia.

While Ukrainian and Russian accounts differ as to some details of what happened, their stories coincide on key points. Russian border patrol vessels intercepted the three Ukrainian ships in the southern approach to the strait, and the Russian vessel Don rammed the Ukrainian tug Yani Kapu. Video and audio from the Don make clear the Don’s intention to ram.

The Ukrainians say the Russian vessels sought to ram the Berdyansk and Nikipol gunboats as well, but the smaller, more agile Ukrainian ships successfully maneuvered out of the way (Russian aerial photos show the sides’ ships circling and maneuvering). In the process, it appears that the Russian vessel Izumrud rammed, or was rammed by, another Russian ship, possibly the Don.

The three Ukrainian ships then maintained station for much of the day in Russian-controlled waters at the south entrance to the Kerch Strait. In the meantime, the Russians physically blocked the main passage through the strait, positioning a tanker under the central span of the Kerch bridge.

That evening, apparently having concluded that they would not be allowed passage into the Sea of Azov, the Ukrainian vessels turned south toward the Black Sea, exiting the approach to the strait. Russian border patrol vessels intercepted the Ukrainian ships, ordered them to halt and then opened fire, wounding several Ukrainian crewmen. The Russians boarded and seized the Ukrainian vessels. Crucially, as Bellingcat has showed, Ukrainian and Russian data agree that the attack took place in the Black Sea more than 12 nautical miles off the coast of Russian-occupied Crimea—that is, in international waters. The Russian action is indefensible, particularly as the Ukrainian ships clearly were heading away from the Kerch Strait when attacked.

WHAT’S AT ISSUE?

Since seizing Crimea in 2014, the Russians have moved to tighten control over the Sea of Azov. The bridge they built to link the city of Kerch in Crimea to the Taman peninsula on the Russian mainland prevents the passage of larger ships that used to call at the Ukrainian port of Mariupol on the Sea of Azov. Mariupol is Ukraine’s third busiest port, exporting steel, iron and grain. Over the past nine months, the Ukrainians have complained that Russian patrol boats have stopped, boarded and/or harassed commercial vessels bound for Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov as well as Ukrainian fishing boats.

Russia seems to be trying to establish unilateral control over passage through the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov. The Ukrainians fear that Russia will impose an economic blockade on Ukrainian ports in a bid to up the economic pressure on Kyiv. During the week of November 26, the Ukrainians reported that ships bound for Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov were not being permitted passage through the Kerch Strait.

THE WEST IS CONCERNED

Late on November 25, the European Union and NATO called on Russia to ensure unhindered passage for Ukrainian ships into the Sea of Azov. Officials of various Western countries began speaking up the next day, indicating various degrees of concern. With thanks to @sovietsergey, we learned that:

  • The Slovenian, Romanian, and Finnish foreign ministries and Swedish foreign minister were “deeply concerned.”
  • The Austrian foreign minister was “seriously concerned.”
  • The Dutch foreign minister was “severely concerned.”
  • The Czech foreign ministry was “highly concerned.”
  • The French foreign ministry was “profoundly concerned.”
  • The G-7 foreign ministers expressed “utmost concern.”

Some went further. The Lithuanian foreign ministry, Canadian foreign minister, and EU president “condemned” the Russian action, while the British foreign secretary “utterly condemned” it.

Washington had nothing to say on the 25th. The next day, Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made strong statements, but President Donald Trump almost immediately undercut them when he seemed to take a neutral position. National Security Advisor John Bolton did not help on November 27 when spelling out topics for the planned Trump meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the margins of the G-20 summit; he had to be prompted to put Ukraine on the list.

In an interview that same day, Trump suggested he might cancel the meeting with Putin. On November 28, however, U.S. and Russian officials indicated that the meeting was on, which the president reaffirmed the morning of November 29 before heading to Andrews Air Force Base. Then, from Air Force One en route to Argentina, he tweeted that the meeting was off, citing Russia’s seizure of the Ukrainian ships and sailors (most thought the more likely reason was that morning’s news of the guilty plea by his former lawyer and reports about his company’s efforts to build a Trump Tower in Moscow).

Nothing suggests that these expressions of concern and condemnation, or Trump’s on again/off again handling of his meeting with Putin, caused anxiety in the Kremlin. Putin in Argentina brushed off the complaints of his Western counterparts. One week after the attack, the Yani Kapu, Berdyansk, and Nikipol remain impounded at a Russian facility in Kerch, the ships’ crews sit in Lefortovo Prison in Moscow, and Russia continues to harass ships traveling to Ukrainian

THE WEST SHOULD GET SERIOUS

Russia’s November 25 attack on the Ukrainian ships was a test of Kyiv’s reaction. It was also a test of how the West would respond. Unfortunately, the West is failing miserably. If the United States and Europe do not wish to see Russia solidify its control over the Sea of Azov and blockade Ukraine’s ports, they have to make clear to Moscow that there will be consequences.

The West could consider military steps such as increasing the tempo of visits by NATO warships to the Black Sea (that tempo has already increased since Russia’s seizure of Crimea). The presence of NATO warships, particularly U.S. Navy vessels capable of carrying sea-launched cruise missiles, clearly irks the Kremlin.

Some have suggested that NATO send warships into the Sea of Azov. That would not prove wise. First, it could well provoke a shooting conflict in a region where Russia has geographic advantages. Second, it would violate the 2003 agreement, which requires the approval of both Ukraine and Russia for third-country naval vessels to enter the Sea of Azov. The West should not take actions that would delegitimize that agreement, as it is critical to Ukraine’s claim for open access through the Kerch Strait.

The United States and other NATO countries, on a national basis, might weigh what additional military assistance would be appropriate for Ukraine in view of Russia’s latest military escalation.

The United States and European Union should consider additional economic sanctions on Russia. They could draw on the following list of examples:

  • Prohibit U.S. and EU member state-flagged ships from calling on Russian ports on the Sea of Azov and Black Sea.
  • Prohibit ships with cargos from Russian ports in the Sea of Azov and Black Sea from entering American and European ports. (Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, a close political ally of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and candidate to succeed her as head of Germany’s Christian Democratic Union, has already suggested closing European ports to ships from Russian ports on the Sea of Azov.)
  • Target Russian state-owned banks or parastatal companies for specific sanctions. (In April, when the U.S. government announced sanctions on United Company Rusal, a large Russian-based aluminum producer, the company’s stock plunged by 50 percent, while the Moscow stock exchange’s index lost 8 percent. The Treasury Department subsequently eased the sanctions, but the case demonstrates that the West can inflict significant economic impacts on Russian entities.)
  • Suspend work on the Nord Stream II pipeline. The pipeline project is dubious as a commercial project. Refurbishing the existing pipeline network that transits gas through Ukraine would be less expensive, but Moscow wishes to end the transit fees it pays Kyiv and have the ability to totally shut off gas into that pipeline network.

The Kremlin tries to put on a brave face about sanctions, but they do cause economic pain, particularly for a stagnant Russian economy that is growing at less than 2 percent per year. Making Moscow understand that unacceptable actions will have growing costs is key to changing calculations in the Kremlin.

This situation cries out for leadership from Washington, and it would behoove the Trump administration to act. First, it could coordinate with European allies on sanctions that would have broad impact and signal trans-Atlantic unity in the face of Russia’s unacceptable actions. Second, administration action would forestall new congressional sanctions, which likely would be less finely targeted and more difficult to remove if/when Russia corrected its misbehavior.

If the West takes no action, it should get used to Moscow treating the Sea of Azov as a virtual Russian lake. And it should think what next steps an emboldened Moscow will attempt in its conflict with Ukraine and hybrid campaign against the West.

 

 

Hero Image
All News button
1
Paragraphs

This article assesses American public attitudes toward the just war principles of proportionality, due care and distinction. Consistent with the logic of proportionality, the authors find that Americans are less willing to inflict collateral deaths on foreign civilians when the military advantage of destroying a target is lower. Most Americans also are willing to risk the deaths of American soldiers to avert a larger number of collateral foreign civilian deaths, which accords with the due care principle. Nevertheless, they find that the public's commitments to proportionality and due care are heavily biased in favor of protecting American soldiers and promoting US national security interests. Moreover, they find little evidence that the majority of the public supports the principle of noncombatant immunity, and, contrary to just war doctrine, Americans are more likely to accept collateral deaths of foreign civilians when those civilians are described as politically sympathetic with the adversary.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Journal Articles
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
International Studies Quarterly
Authors
Scott D. Sagan
Scott Sagan
Benjamin Valentino
Number
Volume 62, Issue 3
Paragraphs

This is a chapter in the second edition of The National Security Enterprise, a book edited by Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof that provides practitioners' insights into the operation, missions, and organizational cultures of the principal national security agencies and other institutions that shape the U.S. national security decision-making process. Unlike some textbooks on American foreign policy, it offers analysis from insiders who have worked at the National Security Council, the State and Defense Departments, the intelligence community, and the other critical government entities. The book explains how organizational missions and cultures create the labyrinth in which a coherent national security policy must be fashioned. Understanding and appreciating these organizations and their cultures is essential for formulating and implementing it. Taking into account the changes introduced by the Obama administration, the second edition includes four new or entirely revised chapters (Congress, Department of Homeland Security, Treasury, and USAID) and updates to the text throughout. It covers changes instituted since the first edition was published in 2011, implications of the government campaign to prosecute leaks, and lessons learned from more than a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq. This up-to-date book will appeal to students of U.S. national security and foreign policy as well as career policymakers.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Books
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Georgetown University Press
Authors
Thomas Fingar
Authors
Clifton Parker
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

International fact-finding reports on issues like war crimes suffer from too much legal jargon and a counterproductive culture of blame, a Stanford legal scholar says.

Rather than let “legal discourse” dominate such reports, international fact-finding agencies should use clearer language in such documents, allowing these institutions to tell a more complex, multifaceted and socially accessible story, wrote Shiri Krebs of Stanford Law School in a new working paper.

In recent years, Krebs points out, international fact-finding has become a popular response to armed conflicts and political violence around the world. For her research, she conducted two survey experiments in 2013 and 2014 of nationally representative samples of 1,000 to 2,000 Americans while also compiling and analyzing a dataset of U.N. fact-finding missions.

Krebs said, “Legal discourse is ineffective in resolving factual disputes, disseminating controversial information and creating a shared narrative of ‘what happened,’ as well as in mobilizing public opinion and influencing attitudes on sanctioning in-group offenders and on reparations for out-group victims.”

Krebs is a Law and International Security Fellow at the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation, as well as the Christiana Shi Stanford Interdisciplinary Graduate Fellow in International Studies at Stanford Law School. Her study is also supported by the Stanford Laboratory for the Study of American Values.

Krebs said her research shows that the writing techniques in legal discourse – “binary legal judgment, ‘hot’ legal terminology and legal framing” – harms the perceived credibility and persuasive value of fact-finding reports.

Framing refers to the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue.

The most surprising findings of the study for Krebs were witnessing the intense polarizing effect of legal judgments on people’s beliefs about military actions, depending on their political and ideological views, as well as realizing just how much “legal framing” doesn’t matter in shaping attitudes on accountability.

Instead, a “moral framing” of the incident would have been a better way to get the public involved in holding those responsible for alleged war crimes accountable, Krebs said.

“Using a moral frame is more effective than a legal frame in influencing attitudes on accountability and mobilizing public support to prosecute U.S. war criminals and to compensate Afghan victims,” she said in an interview.

One of the incidents Krebs studied involved the U.S. gunship attack on a Doctors Without Borders hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, on Oct. 3, 2015, where 42 people, mostly patients and hospital staff members, were killed.

She said that in the days and months following the attack, several investigations were carried out by the U.S. military, NATO, the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and Doctors Without Borders.

“However, the multiple fact-finding efforts failed to resolve the controversies concerning what happened. The decision to describe the events using a legal language – such as ‘war crimes’ and ‘criminal responsibility’ – shifted the focus of attention from the impact of the attack on medical services in conflict zones, the suffering of the victims of the attack or the organizational structures that enabled the attack to occur, to intense legal debate between legal scholars and practitioners concerning the applicable law,” Krebs said.

 

Image
Shiri Krebs

‘Legalization of truth’

Krebs’ research built on studies from three disciplines – law, psychology and political science. She is concerned about what she describes as “an increasing ‘legalization of truth’ phenomenon,” defined as when agencies adopt legal terminology and jargon to “construct and interpret facts outside the courthouse.” It is not necessary and sometimes not productive to do so, she believes.

Such an approach lacks the emotional appeal and ability to focus public attention on problems that moral expressions or other types of social truth-telling entail, she said. Using a legal frame only conveys to the audience the legal context of what happened – not the human element that people can relate to and rally behind.

While some may view the law as objective and uniform, Krebs said, many people have negative attitudes toward lawyers and perceive their language to be overly technical and manipulative. Simply, most people become less engaged in a public debate once it is framed in legal wording, partly because they don’t understand the legal nuances, and partly because they think lawyers can manipulate the truth to fit their clients’ needs.

In contrast, she said, people tend to better understand and engage in conversations about morality – “it allows for a more complex variation and a more versatile spectrum between right and wrong, true and false.”

Improving fact-finding

International agencies can make the fact-finding report process more efficient by considering other types of discourse, Krebs said.

“A broader, non-legalistic interpretation of truth, such as a narrative, social or restorative truth, may be better suited to contribute to a collective narrative of contested events, create a ‘shared history’ and disseminate otherwise threatening facts,” she said.

Krebs points out that scientific and medical literature concludes that the threat of judicial involvement is enough to prevent people from coming forward with information about an incident that they were involved in.

“Judicial involvement can, therefore, engender a climate of fear and silence, in which it can be difficult, if not impossible, to get access to information that may be critical to finding out what happened and to prevent similar errors in the future,” she said.

And so, in situations where people are reluctant to report and disclose information, agencies should promote “blame-free alternatives to legal fact-finding,” which could, potentially, motivate individuals to share information and experiences openly, Krebs said.

She said the attack on the Kunduz hospital is only one recent example of the impact of legalization of truth on public debates; “legal discourse influences our public domain and our conversations concerning many other controversial social issues.”

All News button
1
Authors
Scott Sagan
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

CISAC senior fellow Scott Sagan decodes the enduring lessons and secret messages hidden in the hauting battlefield drawings of the Lakota Chief known as Red Horse, who fought against Lt. Col George Custer and his Seventh Cavalry forces during their infamous defeat in 1876, in this story for the New York Times' Sunday Review section.

 

All News button
1
Paragraphs

The United States is exceptionally secure. No country today presents a clear and imminent security threat in the way that Germany, Japan, or the Soviet Union did in the 20th century. In the short and medium term, there is also no alternative value system that could displace America’s conception of individual liberty and a market-oriented economy—principles that have been embraced by all of the world’s wealthy industrialized countries in Western Europe, North America, and East Asia.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Journal Articles
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
American Interest
Authors
Amy Zegart
Stephen Krasner
-

Abstract: This project looks at the politics of accountability for mass atrocities. In it, I ask why post-atrocity governments often put in place institutions (for instance, kangaroo courts, or powerless investigative commissions) that superficially resemble accountability mechanisms but lack the capacity to deliver justice. I theorize the creation of these institutions as an example of a broader pattern in human rights behavior, which I call “quasi-compliance”. I argue that because international enforcement of human rights norms is uneven, there’s an incentive to gamble on doing just enough to escape penalty. I test this theory on an original cross-national dataset of mass atrocities committed between 1970 and 2014. I find that the characteristics of post-atrocity governments that deliver justice and those that create quasi-compliant accountability institutions are very different. While robust trials and truth commissions are only pursued when domestic politics favors it, quasi-compliant institutions are put in place to deflect international censure for failure to abide by the global accountability norm requiring criminal prosecutions for mass atrocities. I trace the mechanisms underlying quasicompliance in two qualitative case studies, drawing on several months of fieldwork in Sri Lanka and Democratic Republic of the Congo.

About the Speaker: Kate Cronin-Furman is a human rights lawyer (J.D. Columbia, 2006) and political scientist (Ph.D. Columbia, 2015). Her research focuses on the interaction between international norms and politics. Her work has appeared in the International Journal of Transitional Justice, The Washington Post's "Monkey Cage" blog, The AtlanticThe National Interest, and The New York Times.

Kate Cronin-Furman
Seminars
Authors
Steve Fyffe
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

Today’s landmark deal between six world powers and Iran, which would limit Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for lifting economic sanctions, was an important step toward stopping Iran from building a nuclear bomb.

However, the key challenge for the international community will be making sure Iran keeps its part of the bargain, according to Stanford experts.

“Both sides have made a series of compromises that will help Iran’s economy in exchange for constraining its nuclear capabilities – and that’s a deal worth making, in my view,” said Scott Sagan, the Caroline S.G. Munro professor of political science and senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation.

“Iran will still have a technical capability to develop nuclear weapons, given the technology and materials that they have, but under this deal it will both take them a much longer period of time and would require them to take actions that would be easily discerned by the International Atomic Energy Agency, so it constrains their break-out capabilities in important ways.”

[[{"fid":"219719","view_mode":"crop_870xauto","fields":{"format":"crop_870xauto","field_file_image_description[und][0][value]":"","field_file_image_alt_text[und][0][value]":"","field_file_image_title_text[und][0][value]":"Final plenary session at the United Nations Office in Vienna, Austria. Photo credit: U.S. State Department","field_credit[und][0][value]":"","field_caption[und][0][value]":"","field_related_image_aspect[und][0][value]":"","thumbnails":"crop_870xauto","pp_lightbox":false,"pp_description":false},"type":"media","attributes":{"title":"Final plenary session at the United Nations Office in Vienna, Austria. Photo credit: U.S. State Department","width":"870","style":"width: 400px; height: 266px; float: right; margin-left: 15px","class":"media-element file-crop-870xauto"}}]]The U.S.-led negotiations also included fellow United Nations Security Council members Britain, China, France, and Russia, as well as Germany – a group known collectively as as the "P5+1."

Sig Hecker, former Los Alamos National Laboratory director and senior fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, said the nuclear deal was “hard-won and is better than any other reasonably achievable alternative.”

“Iran agreed to considerably greater restrictions on its program than what I thought was possible before the Joint Plan of Action was signed in November 2013,” said Hecker.

Abbas Milani, director of Iranian studies at Stanford and an affiliate at the Center for Democracy Development and the Rule of Law, called it the “least bad deal” for both Iran and the international community.

“Nobody gets everything they want,” Milani said. “Every side gets some of what they want.”

Under the deal, Iran would be allowed to continue to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes in its energy and health industries.

But it would have to reduce the number of its centrifuges from 19,000 to 6,000, and cut its stockpile of low enriched uranium down from more than 20 thousand pounds to about 660 pounds.

“Reducing that stockpile actually lengthens the breakout time more than any other measure,” said Hecker.

These limits were designed to increase the “breakout time” it would take for Iran to produce enough fissile material to make a nuclear weapon from the current two to three months, to one year over a period of the next 10 years.

The agreement still faces a series of political hurdles before it gets implemented, and will face tough scrutiny from a Republican-controlled U.S. Congress, as well as the parliaments of European countries that were parties to the talks.

“I think it’s going to be hard for the U.S. Congress and [European] parliaments to kill the deal and be perceived as the ones who would rather have a war than give diplomacy a chance,” said Thomas Fingar, distinguished fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

[[{"fid":"219720","view_mode":"crop_870xauto","fields":{"format":"crop_870xauto","field_file_image_description[und][0][value]":"","field_file_image_alt_text[und][0][value]":"","field_file_image_title_text[und][0][value]":"The Iranian delegation attend the final plenary session in Vienna, Austria. Photo credit: U.S. State Department","field_credit[und][0][value]":"","field_caption[und][0][value]":"","field_related_image_aspect[und][0][value]":"","thumbnails":"crop_870xauto","pp_lightbox":false,"pp_description":false},"type":"media","attributes":{"title":"The Iranian delegation attend the final plenary session in Vienna, Austria. Photo credit: U.S. State Department","width":"870","style":"width: 400px; height: 268px; float: right; margin-left: 15px","class":"media-element file-crop-870xauto"}}]]If the deal survives the inevitable political challenges, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency will be responsible for confirming that Iran is living up to its obligations.

“The key is going to be the effectiveness of the verification procedures and IAEA access,” Fingar said.

“There’s an element of trust, but a far more important part is the rigorous verification protocols.”

As soon as the IAEA confirms that Iran is abiding by the terms of the agreement, economic sanctions can be lifted.

Sagan warned that the international community should not be surprised if Iran pushed the limits of the agreement, and should be ready to reimpose economic sanctions if Iran violated the deal.

“We should anticipate that Iranian opponents to the agreement will try to stretch it and do things that are potential violations and that we have to call them on that, and not treat every problem that we see as unexpected,” said Sagan.

“We should anticipate such problems and be ready, if necessary, to reimpose sanctions. Having the ability to reimpose sanctions is the best way to deter the Iranians from engaging in such violations.”

But Hecker said the international community should focus on incentivizing Iran.

“The best hope is to make the civilian nuclear path so appealing – and then successful – that Tehran will not want to risk the political and economic consequences of that success by pursuing the bomb option,” he said.

Image
19067549804 85591212aa o
The negotiations were a diplomatic balancing act, with serious consequences for both sides of the negotiations if they failed to reach an agreement.

Iran faced the threat of military action if it continued to press forward with its nuclear program.

While Russia and China had both signaled that they were likely to abandon the sanctions regime if talks fell apart.

One of the key challenges to reaching an agreement was “finding a language that would allow both parties to declare victory”, according to Milani.

“Iran has clearly made some very substantive concessions, but Iran has also been allowed to keep enough of its infrastructure so that it can declare at least partial victory for the domestic political audience."

Now the scramble is on in Tehran to claim credit for the deal.

Reformists, led by current Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, hope it will strengthen their hand as they head into the next election.

On the other side of the political spectrum, conservatives believe it could give them the edge in the battle to succeed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as Iran’s Supreme Leader.

“They understand that whoever gets the credit for this will be in a much better position to determine the future leadership and future direction of Iran’s foreign policy,” said Milani.

It’s too early to tell what impact the agreement might have on Iran’s foreign policy, which is often at odds with U.S. interests in hot spots like Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan. But Sagan said today’s deal was an important step in making sure that future conflicts with Iran don’t go nuclear.

“Hopefully those disagreements will be played out without the shadow of nuclear weapons hanging over the future, and that’s a good thing.”

All News button
1
-

Abstract: In contemporary political science, many believe that normative restrictions on armed conflict are an outgrowth of Western culture and the Judeo-Christian just war tradition.  Drawing on historical evidence that shows that political actors in Ancient China and the early Islamic empire endorsed civilian protection rules, I claim that such norms are more common than most IR theorists suppose.  For IR theory, this raises an important puzzle: how can we explain why similar normative ideas emerged in human societies that are otherwise very different?  Building on research in cognitive science, social psychology, and social neuroscience, I argue that most people have natural cognitive and emotional predispositions that bias the emergence and transmission of cultural norms that protect non-combatants.  More specifically, capacities for perspective-taking and empathy shape how people interpret the limits of their moral commitments, and when these capacities are engaged, intuitional heuristics affect how they judge the morality of killing in war.  What is more, I claim that three key contextual variables modulate the connection between innate moral intuitions and the development of civilian protection norms: (1) societal interdependence; (2) the dispersion of power in ways that increase the agency of potential non-combatants; and (3) the creation of norms in argumentative contexts that require more impartial moral reasoning.  I argue that rationalist and constructivist theories of norm emergence will be able to better articulate the cross-cultural timing of emergence, the durability, and historical trajectory of the norms of war by incorporating this naturalistic theory of moral cognition.

About the Speaker: David Traven joined CISAC as a MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow in July 2014. He received his PhD. in Political Science at Ohio State University in 2013. From January 2013 to June 2014 he was a Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science at Kenyon College. His research examines the evolution of the law and ethics of war in international relations, and he is particularly interested in understanding how moral cognition and emotion shape the creation of norms that protect the victims of armed conflict, especially civilians. Dr. Traven is currently working on a book manuscript that examines how moral intuitions influence the creation and the effectiveness of the norms of war across cultures.

Encina Hall (2nd floor)

CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, E210
Stanford CA 94305-6165

(650) 724-5687 614-961-9670
0
MacArthur Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow
david_traven.jpg
PhD

David Traven joined CISAC as a MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow in July 2014. He received his PhD. in Political Science at Ohio State University in 2013. From January 2013 to June 2014 he was a Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science at Kenyon College. His research examines the evolution of the law and ethics of war in international relations, and he is particularly interested in understanding how moral cognition and emotion shape the creation of norms that protect the victims of armed conflict, especially civilians. Dr. Traven is currently working on a book manuscript that examines how moral intuitions influence the creation and the effectiveness of the norms of war across cultures.

CV
David Traven MacArthur Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow Speaker CISAC
Seminars
News Type
Q&As
Date
Paragraphs

For 14 years, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar has been a tireless Stanford professor who has strengthened the fabric of university’s interdisciplinary nature. Joining the faculty at Stanford Law School in 2001, Cuéllar soon found a second home for himself at the Freeman Spogli for International Studies. He held various leadership roles throughout the institute for several years – including serving as co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation. He took the helm of FSI as the institute’s director in 2013, and oversaw a tremendous expansion of faculty, research activity and student engagement. 

An expert in administrative law, criminal law, international law, and executive power and legislation, Cuéllar is now taking on a new role. He leaves Stanford this month to serve as justice of the California Supreme Court and will be succeeded at FSI by Michael McFaul on Jan. 5.

 As the academic quarter comes to a close, Cuéllar took some time to discuss his achievements at FSI and the institute’s role on campus. And his 2014 Annual Letter and Report can be read here.

You’ve had an active 20 months as FSI’s director. But what do you feel are your major accomplishments? 

We started with a superb faculty and made it even stronger. We hired six new faculty members in areas ranging from health and drug policy to nuclear security to governance. We also strengthened our capacity to generate rigorous research on key global issues, including nuclear security, global poverty, cybersecurity, and health policy. Second, we developed our focus on teaching and education. Our new International Policy Implementation Lab brings faculty and students together to work on applied projects, like reducing air pollution in Bangladesh, and improving opportunities for rural schoolchildren in China.  We renewed FSI's focus on the Ford Dorsey Program in International Policy Studies, adding faculty and fellowships, and launched a new Stanford Global Student Fellows program to give Stanford students global experiences through research opportunities.   Third, we bolstered FSI's core infrastructure to support research and education, by improving the Institute's financial position and moving forward with plans to enhance the Encina complex that houses FSI.

Finally, we forged strong partnerships with critical allies across campus. The Graduate School of Business is our partner on a campus-wide Global Development and Poverty Initiative supporting new research to mitigate global poverty.  We've also worked with the Law School and the School of Engineering to help launch the new Stanford Cyber Initiative with $15 million in funding from the Hewlett Foundation. We are engaging more faculty with new health policy working groups launched with the School of Medicine and an international and comparative education venture with the Graduate School of Education. 

Those partnerships speak very strongly to the interdisciplinary nature of Stanford and FSI. How do these relationships reflect FSI's goals?

The genius of Stanford has been its investment in interdisciplinary institutions. FSI is one of the largest. We should be judged not only by what we do within our four walls, but by what activity we catalyze and support across campus. With the business school, we've launched the initiative to support research on global poverty across the university. This is a part of the SEED initiative of the business school and it is very complementary to our priorities on researching and understanding global poverty and how to alleviate. It's brought together researchers from the business school, from FSI, from the medical school, and from the economics department.  

Another example would be our health policy working groups with the School of Medicine. Here, we're leveraging FSI’s Center for Health Policy, which is a great joint venture and allows us to convene people who are interested in the implementation of healthcare reforms and compare the perspective and on why lifesaving interventions are not implemented in developing countries and how we can better manage biosecurity risks. These working groups are a forum for people to understand each other's research agendas, to collaborate on seeking funding and to engage students. 

I could tell a similar story about our Mexico Initiative.  We organize these groups so that they cut across generations of scholars so that they engage people who are experienced researchers but also new fellows, who are developing their own agenda for their careers. Sometimes it takes resources, sometimes it takes the engagement of people, but often what we've found at FSI is that by working together with some of our partners across the university, we have a more lasting impact.

Looking at a growing spectrum of global challenges, where would you like to see FSI increase its attention? 

FSI's faculty, students, staff, and space represent a unique resource to engage Stanford in taking on challenges like global hunger, infectious disease, forced migration, and weak institutions.  The  key breakthrough for FSI has been growing from its roots in international relations, geopolitics, and security to focusing on shared global challenges, of which four are at the core of our work: security, governance, international development, and  health. 

These issues cross borders. They are not the concern of any one country. 

Geopolitics remain important to the institute, and some critical and important work is going on at the Center for International Security and Cooperation to help us manage the threat of nuclear proliferation, for example. But even nuclear proliferation is an example of how the transnational issues cut across the international divide. Norms about law, the capacity of transnational criminal networks, smuggling rings, the use of information technology, cybersecurity threats – all of these factors can affect even a traditional geopolitical issue like nuclear proliferation. 

So I can see a research and education agenda focused on evolving transnational pressures that will affect humanity in years to come. How a child fares when she is growing up in Africa will depend at least as much on these shared global challenges involving hunger and poverty, health, security, the role of information technology and humanity as they will on traditional relations between governments, for instance. 

What are some concrete achievements that demonstrate how FSI has helped create an environment for policy decisions to be better understood and implemented?

We forged a productive collaboration with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees through a project on refugee settlements that convened architects, Stanford researchers, students and experienced humanitarian responders to improve the design of settlements that house refugees and are supposed to meet their human needs. That is now an ongoing effort at the UN Refugee Agency, which has also benefited from collaboration with us on data visualization and internship for Stanford students. 

Our faculty and fellows continue the Institute's longstanding research to improve security and educate policymakers. We sometimes play a role in Track II diplomacy on sensitive issues involving global security – including in South Asia and Northeast Asia.  Together with Hoover, We convened a first-ever cyber bootcamp to help legislative staff understand the Internet and its vulnerabilities. We have researchers who are in regular contact with policymakers working on understanding how governance failures can affect the world's ability to meet pressing health challenges, including infectious diseases, such as Ebola.

On issues of economic policy and development, our faculty convened a summit of Japanese prefectural officials work with the private sector to understand strategies to develop the Japanese economy.  

And we continued educating the next generation of leaders on global issues through the Draper Hills summer fellows program and our honors programs in security and in democracy and the rule of law. 

How do you see FSI’s role as one of Stanford’s independent laboratories?

It's important to recognize that FSI's growth comes at particularly interesting time in the history of higher education – where universities are under pressure, where the question of how best to advance human knowledge is a very hotly debated question, where universities are diverging from each other in some ways and where we all have to ask ourselves how best to be faithful to our mission but to innovate. And in that respect, FSI is a laboratory. It is an experimental venture that can help us to understand how a university like Stanford can organize itself to advance the mission of many units, that's the partnership point, but to do so in a somewhat different way with a deep engagement to practicality and to the current challenges facing the world without abandoning a similarly deep commitment to theory, empirical investigation, and rigorous scholarship.

What have you learned from your time at Stanford and as director of FSI that will inform and influence how you approach your role on the state’s highest court?

Universities play an essential role in human wellbeing because they help us advance knowledge and prepare leaders for a difficult world. To do this, universities need to be islands of integrity, they need to be engaged enough with the outside world to understand it but removed enough from it to keep to the special rules that are necessary to advance the university's mission. 

Some of these challenges are also reflected in the role of courts. They also need to be islands of integrity in a tumultuous world, and they require fidelity to high standards to protect the rights of the public and to implement laws fairly and equally.  

This takes constant vigilance, commitment to principle, and a practical understanding of how the world works. It takes a combination of humility and determination. It requires listening carefully, it requires being decisive and it requires understanding that when it's part of a journey that allows for discovery but also requires deep understanding of the past.

Hero Image
All News button
1
Subscribe to International Law