Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is launching a U.S.-Asia Security Initiative spearheaded by a former top American diplomat to deepen dialogue on contemporary Asia-Pacific security issues and to further bridge American and Asian academics, government officials and industry leaders.

A new and uncertain multipolar system is emerging in Asia. The United States is and will remain a global power, but it is evident the post-Cold War international order is increasingly under strain. There is a pressing need for research about how developments in the Asia-Pacific region impact U.S. interests, and what the optimal strategies are to respond. Led by Karl Eikenberry, who served as U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from 2009 to 2011, the initiative will look beyond simplistic notions of nations engaging harmoniously or competing against each other and explore a range of policy options.

Combining expertise from across Stanford University, the initiative will gather faculty and researchers from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and take place under the auspices of Shorenstein APARC, a center focused on interdisciplinary research on contemporary issues of international cooperation, governance and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Eikenberry, an Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow at Shorenstein APARC, retired from the U.S. Army as a lieutenant general after 35 years of service before taking the role as ambassador. At Stanford, he has returned to an early and longstanding interest in Asia, contributing to an urgent discussion about how the United States should respond regionally and globally to an increasingly strong China. The initiative is founded on the premise that there is a role for an institution that not only fosters groundbreaking research, but also serves to convene academic and governmental expertise from across the Asia-Pacific region in a dialogue aiming to inform policy and strategy.

“As China rises and Japan seeks a greater defense role in Asia, a number of questions are raised over the United States’ role in the region. This creates a great impetus for stakeholders to gather and develop an understanding of today’s perplexing security issues,” Eikenberry said.

“It’s an honor to lead this Stanford initiative and make possible opportunities for students, scholars, peers and leaders across the world.”

Before arriving at Stanford, Eikenberry’s Asia-related postings included assistant army, and later, defense attaché at the U.S. Embassy Beijing, operational assignments in the Republic of Korea and Hawaii, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy at U.S. Pacific Command, Senior Country Director for China at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and two senior command tours in Afghanistan. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, holds master’s degrees from Harvard University and Stanford University, and has an advanced degree in Chinese history from Nanjing University.

The three-year initiative will build synergies with existing activities at Stanford, drawing scholars, government officials and industry leaders to engage at conferences and public seminars on important U.S.-Asia security themes. Understanding that inquiry is enlivened through interdisciplinary dialogue, participants will share best practices across multiple fields including diplomacy, military strategy and environmental risk.

“I can’t think of a better person to drive this initiative – Karl has a profound understanding of the economic, diplomatic and military complexities in the region. I have every confidence that it will develop into a robust, established project under his leadership,” said Gi-Wook Shin, director of Shorenstein APARC.

Launching July 1, 2015, the initiative aims to bolster local, national and global networks through several foundational components, including a core working group of experts from Stanford and peer institutions to provide new perspectives on U.S. policies in Asia; educational opportunities for Stanford students; and public programs that will bring intellectual and strategic leaders to Stanford to enrich the conversation on Asia-Pacific security.

The initiative seeks to operate as a focal point for academic scholarship on the west coast of the United States and offer practical steps that stakeholders can take to strengthen the security architecture and U.S. alliance commitments in the region. Outcomes from the initiative’s activities will include publications and policy reports, many of which will be offered open access online.

“As the Asia-Pacific region continues to rise, we see new threats but also greater opportunity to work together,” said Michael McFaul, director of FSI. “Stanford and FSI excel in offering practical solutions to policy challenges and can play a role in identifying strategies aimed at maintaining peace and stability in the region.”

Initiative inquires: Charlotte Lee, Shorenstein APARC, cplee@stanford.edu, (650) 725-6445

Media inquires: Lisa Griswold, Communications and Outreach Coordinator, Shorenstein APARC, lisagris@stanford.edu, (650) 736-0656

U.S. Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) told a Stanford audience Thursday that mass surveillance programs are designed to find possible terrorists, not snoop on American citizens.

She pointed to the rise of groups like ISIS – now in 12 countries, she said – and the gruesome spectacles of their brand of terrorism as proof that the world is more dangerous than ever.

"I don't think during my lifetime I've ever seen the degree of evil that is out there in the world today," said Feinstein, noting mass murders and beheadings of innocent civilians, including children. "These [surveillance] programs aim to protect this country, pure and simple. They're not aimed to go after Americans."

Feinstein was the final speaker in the yearlong series titled "The Security Conundrum." She spoke in a colloquy format with Stanford's Philip Taubman, consulting professor at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and former Washington bureau chief of the New York Times. 

Sen. Dianne Feinstein was the final speaker in the yearlong series titled 'The Security Conundrum.' 

Image

The discussion comes during a national debate on how to strike the right balance between security and liberty when technology now makes it possible for the government to collect phone and email data on citizens. With the USA Freedom Act expiring on June 1, Congress is considering legislation to reform the National Security Agency's mass surveillance program.

"We recognize that some reform is in order," said Feinstein, who plans to fly back to Washington for a rare Sunday Senate session on the expiring law.

"The big reform is that the data would be held by the phone companies and not the NSA," she said. If red flags resulted in queries, then warrants would have to be approved.

She took issue with descriptions of those programs as "mass surveillance." In 2013, warrants were sought in just 12 cases out of 288 queries about possible suspects. She said it is a selective process to find a suspect who raises enough concerns to trigger a query.

Feinstein's talk, titled "Congressional Oversight and the Intelligence Community," was held at CEMEX Auditorium.

Feinstein served as chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence from 2009 to 2014 and is now the ranking minority member. She played a leading role in the Senate investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency detention and interrogation program following the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

'Miscarriages of justice'

Taubman asked Feinstein if she was worried that the surveillance programs could track law-abiding citizens, like more primitive efforts in the 1960s and '70s that targeted political and civil rights groups. Feinstein acknowledged that abuses happened in the past, but that congressional oversight of the programs – as is the case today – is essential to a fair process.

In particular, Feinstein decried the government's interrogation process of terrorism suspects at Guantanamo Bay that resulted in claims of torture. Her committee reviewed considerable intelligence data on that issue. "We found there were terrible miscarriages of justice," she said.

She described intelligence agencies as akin to "presidents" in the power they wield. "How do you make these agencies follow the law?" she asked. The only way is to "get in deep enough and close enough" to make it impossible for them to tell an "untruth" in a congressional hearing, she said.

Taubman suggested that it's extremely hard for a few dozen congressional staffers and members to oversee large agencies that employ thousands of people. "You're outgunned," he said.

Feinstein replied that "we have to look beyond the hearing." She said bipartisanship and a focus on producing effective legislation that addresses real problems is critical. "That's the nature of what we do."

She added that no other country in the world has an intelligence committee with as strong an oversight function as does the United States. China and Russia, for example, have growing intelligence agencies but no one watching them.

Feinstein agreed with Taubman that too much secrecy is detrimental to a democratic society. She said she wished she would have held more open, public meetings while in charge of the intelligence committee.

Feinstein expects that renewing the legislation will depend on perhaps three votes in the Senate. "It's possible. If not, the law ends at midnight and that creates a chink in our armor. There's no question in my mind," she said.

Feinstein said there is a "backup" bill that is similar to the USA Freedom Act, but she would prefer to reform the original legislation.

Taubman asked her if the surveillance efforts were actually preventing terrorist acts.

Feinstein said that people are arrested every week under the program, and that relevant information also goes to other countries to help them.

But more than ever, she noted, it's the private sector – not the government – that is extremely enterprising in collecting vast amounts of data from people, such as how they use their cellphones or surf the web.

CIA, China an issue

A California Democrat and Stanford graduate, Feinstein has served in the U.S. Senate since 1993.

When asked why she continues to work as a public servant, she said that 9/11 was a pivotal point in her life. That tragic event and flawed intelligence regarding the justification for the war in Iraq convinced her that a senior position on the intelligence committee would give her a way to help protect her country and fellow citizens.

Taubman expressed amazement that the CIA was actually spying on Feinstein's committee during its review of the hostage intelligence data.

"It was a real dust-up, there's no question about. I think it was a real violation of the separation of powers," she said.

On other issues, such as the rise of China, Feinstein said that country is now practicing "soft power" and flexing its muscles in the South China Sea. Plus, China is "eating our lunch" in regard to cybersecurity.

"I am very worried," she said. "I do not see China as a necessary enemy, but it seems to be going the opposite direction now."

In addition to CISAC, sponsors of "The Security Conundrum" series included the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the Hoover Institution, Stanford Continuing Studies, Stanford in Government and Stanford Law School.

The series "was designed to be an open inquiry in the ongoing debate on how to balance security and liberty," said Amy Zegart, co-director of CISAC and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.

This year the series has also included Gen. Michael Hayden, the former director of the National Security Agency and the CIA; journalist Barton Gellman; and former U.S. Sen. Mark Udall.

Bioengineering researchers have recently constructed the final steps required to engineer yeast to manufacture opiates, including morphine and other medical drugs, from glucose, drawing significant interest, and concern, from the media and academics in the science and policy fields, including at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC).  

“Researchers are getting better at building biology based platforms to create a wide variety of compounds that are difficult, inefficient, or sometimes impossible to create by other means,” Dr. Megan J. Palmer told National Public Radio in the weekly Science Friday segment.

She highlighted how these platforms can enable production of potentially safer, cheaper and more effective drugs. “But one significant concern is if we create the full pathway to go from glucose to this intermediate and then all the way to things like morphine, this could feed into illicit markets and bolster new illicit markets.”

Image

The media this week has focused on comments by researchers who pointed out that the modified yeast could be used to manufacture heroin, a synthesized version of morphine. The prospect of “home-brewed heroin” has been prominently featured in news coverage.

There are significant concerns, says Palmer, but she cautioned that focusing solely on that possibility could lead to bad policy outcomes.

“There is a big opportunity for researchers, policy makers, and industry to work together to figure out what controls they can put in,” she said in a separate interview. “We have time to get ahead of this problem. We now have choices in how we build and regulate the technology. The challenge for regulatory and technical communities will be to avoid reactive quick fixes. It’s encouraging to see researchers engaging in these issues early on.”

The challenge will be to find ways for researchers, law enforcers, and policy experts to work together to build safeguards into the biology itself as well as into organizations and institutions. 

“We really need to think about security as a design principle,” Palmer said. She hopes to foster thoughtful and rigorous analysis of how the design of biotechnology impacts future governance options.

“This issue highlights beautifully the nexus between public policy and science and technology, which is where CISAC has already, and will continue to make important contributions,” said CISAC Co-Director David Relman. Dr. Relman is also the Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Professor in the Departments of Medicine, and of Microbiology and Immunology at Stanford University. 

CISAC recently hosted a seminar led by Stanford’s Dr. Christina Smolke that discussed technology advances that are resulting in alternative supply chains for drugs, with particular attention to opiates.

Dr. Smolke is also troubled by the over-emphasis of the risks associated with the potential technology. “I believe it’s inflammatory, biased, and not grounded in an accurate representation of the technology. However, the commentary focuses on the risks of the supply chain and proposes regulations/governance for such a technology, without implementing a process to engage various parties in discussions to thoughtfully assess risks, opportunities, and regulatory needs in this context.”

“I think we need to frame this issue in the context of the larger systemic challenges involving the rearrangements of supply chains enabled through bio-manufacturing and how we spread responsible norms and practices,” Palmer said. “We need to think about governance options in terms of human capacities and technical capacities. What safeguards can we engineer into our technologies, and in turn what safeguards can we build into our organizations and institutions?”