Science and Technology
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Reuben W. Hills Conference Room, East 207, Encina Hall

CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

(650) 724-5694 (650) 723-0089
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CISAC Fellow
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Paul K. MacDonald is a doctoral candidate at Columbia University and a 2004-2005 predoctoral fellow at CISAC. His research focuses on how great powers utilize the institution of imperial rule in order to exert control over less powerful polities in the international system. Most recently, he has published research on the epistemological foundations of rational choice theory in the American Political Science Review and on the relevance of evolutionary biology to international politics in International Security.

Paul K. MacDonald
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Sanjeev Khagram is a visiting professor at SIIS and CDDRL 2004-2005. He will speak about his current transnational research projects. He is the author of Dams and Development (Cornell University Press, 2004).

This event is sponsored by CDDRL and CISAC.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Sanjeev Khagram CDDRL Visiting Fellow and Assistant Professor of Public Policy Speaker Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Seminars
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Reuben W. Hills Conference Room, East 207, Encina Hall

CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, E202
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

(650) 725-2715 (650) 723-0089
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The Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science
The Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education  
Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
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Scott D. Sagan is Co-Director and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, and the Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education at Stanford University. He also serves as Co-Chair of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences’ Committee on International Security Studies. Before joining the Stanford faculty, Sagan was a lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University and served as special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon.

Sagan is the author of Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton University Press, 1989); The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton University Press, 1993); and, with co-author Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate (W.W. Norton, 2012). He is the co-editor of Insider Threats (Cornell University Press, 2017) with Matthew Bunn; and co-editor of The Fragile Balance of Terror (Cornell University Press, 2022) with Vipin Narang. Sagan was also the guest editor of a two-volume special issue of DaedalusEthics, Technology, and War (Fall 2016) and The Changing Rules of War (Winter 2017).

Recent publications include “Creeds and Contestation: How US Nuclear and Legal Doctrine Influence Each Other,” with Janina Dill, in a special issue of Security Studies (December 2025); “Kettles of Hawks: Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Noncombatant Immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel”, with Janina Dill and Benjamin A. Valentino in Security Studies (February 2022); “The Rule of Law and the Role of Strategy in U.S. Nuclear Doctrine” with Allen S. Weiner in International Security (Spring 2021); “Does the Noncombatant Immunity Norm Have Stopping Power?” with Benjamin A. Valentino in International Security (Fall 2020); and “Just War and Unjust Soldiers: American Public Opinion on the Moral Equality of Combatants” and “On Reciprocity, Revenge, and Replication: A Rejoinder to Walzer, McMahan, and Keohane” with Benjamin A. Valentino in Ethics & International Affairs (Winter 2019).

In 2022, Sagan was awarded Thérèse Delpech Memorial Award from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at their International Nuclear Policy Conference. In 2017, he received the International Studies Association’s Susan Strange Award which recognizes the scholar whose “singular intellect, assertiveness, and insight most challenge conventional wisdom and intellectual and organizational complacency" in the international studies community. Sagan was also the recipient of the National Academy of Sciences William and Katherine Estes Award in 2015, for his work addressing the risks of nuclear weapons and the causes of nuclear proliferation. The award, which is granted triennially, recognizes “research in any field of cognitive or behavioral science that advances understanding of issues relating to the risk of nuclear war.” In 2013, Sagan received the International Studies Association's International Security Studies Section Distinguished Scholar Award. He has also won four teaching awards: Stanford’s 1998-99 Dean’s Award for Distinguished Teaching; Stanford's 1996 Hoagland Prize for Undergraduate Teaching; the International Studies Association’s 2008 Innovative Teaching Award; and the Monterey Institute for International Studies’ Nonproliferation Education Award in 2009.     

Co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation
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Scott D. Sagan
Seminars
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Marc J. Ventresca is University Lecturer in Management Studies at Saïd Business School, University of Oxford, Fellow of Wolfson College, and University Fellow at the James Martin Institute for Science and Civilization. For 2004-5 he is a Research Fellow in Organizational Learning and Homeland Security, CISAC, IIS, Stanford University.

His research and teaching interests focus on institutions, organizations, and industry entrepreneurship; organizational learning; organization design and managing change; environmental management; power and leadership in organizations, and economic sociology of strategy.

He earned his Ph.D. in sociology at Stanford University, after master's degrees in policy analysis and education and in sociology. He has taught at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, the University of Illinois, the Copenhagen Business School, the Center for Work, Technology, and Organizations at Stanford University, and the Stanford Institute for Research on Higher Education.

Prior to a faculty career, Dr. Ventresca worked as a policy analyst at the Congressional Budget Office in Washington D.C., studied language and politics in Florence, Italy, and worked as a technical writer for hopeful start-ups in Silicon Valley.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room, East 207, Encina Hall

Marc Ventresca CISAC Fellow and Lecturer in Management Studies Oxford University
Seminars
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The nuclear programs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Iran, and Pakistan provide the most visible manifestations of three broad and interrelated challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The first is so-called latent proliferation, in which a country adheres to, or at least for some time maintains a façade of adhering to, its formal obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) while nevertheless developing the capabilities needed for a nuclear weapons program. That country can then either withdraw from the NPT and build actual weapons on short notice, or simply stay within the NPT while maintaining the latent capability for the rapid realization of nuclear weapons as a hedge against future threats. This was the path followed by the DPRK with its plutonium program and one that is likely being followed by Iran and more subtly by others. The second broad challenge is first-tier nuclear proliferation, in which technology or material sold or stolen from private companies or state nuclear programs assists nonnuclear weapons states in developing illegal nuclear weapons programs and delivery systems. The third challenge--the focus of this article--is second-tier nuclear proliferation, in which states in the developing world with varying technical capabilities trade among themselves to bolster one another's nuclear and strategic weapons efforts.

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International Security
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This article grew out of a week-long study in August 2002 to assist ongoing efforts inside and outside the government to remedy some vulnerabilities of the international shipping system on which US and a great deal of world prosperity depend. The study's objective was to identify the most important research initiatives and the major policy issues that need to be addressed in order to improve security of imports using shipping containers, particularly against the importation of nuclear materials and weapons, while maintaining an open trading system. To be effective, a system to detect nuclear weapons or special nuclear material before they reach U.S. ports must be international in scope and reach. It must also be economically acceptable both in terms of total cost and with respect to how these costs are allocated; degrade gracefully when subjected to attack; produce actionable intelligence in a timely manner; treat false alarms realistically; be adaptable to a variety of local physical and political conditions; be auditable, secure yet accessible to the needed foreign and domestic security agencies, and have clear lines of oversight and responsibility. Finally, the system should be flexible enough to allow for regular updates as users and operators gain experience and system performance is reviewed. This study identified a sample technical approach that is feasible technically and operationally and involves components already in the early deployment stage. The approach involves container certification; monitoring at ports of embarkation, debarkation, and continuously during shipment and storage; and continuous data fusion. Specific recommendations regarding system characteristics made by the study include rigorous testing during deployment and in the field, international coordination of standards and protocols, careful analysis of the system for compatibility with pertinent governmental policies and business and labor agreements, and early provision for forward-looking research and development.

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Journal of Physical Security
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Michael M. May
Tonya Putnam
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