Science and Technology
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David Montague, an independent consultant, is retired President of the Missile Systems Division at Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space. A member of the NAE, his background is in military weapon systems, particularly in regard to guidance and control of submarine-launched weaponry. His experience has focused on both tactical and strategic strike systems, as well as on the requirements for, development of, and policy issues related to defense systems to protect against weapons of mass destruction. His recent research interests include the area of electric vehicles powered by battery or fuel cells integrated with induction drive high-speed highway automatic headway and vehicle control. Mr. Montague is a fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and has served on numerous scientific boards and advisory committees, to include task forces for both the U.S. Army and Defense Science Board. He currently serves as a member of the Naval Studies Board.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

David Montague CISAC Affiliate Speaker
Seminars
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Scott Sagan (speaker) is a professor of political science and co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation. Before joining the Stanford faculty, Sagan was a lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University and served as a special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon. He has also served as a consultant to the office of the Secretary of Defense and at the Sandia National Laboratory and the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Sagan is the author of Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton University Press, 1989), The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton University Press, 1993), and with co-author Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (W.W. Norton, 2002). He is the co-editor of Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James L. Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000). Sagan was the recipient of Stanford University's 1996 Hoagland Prize for Undergraduate Teaching and the 1998 Dean's Award for Distinguished Teaching. As part of CISAC's mission of training the next generation of security specialists he and Stephen Stedman founded Stanford's Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies in 2000. His recent articles include "How to Keep the Bomb From Iran," in Foreign Affairs (September-October 2006); "The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969" co-written by Jeremi Suri and published in International Security in spring 2003; and "The Problem of Redundancy Problem: Will More Nuclear Security Forces Produce More Nuclear Security?" published in Risk Analysis in 2004. In addition to these works, Sagan is also finishing a collection of essays for a book tentatively entitled Inside Nuclear South Asia.

Paul Kapur (discussant) is a visiting professor at CISAC, on leave from the U.S. Naval War College, where he is an associate professor in the Department of Strategic Research. Before joining the War College in 2006, Kapur was visiting professor at CISAC and assistant professor of Government at Claremont McKenna College. He also served as a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Chicago, where he received his PhD in political science. His research interests include the strategic effects of nuclear weapons proliferation, deterrence theory, and the international security environment in South Asia. Kapur is author of Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia (Stanford University Press, 2007). His work has also appeared in journals such as International Security, Security Studies, Asian Survey, and Asian Security.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Paul Kapur Commentator

CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, E202
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

(650) 725-2715 (650) 723-0089
0
The Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science
The Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education  
Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
rsd25_073_1160a_1.jpg PhD

Scott D. Sagan is Co-Director and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, and the Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education at Stanford University. He also serves as Co-Chair of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences’ Committee on International Security Studies. Before joining the Stanford faculty, Sagan was a lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University and served as special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon.

Sagan is the author of Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton University Press, 1989); The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton University Press, 1993); and, with co-author Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate (W.W. Norton, 2012). He is the co-editor of Insider Threats (Cornell University Press, 2017) with Matthew Bunn; and co-editor of The Fragile Balance of Terror (Cornell University Press, 2022) with Vipin Narang. Sagan was also the guest editor of a two-volume special issue of DaedalusEthics, Technology, and War (Fall 2016) and The Changing Rules of War (Winter 2017).

Recent publications include “Creeds and Contestation: How US Nuclear and Legal Doctrine Influence Each Other,” with Janina Dill, in a special issue of Security Studies (December 2025); “Kettles of Hawks: Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Noncombatant Immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel”, with Janina Dill and Benjamin A. Valentino in Security Studies (February 2022); “The Rule of Law and the Role of Strategy in U.S. Nuclear Doctrine” with Allen S. Weiner in International Security (Spring 2021); “Does the Noncombatant Immunity Norm Have Stopping Power?” with Benjamin A. Valentino in International Security (Fall 2020); and “Just War and Unjust Soldiers: American Public Opinion on the Moral Equality of Combatants” and “On Reciprocity, Revenge, and Replication: A Rejoinder to Walzer, McMahan, and Keohane” with Benjamin A. Valentino in Ethics & International Affairs (Winter 2019).

In 2022, Sagan was awarded Thérèse Delpech Memorial Award from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at their International Nuclear Policy Conference. In 2017, he received the International Studies Association’s Susan Strange Award which recognizes the scholar whose “singular intellect, assertiveness, and insight most challenge conventional wisdom and intellectual and organizational complacency" in the international studies community. Sagan was also the recipient of the National Academy of Sciences William and Katherine Estes Award in 2015, for his work addressing the risks of nuclear weapons and the causes of nuclear proliferation. The award, which is granted triennially, recognizes “research in any field of cognitive or behavioral science that advances understanding of issues relating to the risk of nuclear war.” In 2013, Sagan received the International Studies Association's International Security Studies Section Distinguished Scholar Award. He has also won four teaching awards: Stanford’s 1998-99 Dean’s Award for Distinguished Teaching; Stanford's 1996 Hoagland Prize for Undergraduate Teaching; the International Studies Association’s 2008 Innovative Teaching Award; and the Monterey Institute for International Studies’ Nonproliferation Education Award in 2009.     

Co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation
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Scott D. Sagan Speaker
Seminars
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Brent Durbin (speaker) is a PhD candidate at the University of California, Berkeley, and a predoctoral fellow at CISAC. He is also a 2007-2008 dissertation fellow at the Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation. In his dissertation, Durbin explains the political and policy dynamics of U.S. intelligence adaptation. His broader research interests fall at the intersection of organization theory, decision-making, and national security policy. Durbin has served as a visiting fellow at the University of Cambridge (UK) and The George Washington University, and as a senior staff member for U.S. Senator Patty Murray. He holds degrees from Oberlin College, Harvard University, and the University of California, Berkeley.

Paul Stockton (discussant) is a senior research scholar at CISAC. He was formerly the associate provost at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and was the former director of its Center for Homeland Defense and Security. His teaching and research focuses on how U.S. security institutions respond to changes in the threat (including the rise of terrorism), and the interaction of Congress and the Executive branch in restructuring national security budgets, policies and institutional arrangements. Stockton joined the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in August 1990. From 1995 until 2000, he served as director of NPS's Center for Civil-Military Relations. From 2000-2001, he founded and served as the acting dean of NPS's School of International Graduate Studies. He was appointed associate provost in 2001.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Paul Stockton Senior Research Scholar Commentator CISAC
Brent Durbin Predoctoral Fellow Speaker CISAC
Seminars
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Insurgents in Iraq have turned mosques into fortified strongholds, forcing U.S. troops to weigh the costs of desecrating sacred space against the risk of operational failure. U.S. decision-makers are woefully ill-equipped to engage with the religious implications of the war in Iraq. Learn how a nuanced understanding of Islam in its multiple traditions might change the terms of engagement in the conflict in Iraq and elsewhere.

Bechtel Conference Center

Seminars
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On April 19, 2007, the Preventive Defense Project convened a workshop of leading federal government civilian and military officials, scientists, policy experts, and journalists to address the actions that can and should be taken in the 24 hours following a nuclear blast in a U.S. city.

Through efforts like the Nunn-Lugar program, the U.S. government and many of the Day After Workshop participants, including us, have long sought to prevent nuclear weapons and fissile materials from falling into new and threatening hands, especially terrorists. But we all know that these efforts have not reduced the probability to zero. It is also a common refrain among policy thinkers concerned with the growing nuclear threat--again, ourselves included--to frame the issue of prevention in terms of a provocative question, "On the day after a nuclear weapon goes off in a U.S. city, what will we wish we had done to prevent it?"

But our Preventive Defense "Day After Workshop" asked a different question: "What will we actually do on the day after prevention fails?" What will we want to do? How can we prepare now to be able to do it? We asked the distinguished participants in the Workshop to catapult themselves vividly and concretely into the aftermath of a nuclear detonation on a U.S. city. The needed actions by government and the public on the Day After will fall into two categories: actions to recover from the first detonation, and actions to prevent a second detonation. The Workshop addressed both types of action in as much detail, including technical detail, as possible. Topics included emergency response, evacuation and sheltering, immediate radiation effects, follow-on threats to the first nuclear weapon, attribution and retaliation, and the long process of cleanup--especially the uniquely difficult problem of fallout and residual radioactivity.

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Preventive Defense Project, Harvard and Stanford Universities
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Michael M. May
William J. Perry
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Motivated by the failure of current methods to control dengue fever, we formulate a mathematical model to assess the impact on the spread of a mosquito-borne viral disease of a strategy that releases adult male insects homozygous for a dominant, repressible, lethal genetic trait. A dynamic model for the female adult mosquito population, which incorporates the competition for female mating between released mosquitoes and wild mosquitoes, density-dependent competition during the larval stage, and realization of the lethal trait either before or after the larval stage, is embedded into a susceptible-exposed-infectious- susceptible human-vector epidemic model for the spread of the disease. For the special case in which the number of released mosquitoes is maintained in a fixed proportion to the number of adult female mosquitoes at each point in time, we derive mathematical formulas for the disease eradication condition and the approximate number of released mosquitoes necessary for eradication. Numerical results using data for dengue fever suggest that the proportional policy outperforms a release policy in which the released mosquito population is held constant, and that eradication in approximately 1 year is feasible for affected human populations on the order of 105 to 106, although the logistical considerations are daunting. We also construct a policy that achieves an exponential decay in the female mosquito population; this policy releases approximately the same number of mosquitoes as the proportional policy but achieves eradication nearly twice as fast.

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Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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Lawrence M. Wein
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The CISAC Fellows Forum showcases some of the vitally important work that has been accomplished at CISAC this year. Moderated by Scott Sagan, CISAC co-director, three scholars represent the promising work of CISAC fellows:

David Patel

Postdoctoral Fellow

"Islam, Identity, and Electoral Outcomes in Iraq"

Why has a cohesive national Shiite political identity emerged in Iraq while Sunni Arabs remain fractured? What does the United States need to understand about how differences between Shiite and Sunni clerical networks influence electoral successes?

David Patel's work focuses on questions of religious organizations and collective action in the Middle East. In fall 2007, he will join the faculty at Cornell University as an assistant professor of political science.

Jacob Shapiro

"Mis-overestimating Terrorism: The Problems Terrorists Face and How to Make Them Worse"

Terrorist organizations face substantial internal challenges which make them vulnerable to government action. Careful counter terrorism strategies can exploit these organizational pathologies.

Jacob Shapiro is a graduate student in political science at Stanford University and a CISAC predoctoral fellow. His research focuses on the economic forces that motivate terrorist organizations and the organizational challenges that these groups face.

Rebecca Slayton

"Technology Limited: How Scientists Do and Don't Influence U.S. Defense Policy"

In the United States, high technology is a favorite solution to national security problems. But how do we know when complex technology has reached its limits? The rancorous debate over missile defense shows how experts use science to authoritatively frame options and thus influence the making of defense policy.

Rebecca Slayton is a lecturer in the Science, Technology and Society Program at Stanford University and a CISAC affiliate. In 2004-2005 she was a CISAC science fellow. Slayton's research examines the relationships between technocrats, academia, and the media.

Bechtel Conference Center

CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, E202
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

(650) 725-2715 (650) 723-0089
0
The Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science
The Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education  
Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
rsd25_073_1160a_1.jpg PhD

Scott D. Sagan is Co-Director and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, and the Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education at Stanford University. He also serves as Co-Chair of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences’ Committee on International Security Studies. Before joining the Stanford faculty, Sagan was a lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University and served as special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon.

Sagan is the author of Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton University Press, 1989); The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton University Press, 1993); and, with co-author Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate (W.W. Norton, 2012). He is the co-editor of Insider Threats (Cornell University Press, 2017) with Matthew Bunn; and co-editor of The Fragile Balance of Terror (Cornell University Press, 2022) with Vipin Narang. Sagan was also the guest editor of a two-volume special issue of DaedalusEthics, Technology, and War (Fall 2016) and The Changing Rules of War (Winter 2017).

Recent publications include “Creeds and Contestation: How US Nuclear and Legal Doctrine Influence Each Other,” with Janina Dill, in a special issue of Security Studies (December 2025); “Kettles of Hawks: Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Noncombatant Immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel”, with Janina Dill and Benjamin A. Valentino in Security Studies (February 2022); “The Rule of Law and the Role of Strategy in U.S. Nuclear Doctrine” with Allen S. Weiner in International Security (Spring 2021); “Does the Noncombatant Immunity Norm Have Stopping Power?” with Benjamin A. Valentino in International Security (Fall 2020); and “Just War and Unjust Soldiers: American Public Opinion on the Moral Equality of Combatants” and “On Reciprocity, Revenge, and Replication: A Rejoinder to Walzer, McMahan, and Keohane” with Benjamin A. Valentino in Ethics & International Affairs (Winter 2019).

In 2022, Sagan was awarded Thérèse Delpech Memorial Award from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at their International Nuclear Policy Conference. In 2017, he received the International Studies Association’s Susan Strange Award which recognizes the scholar whose “singular intellect, assertiveness, and insight most challenge conventional wisdom and intellectual and organizational complacency" in the international studies community. Sagan was also the recipient of the National Academy of Sciences William and Katherine Estes Award in 2015, for his work addressing the risks of nuclear weapons and the causes of nuclear proliferation. The award, which is granted triennially, recognizes “research in any field of cognitive or behavioral science that advances understanding of issues relating to the risk of nuclear war.” In 2013, Sagan received the International Studies Association's International Security Studies Section Distinguished Scholar Award. He has also won four teaching awards: Stanford’s 1998-99 Dean’s Award for Distinguished Teaching; Stanford's 1996 Hoagland Prize for Undergraduate Teaching; the International Studies Association’s 2008 Innovative Teaching Award; and the Monterey Institute for International Studies’ Nonproliferation Education Award in 2009.     

Co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation
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Scott D. Sagan Co-Director Moderator CISAC
David S. Patel Postdoctoral Fellow Speaker
Jacob N. Shapiro Predoctoral Fellow Speaker
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Affiliate
slayton_headshot.jpg PhD

Slayton’s research and teaching examine the relationships between and among risk, governance, and expertise, with a focus on international security and cooperation since World War II. Slayton’s current book project, Shadowing Cybersecurity, examines the historical emergence of cybersecurity expertise. Shadowing Cybersecurity shows how efforts to establish credible expertise in corporate, governmental, and non-governmental contexts have produced varying and sometimes conflicting expert practices. Nonetheless, all cybersecurity experts wrestle with the irreducible uncertainties that characterize intelligent adversaries, and the fundamental inability to prove that systems are secure. The book shows how cybersecurity experts have paradoxically gained credibility by making threats and vulnerabilities visible, while acknowledging that more always remain in the shadows.

Slayton’s first book, Arguments that Count: Physics, Computing, and Missile Defense, 1949-2012 (MIT Press, 2013), shows how the rise of a new field of expertise in computing reshaped public policies and perceptions about the risks of missile defense in the United States. In 2015, Arguments that Count won the Computer History Museum Prize. In 2016, Slayton was awarded a National Science Foundation CAREER grant for her project “Enacting Cybersecurity Expertise.” In 2019, Slayton was also a recipient of the United States Presidential Early Career Award for Scientists and Engineers, for her NSF CAREER project.

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Rebecca Slayton Lecturer, Science, Technology, and Society Program; CISAC Affiliate; former Science Fellow Speaker
Conferences
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The anatomy of a program to develop a first nuclear weapon was analyzed as a precursor to comparison of potential counter-proliferation activities. In this talk we discuss this precursor task. The weapon and path selected for this analysis was covert development of a gun-type fission device using uranium enriched by centrifuge technology. The rationale for this selection is described. The anatomy was developed by identifying and sequencing each task required to ultimately assemble a single working nuclear explosive device and to provide a limited follow-on production capability. Tasks involve acquisition of materials, design and development of components including manufacturing tools and equipment, design and construction of facilities, operation of the facilities, assembly and integration of the components, and test and evaluation of the components and assembled device. Critical aspects of these steps will be discussed in the presentation. For each task the resources required (time, manpower, utilities, feed materials, and equipment) and their associated costs were estimated. These were inserted into standard project management tools. This permitted easy determination of overall costs and program duration as well as establishing a critical program path. The significance of this information and its use in one potential counter-proliferation activity is described as are potential extensions of this process to analysis of other proliferation pathways.

Robert C. Harney is an associate professor of systems engineering at the Naval Postgraduate School and is the Naval Sea Systems Command Chair of Total Ship Systems Engineering (Combat Systems). He received the BS degree in chemistry and physics from Harvey Mudd College in 1971 and the PhD in applied science from the University of California, Davis in 1976. His entire career has been spent in the field of national defense, working at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, M.I.T. Lincoln Laboratory, and Martin Marietta Corporation before joining the Naval Postgraduate School in 1995. He teaches courses in sensor systems, weapon systems, and systems engineering. His primary research interests are in advanced sensor systems, unconventional weapons of mass destruction, and counter-terrorism.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Robert Harney Associate Professor, Department of Systems Engineering Speaker Naval Postgraduate School
Seminars
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One of the world's greatest ethical challenges is the inequities in global health. Life expectancy in the United States is about 80 years and rising, while in many parts of the developing world, particularly in Africa as a result of HIV/AIDS, it is 40 years and falling. On the "bright side," the globalization of life sciences is key force to improve health in the developing world. For example, the rise of the Indian biotechnology industry has improved availability of vaccines and programs like the Grand Challenges in Global Health Initiative funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation provide hope for upstream discovery science against global health problems. However, on the "dark side," the globalization of life sciences poses risks to global biosecurity including bioterrorism by non-state actors.

This lecture will explore how to optimize the benefits of the "bright side," and mitigate the risks of the "dark side," of the globalization of life sciences. Dr. Singer will argue that the biological case is different from the nuclear case and demands a different approach, and explore the potential role of the United Nations in enhancing global biosecurity.

Peter A. Singer is senior scientist at the McLaughlin Rotman Centre, University Health Network; professor of medicine, University of Toronto; co-director of the Canadian Program in Genomics and Global Health; and a distinguished investigator of the Canadian Institutes of Health Research. He studied internal medicine at the University of Toronto, medical ethics at the University of Chicago, public health at Yale University, and management at Harvard Business School. Between 1995 and 2006, Singer was Sun Life Financial Chair in Bioethics, director of the University of Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics, and director of the World Health Organization Collaborating Centre for Bioethics at the University of Toronto.

History Corner, Building 200, Room 002

Peter A. Singer Senior Scientist, McLaughlin Rotman Centre, University Health Network, and Professor of Medicine Speaker University of Toronto
Lectures
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