Foreign Policy
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 Is military conflict in space inevitable? Has former president Eisenhower’s vision of keeping space peaceful become outdated? How can the United States secure its space interests and assets without provoking international violence? Bound by a treaty written and signed forty years ago, every space-faring nation—save the U.S. and Israel—has gone on record in favor of a new agreement. A new Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) treaty could address changes in the post-Cold War world as well as modern satellite and weapons technologies that the 1967 treaty could not anticipate. But in the grand tradition of American exceptionalism, Washington has largely avoided the issue. The administrations of Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush have blocked negotiations, citing potential threats to U.S. “rights, capabilities, and freedom of action.” Self-proclaimed “space warriors” even argue that U.S. military dominance in orbital space will be the only guarantee for international peace in the future. In Twilight War: The Folly of U.S. Space Dominance, Moore argues that the U.S. merely provokes conflict when it presumes to be the exception to the rule. “Unilateral military actions in space will not guarantee American security; they will guarantee conflict, and possibly, a new cold war,” Moore concludes.

Mike Moore is an author, journalist, and speaker, and research fellow at The Independent Institute. He is the author of many articles on national security, conflict resolution, nuclear weapons and proliferation, space weaponry, and related topics. Mike has spoken at many professional conferences and meetings sponsored by scientific organizations and policy institutes. Moore is the former editor of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in 2000, and he has also served as editor of Quill, the magazine of the Society of Professional Journalists. He was general editor of Health Risks and the Press: Perspectives on Media Coverage of Risk Assessment and Health and has been an editor or reporter for the Milwaukee Journal, Chicago Tribune, Chicago Daily News, and the Kansas City Star. His articles have appeared in the Brown Journal of World Affairs, Foreign Service Journal, Yes! A Journal of Positive Futures, and The SAIS Review and International Affairs. He has contributed chapters to The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy, Cyberwar, Netwar and the Revolution in Military Affairs and Asia-Pacific Cooperative Security in the 21st Century. Moore has spoken at the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Business Leaders for Sensible Priorities, Fudan University (Shanghai), the National Atomic Museum, the Lawyers Alliance for World Security, the Nuclear-Free Future Foundation, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Stanley Foundation, the International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts, the Eisenhower Institute, and the Nuclear Policy Research Institute.

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Mike Moore Research Fellow Speaker The Independent Institute
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Scholars of international relations usually argue that democracies are better able to signal their foreign policy intentions than nondemocracies, in part because democracies have an advantage in generating audience costs that make backing down in international crises costly to the leader. This article argues that the conventional hypothesis underestimates the extent to which nondemocratic leaders can be held accountable domestically, allowing them to generate audience costs. First, I identify three factors contributing to audience costs: whether domestic political groups can and will coordinate to punish the leader; whether the audience views backing down negatively; and whether outsiders can observe the possibility of domestic sanctions for backing down. The logic predicts that democracies should have no audience costs advantage over autocracies when elites can solve their coordination dilemma, and the possibility of coordination is observable to foreign decision makers. Empirical tests show that democracies do not in fact have a significant signaling advantage over most autocracies. This finding has important implications for understanding the relationship between regime type and international relations.

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International Organization
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The Iran-United States Tribunal has recently celebrated its 25th anniversary. Although it has resolved all of the cases brought by private claimants, it is still likely to be many more years before the Tribunal is able to complete the remaining government-to-government cases on its docket. There are multiple reasons why so much time will be required: the pending cases are extremely complex, the governments brief them slowly, and the Tribunal's decision-making process itself is slow. There does not for the foreseeable future appear to be an alternative to continued litigation, because the prospects of a global settlement of the remaining claims before the Tribunal are remote. The parties face challenges in developing reasonable assessments of the legal and economic costs and benefits of settlement. Beyond this, the strained political relations between the United States and Iran would make even a legally and economically rationale settlement extremely difficult to achieve. The challenge facing the Tribunal in the remaining years of its existence, in which the Iran and United States are the only parties before it, is to continue to decide cases in a principled fashion on the basis of the law and the facts, and to resist the temptation to reach compromise decisions in the interests of political expediency.

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Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals
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Allen S. Weiner
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These days, it's rare to pick up a newspaper and not see a story related to intelligence. From the investigations of the 9/11 commission, to accusations of illegal wiretapping, to debates on whether it's acceptable to torture prisoners for information, intelligence—both accurate and not—is driving domestic and foreign policy. And yet, in part because of its inherently secretive nature, intelligence has received very little scholarly study. Into this void comes Reforming Intelligence, a timely collection of case studies written by intelligence experts, and sponsored by the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) at the Naval Postgraduate School, that collectively outline the best practices for intelligence services in the United States and other democratic states.

Reforming Intelligence suggests that intelligence is best conceptualized as a subfield of civil-military relations, and is best compared through institutions. The authors examine intelligence practices in the United States, United Kingdom, and France, as well as such developing democracies as Brazil, Taiwan, Argentina, and Russia. While there is much more data related to established democracies, there are lessons to be learned from states that have created (or re-created) intelligence institutions in the contemporary political climate. In the end, reading about the successes of Brazil and Taiwan, the failures of Argentina and Russia, and the ongoing reforms in the United States yields a handful of hard truths. In the murky world of intelligence, that's an unqualified achievement.

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University of Texas Press, Austin
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978-0-292-71660-5
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A distinguished panel including psychological scientists, political scientists, and psychiatrists – Arie W. Kruglanski, Martha Crenshaw, Jerrold M. Post, and Jeff Victoroff – assesses the impact of different metaphorical framings (warfare, law enforcement, epidemiology, and prejudice reduction) on the worldwide effort to combat and prevent terrorism. The authors show that the metaphorical “war on terrorism” that has dominated post-9/11 thinking about national security and foreign policy is highly limited, blinding political leaders and other key decision makers to different possibilities both for containing the worldwide spread of terrorist ideologies and also for preventing terrorism by alleviating the social problems giving rise to it. The report includes an editorial by Louise Richardson, Harvard University, who underscores the importance of not reducing counterterrorism to simplistic metaphors that hamper our ability to face inherently complex political and security issues.

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Psychological Science in the Public Interest
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Martha Crenshaw
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Ron E. Hassner (speaker) is an assistant professor of political science at University of California, Berkeley. He returns to CISAC as a visiting professor, having served as predoctoral fellow from 2000 to 2003. His research revolves around symbolic and emotive aspects of international security with particular attention to religious violence, Middle Eastern politics and territorial disputes. His publications have focused on the role of perceptions in entrenching international disputes, the causes and characteristics of conflicts over sacred places, the characteristics of political-religious leadership and political-religious mobilization and the role of national symbols in conflict.

Hassner was a fellow of the MacArthur Consortium on Peace and Security in 2000-2003. In 2003-2004 he was a postdoctoral scholar at the Olin Institute for International Security, Harvard University. He is a graduate of Stanford University with degrees in political science and religious studies.

Jacob Shapiro (discussant) is a CISAC postdoctoral fellow. His primary research interest is the organization of terrorism and insurgency. His other research interests include international relations, organization theory, and security policy. Shapiro's ongoing projects study the balance between secrecy and openness in counterterrorism, the impact of international human rights law on democracies' foreign policy, the causes of militant recruitment in Islamic countries, and the relationship between public goods provision and insurgent violence in Iraq and Afghanistan. His research has been published in International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Foreign Policy, and a number of edited volumes. Shapiro is a Harmony Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy. As a Naval Reserve officer he was assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval Warfare Development Command. He served on active duty at Special Boat Team 20 and onboard the USS Arthur W. Radford (DD-968). He holds a PhD in political science and an MA in economics from Stanford University and a BA in political science from the University of Michigan.

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Ron Hassner Speaker
Jacob Shapiro Speaker
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Jacob Shapiro (speaker) is a CISAC postdoctoral fellow. His primary research interest is the organization of terrorism and insurgency. His other research interests include international relations, organization theory, and security policy. Shapiro's ongoing projects study the balance between secrecy and openness in counterterrorism, the impact of international human rights law on democracies' foreign policy, the causes of militant recruitment in Islamic countries, and the relationship between public goods provision and insurgent violence in Iraq and Afghanistan. His research has been published in International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Foreign Policy, and a number of edited volumes. Shapiro is a Harmony Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy. As a Naval Reserve officer he was assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval Warfare Development Command. He served on active duty at Special Boat Team 20 and onboard the USS Arthur W. Radford (DD-968). He holds a PhD in political science and an MA in economics from Stanford University and a BA in political science from the University of Michigan.

Jeremy Weinstein (discussant) is an assistant professor of political science at Stanford University and an affiliated faculty member at CDDRL and CISAC. Previously, he was a research fellow at the Center for Global Development, where he directed the bi-partisan Commission on Weak States and US National Security. While working on his PhD, with funding from the Jacob Javits Fellowship, a Sheldon Fellowship, and the World Bank, he conducted hundreds of interviews with rebel combatants and civilians in both Africa and Latin America for his forthcoming book, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. He has also worked on the National Security Council staff; served as a visiting scholar at the World Bank; was a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; and received a research fellowship in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution. He received his BA with high honors from Swarthmore College, and his MA and PhD in political economy and government from Harvard University.

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Jeremy Weinstein Speaker
Jacob N. Shapiro Speaker
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Jessica Weeks is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University, the 2007-2008 Zukerman Fellow and a pre-doctoral fellow at CISAC, and the Teaching Assistant for the CISAC Honors Program. Her dissertation, "Leaders, Accountability, and Foreign Policy in Non-Democracies" studies how different levels of domestic accountability affect leaders' decisions about international conflict. Additional research investigates the effectiveness of military interventions, and the escalation and resolution of international military crises.

Jessica graduated summa cum laude with a BA in Political Science from The Ohio State University in 2001, and received an MA in International History and Politics from the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland.

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Jessica L. Weeks Speaker
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This presentation provides an overview of the history of US satellite-based reconnaissance as has been publicly revealed by the US Government to date. Extrapolating from there, it will transition to the evolutionary and revolutionary role that commercial satellite imagery is now playing on the international stage in proving a heretofore-unimaginable basis for greater global transparency and the way it has helped, and will continue to help, to detect and monitor undeclared unconventional weapons related facilities and activities. In addition, new geospatial tools, which draw heavily upon commercial satellite imagery as well as augmenting it, have also become available over the internet. Among those Geospatial tools, "Digital Virtual Globes" (i.e., Google Earth, Virtual Earth, etc.) not only provide a much improved mapping capability over previously used simple plan-view line drawings used by various international inspection organizations such as the IAEA, but the offer much improved visualization of known and inspected sites. Such digital globes also provide a new, essentially free means to conduct broad area baseline search for possible "clandestine" sites...either allege through open source leads; identified on internet blogs and wiki layers with input from a "free" cadre of global browsers and/or by knowledgeable local citizens that can include ground photos and maps; or by other initiatives based on existing country program knowledge. The digital globes also provide highly accurate terrain mapping for better overall geospatial context and allow detailed 3-D perspectives of all sites or areas of interest. 3-D modeling software, when used in conjunction with these digital globes can significantly enhance individual building characterization and visualization (including interiors), allowing for better international inspector training through pre-inspection walk-arounds or fly-around, and perhaps better IAEA safeguard decision making. In sum, these new geospatial visualization aids are ideal for international inspector training and orientation, as well as site characterization, monitoring and verification. But perhaps just as significantly, these new geospatial tools also now make it possible for anyone to conduct his or her own satellite-based reconnaissance for any application from the comfort of home, at a wi-fi enabled coffee shop, or even on the beach at a tropical island resort.

Frank Pabian is a Senior Nonproliferation Infrastructure Analyst at Los Alamos National Laboratory who has over 35 years experience in the nuclear nonproliferation field including six years with the Office of Imagery Analysis and 18 years with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's "Z" Division. Frank also served as a Chief Inspector for the IAEA during UN inspections in Iraq from 1996-1998 focusing on "Capable Sites." In December 2002, Frank served as one of the first US nuclear inspectors back in Iraq with UN/IAEA. While at Los Alamos, Frank has developed and presented commercial satellite imagery based briefings on foreign clandestine nuclear facilities to the International Nuclear Suppliers Group, the IAEA, NATO, and the Foreign Ministries of China and India on behalf of the NNSA and STATE.

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Frank Pabian Speaker Los Alamos National Laboratory
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Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones is the well-known scholar of U.S. intelligence agencies and the author of numerous books, among them The CIA and American Democracy; Cloak and Dollar: A History of American Secret Intelligence; Changing Differences: Women and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy; and Peace Now! American Society and the Ending of the Vietnam War. His most recent book, The FBI: A History (Yale University Press, September 2007), examines the bureau's history from a European perspective and in the context of American history, including the prism of race.

Jeffreys-Jones, a professor of American History at the University of Edinburgh, received his BA from the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, and his PhD from the University of Cambridge. Other appointments have included a fellowship at the Charles Warren Center for the Study of American History, Harvard University; stipendiary, JFK Institut für Nordamerikastudien, Berlin; and Canadian Commonwealth Fellow and Visiting Professor, University of Toronto.

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Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones Professor of American History Speaker University of Edinburgh
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