On July 19, 2000 the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and the Lawyers Alliance for World Security (LAWS) gathered forty preeminent scientists, security experts, and political analysts for a Roundtable Discussion on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at Stanford University. The day-long seminar was intended to explore the diverse set of topics that arose during the October 1999 Sentate debate of the Treaty and to develop a consensus on steps that the United States should now take with regard to the CTBT. This booklet includes a transcript of that discussion along with a collection of short papers submitted by experts who were unable to attend.

How should the United States deal with so-called rogue states that threaten to use chemical or biological weapons against the U.S. homeland or its troops abroad? Scott Sagan of Stanford University examines Washington's "calculated ambiguity doctrine," which holds that the United States does not rule out the use of nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological weapons attack. Sagan argues that the risks associated with this doctrine outweigh the benefits. He warns that although the ambiguity doctrine might decrease the likelihood of a chemical or biological attack, it also raises the probability that Washington would feel compelled to use nuclear weapons to respond to such an attack. Sagan concludes that the United States should renounce the nuclear option and instead recommit itself to meeting a chemical or biological attack with overwhelming conventional force.

This paper examines the impact on global warming of development and structural changes in the electricity sector of Guangdong Province, China, together with the possible effect of international instruments such as are generated by the Kyoto Protocol on that impact. The purpose of the paper is three-fold: to examine and analyze the data available, to put that data into an explanatory economic and institutional framework, and to analyze the possible application of international instruments such as CDMs in that locality. Our plans are to supplement this work with similar work elsewhere in China.

This research contributes to two groups of existing studies. First, several researchers have studied China's energy industry, including the utility sector, in the context of global greenhouse gas emissions and abatement policies. Not much attention has been paid to the electricity sectoral development at the sub-national level and its regional differences. Yet, important decisions are taken and important constraints operate at the sub-national level. Second, since the Kyoto Protocol provided for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) as a policy instrument to involve developing countries in carbon emissions abatement in 1997, a number of studies have focused on the operation of CDM. Applying CDM is challenging because its rule of additionality requires that a "baseline" estimate be made of what developing countries, including China, would do to reduce carbon emissions in the absence of CDM. Minimizing moral hazard and other incentive problems is a daunting task. The studies to date have focused on discussions of general embedded problems and desirable principles for applying the additionality rule. However, how to identify baseline factors in specific economies and evaluate their impact on the energy sector decisions in terms of transaction or institutional costs remain unsettled questions.

This study is a first step towards filling that gap. By investigating Guangdong's electricity sector, we hope to highlight new characteristics of Guangdong's electricity market and institutions, which may have been neglected from large model and highly aggregated approaches. At the same time, by examining the economic and institutional features of the decision making process in Guangdong's electricity sector, we hope to get a better understanding of the factors affecting possible baselines and to draw some preliminary implications for CDM and other carbon abatement policy instruments. This study may also provide a reference for other regional analyses and permit some preliminary implications for baseline and abatement policy studies to be drawn.

The United States has a global security strategy, in deeds if seldom clearly in words. The U.S. security strategy is to enlarge the areas of the world that it can control militarily and to weaken all states outside those areas. The strategy does not rely solely on military means, but enlarged military control is the end and military means--armed interventions, alliance extensions, arms sales--usually lead the way. Aside from a 1992 Pentagon trial balloon, which was poorly received though accurate enough as far as it went, and a few other statements, the strategy has been manifested via a series of consistent actions rather than formal statements.

Along with this overall strategy, the United States also has policies regarding nuclear weapons. Some of these policies are stated, some are tacit. The stated policies include de-emphasizing nuclear weapons, discouraging nuclear proliferation, and pursuing nuclear arms reductions, a comprehensive test ban, and other nuclear-arms-control measures. The tacit policy is reliance on deterrent nuclear forces to limit escalation of conventional conflicts and to offset the nuclear forces of other powers.

These two policies, military enlargement and reliance on nuclear stability and arms control, are not compatible. Continued enlargement backed or led by military force will not support de-emphasis of nuclear weapons, let alone nuclear disarmament. It may not support nuclear nonproliferation even among allies, depending on whether the United States is seen to become overextended or overcommitted at home or abroad. Military enlargement weakens support for several of the arms-control measures on the U.S. agenda. Enlargement is also likely to lead to crises that will test the stability of nuclear deterrence more seriously than it has been tested since the early years of the Cold War.

In this paper I first remind the reader of the main components of the U.S. military enlargement strategy. Next I describe why other states, given the U.S. enlargement strategy, find and will continue to find nuclear weapons useful. These states are not all potential opponents. Third, I explain how the U.S. enlargement strategy undermines nuclear arms control. What is more important, I show why it will inevitably lead to nuclear crises. Last, I discuss the alternative strategy of military restraint and show how it would ensure U.S. influence for a longer time and with greater safety than the present strategy of unilateral U.S. military enlargement.