Security

FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.

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Steven Pifer
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On Vladimir Putin’s order, the Russian army launched a new invasion of Ukraine in February.  That has inflicted tragedy on Ukrainians but, seven months later, has also proved a catastrophe for Russia.  By all appearances, Putin remains fixed on his war of choice, now betting the West’s will to support Ukraine will ebb with time.  The West should ensure that that becomes another one of his grievous miscalculations.

A War Gone Awry

On February 24, Russian forces attacked Ukraine from the north, east and south.  The assault vectors suggested they sought to occupy Kyiv and as much as the eastern two-thirds of Ukraine.  Staunch resistance drove the Russians back from the capital.  By early April, Russian forces had withdrawn from Kyiv and the north, though they occupied parts of southern Ukraine.  Moscow then proclaimed the downsized goal of taking Donbas, consisting of the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, parts of which Russian and Russian proxy forces had occupied since 2014.

After more than three months of grinding fighting, the Russian army held most of Luhansk oblast.  In July, the Russians turned their military efforts to Donetsk oblast but made scant progress.  Western experts begin speaking of the Russian army’s “culmination”—the point where the combination of casualties (particularly of experienced personnel), loss of equipment, troop exhaustion and low morale make it difficult for a force to sustain a coherent offensive.

After six months of fighting, the conflict seemed to have become a war of attrition.  However, the Ukrainians launched a counteroffensive in Kherson, aimed at driving Russian forces from the only area west of the Dnipro River that they occupied.  They then struck in the Kharkiv region, routing Russian forces and liberating more than 2000 square miles in the first two weeks of September.  While the Russian military continues to occupy large swathes of Ukraine, the tide of war has shifted in Kyiv’s favor, as poor leadership, tactics and logistics hamper Russian forces.

Growing Losses for Russia

The war has meant heavy losses for Russia, first and foremost in its military ranks.  In mid-August, Western intelligence estimated that 15,000-25,000 Russian soldiers had been killed in action and another 45,000-60,000 wounded (the Russians have not reported casualty numbers since March).  These totals have certainly grown over the past month.  The Russian military has also lost substantial amounts of equipment, including confirmed losses of 1100 tanks, 1200 infantry fighting vehicles and thousands of other items.  The Russian defense budget will require many years to replace that equipment, and the Russian army increasingly must make do with older weapons, such as T-62 tanks first produced five decades ago.  Russian arms exporters will likely find that the Russian brand has lost much of its luster with overseas customers.

Western sanctions are exacting a growing economic price.  While the Central Bank of Russia has managed the crisis well, inflation still ran at a hefty 14 percent in September.  In August, the Central Bank reported that the Russian economy had contracted by 4 percent since 2021.  A confidential study purportedly done for the Kremlin provided a grim outlook, projecting an “inertial” scenario of the economy’s contraction bottoming out in 2023 at 8.3 percent below its 2021 level.  The European Union’s coming embargo on most imports of Russian oil and the G7’s planned price cap could significantly cut the revenues that Moscow earns from oil exports.

The West’s ban on export of semiconductors and other high tech products affects both Russia’s defense and civilian manufacturing sectors, and the impact will grow with time.  Since the beginning of the war, more than 1000 multinational companies have exited Russia altogether or substantially curtailed operations there.  There is also brain drain, with tens of thousands of IT specialists reported to have left the country.

Russia has also incurred steep geopolitical costs.  NATO is reenergized, and almost all members are increasing their defense spending.  Putin and the Kremlin did not like the small multinational battlegroups that NATO deployed as trip-wire forces in the Baltic states in 2015; they will like even less the scaled-up contingents being deployed there now.  And the entry of Finland and Sweden into the Alliance will make the Baltic Sea, in effect, a NATO lake.

In sum, Putin’s war has cost Russia much.

Disaster and Dilemma

A series of miscalculations led Putin to this disaster.  The Kremlin apparently did not believe the Ukrainians would resist and expected a quick victory.  Some invading Russian units crossed the border with only two-three days of food rations.  The Kremlin overestimated the might of its military.  Anecdotal reports, such as one that T-80 tank reactive armor was filled with rubber instead of an explosive charge, suggest that corruption, endemic in Russia, has not left the defense sector untouched.  The Kremlin also apparently did not expect NATO’s sharp response, the decisions by Finland and Sweden to seek to join the Alliance, the Western flow of arms to Kyiv, or the scale of economic sanctions.

Russia itself is not yet in crisis.  The economy, while grappling with growing problems, has not broken down, and the Russian military retains formidable capabilities.  But the Kremlin faces a far more difficult situation than it imagined in January, and it will get worse.

Whether Putin fully grasps this is an open question.  On September 7, he said that “we [Russia] have not lost anything and will not lose anything,” a bizarre assessment that the many thousands of Russian families who have lost loved ones in Ukraine surely do not share.  Russian officials have indicated that Kremlin conditions for ending the war remain unchanged from the total capitulation they demanded at the start.  Following a September 13 phone call with Putin, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz noted “there was no indication that new attitudes are emerging.”

Putin faces limits in continuing the war, some self-imposed.  He termed the invasion a “special military operation” (calling it a “war” in Russia can lead to jail time), and he has sought to minimize the scale of the conflict in the eyes of the Russian public.  Despite heavy casualties, the Kremlin officials say they are “not discussing” mobilization.  Russia instead has scrapped the age limit for contract soldiers while scouring prisons for volunteers.  Calls outside the Kremlin have increased for a major mobilization.  However, that could alarm the broader Russian public, who will fear their sons will be drafted and sent to fight.  In any case, it would take considerable time to train new units and equip them with modern arms.

Putin’s Big Bet

The Ukrainian military may well rack up further gains before winter, when the pace of fighting should slow, but the war will continue for some time.  The question:  will the growing economic pain and agonizing flow of dead and injured soldiers home erode the Russian will to fight, or will a weak economy and lack of weapons and ammunition erode Ukraine’s ability to defend itself?

The West has a say in this.  If it continues to provide the arms and financial support the Ukrainians need, their military has the resolve to prevail and defeat the Russian invasion.  Putin is betting, however, that Western support will falter.  He hopes the rising price of energy and costs of assisting Ukraine will undermine European and U.S. support for Kyiv.

The West must stay the course and show Putin his bet is a loser.

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On Vladimir Putin’s order, the Russian army launched a new invasion of Ukraine in February. That has inflicted tragedy on Ukrainians but, seven months later, has also proved a catastrophe for Russia.

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Or (Ori) Rabinowitz, (PhD), a Chevening scholar, is an associate professor at the International Relations Department of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. During the academic year of 2022-2023 she will hold the post of visiting associate professor at Stanford’s CISAC. Her research interests include nuclear proliferation, intelligence studies, and Israeli American relations. Her book, Bargaining on Nuclear Tests was published in April 2014 by Oxford University Press. Her studies were published leading academic journals, including International Security, Journal of Strategic Studies, and International History Review, as well as op-eds and blog posts in the Washington Post, Foreign Policy and Ha’aretz. She holds a PhD degree awarded by the War Studies Department of King’s College London, an MA degree in Security Studies and an LLB degree in Law, both from Tel-Aviv University. She was awarded numerous awards and grants, including two personal research grants by the Israeli Science Foundation and in 2020 was a member of the Young Academic forum of the Israeli Academy for Sciences and Humanities.  

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Pallabi Mitra Chakrabarti serves as the Chief Strategy & Innovation Officer at CMCI, a Women-Owned Small Business headquartered in Fairfax, Virginia. In this role, she delivers the highest quality solutions related to science, technology, and policy. 

Prior to joining CMCI, Pallabi held positions at multiple Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories and federal government contracting organizations since 2016. She began her career supporting the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), DOE’s semi-autonomous agency tasked with enhancing national security. During this time, she led the exploration of ionizing radiation technologies and spearheaded the development of innovative alternative technologies to radiological materials. 

Most recently, Pallabi served as a subject matter expert at Sandia National Laboratories. She led activities related to the security of radioactive materials across a diverse set of partners, including international and domestic government agencies, other U.S. government laboratories, NGOs, industry, and academia. She also played an instrumental role in developing and designing research studies that identified and analyzed information on radiation technologies used in the treatment of cancer. 

In parallel with her professional endeavors, Pallabi has pursued scholarly work at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, where she continues to research how to bridge the gap between global health and radiological security. Pallabi received a Master of Science degree from the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2014, and she earned a Bachelor of Science degree from Cornell University in 2013.

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The Institute recently received new information and feedback, warranting a major revision to our report, “Abadeh is Marivan,” first published on August 28, 2020. The Abadeh site is the Amad Plan’s Marivan site, an important test site responsible for conducting large-scale high explosive tests for developing nuclear weapons under the Amad Plan, Iran’s effort during the early 2000s to build five nuclear weapons, subsequently reoriented to a smaller, better camouflaged nuclear weapons effort. The new information allowed the Institute to locate with high certainty Marivan’s outdoor test site, located about 1.5 kilometers northeast from the support site (see Figure 1). Although the logistical support site was razed in July 2019, the outdoor test site appears to have remained largely intact. Recent satellite imagery acquired and analyzed by the Institute shows that the outdoor site features two bunkers and a test ramp.he Institute recently received new information and feedback, warranting a major revision to our report, “Abadeh is Marivan,” first published on August 28, 2020. The Abadeh site is the Amad Plan’s Marivan site, an important test site responsible for conducting large-scale high explosive tests for developing nuclear weapons under the Amad Plan, Iran’s effort during the early 2000s to build five nuclear weapons, subsequently reoriented to a smaller, better camouflaged nuclear weapons effort. The new information allowed the Institute to locate with high certainty Marivan’s outdoor test site, located about 1.5 kilometers northeast from the support site (see Figure 1). Although the logistical support site was razed in July 2019, the outdoor test site appears to have remained largely intact. Recent satellite imagery acquired and analyzed by the Institute shows that the outdoor site features two bunkers and a test ramp.

Read more at The Institute for Science and International Security.

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The Institute of Science and International Security’s new book Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons chronicles the Islamic Republic of Iran’s efforts to build nuclear weapons. The book draws from original Iranian documents seized by Israel’s Mossad in 2018 in a dramatic overnight raid in Tehran. The “Nuclear Archive” allows deep insight into the country’s effort to secretly build nuclear weapons. The book relies on unprecedented access to archive documents, many translated by the Institute into English for the first time. Based on three years of intensive research and analysis of the Nuclear Archives, this new book from the Institute presents a compelling account of Iran’s secret plans to develop nuclear weapons. The Institute of Science and International Security’s new book Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons chronicles the Islamic Republic of Iran’s efforts to build nuclear weapons. The book draws from original Iranian documents seized by Israel’s Mossad in 2018 in a dramatic overnight raid in Tehran. The “Nuclear Archive” allows deep insight into the country’s effort to secretly build nuclear weapons. The book relies on unprecedented access to archive documents, many translated by the Institute into English for the first time.

Read more at the Institute for Science and International Security.

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Based on three years of intensive research and analysis of the Nuclear Archives, this new book from the Institute presents a compelling account of Iran’s secret plans to develop nuclear weapons. Frank was the Geospatial Contributing Analyst.

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Frank Pabian
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Ph.D

Dr. Neilsen is an Assistant Professor in International Security at Baruch College, City University of New York (CUNY). She was the Cyber Security Fellow at CISAC from 2022-2024. Her research focuses on new technologies in conflict (specifically cyber, social media, and AI), mass atrocities, dis/misinformation, and the ethics of war. Her published work has appeared in International Affairs, Terrorism & Political Violence, Ethics & International Affairs, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Genocide Studies & Prevention, Lawfare, Just Security, and War on the Rocks. 

Previously, Rhiannon was a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Australian National University, a Research Consultant for the Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict (ELAC) at the University of Oxford, and a Visiting Fellow at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence.

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Naomi Egel recently completed her PhD from the Government Department at Cornell University. Her research examines the politics of multilateral weapons governance. Using a mixed methods approach, she assess why states pursue multilateral agreements to govern various weapons, and how their motivations for doing so affect the process and outcome of negotiations. More broadly, her research analyzes how different actors shape and contest multilateral security negotiations, how they frame weapons in different ways, and how power is exercised and contested in such negotiations.

Previously, Naomi was a Hans J. Morgenthau (nonresident) fellow at the University of Notre Dame and the inaugural Janne Nolan nuclear security visiting fellow at the Truman Center for National Policy. She has also been a visiting fellow at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) in Geneva, Switzerland. Before starting my PhD, she was a research associate for International Institutions and Global Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations.

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Laura Courchesne is the Co-Director and the Co-Founder of the Centre for Artificial Intelligence, Data and Conflict. Her work focuses on the role of the online environment in shaping and augmenting conflict dynamics. Laura was previously a Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and a Research Fellow at the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project at Princeton University. She has also consulted for Google's Jigsaw and Schmidt Futures. She completed her Ph.D. in International Relations at the University of Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar.

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Miriam Barnum completed her Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Southern California (USC). Her research is focused on understanding the motivations and constraints that shape states’ arming choices. In her book project, she examines the role that internal security threats play in driving choices between nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons pursuit options. Other ongoing projects relate to arming choices more generally, international conflict, and nonproliferation and arms control, with a focus on applying computational measurement models to enhance our understanding of these substantive areas.

While pursuing her Ph.D., Miriam was a US-Asia Grand Strategy predoctoral fellow at USC's Korean Studies Institute, and Director of Data Science for the Security and Political Economy (SPEC) Lab. Before coming to USC, she worked as a research assistant in the National Security Office at Los Alamos National Laboratory.

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Ian’s research focuses on the intersection of technology, science, and international security. His dissertation addresses the history and cultural politics of integrating Artificial Intelligence into military decision-making processes in the United States. 

Ian is affiliated with the Internet Governance Lab and the Center for Security, Innovation & New Technology, both housed at American University. He was a pre-doctoral fellow at CISAC and the Institute for Human Centered AI from 2022-2023. Ian's work has appeared in publications such as War on the Rocks and The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

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