About the Topic: Foreign aid for health in low- and middle-income countries has increased five-fold over the past 25 years. Between 2005 and 2010, health aid made up more than 30% of all health spending in low-income countries.  Global health is also an increasingly important component of U.S. foreign aid, rising steadily from under 4% of all U.S. non-military aid in 1990 to 22.7% in 2011. There is growing evidence for the role of health aid in improving health among recipient countries, but is that it? In this talk I will address the arguments for and against health as a focus of aid efforts and present initial evidence on the role of health aid on human capital and economic development.

About the Speaker: Eran Bendavid is an infectious diseases physician and an Assistant Professor of Medicine in the Division of General Medical Disciplines and a Stanford Health Policy affiliate. His research interests involve understanding the relationship between policies and health outcomes in developing countries. He explores how decisions about foreign assistance for health are made, and how those decisions affect the health of those whom assistance aims to serve.

He received a B.A. in chemistry and philosophy from Dartmouth College, and an M.D. from Harvard Medical School. He completed his residency in internal medicine and fellowship in infectious diseases at Stanford.

Abstract: Professor Philip Morrison once described SETI as the ‘archeology of the future’.  That characterization is both complex and immensely profound. We are a very young technology in a very old galaxy; detection of another technological civilization will validate the proposition that it is possible to become an old technology. 

SETI marked its semi-centennial as a scientific exploration in 2010. Now that exoplanets have been discovered in such abundance and diversity, and Earth 2.0 is a reasonable expectation, it seems more relevant than ever to ask the “Are we alone?” question.  What should we be doing to improve our capability to detect intelligent life beyond Earth? 

To date, technology has been our proxy for intelligence, and our searches have concentrated on electromagnetic radiation.  Should we be emphasizing artifacts? Perhaps collaborating with programs now systematically trying to explore our local solar neighborhood to find small bodies on collision courses with Earth?  Is there a case for genomic SETI?  Should we consider other information-carrying particles in addition to photons?  And if we do continue to emphasize EM signals, how do we improve our sensitivity to transient events, and what other portions of the spectrum can we explore?  Is it time to start transmitting instead of just listening?

There are lots of technical questions about how to move forward, but the most difficult question of all may be how do we integrate and support this vast, and potentially long-term endeavor into a world of short-term thinking?  How do we justify continued investment in SETI?  

About the Speaker: Dr. Jill Tarter holds the Bernard M. Oliver Chair for SETI (Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence) at the SETI Institute in Mountain View, California.  Tarter received her Bachelor of Engineering Physics Degree with Distinction from Cornell University and her Master’s Degree and a Ph.D. in Astronomy from the University of California, Berkeley.  She is a Fellow of the AAAS and of the California Academy of Sciences, where she also serves on the Board of Trustees.  She is passionate about science education and strives to secure funding for SETI research, particularly with the Allen Telescope Array.  Tarter’s work has brought her wide recognition, including two Public Service Medals from NASA.  In 2004 Time Magazine named her one of the Time 100 most influential people in the world.  Tarter was one of three TED prizewinners in 2009, and was a recipient of the Silicon Valley Women of Influence 2010 Award.  Many people are now familiar with her work as portrayed by Jodie Foster in the movie Contact.

Abstract: Biotechnology is diffusing globally. Efficient methods for reading, writing and editing genetic information, generating genetic diversity, and selecting for traits, are becoming widely available. Increasingly, the capacity to manipulate living systems is in the hands of individuals and small groups instead of only large institutions and states.

In this presentation I will explore key governance challenges coupled to the reorganization of practitioner communities and supply chains in biotechnology. In particular, I will examine the effectiveness of strategies proposed by new US federal policies for the oversight of so-called Life Sciences Dual-Use Research of Concern (DURC): experiments that while seeking to mitigate certain risks may pose new ones. More broadly, I will consider options and tradeoffs in building more centralized versus decentralized organizational structures for identifying and responding to emerging biotechnology opportunities and threats.

About the Speaker: Dr. Megan J. Palmer is a William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at CISAC for 2013-2015. She is also a research scientist UC Berkeley and Lawrence Berkeley National Labs, and serves on the advisory board for the synthetic biology program at the Joint Genomics Institute (JGI). Dr. Palmer is an investigator for the NSF Synthetic Biology Engineering Research Center (Synberc) and serves as its Deputy Director of Policy & Practices. She was previously a postdoctoral scholar in the Bioengineering Department at Stanford, where she first joined CISAC as an affiliate in 2012.

Dr. Palmer’s work seeks to develop and advise on best practices and policies for responsibly advancing biotechnology. She has directed projects in biological safety and security, property rights, and governance. She has also launched many programs on the societal aspects of biotechnology.

Dr. Palmer holds a Ph.D. in Biological Engineering from MIT. She received a B.Sc.E. in Engineering Chemistry from Queen’s University, Canada.

About the Topic: U.S. government leaders are making extraordinary efforts to prevent and protect against cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure.  Plans for responding to and recovering from such attacks receive far less attention and are deeply flawed -- especially for catastrophic events when effective plans will be most vital.  Given the rapid growth of cyber threats to the power grid and other critical infrastructure, we should not only continue to strengthen prevention and protection measures, but also assume that a catastrophic cyber-attack will occur and ramp up U.S. response plans and capabilities accordingly. I will argue that the Interim National Cyber Incident Response Plan (which governs the U.S. cyber response system) should be replaced by a plan that is better aligned with industry needs and with “traditional” U.S. disaster response plans, especially the National Response Framework. I will also propose how to structure cyber response planning to maximize “deterrence by denial” and reduce the potential attractiveness of attacking U.S. critical infrastructure for state and non-state adversaries. 

About the Speaker: Paul N. Stockton is Managing Director of Sonecon, LLC. Before joining Sonecon, Dr. Stockton served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs from June, 2009 until January, 2013.  In that position, helped lead the Department’s response to Superstorm Sandy and other disasters, guided the Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection program, and oversaw policies and programs to secure DOD’s domestic installations and personnel against terrorism. In September, 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel appointed Dr. Stockton to co-chair the Independent Review of the Washington Navy Yard Shootings, which recommended major changes to the Department’s security clearance system that are now being implemented.  Dr. Stockton’s recent publications include articles on cyber security in the Yale Law and Policy Review and other journals. Dr. Stockton holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University and a BA Summa Cum Laude from Dartmouth College.

Abstract: Zero-day exploits (ZDEs) are programs that make use of newly-discovered software vulnerabilities to allow attackers to break into and manipulate information systems. A market for software vulnerabilities and exploits has developed, with military and intelligence agencies sometimes paying over $100,000 for exploits and software vendors offering bounties for their disclosure. Labeled a ‘digital arms race’ by some, it is generating a transnational debate about control and regulation of cyber capabilities, the role of secrecy and disclosure in cybersecurity, the ethics of exploit production and use, and the implications of trading software vulnerabilities for a secure and reliable Internet.

This research uses concepts and methods of science and technology studies (STS) and institutionalism to the debate over the production, sale and regulation of ZDEs. The goal of this research is to advance understanding of the way discourses are related to the emergence of governance institutions. The work also sheds light on the socio-technical and economic consequences of efforts to control software vulnerabilities and exploits, and make more transparent applications of ZDEs and cyber capabilities.

This talk will report on the ongoing dissertation work and explore how the discourse on software vulnerabilities and exploits is co-produced along with new institutions and practices in cybersecurity.

About the Speaker: Andreas Kuehn is a Ph.D. Candidate in Information Science and Technology and a Fulbright Scholar at Syracuse University. He joined CISAC as a Zukerman Cybersecurity Predoctoral Fellow in October 2014. Before joining Stanford, he was a visiting graduate student at Cornell University’s Department of Science & Technology Studies.

In his dissertation research, Andreas examines the discourse and the emerging institutions in cybersecurity with a particular focus on software vulnerability and exploit markets. The trade with exploitable security flaws in software and their use in cyber attacks has sparked a controversy about the control and regulation of information technology, and the role of secrecy and disclosure in achieving cybersecurity. While at CISAC, Andreas is conducting qualitative, empirical research on cybersecurity institutions.

His broader research agenda is informed by Science and Technology Studies and Internet Governance to study emerging technology and its relation to privacy, security, and surveillance. Previous research included an NSF-funded project on deep packet inspection technology (DPI) and its implications on Internet governance (www.deeppacket.info), and the use of information technology in the public administration (e.g., enterprise architecture, standardization, interoperability).

Andreas worked in various research positions for the Austrian Ministry of Finance, the Swiss E-Government Institute, the Swiss Federal Office of Communications, and the Malaysian National Advanced IPv6 Centre of Excellence. The Austrian Computer Society awarded him an eGovernment Innovation Award for his research on multidisciplinary actor coordination and collaboration in large scale public ICT efforts. Andreas holds a M.Sc. in Information Systems from the University of Zurich, Switzerland, and an M.Phil. in Information Science and Technology from the School of Information Studies at Syracuse University. He is originally from Zurich, Switzerland.

Abstract: Organizations face a range of cyber threats including spammers, lone hackers, and advanced nation states. Significant uncertainty surrounds how to best secure organizations, and the relative value of different safeguards such as intrusion detection, two-factor authentication, and full disk encryption is unknown. In this talk, I will summarize results from a data analysis performed on a data set from a Research and Development Center and present stochastic models to assess risk in organizations. 

About the Speaker: Marshall is a predoctoral science fellow at CISAC. He is a PhD candidate in Management Science and Engineering at Stanford University, concentrating in Risk Analysis. Marshall studies quantitative models for cyber security in organizations. He is interested in developing probabilistic modeling techniques to improve decision making regarding defense against cyber threats. 

Abstract: It is often said that economists in general, and CIA analysts in particular, failed to understand until very late in the game just how serious the USSR's economic problems were.  That failure, it was widely claimed, was the root cause of a more general failure on the part of the U.S. policy community to understand what was going on in the Soviet Union during the later Cold War period.  It turns out, however, that the Soviet economic problem was understood from the mid-1960s on;  in intellectual terms, the analysis was quite impressive.  The Soviets themselves, moreover, understood the problem in much the same way as Western economists did.   All this provides us with a key--perhaps the key--to understanding great power politics during the latter part of the Cold War.

About the Speaker: Marc Trachtenberg is Professor of Political Science at the University of California - Los Angeles. He studies national security strategy, diplomatic history, and international relations. He has been Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation, the German Marshall Fund, and the SSRC/MacArthur Foundation. His award-winning book, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton University Press, 1999), explores the profound impact of nuclear weapons on the conduct of international relations during the Cold War, making extensive use of newly opened documentary archives in Europe and the United States. History and Strategy (Princeton University Press, 1991) studies seminal events like the onset of World War I and the Cuban Missile Crisis to shed light on the role of force in international affairs. Professor Trachtenberg teaches courses on the history of international relations, international security, and historical research methods.