About the event: A fundamental premise of the nuclear revolution theory (TNR) is the claim of assured destruction—the ability of a state to retaliate with a nuclear second-strike that leads to the destruction of the adversary’s sociopolitical-economic-industrial infrastructure, denying it the ability to survive as a viable modern nation-state. However, as we enter an era of renewed strategic great power competition, emerging technological advances have reanimated questions about the continued relevance of TNR. Can a state employing emerging technologies significantly undermine the assured destruction capabilities of its adversary? Using insights and techniques from Self-Organized Criticality theory, Dr. Sankaran analytically reexamines and models the requirements for assured destruction. He demonstrates that the networked structure of critical infrastructures continues to make advanced industrial states extremely vulnerable to assured destruction—at a fraction of Cold War arsenal requirements. Dr. Sankaran argues that advanced industrial nation-states remain vulnerable to assured destruction retaliatory strikes.

About the speaker: Jaganath “Jay” is an associate professor in the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin and a non-resident fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. He works on problems at the intersection of international security and science & technology. Dr. Sankaran spent the first four years of his career as a defense scientist with the Indian Missile R&D establishment. Dr. Sankaran’s work in weapons design and development led to his interests in missile defenses, space weapons, nuclear weapons, military net assessment, and arms control.

The current focus of his research is the growing strategic and military competition between the major powers. In particular, Dr. Sankaran studies the impact of emerging technological advances on international politics, warfare, and nuclear weapons doctrine. His recent publications examine the impact of five technologies—small satellites, hypersonic weapons, machine learning, cyber weapons, and quantum sensing—on nuclear operations, strategic nuclear stability, and international security. His other recent publications have explored a multitude of national security issues, including the lessons for air power emerging from the Russia-Ukraine War, the politics behind the India-China border crises, and the influence of missile defenses on great power nuclear deterrence.

Dr. Sankaran has held fellowships at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, and the RAND Corporation. He has held visiting positions at the Congressional Budget Office’s National Security Division, the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) at the U.S. Air University, Tsinghua University, and the National Institute for Defense Studies (Tokyo). Dr. Sankaran has served on study groups of the National Academies of Sciences (NAS) and the American Physical Society (APS) Panel on Public Affairs examining missile defenses and strategic stability. Dr. Sankaran’s first book, “Bombing to Provoke: Rockets, Missiles, and Drones as Instruments of Fear and Coercion,” was published by Oxford University Press. He has published in International Security, Contemporary Security Policy, Journal of Strategic Studies, Journal of East Asian Studies, Asian Security, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Arms Control Today, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, and other outlets. The RAND Corporation and the Stimson Center have also published his research.

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Europe is a pioneering regulator of digital goods and services, but a digital innovation laggard: Mario Draghi, esteemed European statesman and respected economist, concluded in an influential study on European competitiveness that Europe “is weak in the emerging technologies that will drive future growth,” noting that only four of the world’s top 50 tech companies are European.

Should Europe resign itself to this fate? The EU’s Senior Envoy for Digital to the United States, Gerard de Graaf, and Heikki Hietala, a Finnish diplomat who spent a year at Stanford as a visiting scholar grappling with how Europe can up its innovation game, discuss this question and more with CISAC’s AJ Grotto.

The event also marks the release of a white paper authored by Heikki Hietala, "Blueprint for a Global Technology Strategy – Policy Recommendations for Finland and Europe," during his tenure as a visiting scholar at Stanford last year.

Speakers

Gerard de Graaf, Senior Envoy for Digital to the U.S. and head of the EU office in San Francisco

Heikki Hietala, Adviser to the Under-Secretary of State and Director-General for International Trade, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland

Moderator

Andrew Grotto, Founder and Co-Director, Stanford Program on Geopolitics, Technology, and Governance

About the event: Over the last two decades, the United States has supported a range of militias, rebels, and other armed groups in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Critics have argued that such partnerships have many perils, from enabling human rights abuses to seeding future threats. Is it possible to work with such forces but mitigate some of these risks? In Illusions of Control: Dilemmas in Managing U.S. Proxy Forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, Erica L. Gaston explores U.S. efforts to do just that, drawing on a decade of field research and hundreds of interviews with stakeholders to unpack the dilemmas of attempting to control proxy forces.

The book has been described by reviewers as a "grim but necessary autopsy of America’s policy failures” in the last two decades (Ariel Ahram) and a book that casts light on the "moral hazards and strategic pitfalls of partnerships forged in war" (H.R. McMaster). Gaston’s conclusions not only suggest a greater need for strategic thinking in how risks are managed and weighed in U.S. Security Policy, but also help nuance the academic frameworks and lenses used to understand proxy warfare dynamics. By combining insights and tools from the fields of international relations that incorporate a more diverse set of international actors with domestic bargaining and organizational theory, the book helps to expand the theoretical toolkit for understanding foreign policy generation.

About the speaker: Dr. Erica Gaston is Head of the Conflict Prevention Programme at United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, and an Adjunct Assistant Professor at Columbia University’s SIPA programme. Her most recent book with Columbia University Press, Illusions of Control: Dilemmas of Managing U.S. Proxy Forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, was recently short-listed for the Conflict Research Society’s Book of the Year Prize 2025. Her prior academic articles and book compendiums have considered changing norms and practices within international humanitarian law.

She has a B.A from Stanford University, a juris doctorate from Harvard Law School, and a PhD from Cambridge University.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

No filming or recording without express permission from speaker.

About the event: Scholars of nuclear brinkmanship have long debated whether nuclear crises are dominated by a balance of resolve, or whether nuclear superiority may offset that balance in favor of the more technologically advanced competitor. Recent studies indicate the latter, suggesting that the high accuracy of modern strategic weapons may have ushered in a “new era of counterforce dominance.” The state that masters those weapons, they argue, can steel their resolve if they become confident in their ability to eliminate an adversary’s retaliatory nuclear forces in a disarming first strike. Yet these counterforce enthusiasts overlook an important technological headwind: the complexity of advanced weapon systems can confound nuclear planners’ ability to predict their performance in a real nuclear exchange. This challenge is particularly acute for counterforce systems that cannot be tested in operational settings, and whose failure would bring catastrophic consequences on their user. Drawing from scholarship in complexity theory and science and technology studies, Lawrence argues that nuclear competitions are also beset by a balance of nuclear humility: States with more grandiose, technically demanding nuclear doctrines can be less confident in their knowledge, must work harder to retain their capabilities, and can hence be less certain in the success of their nuclear missions. More humble competitors may address their vulnerabilities with relatively modest innovation, and fret less over vagaries of the unknown. Crucially, the advantages and disadvantages of technological humility can run against those traditionally associated with the balances of capability and resolve. Lawrence illustrates this dynamic by constructing a Monte Carlo simulation of a counterforce strike with modern US strategic missiles on China’s silo-based missile force. He shows that small variations in parameters that cannot be known to the attacker with certainty correspond to wide variation in strike outcomes. The resulting uncertainty in costs to the attacker complicates popular strategic theories of damage limitation.

About the speaker: Christopher Lawrence is Assistant Professor of Science, Technology and International Affairs in Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service. He studies the histories of U.S. nonproliferation engagement with North Korea and Iran, as well as the epistemic communities in the West that create knowledge about those countries’ nuclear programs. His academic writing has been published in International Security, Social Studies of Science, Journal of Applied Physics, and IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science. He has also written policy analysis for various online publications, including Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and War on the Rocks.

Prior to Joining SFS, Christopher carried out postdoctoral fellowships at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation; Harvard’s Program on Science, Technology and Society and Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; and Princeton’s Program on Science and Global Security. He carried out his PhD dissertation in Nuclear Science and Engineering at University of Michigan, where he developed novel neutron-spectroscopy techniques for characterizing nuclear warhead components for treaty verification.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

No filming or recording without express permission from speaker.

About the event: Nuclear power in Eastern Europe has been framed in various ways depending on political context: as a uranium state-building project, a key element of international decarbonization efforts, a model for reducing energy dependence on Russia, and an environmental risk slated for phase-out. Yet, one crucial aspect remains overlooked: how gendered expertise has sustained Bulgaria’s nuclear industry for decades—and how it remains entangled with the social hierarchies shaping nuclear energy production.

This talk draws on ethnographic and historical research, along with footage from a film-in-progress, to explore the labor, expertise, and social lives of women working in nuclear spaces along the Danube River. It focuses on two key sites: the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant, which continues to expand, and the Belene Nuclear Power Plant, a stalled project since the end of socialism. As laboratory technicians, construction managers, and power plant engineers, these women navigated state socialist labor policies, shifting gender expectations, and the demands of both career and family. Their perspectives offer deeper insight not only into the evolving role of women’s expertise in the nuclear power industry but also into how human labor itself is being reconfigured in relation to aging nuclear infrastructures—whether left to decay or reimagined as part of the “green” energy transition.

About the speaker: Elana Resnick is an Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and leads the Infrastructural Inequalities Research Group. Her published work includes articles in American Anthropologist (2021), American Ethnologist (2024), Cultural Anthropology (2024), Journal of Contemporary Archaeology (2018), and Public Culture (2023). Her forthcoming book, Refusing Sustainability: Race and Environmentalism in a Changing Europe, will be published by Stanford University Press in July 2025.

Resnick’s scholarship has received multiple awards, including the 2022 American Anthropological Association GAD Prize for Exemplary Cross-Field Scholarship, the 2023 Women’s Forum Article Prize from the British Association for Slavonic & East European Studies, and the 2024 Association of Women in Slavic Studies (AWSS) Heldt Prize for the Best Article in Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Women’s and Gender Studies. Her current research focuses on the environmental and social politics surrounding nuclear power development and decommissioning in Europe. She holds a Ph.D. in Anthropology from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and has received research support from the Wilson Center, the Council for European Studies, the School for Advanced Research, the Wenner-Gren Foundation, and the Fulbright Program.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

All images are copyrighted and may not be reproduced, copied, or used without explicit written permission.

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Dr. Janar Pekarev, a Stanford Global Digital Governance Fellow, will present his research exploring the impact of AI on military decision-making and the nuances of AI-driven command and control. His work uses simulated scenarios with AI feedback ranging from accurate to intentionally flawed. It measures decision accuracy, decision time, and user confidence to determine how varying AI feedback influences the quality and speed of decisions.

The research integrates a machine learning model and an override-rule module within an end-user interface. It operationalizes key principles of the laws of war—distinction, proportionality, and military necessity—through scenario simulations and a blend of qualitative and quantitative metrics. A stepwise experimental design enables a close examination of human-machine interaction dynamics, particularly how the transparency of AI reasoning affects human trust, decision-making biases, and ethical judgments under uncertainty. Though conceptual at this stage, the intent is to facilitate broad empirical validation and interdisciplinary collaboration, thereby augmenting our understanding of adaptive, transparent, and ethically grounded human-machine teaming in military operations.

The Global Digital Governance Fellows program is a joint initiative with Stanford Libraries, Vabamu, and Estonia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

About the Author

Dr. Janar Pekarev is a Global Digital Governance Fellow in the Program in Geopolitics, Technology, and Governance at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. Janar holds the rank of Major with more than 20 years in the Estonian military. He is a Fellow at the Estonian Military Academy and a member of multiple NATO STO research groups, including SAS-MSG-ET-FV (Emerging and Disruptive Technology) and NATO STO SAS-160 (Ethical, Legal, and Moral Impacts of Novel Technologies on NATO’s Operational Advantage), as well as an Estonian Ministry of Defence project on cognitive warfare against a superior adversary. Holding a PhD in Sociology and a BA in Law from the University of Tartu, he adopts an interdisciplinary approach that integrates law, military science and technology, and sociology. His research focuses on human-machine teaming within the military domain, with particular emphasis on AI weaponization and the moral programming of the use of force. He has contributed to the field through numerous publications in journals and presentations at academic conferences.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

About the event: How can states use military force to achieve their political aims without triggering a catastrophic nuclear war? How has China coped with this dilemma? While other nuclear-armed countries have preferred the traditional options of threatening to use nuclear weapons or fielding capabilities for decisive conventional military victories, China has instead chosen to rely on information-age weapons—offensive cyber capabilities, counterspace capabilities, and precision conventional missiles—to coerce its adversaries. In Under the Nuclear Shadow: China’s Information-Age Weapons in International Security (Princeton University Press, 2025) Fiona Cunningham explains this distinctive aspect of China’s post–Cold War deterrence strategy using an original theory of strategic substitution. When crises with adversaries created leverage deficits that highlighted the inadequacy of China’s existing military capabilities, China pursued information-age weapons that promised to provide coercive leverage against adversaries more quickly and credibly than the traditional options adopted by other nuclear-armed states. Drawing on hundreds of original Chinese-language sources and interviews with experts in China, the book provides new insights into the information-age technologies that are reshaping how states gain coercive leverage.

About the speaker: Fiona Cunningham is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. Her research interests lie at the intersection of technology and conflict, with a focus on China. Fiona’s first book Under the Nuclear Shadow: China’s Information-Age Weapons in International Security (Princeton University Press, 2025) examines China’s distinctive approach to the dilemma of coercing an adversary under the shadow of nuclear war, which relies on substitutes for nuclear threats. Her research has been published in International Security, Security Studies, Journal of Strategic Studies, The Texas National Security Review, and The Washington Quarterly.

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Registration for this event is closed.

About the event: The foundations of American power are eroding due to a failure to adapt to a new era in which knowledge and technological innovation are the primary sources of national strength. Traditional measures of power—military might, natural resources, and economic scale—are increasingly insufficient. Instead, intangible assets such as education, research capacity, and control over emerging technologies determine long-term geopolitical influence. The United States is losing ground in these areas, with declining K–12 educational outcomes, reduced federal investment in basic research, outdated immigration policies, and growing reliance on private-sector actors whose interests may diverge from national objectives. Meanwhile, global competitors—particularly China—are rapidly expanding their innovation capacity. The U.S. must look toward a strategic shift in policy to enhance knowledge power through educational reform, immigration modernization, increased public research funding, and improved coordination between government, academia, and industry.

About the speaker: Amy Zegart is the Morris Arnold and Nona Jean Cox senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, professor of political science by courtesy at Stanford University, and a contributing writer at The Atlantic. She is also a senior fellow at Stanford’s Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (HAI) and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). Zegart is an internationally recognized expert in U.S. intelligence, emerging technologies, and global political risk management. In addition to her research and teaching, Zegart led Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), founded the Stanford Cyber Policy Program, and served as chief academic officer of the Hoover Institution. At Hoover, Zegart currently serves as the Director of the Robert and Marion Oster National Security Affairs fellows program and as Director of the Technology Policy Accelerator, which produces the annual Stanford Emerging Technology Review. Before coming to Stanford, she was professor of public policy at the University of California, Los Angeles, and a McKinsey & Company consultant. Zegart has served on the National Security Council staff and as a presidential campaign foreign policy advisor. She frequently advises senior U.S. officials on intelligence and emerging technology matters. She is the author of five books, including the bestseller Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence; Political Risk: How Businesses and Organizations Can Anticipate Global Insecurity, co-authored with Condoleezza Rice; and Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11. Zegart holds a bachelor’s degree in East Asian studies from Harvard University and a doctorate in political science from Stanford University. She serves on the boards of Kratos Defense & Security Solutions and the Capital Group. Zegart is based in Stanford, CA.

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No filming or recording without express permission from speaker.

Limited number of lunches available for registered guests on day of event.

About the event: The advent of generative artificial intelligence and associated innovation in the broader AI domain has the potential to create transformative opportunities globally, automating routine tasks and shortening the timeline to understand and potentially solve complex problems while permitting humans to focus on challenges that require human creativity and problem-solving. There is no doubt, likewise, that the broad adoption and use of AI will result in some significant shifts in the workforce and could enhance challenges in domains like cybersecurity, misinformation and disinformation, and others. Additionally, there are significant questions about how to achieve broad adoption given concerns raised by many about trust, safety, and security in this domain. The key question facing policymakers, then, is what they ought to do in the fairly early days of the AI revolution, and whether the adoption of broad-based AI regulatory frameworks like those adopted by the European Union is the right initial step.

This presentation will evaluate and challenge the claim that broad-based regulation is the correct initial approach and even long-term approach to this rapidly expanding and increasingly publicly accessible domain of innovation.  The presentation will evaluate the innovation environments in jurisdictions where regulatory action is the initial move versus those that take a more limited approach during the lifecycle of rapid innovation. Specifically, the presentation will compare and contrast the regulatory approaches taken in the United States and the EU historically in the technology domain and seek to assess their impact on innovation or the relative lack thereof in those jurisdictions while drawing out some insights for policymakers in the AI domain.

The presentation will also assess whether key issues raised in the AI domain might be addressed through private sector action alone--which there is strong reason to believe they can--and, if policymakers nonetheless determine that some government action is needed, what approaches to such action can help ensure that broad innovation continues to be incentivized effectively.   The presentation will close on a set of recommendations for policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic—and around the globe—for expanding and protecting innovation in this critical domain while also ensuring that legitimate concerns are accounted for and addressed, as well as identifying issues for further research and evaluation.

About the speaker: Jamil N. Jaffer is the Founder and Executive Director of the National Security Institute at George Mason University’s Antonin Scalia Law School, where he also teaches national security law, cybersecurity, and counterterrorism. He is a Venture Partner at Paladin Capital and serves on multiple corporate and advisory boards in cybersecurity, technology, and national security.

Previously, Jamil held leadership roles at IronNet Cybersecurity, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the House Intelligence Committee. He served in the Bush Administration as an Associate Counsel to the President and at the Justice Department’s National Security Division. Jamil holds degrees from UCLA, the University of Chicago Law School, and the Naval War College.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

No filming or recording without express permission from speaker.

About the event: Conflicts and crises between nations play out in cyberspace. For many years, policy practitioners have proposed a parallel between nuclear deterrence and cyber deterrence. Over the last decade, practical lessons learned from cyber offenses and defense across policy and operations contradict any parallel to nuclear deterrence theory. Indeed, it is better to think of offensive cyber attacks as a new form of warfare, playing out across offense and defense. AI is about to supercharge both sides of this equation through everything from identifying vulnerabilities and exploits to managing cyber operations. This talk will discuss the lessons learned across offense and defense, based on the lecturer’s experiences in the policy and operational arenas at the White House’s National Security Council, NSA and USCC.

The Payne Lectureship is named for Frank E. Payne and Arthur W. Payne, brothers who gained an appreciation for global problems through their international business operations. Their descendants endowed the annual lecture series at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies in order to raise public understanding of the complex policy issues facing the global community today and to increase support for informed international cooperation.

The Payne Distinguished Lecturer is chosen for his or her international reputation as a leader, with an emphasis on visionary thinking; a broad, practical grasp of a given field; and the capacity to clearly articulate an important perspective on the global community and its challenges.

About the speaker: Anne Neuberger is an internationally recognized expert in cyber warfare and cybersecurity, risk and emerging technologies. She served as Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber and Emerging Technologies in the Biden Administration, coordinating national policy, and led NSA’s intelligence operations as well as its cybersecurity mission, in addition to serving as NSA’s Chief Risk Officer. She also initiated and led the successful effort to convene 71 countries to combat trans-national cyber threats like ransomware, and money laundering via cryptocurrencies. Prior to her time in government (which included a stint at the Pentagon and Navy), Ms. Neuberger held several positions related to technology and operations at a large financial services firm.

 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

No filming or recording without express permission from speaker.