* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

Seminar Recording:  https://youtu.be/mz-f4jzKrRI

About the Event: In 1903, the United Kingdom’s War Office announced that up to 60 percent of men who presented for military enlistment were physically unfit for service. Amid growing fears about national decline, the government convened an Inter-departmental Committee on Physical Deterioration to investigate the issue. After consulting anthropologists from the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS), the Committee’s 1904 Report recommended a National Anthropometric Survey – a large-scale collection and investigation of biometric measurements of British citizens’ bodies – to determine the occurrence of physical deterioration in the population.

Relying on extensive archival research, the presentation shows how the Survey emerged as a solution for these goals and why it was never implemented. It examines how its design was shaped by (1) the Inter- departmental Committee, who hoped to measure the population’s health and develop social reforms, and (2) BAAS anthropologists who wished to advance their eugenic research on racial classification in the UK and promote anti-immigration policies. In the process, these groups imbued the Survey’s methods with varying politics of national inclusion and exclusion.

Drawing on concepts and methods from Science and Technology Studies, the paper presents the Survey as a precursor of contemporary state biometric infrastructures that demonstrates how these systems link measurements of citizens’ bodies with notions of national belonging. The Survey was not simply a tool to collect citizen data. It was also a locus of tensions over industrialization, class, urbanization, immigration, race, and empire – dynamics that resonate in biometric systems today.

About the Speaker: Michelle is a CISAC/HAI Pre-Doctoral Researcher at Stanford University, and a PhD Candidate at MIT in History, Anthropology, and Science, Technology, and Society (HASTS). Her research broadly focuses on the ways national biometric identification systems shape state-citizen relationships, and how past biometric infrastructures influence contemporary ones.

THIS EVENT STARTS AT 2:40PM. Introductions will start at 2:40pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_u9n9HEq0QqmgMpVr2py4Aw

About the Event: Many policymakers believe that the consolidation of the U.S. defense industry is suboptimal, pointing to cost overruns, program delays, and technological problems with products. Meanwhile, economists believe that there may actually be efficiencies to be gained through consolidation in the defense industry and that therefore, its effects are not always negative. Utilizing a novel approach that combines economic and social science analyses, this thesis asks whether the consolidation of the U.S. defense industry has, in fact, increased costs and schedule delays of major defense acquisition programs and decreased private sector innovation and investment in innovation. Analysis of original datasets of Selected Acquisition Report summary table data from 2000-2020, schedule delay data compiled from GAO Annual Weapon’s Assessment reports since 2003, and company research and development spending of the prime contractors from 2000-2020 suggests that defense industry consolidation leads to negative effects on the cost and schedule of major defense acquisition programs as well as varied effects on private sector innovation/investment in innovation. Case studies of the F-35 and Ground Based Strategic Deterrent illustrate the dangers of the current state of the industry and also raise questions about the efficacy of current economic methodologies for analyzing cost growth of major defense acquisition programs. Policymakers should consider further examination of defense industry competition and M&A activity as well as the benefits of knowledge-based acquisition practices as the Department of Defense moves towards key decision points regarding legacy systems and the future of U.S. defense capabilities.

About the Speaker: Corinne is a senior studying Political Science with concentrations in International Relations and Political Economy. She became interested in public-private partnerships through her work at a tech startup and her thesis expands upon this interest by examining the effects of U.S. defense industry consolidation on procurement outcomes. She has also served as a research assistant on projects about the U.S. intelligence community, offensive cyber operations, and information warfare. In addition to her academic interests, Corinne plays field hockey for Stanford and the USA Women’s National Team.

THIS EVENT STARTS AT 2:40PM. Introductions will start at 2:40pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_u9n9HEq0QqmgMpVr2py4Aw

About the Event: At the September 2012 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his “Pivot to Asia”, ostensibly launching a reorientation of Russia’s foreign policy. Yet, has Russia truly pivoted to Asia? If so, why? Data on Russia’s economic and security ties with major Asian countries illustrate that Russia’s shift to Asia is real, especially towards China. Such a shift has been motivated by the Kremlin’s desire to reduce Russia’s economic reliance on Europe in light of Western sanctions as well as shared regional security interests and elite diplomacy between Putin and other heads of state. While Putin and the Kremlin have taken deliberate actions to support a pivot east, broader geopolitical and economic trends have been at least as consequential in pushing Russia east, such as Asia’s growing economic power. Far from starting in 2012 with Putin’s pronouncement, Moscow continually looking east is part of a historical pattern dating back several hundred years. As the global balance of power shifts towards Asia, U.S. policymakers must be cognizant of the second and third order effects U.S. foreign policy can have on the Kremlin’s ties with major powers in Asia.

About the Speaker: Kyle is a senior studying economics from Santa Rosa, California. Inspired by his experiences leading the Stanford U.S.-Russia Forum, his thesis examines Russia’s so-called pivot to Asia. Next year, he will be returning to Stanford to complete a Master's in Management Science & Engineering.

Introductions will start at 2:40pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_C-7gXRifSDWhhfZ2yBCkTg

About the Event: What motivates Middle Eastern nations to develop the cybersecurity governance agencies that protect from malicious cyber activity? As the world has watched major cyber powers such as China, Russia and the United States emerge, a region often at the forefront of conversations on conventional military conflict, the Middle East, has broadly been left undiscussed in the realm of cyber policy. While this may be indicative of a lack of malicious cyber activity within the region, cyber conflict, however, is on the rise between Middle Eastern States. An original data set of over 50 significant cyber incidents since 2007 shows that the biggest perpetrators of malicious cyber activity against Middle Eastern states are state actors within the region, as opposed to extra-regional states, third-party hacking groups, terrorist organizations or political organizations. Moreover, this malicious cyber activity has had two major waves of increase that align with both the Arab Spring and the Persian Gulf Crisis. The growing threat of regional cyber conflict in tandem with political unrest and conventional military conflict suggest that Middle Eastern nations have been motivated to develop cyber defense structures in response to a growing regional threat of malicious cyber activity.

About the Speaker: Kate is currently studying History with a minor in Middle Eastern Languages. She has pursued her interests in both cyber policy and Middle Eastern politics through an internship at the National Security Commission on A.I. and as deputy head of Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster's research team. She has received a Fulbright award to purse a Master's in Conflict Research, Management and Resolution at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem next year.

THIS EVENT STARTS AT 2:40PM. Introductions will start at 2:40pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_C-7gXRifSDWhhfZ2yBCkTg

About the Event: Why do certain Latin American countries receive substantially more Chinese investment than others? Various reports, books, and statements from officials argue that Chinese investments, notably ones from its Belt and Road Initiative, seek to augment Chinese global influence through corruption, political influence, and debt diplomacy. Since 2005, the People’s Republic of China has increased its interest in Latin America, as evidenced by its upward trend of investment with the region now receiving nearly 10% of total Chinese investment, or $200bn. Using the American Enterprise Institute’s China Global Investment Tracker, this thesis aims to identify some potential factors for the distribution of Chinese investment across different Latin American nations and test the veracity of such claims, and explain why Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela receive such high levels of investment compared to regional peers like Colombia and Mexico. The data suggests that Latin American corruption is not an influential factor in Chinese investment destinations, but rather the primary motive is more likely the potential for commodity exports like soybeans, petroleum, and copper. As China raises its economic influence in Latin America, Beijing will likely obtain greater political and diplomatic influence. The United States government must understand Beijing’s intentions in the region and compete accordingly rather than maligning the PRC’s actions in Latin America without providing a competitive alternative.

About the Speaker: Carter is a senior studying International Relations with specializations in international security and East and South Asia, as well as German studies. Growing up in Phoenix, Arizona, he extended his affinity for Latin America into his thesis by writing about Chinese investments across various Latin American states. After graduation, he will be moving to Bologna, Italy and Washington, DC for a Masters in International Relations at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies.

Introductions will start at 1:50pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_Uoa_Nef3RAu1JAfPRDTg2A

About the Event: When and under what circumstances does the US government publicly attribute state-backed cyber intrusions? Over the past decade, the US government has become increasingly willing to publicly attribute the state adversaries behind cyber incidents. Yet the timing of public attribution appears to vary significantly. Much of the existing work on public attribution of cyber incidents is theoretical – examining when states should publicly attribute – without providing a systematic study of the circumstances in which it actually takes place. This thesis seeks to fill this gap by compiling a data set of every public attribution by the U.S. government to another state from 2010-2021, in addition to data on timing. My analysis suggests that the U.S. government is not a unitary actor; instead, public attribution operates through four distinct channels – technical alerts, criminal charges, and official and unofficial policy statements. Bilateral relations between the U.S. and adversary state, U.S. domestic politics, and attribution by private sector entities have no systematic effect on the timing of public attribution. Moreover, case studies of public attribution for Iran’s Operation Ababil and Russia’s Dragonfly 2.0 campaign demonstrate that organizational factors matter more than the public discourse would suggest. As the government pursues whole-of-government strategies of “persistent engagement” and “defend forward,” this thesis suggests that policymakers must think systematically across government about when and under what circumstances to publicly attribute cyber incidents to other states.

About the Speaker: June is a senior studying International Relations and minoring in Computer Science. Her course of study has focused on cyber policy and international law, inspired by her experiences at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative and State Department. Her thesis extends these interests, by examining the US government's approach to public attribution in cyberspace.

THIS EVENT STARTS AT 1:50PM. Introductions will start at 1:50pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_Uoa_Nef3RAu1JAfPRDTg2A

About the Event: Russia harbors both real and imagined grievances against the West. Since the end of the Cold War, the Kremlin has accumulated a litany of complaints – spanning NATO enlargement to liberal hegemony, economic sanctions to cultural degeneracy – and amplified them with renewed fervor at home and abroad. Despite the resurgence of resentment politics in Russia, China, and Iran, few studies have examined the phenomenon of national grievance narratives. This thesis fills the gap with a study on the sources and strategic aims of Russia’s grievances against the West. An original dataset of 471 grievances, created by surveying hundreds of Russian presidential speeches, interviews, and strategic documents, charts Russia’s grievance narrative since 1991. Contrary to conventional assumptions, grievance narratives do not reflect the genuine foreign policy interests of the state. A fifth of the grievances in the dataset are neither reliable nor merely rhetorical, but rather instrumental to a revisionist Russian foreign policy. Instrumental grievances, a term this thesis introduces, are tactical complaints that state actors exploit to undermine, challenge, or gain leverage over an adversary. An in-depth case study on Russia’s long-standing grievance against NATO suggests the Russian political elite inflate national security threats to serve their geopolitical ambitions and domestic political interests. Consequently, policymakers should interpret Russia’s grievance narrative with caution and skepticism. When policymakers mistake an instrumental grievance for harmless rhetoric or, worse, genuine offense, they overlook the subversive ways that Russia exploits the grievance to deceive and undermine the West.

About the Speaker: Yasmin is an international student from the UK studying History and Economics at Stanford. Since visiting Russia three times and studying the language, she has developed a deep interest in the country and turned to historical analysis to help make sense of Russian foreign policy.

Introductions will start at 2:40pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_Y4kF9dTJTJinogbJqvNSpw

About the Event: How do Chinese state media partnerships impact perceptions of China in East Asia and the Pacific? Chinese state media groups form partnerships to publish content in local outlets, reaching foreign audiences through trusted sources. Previous scholars identify media partnerships as the most impactful form of Beijing’s public diplomacy, but do not investigate which factors moderate this influence. This thesis analyzes the relationship between partnerships and approval of China in 12 countries using an original dataset of 98 partnerships from 2006-2020. By recording the size of partner groups, strength of ties, and language of publication, this this investigation differentiates itself from previous studies. Partnerships are collectively associated with increasing approval and decreasing disapproval of China, but surprisingly the most influential partnerships are with small, Chinese language media groups. These results contradict the conventional logic that partnerships with larger, multilingual media would have greater impact. An interview with a Xinhua journalist and case studies of media organizations in Thailand and Australia suggest that small, Chinese language platforms are uniquely vulnerable to influence from PRC state media. Policymakers must support independent publishers to prevent the consolidation of the Chinese language media ecosystem.

About the Speaker: Dylan is a senior studying international relations and human rights. After researching disinformation for the Department of Defense and working for a journalism-tech startup, Dylan chose to investigate Chinese state media partnerships in East Asia and the Pacific. After graduation, he will move to D.C. and work as a Junior Fellow at the Stimson Center.

THIS EVENT STARTS AT 2:40PM. Introductions will start at 2:40pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_Y4kF9dTJTJinogbJqvNSpw

About the Event: How do U.S. and UN targeted sanctions impact the behavior and strategies of militant groups? Despite several theories on the use of sanctions to punish non-state actors, scholars have largely neglected the impact of targeted sanction application on militant group behavior. This thesis combines an original dataset of 160 U.S. and UN sanction regimes with data on the activity of over 600 militant groups to examine the relationship between sanction imposition and militant activity. The results show mixed impact of sanctions on militant activity. While UN targeted sanctions precipitate falls in militant activity, unilateral U.S. sanctions are associated with a significant increase in violence committed by sanctioned groups. Comparative analysis of two militant groups in India –The National Democratic Front of Bodoland and Hizbul Mujahideen– explores the causality of this finding. U.S. sanctions strip militant groups of international legitimacy but often fail to limit their availability to resources. As a result, U.S. sanctions reduce the incentives of non-state actors to seek international recognition and constrain the forms of violence and insurgency they employ. This thesis illustrates the importance of international cooperation in ensuring targeted sanctions effectively limit the operating capabilities of militant groups.

About the Speaker: Nathalie is a senior from Kansas City, Kansas, studying Economics and Political Science. Her experiences working for the World Bank and studying at Oxford have made her passionate about the intersection of economic development, human rights, and violence prevention. After graduation, she plans on conducting economic analysis for the Ludwig Institute for Shared Economic Prosperity in Washington, D.C.

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

Seminar Recording:  https://youtu.be/L04_-G6N7Go

About the Event: What can wargames tell us about the ethics of decision-making under the threat of nuclear escalation? The “Cold War Game” (CWG) that took place from 1954-1956 at the RAND Corporation offers insights into the origins of deterrence and the dilemmas of contemplating the possible futures of war with rare events or little empirical data through the method of gaming. Based on extensive archival research at RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, CA, this project identifies the methodological and epistemological issues faced by early systems analysts and social scientists in attempting to link political and economic issues to traditional military wargaming in the nuclear era. The CWG sought to both quantify the non-rational or social dimensions of nuclear decision-making as well as develop psychological insights, to recognize the ways that propaganda and psychology were used as techniques of warfare alongside the quantitative and rational analytics of game theory. I argue that discussions of the ethics of nuclear weapons were sidelined throughout the Cold War for nuclear strategists and my questions examine how ethics functioned even it its absence of explicit discourse. Nevertheless, a kind of ethical restraint became implicit throughout the CWG that tempered even the most bellicose players through the process of physical play by forcing strategists to face the weight of their decisions. Differing epistemological approaches to the game from the social science division and the mathematics/economics division at RAND offers a unique empirical test to compare qualitative and quantitative approaches to wargaming operating within the same context of uncertainty in the early Cold War period. The conclusions of this study offers insights for contemporary dilemmas of AI and wargaming the future of war today. Ultimately, the project offers both an in-depth look at the origins of the political-military wargames and interjects with the larger questions of how abstraction and technostrategic language enables and constrains the acceptable discourse for decision-making in the face of nuclear brinksmanship.

About the Speaker: John R. Emery is a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Irvine and then became a Tobis Fellow at the Interdisciplinary Center for the Scientific Study of Ethics and Morality at UC Irvine. His research agenda is at the intersection of security studies, ethics of war, and science and technology studies. His previous work on drones, ethics, AI, and counter-terrorism has been published in Law & Policy, Critical Military Studies, Ethics & International Affairs, and Peace Review. His current research agenda explores issues of human-machine interaction in the U.S. national security context analyzing both historical and contemporary cases.