This interview by Bruce Goldman was originally published by the Stanford School of Medicine.

On May 13, the journal Science published a letter, signed by 18 scientists, stating that it was still unclear whether the virus that causes COVID-19 emerged naturally or was the result of a laboratory accident, but that neither cause could be ruled out. David Relman, MD, the Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Professor and professor of microbiology and immunology, spearheaded the effort.

Relman is no stranger to complicated microbial threat scenarios and illness of unclear origin. He has advised the U.S. government on emerging infectious diseases and potential biological threats. He served as vice chair of a National Academy of Sciences committee reviewing the FBI investigation of letters containing anthrax that were sent in 2001. Recently, he chaired another academy committee that assessed a cluster of poorly explained illnesses in U.S. embassy employees. He is a past president of the Infectious Diseases Society of America.

Stanford Medicine science writer Bruce Goldman asked Relman to explain what remains unknown about the coronavirus’s emergence, what we may learn and what’s at stake.

1. How might SARS-CoV-2, which causes COVID-19, have first infected humans?

Relman: We know very little about its origins. The virus’s closest known relatives were discovered in bats in Yunnan Province, China, yet the first known cases of COVID-19 were detected in Wuhan, about 1,000 miles away.

There are two general scenarios by which this virus could have made the jump to humans. First, the jump, or “spillover,” might have happened directly from an animal to a human, by means of an encounter that took place within, say, a bat-inhabited cave or mine, or closer to human dwellings — say, at an animal market. Or it could have happened indirectly, through a human encounter with some other animal to which the primary host, presumably a bat, had transmitted the virus.

Bats and other potential SARS-CoV-2 hosts are known to be shipped across China, including to Wuhan. But if there were any infected animals near or in Wuhan, they haven’t been publicly identified.

Maybe someone became infected after contact with an infected animal in or near Yunnan, and moved on to Wuhan. But then, because of the high transmissibility of this virus, you’d have expected to see other infected people at or near the site of this initial encounter, whether through similar animal exposure or because of transmission from this person.

2. What’s the other scenario?

Relman: SARS-CoV-2 could have spent some time in a laboratory before encountering humans. We know that some of the largest collections of bat coronaviruses in the world — and a vigorous research program involving the creation of “chimeric” bat coronaviruses by integrating unfamiliar coronavirus genomic sequences into other, known coronaviruses — are located in downtown Wuhan. And we know that laboratory accidents happen everywhere there are laboratories.

All scientists need to acknowledge a simple fact: Humans are fallible, and laboratory accidents happen — far more often than we care to admit. Several years ago, an investigative reporter uncovered evidence of hundreds of lab accidents across the United States involving dangerous, disease-causing microbes in academic institutions and government centers of excellence alike — including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Institutes of Health.

SARS-CoV-2 might have been lurking in a sample collected from a bat or other infected animal, brought to a laboratory, perhaps stored in a freezer, then propagated in the laboratory as part of an effort to resurrect and study bat-associated viruses. The materials might have been discarded as a failed experiment. Or SARS-CoV-2 could have been created through commonly used laboratory techniques to study novel viruses, starting with closely related coronaviruses that have not yet been revealed to the public. Either way, SARS-CoV-2 could have easily infected an unsuspecting lab worker and then caused a mild or asymptomatic infection that was carried out of the laboratory.

3. Why is it important to understand SARS-CoV-2’s origins?

Relman: Some argue that we would be best served by focusing on countering the dire impacts of the pandemic and not diverting resources to ascertaining its origins. I agree that addressing the pandemic’s calamitous effects deserves high priority. But it’s possible and important for us to pursue both. Greater clarity about the origins will help guide efforts to prevent a next pandemic. Such prevention efforts would look very different depending on which of these scenarios proves to be the most likely.

Evidence favoring a natural spillover should prompt a wide variety of measures to minimize human contact with high-risk animal hosts. Evidence favoring a laboratory spillover should prompt intensified review and oversight of high-risk laboratory work and should strengthen efforts to improve laboratory safety. Both kinds of risk-mitigation efforts will be resource intensive, so it’s worth knowing which scenario is most likely.

4. What attempts at investigating SARS-CoV-2’s origin have been made so far, with what outcomes?

Relman: There’s a glaring paucity of data. The SARS-CoV-2 genome sequence, and those of a handful of not-so-closely-related bat coronaviruses, have been analyzed ad nauseam. But the near ancestors of SARS-CoV-2 remain missing in action. Absent that knowledge, it’s impossible to discern the origins of this virus from its genome sequence alone. SARS-CoV-2 hasn’t been reliably detected anywhere prior to the first reported cases of disease in humans in Wuhan at the end of 2019. The whole enterprise has been made even more difficult by the Chinese national authorities’ efforts to control and limit the release of public health records and data pertaining to laboratory research on coronaviruses.

In mid-2020, the World Health Organization organized an investigation into the origins of COVID-19, resulting in a fact-finding trip to Wuhan in January 2021. But the terms of reference laying out the purposes and structure of the visit made no mention of a possible laboratory-based scenario. Each investigating team member had to be individually approved by the Chinese government. And much of the data the investigators got to see was selected prior to the visit and aggregated and presented to the team by their hosts.

The recently released final report from the WHO concluded — despite the absence of dispositive evidence for either scenario — that a natural origin was “likely to very likely” and a laboratory accident “extremely unlikely.” The report dedicated only 4 of its 313 pages to the possibility of a laboratory scenario, much of it under a header entitled “conspiracy theories.” Multiple statements by one of the investigators lambasted any discussion of a laboratory origin as the work of dark conspiracy theorists. (Notably, that investigator — the only American selected to be on the team — has a pronounced conflict of interest.)

Given all this, it’s tough to give this WHO report much credibility. Its lack of objectivity and its failure to follow basic principles of scientific investigation are troubling. Fortunately, WHO’s director-general recognizes some of the shortcomings of the WHO effort and has called for a more robust investigation, as have the governments of the United States, 13 other countries and the European Union.

5. What’s key to an effective investigation of the virus’s origins?

Relman: A credible investigation should address all plausible scenarios in a deliberate manner, involve a wide variety of expertise and disciplines and follow the evidence. In order to critically evaluate other scientists’ conclusions, we must demand their original primary data and the exact methods they used — regardless of how we feel about the topic or about those whose conclusions we seek to assess. Prior assumptions or beliefs, in the absence of supporting evidence, must be set aside.

Investigators should not have any significant conflicts of interest in the outcome of the investigation, such as standing to gain or lose anything of value should the evidence point to any particular scenario.

There are myriad possible sources of valuable data and information, some of them still preserved and protected, that could make greater clarity about the origins feasible. For all of these forms of data and information, one needs proof of place and time of origin, and proof of provenance.

To understand the place and time of the first human cases, we need original records from clinical care facilities and public health institutions as well as archived clinical laboratory data and leftover clinical samples on which new analyses can be performed. One might expect to find samples of wildlife, records of animal die-offs and supply-chain documents.

Efforts to explore possible laboratory origins will require that all laboratories known to be working on coronaviruses, or collecting relevant animal or clinical samples, provide original records of experimental work, internal communications, all forms of data — especially all genetic-sequence data — and all viruses, both natural and recombinant. One might expect to find archived sequence databases and laboratory records.

Needless to say, the politicized nature of the origins issue will make a proper investigation very difficult to pull off. But this doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t try our best. Scientists are inquisitive, capable, clever, determined when motivated, and inclined to share their insights and findings. This should not be a finger-pointing exercise, nor an indictment of one country or an abdication of the important mission to discover biological threats in nature before they cause harm. Scientists are also committed to the pursuit of truth and knowledge. If we have the will, we can and will learn much more about where and how this pandemic arose.  

President Joe Biden is the first president since the Cold War to begin his term not seeking closer relations with Russia; there will be no “reset.” He has indicated instead that he will push back against Russian misbehavior while seeking to cooperate where doing so advances U.S. interests. In his first 100 days Mr. Biden has sought to distinguish his policy from that of Donald Trump, who seemed incapable of criticizing Vladimir Putin or Russian transgressions.

The first full day of his administration illustrated Mr. Biden’s approach. The White House said he would extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) for five years, essentially accepting an offer Mr. Putin had made more than a year earlier—but something that was very much in the interest of U.S. national security. White House officials also announced that Mr. Biden had asked for assessments of Russian actions such as interference in the 2020 presidential election and the Solar Winds cyber hack, promising that the administration would “hold Russia to account for its reckless and adversarial actions.”

Mr. Biden described his policy directly to Mr. Putin in a January 26 phone call. He discussed New START and strategic stability but also raised issues of concern, including Ukraine, election interference and Kremlin-opponent Alexey Navalny’s poisoning. The White House read-out of the call (there were several important Trump-Putin calls with no read-outs) noted that the president had also said that the United States would “act firmly in defense of its national interests in response to actions by Russia” that caused harm to America or its allies.

Anticipating relations with the Kremlin that will have major adversarial elements, the Biden administration has moved to shore up the trans-Atlantic relationship and repair the damage done during his predecessor’s four years. In a February 19 virtual appearance at the Munich Security Conference, the president reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to NATO and Article 5 (an attack against one shall be considered an attack against all), stressed the importance of collective efforts to meet the “threat from Russia,” and reached out to German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who often found herself the target of Mr. Trump’s ire. (The Biden administration also halted, and then reversed, Mr. Trump’s order to withdraw some 10,000 troops from Germany.)

As the intelligence community completed its assessment of election interference and other Russian actions, and with tensions rising due to the Russian military build-up around Ukraine, the Biden administration calibrated its response. It sanctioned a number of Russian entities and individuals on April 15. As a warning of what could come, the president issued an executive order authorizing sanctions for a broad range of potential Russian misdeeds, and the Treasury Department placed limits on purchasing Russian sovereign debt, though in a restrained manner that could later be ratcheted up and made considerably more painful.

The president foreshadowed the coming sanctions to Mr. Putin in an April 13 call in which he also reiterated the U.S. commitment to support Ukraine, a commitment that the administration has stressed publicly (if Mr. Putin was bothered by Mr. Biden’s “killer” comment in a mid-March press interview, he apparently said nothing during the call). In remarks to the press two days later, Mr. Biden noted that Washington could have imposed harsher penalties, but he had chosen proportionate measures. He added that he did not want an escalatory cycle with Moscow but sought “a stable, predictable relationship.”

Stable and predictable may be as good as it can get in the near term. In both of his calls with his Russian counterpart, Mr. Biden has raised areas—such as arms control and strategic stability—where U.S. and Russian interests should coincide. Secretary of State Tony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan have echoed these points. While virtually all Trump political appointees were let go when Mr. Biden took office, one notable exception was John Sullivan, the ambassador in Moscow. And the president proposed that he and Putin meet this summer.

The Biden administration believes that, even with U.S.-Russian relations at a post-Cold War nadir, the two countries can do business on certain questions where they have mutual interests. In addition to using arms control to manage their nuclear competition, the sides presumably share an interest in blunting the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea. As U.S. and NATO military forces prepare to leave Afghanistan, neither Washington nor Moscow has anything to gain from chaos or a return of the Taliban to power.

The president thus has correctly laid out the possibility of some positive engagement along with measures holding Russia to account for misbehavior. His ability to pursue both of those tracks, however, will depend in part on Kremlin actions.

Arrested immediately on his return to Moscow in January, Mr. Navalny now is in dire health in a Russian prison. His death would spark an uproar in the West. More critically, while the menacing Russian military movements around Ukraine likely aim just to unnerve Kyiv and, at the same time, test Mr. Biden’s reaction (as well as that of the West more broadly), a Russian military incursion remains a distinct possibility.

Such an attack would provoke a deep crisis in relations between the West and Russia. Washington and its European partners almost certainly would respond with new and more punishing sanctions. And should that happen, a summer summit, as well as real effort to work together on selected issues where the countries’ interests converge, could get booted a long way down the road.

Originally for Brookings

BERLIN — Over the past week, Russia has reinforced its military presence on the Crimean peninsula, moved military units close to the Russia-Ukraine border and announced military “readiness checks.” Most likely, this is just a ploy to unnerve the government in Kyiv and test the West’s reaction. 

But it could be something worse. If the Kremlin is weighing the costs and benefits of a military assault on Ukraine, Europe and the United States should ensure that Moscow does not miscalculate because it underestimates the costs. 

Read the rest at Politico

The agenda for nuclear arms control and related issues in the 2020s is a broad one. As the United States, Russia and others figure out how to maintain and enhance strategic stability in a multi-player, multi-domain world, Washington and Moscow will continue to have a central role, writes Steven Pifer, a fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy and a retired US Foreign Service officer.

The Biden administration sees arms control as a tool that can advance security and stability. It will seek to engage Russia on further nuclear arms reductions and other measures. Arms control in the 2020s will reflect continuity with earlier efforts—nuclear arms reductions will remain a bilateral matter between Washington and Moscow—but also contain new elements. That reflects the fact that strategic stability has become a more complex concept.

Start with Strategic Stability

Donald Trump was the first American president in 50 years to reach no agreement in the area of nuclear weapons. President Biden sees arms control as an important policy tool. On his first full day in office, he agreed to extend the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) for five years. His administration plans to do more. On February 3, Secretary of State Blinken said Washington would “pursue with the Russian Federation, in consultation with Congress and US allies and partners, arms control that addresses all of its nuclear weapons.”

This will not happen immediately. The administration needs to get its team in place. It will conduct a review of US programs and doctrine, which may be broader than the nuclear posture reviews conducted by past administrations.

The first serious US-Russian engagement on nuclear arms issues will likely occur in strategic stability talks. The classic definition of strategic stability is a situation in which neither side has an incentive, in a severe crisis or conventional conflict, to use nuclear weapons first. For five decades beginning in the 1960s, strategic stability was based largely on comparing US and Soviet strategic offensive nuclear forces. If each side had the ability, even after absorbing a massive first strike, to retaliate with devastating consequences, neither had an incentive to use nuclear weapons.

Today’s strategic stability model is more complex. Instead of a two-player model based just on strategic nuclear forces, today’s is multi-player and multi-domain. Third-country nuclear forces such as China need to be factored in. In addition to nuclear weapons, the model should take account of missile defense, precision-guided conventional strike, space and cyber developments.

US-Russian strategic stability talks should address all these factors. They should also address doctrine. Case in point: escalate-to-deescalate. Most Russian experts assert that this never became official Russian doctrine. However, the Pentagon believes it has, and that influenced the 2018 US nuclear posture review. At the least, each side appears to believe that the other has lowered the threshold for using nuclear weapons. That should leave no one comfortable.

Nuclear Arms

Formal nuclear arms negotiations will, for the foreseeable future, remain a bilateral US-Russian matter. That is due to the disparity in numbers. According to the Federation of American Scientists, the United States has about 3,600 nuclear warheads in its active stockpile, while Russia has about 4,300. No third country has more than about 300.

The Trump administration tried to bring China into a US-Russia negotiation, but it never articulated a plan for doing so. That is no surprise. Washington and Moscow would not agree to reduce to China’s level, nor would they agree to legitimize a Chinese build-up to their levels, and China would not accept unequal limits.

New START caps the United States and Russia each at no more than 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and nuclear-capable bombers and no more that 1,550 deployed strategic warheads. Those limits will remain in force until February 2026.

However, New START’s limits do not cover 60-65 percent of the active nuclear stockpiles of the two countries. Reserve (or non-deployed) strategic nuclear warheads, and non-strategic nuclear warheads—whether deployed or non-deployed—are unconstrained.

After the Cold War, the United States dramatically reduced its non-strategic nuclear weapons, eliminating all sea-based and land-based systems. Today, the only US non-strategic nuclear weapon is the B61 gravity bomb. Russia, on the other hand, maintains a large number and variety of non-strategic nuclear warheads—close to 2,000 for land-, sea- and air-based delivery as well as for defensive systems. This raises concern that Russia might be postured to use such weapons in a conflict.

The US military maintains more reserve strategic warheads. This reflects a desire to hedge against technical surprises or adverse geopolitical developments. The US military has implemented New START reductions in a manner that would allow it, should the treaty collapse, to add or “upload” warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs that now carry fewer than their capacity. As Russia modernizes its strategic ballistic missiles, it also is expanding its upload capacity.

The logical next step for the United States and Russia would entail negotiation of an agreement with an aggregate limit covering all their nuclear warheads. (Retired but not yet dismantled warheads could be dealt with separately.) An aggregate limit could offset reductions in Russia’s numerical advantage in non-strategic nuclear warheads with reductions in the US numerical advantage in non-deployed strategic warheads.

For a notional agreement, assume an aggregate limit of no more than 2,500 total nuclear warheads. Within that aggregate, there could be a sublimit of no more than 1,000 deployed strategic warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and any new kinds of strategic systems with deployed warheads—the weapons most readily launched. This approach would treat bomber weapons as non-deployed, since they are not maintained on board aircraft. Ideally, all nuclear weapons other than those on deployed strategic delivery systems would be kept in storage. A new agreement could also lower the New START limits on deployed delivery systems and deployed and non-deployed launchers.

This would be ambitious. That said, it would leave each nuclear superpower with eight times as many nuclear weapons as any third country. Even if the agreement did not entail such dramatic reductions, the structure would, for the first time, capture all US and Russian nuclear warheads.

Such an agreement could enable the United States and Russia to begin to deal with third-country nuclear weapons states, and here is where nuclear arms control in the 2020s might get into new territory. Washington and Moscow could ask China, Britain and France to undertake unilateral commitments not to increase their nuclear weapon numbers as long as the United States and Russia were reducing theirs and agree to limited transparency measures to provide confidence that they were abiding by those commitments.

This US-Russian agreement would require new verification measures to monitor numbers of nuclear weapons in storage. That likely will make both sides’ militaries uncomfortable. But both have adjusted to uncomfortable monitoring measures in the past.

Some arms control experts assess that an agreement limiting all nuclear weapons, particularly non-strategic nuclear arms, is too ambitious and have suggested alternative approaches. One would expand New START’s limits to capture systems such as intercontinental ground-launched boost-glide missiles and nuclear-powered torpedoes, ban other new kinds of strategic systems, and reduce the ratio of deployed strategic warheads to deployed strategic delivery systems, but would not attempt to constrain non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Another alternative would require that non-strategic nuclear weapons be relocated away from bases with associated delivery systems to a small number of storage sites, with monitoring activities designed to verify the absence of nuclear weapons at the bases housing delivery systems, not at confirming or monitoring the number of weapons in storage. While originally suggested for Europe only, it could be broadened to apply on a global basis.

A third alternative would simply seek to lower New START’s limits. Hopefully, however, the US and Russian governments will demonstrate greater ambition.

Other Possible Issues on the US-Russia Agenda

Arms control may enter new territory in the 2020s on issues and types of weapons that, while not nuclear arms, still affect strategic stability. They could be discussed in US-Russian strategic stability talks. If a mandate were agreed, they could be spun off into separate negotiations.

One set of issues concerns missile defense. The US ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) system is designed to defend against rogue states, such as North Korea, not against a Russian or Chinese ballistic missile attack. Russian officials in the past have nevertheless indicated an interest in constraining missile defenses. Whether they will insist on negotiating on missile defense in connection with a next round of nuclear arms negotiations remains to be seen.

US missile defenses now and for the foreseeable future pose no serious threat to Russian strategic ballistic missiles, a point Russian officials sometimes appear to acknowledge. (China, with a much smaller strategic force, has greater grounds for concern, though the performance of GMD system has not been particularly good.) On the other hand, it would not seem difficult to craft an agreement covering strategic missile defenses such as the GMD system and Moscow missile defense system that would apply constraints but still leave the United States room for capabilities to defend against a North Korean ICBM attack. What would prove difficult would be the Washington politics, where Republicans oppose any limits on missile defense.

Another issue is precision-guided conventional strike weapons. In some cases, these can fulfill missions that previously required nuclear weapons. Air- and sea-launched cruise missiles have been in the US inventory for decades and now in the Russian inventory. Both sides are developing hypersonic weapons. With the demise of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, there is the 9M729 ground-launched cruise missile and likely other future intermediate-range missiles. It would be difficult to devise an arrangement that constrained all such weapons, but US and Russian officials might consider whether a subset poses a particular threat to strategic stability and should be subject to negotiation.

One possibility would seek to ban nuclear-armed intermediate-range missiles. Another possibility, though it has drawbacks, would build on the Russian idea for a moratorium on the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, provided that it would mean relocation of 9M729 missile systems out of Europe.

Operations in space—used for early warning, command, control and communications and other purposes—also can affect strategic stability. A broad agreement banning the militarization of space is difficult to envisage. However, US and Russian officials might explore more limited measures, such as keep-out zones around certain declared satellites, a ban on anti-satellite tests that generate orbital debris and a ban on emplacing weapons in space designed to strike targets on the Earth.

As for the cyber domain, traditional arms control measures appear ill-suited. Washington and Moscow might pledge not to interfere in the other side’s nuclear command, control and communication systems, but neither could be certain the pledge was being observed.

In contrast to nuclear arms reductions, which will remain a US-Russia issue in the 2020s, some related issues might be considered on a broader basis. For example, China increasingly appears a peer competitor with the United States and Russia in space operations. Moreover, China has many intermediate-range missiles. It remains in the US interest to engage China in strategic stability talks. At some point, trilateral or multilateral discussions might be appropriate.

The agenda for nuclear arms control and related issues in the 2020s is a broad one. As the United States, Russia and others figure out how to maintain and enhance strategic stability in a multi-player, multi-domain world, Washington and Moscow will continue to have a central role. There is much that could be done to enhance stability and strengthen global security. Washington and Moscow will have to overcome the mistrust created by violations of earlier arms control agreements and take an innovative approach, even if certain problems prove insoluble, at least in the near term. But they have an opportunity, and an obligation, to try.

Originally for Valdai Discussion Club

Two weeks ago, President Joe Biden affirmatively responded to George Stephanopoulos’s question, “Vladimir Putin. You think he’s a killer?” Russian commentators voiced outrage, while some American observers foresee a new or intensified ice age in U.S.-Russia relations.

The Russian president is a big boy though. He surely did not like Biden’s answer, but it is difficult to imagine that he would refuse to engage when he sees doing so in his or Russia’s interest.

Biden could and should have used more diplomatic language in replying to Stephanopoulos: “Look, there is a tightly controlled system over there. Certain things do not happen without the approval of the guy at the top.” Still, was his assessment incorrect? 

Russia has carried out a conflict against Ukraine in eastern Donbas that has taken more than thirteen thousand lives and has no discernible motive other than to destabilize Kyiv. Putin-opponent Alexei Navalny was poisoned last summer, apparently by a special unit of the Russian Federal Security Service. In 2018, a Russian military intelligence hit team traveled to Britain, where it tried to poison Sergei Skripal, a busted double-agent who wound up in London after a spy swap.

Over twenty years, Putin has built a “power vertical” that concentrates authority in the Kremlin. It strains credulity to think the Donbas conflict or failed attacks on Navalny and Skripal would have occurred without his knowledge and consent.

It’s true that a comment like Biden’s is not usual between Washington and Moscow.  Recall, however, that Ronald Reagan called the Soviet Union an “evil empire” whose leaders “reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat.”  He poured Stinger missiles and other weapons into Afghanistan to drive out the Soviet army.  Mikhail Gorbachev nonetheless chose to deal with Reagan, and the two recorded major successes for relations between Washington and Moscow.

While Biden intends to push back against Russian overreach, his administration has also indicated readiness to cooperate where U.S. and Russian interests coincide.  On his first day in office, Biden agreed to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty until 2026, essentially accepting Putin’s offer from 2019.  His officials plan to talk to Russian officials on a range of strategic stability issues. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has a channel to his Russian counterpart. U.S. ambassador to Russia John Sullivan (no relation) is the rare Trump political appointee kept in place after Biden took office.  The Russians presumably noticed all this.

Dr. Julie Newton, an associate professor at the American University of Paris, recently expressed concern that Biden’s comment will fuel Russian grievances. Not to say that the deterioration in U.S.-Russia and West-Russia relations is solely the Kremlin’s fault, but Russian officials have a long list of grievances that often seem to boil down to “everyone is mad at us, what’s wrong with everyone?” They show no sign of having asked themselves whether invading neighboring states, cyber hacks against Western governmental and private institutions, and assassination attempts on the streets of European cities contribute to the problem.

Newton seems to believe Biden’s comment could make Putin less prepared to engage on issues that matter to Washington. Perhaps, but Putin calculates costs and benefits. Russia, like the United States, has an interest in keeping the nuclear arms competition bounded. While a nuclear Iran might pose a bigger problem for Washington, Moscow certainly would not welcome it. The Kremlin has an interest in a stable Afghanistan; if things go badly there, it’s much closer to Russia. Climate change poses challenges for Russia. Moscow and Washington can benefit from cooperation on these questions. Would Putin forgo that? Indeed, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov on March 29 listed a number of issues for U.S.-Russian engagement.

Additionally, Newton appears to suggest a double standard. She notes that Biden has not sanctioned Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman. That is not exactly true. The White House has indicated that Biden will deal with the Saudi king, not Mohammed bin Salman. Putin and the Saudi king, not MbS, have invitations to Biden’s virtual climate summit in April.

Biden’s comment shocked those in Moscow, where they had become used to Donald Trump. Trump rarely, if ever, criticized Putin or Russian misbehavior. He also did not produce a single positive achievement in U.S.-Russia relations. Under Biden, New START extension got done in two weeks. To be sure, that does not mean a reset for U.S.-Russia relations, but in contrast to his predecessor, Biden is a serious interlocutor. Putin may not like being called a killer—who would? However, when he sees engagement with Biden can advance his goals, he will engage.

Steven Pifer, a fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy and also affiliated with the Brookings Institution and Stanford University, is a retired Foreign Service officer. 

Originally for National Interest

The German government and many Germans breathed a sigh of relief when Joe Biden defeated Donald Trump in November.  Mr. Trump damaged U.S. relations with its trans-Atlantic allies, and he often targeted Germany and Chancellor Angela Merkel for particular ire.  Berlin has welcomed President Biden’s readiness to rebuild U.S.-German and U.S.-European ties.

All to the good, but rebuilding the U.S.-German relationship could well prove more difficult than it first appears.  Trump’s four years have left nagging questions in the German capital about the future of U.S. politics and Trumpism, and several issues will entail difficult exchanges between Washington and Berlin.

The Trump presidency meant a difficult time for Europe and the trans-Atlantic relationship.  He regarded the European Union as an economic adversary and questioned NATO’s value.  He held Germany in particularly low regard, criticizing its trade surpluses—telling his first NATO summit that “the Germans are very, very bad”—and decrying its defense spending levels, even suggesting that Berlin owes “vast sums of money” to the Alliance and America.  Trump had no personal chemistry with Merkel, reportedly referring to her as “stupid.”  In 2020, she publicly referred to “the limits of populism and denial of basic truths” without naming names.

In May 2020, Merkel declined, in the midst of the global COVID19 pandemic, to attend an in-person G7 summit at Camp David.  Shortly thereafter, Trump ordered the withdrawal of some 10,000 U.S. troops from Germany—a decision for which the Pentagon could offer no compelling strategic rationale (the Biden administration has suspended and ordered a review of the decision).

Berlin thus was delighted with Biden’s election, but Trump left much ground to make up.

What is the New “Normal” in America?

One senior German official privately observed that Trump had done real damage to German perceptions of the United States.  While welcoming Biden’s desire to rebuild relations with Germany and Europe and seeing his election as marking a return to “normalcy” in Washington, he wondered whether that “normalcy” was acceptable to the large segment of the American electorate that had voted for Trump.  Moreover, could Trump—or Trumpism—return to power?

In a separate discussion, another senior German official agreed that Trump had done significant damage to trans-Atlantic relations, noting that he had provided a boost to ideas such as strategic autonomy for Europe.  He pointed to the Conservative Political Action Conference held in late February as reminding Germans that Trump and Trumpism were not over.  What would the Republican Party look like in the future?

A third German official reiterated that Trump had caused many in Europe to contemplate how they might have to cope without strong U.S. leadership.  Germans had lost confidence in parts of the American political class.  It would be important that Biden define the level of U.S. leadership that his administration intended—and would be able—to provide.

Opinion surveys show that German citizens share these questions about America.  In a late 2020 poll commissioned by the European Council on Foreign Relations, 53 percent agreed or strongly agreed that “after voting for Trump in 2016, Americans cannot be trusted.”  The poll had 71 percent of Germans agreeing that the U.S. political system was somewhat or completely broken, though 48 percent believed that America could overcome its internal difficulties and contribute to solving global problems.  However, when asked whether they trusted in Europe or the United States, 53 percent opted for Europe compared to 4 percent for America.

Difficult Issues Loom

Early moves by Biden, such as rejoining the Paris Climate Agreement and World Health Organization, both of which Trump had quit, and reaffirming the U.S. commitment to NATO’s Article 5 (an attack on one shall be considered an attack on all) won plaudits in Berlin.  The Germans likewise welcomed Biden’s agreement to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia, as well as his administration’s readiness to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear program and reengage with the UN Human Rights Commission.  However, other issues that promise to figure prominently on the U.S.-German agenda could prove contentious between Washington and Berlin.

The Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline running under the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany tops the list.  The Biden administration, under pressure from Congress, has made clear its opposition to the pipeline, which is now about 95 percent finished.  Secretary of State Blinken issued a statement on March 18 reiterating the administration’s intent to comply with Congressional legislation calling for sanctions and warning that “any entity involved in the Nord Stream 2 pipeline risks U.S. sanctions and should immediately abandon work on the pipeline.”  On March 23, Blinken voiced U.S. opposition to the pipeline directly to German Foreign Minister Maas.

The German government, however, appears committed to finishing the pipeline, which has the support of the bulk of Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (and the allied Christian Socialist Union) and the Social Democratic Party, the parties that together make up the current governing coalition.  The German business community also supports the pipeline.  The CDU/CSU-SPD coalition, moreover, has an incentive to complete the pipeline prior to the German national election in September.  Polls indicate that, whatever coalition emerges following that election, the Greens Party will be part of it.  The Greens strongly oppose Nord Stream 2, both on ecological grounds and because of their concern about the human rights situation in Russia.  If the pipeline remains unfinished in September, this will be a major issue for the negotiation on forming a new governing coalition.

German officials note that stopping the pipeline now would be potentially costly; the German government could find itself on the hook for part or all of the nearly 10 billion Euros (about 12 billion dollars) already invested in the pipeline.  They note that U.S. sanctions on German or European companies would provoke a backlash in Germany.  Even those opposed to Nord Stream 2 caution against sanctions on German or European companies, which would go down badly with the pro-America CDU and could unite the European Union against the extra-territorial application of U.S. sanctions.  German politicians dismiss American charges that buying gas from Russia feeds the aggressive Moscow machine and point out the United States now imports billions of dollars’ worth of oil from Russia.

Creative thinking by U.S. and German officials might find a way by which Washington could acquiesce in the pipeline’s completion without applying U.S. sanctions against German companies.  That most likely will entail developing some benefits for Ukraine, which stands to lose the most if Nord Stream 2 is completed.  German officials acknowledge that the Biden administration needs something to show if it does not go forward with sanctions, but the mood in Washington appears to be hardening, and time to find a settlement is running short.

China poses a second issue that could prove difficult for U.S.-German relations.  As the Biden administration puts in place a policy to compete more effectively with Beijing, it will look to its European allies for support.  Berlin, however, pushed the European Union to complete an investment deal with Beijing without waiting to consult with the incoming Biden administration and does not share U.S. concern about the security considerations of allowing Huawei, the Chinese IT giant, to take part in providing the German 5G network.

German business interests on this issue matter—a lot, as China has become Germany’s largest trading partner.  While some in Berlin have become more wary of Beijing’s policy objectives and the means used to advance those goals, the German government does not want to have to choose sides between Washington and Beijing.  It may well have been China that Merkel had in mind when she told the (virtual) Munich Security Conference on February 19 that, while Europe and the United States should develop joint approaches, “that doesn’t mean that our interests will always converge.” 

That appears to have the backing of the German public.  Asked what Germany should do if there were a disagreement between Washington and Beijing, the European Council on Foreign Relations-commissioned poll showed 16 percent favoring support for the United States, while 8 percent favored support for China and 66 percent opted for neutrality.  (Worryingly for Washington’s effort to maintain a trans-Atlantic front against Russia, the poll showed identical numbers when substituting Russia for China.)

A third issue is German defense spending and the NATO-agreed goal that allies devote 2 percent of gross domestic product to defense by 2024.  Germany is now spending much more on its military than in 2014 but likely will fall short of the 2 percent target.  The Biden administration almost certainly will be more diplomatic than Trump on this issue.  Still, it will look to NATO allies in Europe to bear a larger share of the burden of deterring and defending against Russia as the United States shifts its military focus to the Asia-Pacific region. 

And a German Election

One complicating factor is that Germany will soon move into the campaign season for the national election in September.  As one German think-tank analyst put it, the issues that would help solidify U.S.-German relations—suspending construction of Nord Stream 2, adopting a tougher policy toward China, dramatically bolstering defense spending, and moving forward to procure a nuclear-capable fighter to replace the aging Tornado and sustain Germany’s nuclear-sharing role in NATO—are not positions that will attract votes.  Quite the opposite, too close an embrace of Washington’s views on these questions could drive ballots to other parties.

The September election, moreover, will mean an end to Merkel’s long run as chancellor.  Most expect her replacement to come from the CDU or CSU, though prognostications are less certain after the lackluster showing by the CDU in March 14 state elections in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Rhineland-Pflaz.  Regardless, a new chancellor will need time to get up to speed, and that could affect how quickly he or she might engage and decide on issues of interest to Washington.

This does not mean that the U.S.-German relationship is headed for trouble.  The good news is that both Washington and Berlin clearly want to restore the comity that was lost during the Trump administration.  However, building that relationship back, and not letting things get derailed by difficult issues that could divide the two allies, will require flexible diplomacy and that each take some account of the other’s interests and domestic pressures.

* * * * *

CISAC affiliate Steven Pifer is spending the first part of 2021 on a fellowship with the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin.

On March 3, the Biden administration released its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. Regarding cybersecurity, the document stated that 

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Abstract

In the absence of a federal geologic repository or consolidated, interim storage in the United States, commercial spent fuel will remain stranded at some 75 sites across the country. Currently, these include 18 “orphaned sites” where spent fuel has been left at decommissioned reactor sites. In this context, local communities living close to decommissioned nuclear power plants are increasingly concerned about this legacy of nuclear power production and are seeking alternative strategies to move the spent fuel away from those sites. In this paper, we present a framework and method for the socio-technical multi-criteria evaluation (STMCE) of spent fuel management strategies. The STMCE approach consists of (i) a multi-criteria evaluation that provides an ordinal ranking of alternatives based on a list of criterion measurements; and (ii) a social impact analysis that provides an outranking of options based on the assessment of their impact on concerned social actors. STMCE can handle quantitative, qualitative or both types of information. It can also integrate stochastic uncertainty on criteria measurements and fuzzy uncertainty on assessments of social impacts. We conducted an application of the STMCE method using data from the decommissioned San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) in California. This example intends to facilitate the preparation of stakeholder engagement activities on spent fuel management using the STMCE approach. The STMCE method provides an effective way to compare spent fuel management strategies and support the search for compromise solutions. We conclude by discussing the potential impact that such an approach could have on the management of commercial spent fuel in the United States.

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There are strong indications that the Biden administration intends to continue strengthening U.S.-Taiwan ties. The Biden team invited Taiwan's representative Bi-khim Hsiao to the presidential inauguration, supporters of Taiwan now hold senior roles in the administration, and officials have pledged "rock-solid" U.S. commitment to Taiwan, warning that PRC military pressure against Taiwan threatens regional peace and stability. But Cross-strait deterrence is arguably weaker today than at any point since the Korean War, according to Chinese military and security expert Oriana Skylar Mastro, FSI Center Fellow at APARC.

On February 18, 2021, Mastro testified to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission at a hearing on Deterring PRC Aggression Toward Taiwan. Her testimony on the political and strategic dynamics underpinning deterrence across the Taiwan Strait is available to watch below.

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Beijing has turned to increasingly hostile and combative rhetoric and actions since the democratic election of Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen. PLA air and water operations around Taiwan, particularly in the Taiwan Strait, have increased significantly in the past year, and concern is growing that the Chinese Communist Party is imminently planning to use force to compel Taiwan to accept unification with mainland China.

Drawing on her expertise in both policy and military security, Mastro explains why deterrence in Taiwan must be based on military capabilities rather than signaling through policy.

Catalysts to Conflict

Foremost, Mastro argues that the basic circumstances of aggression towards Taiwan have changed. In years past, it was accepted that China would launch military operations against Taiwan in response to actions or policy positions taken there or in the United States. However, Mastro believes that China is now primed to force a campaign of reunification regardless of either Taiwan’s or the U.S.’s policies moving forward.

By Mastro’s assessment, China is now in a position where it could prevail in cross-strait military contingencies even if the U.S. intervenes in Taiwan’s defense. The reform overhaul and modernization of China’s military have vastly improved the quality it equipment and confidence in its capability. China now possesses offensive weaponry, including ballistic and cruise missiles, which if deployed, could destroy U.S. bases in the Western Pacific. Sophisticated cyber attacks on domestic infrastructure both in Taiwan and the United States are also a credible threat and viable form of retaliation.

As long as President Xi is confident that the PLA can successfully back a forced unification in Taiwan, Mastro argues that action of some kind against Taiwan is not a matter of if, but of when, and what severity.

Types of Escalation

Failure to reunify Taiwan is too high a political and military cost for the PRC to risk, but there is also growing agitation amongst the mainland Chinese population for a resolution on the half-baked status of the island and its governance. Mastro believes that this pressure will ensure that action will be taken on Taiwan in the next 3 to 5 years.

Since Taiwan cannot withstand a sustained, active assault from China on its own, the deciding factor in when and how China moves against Taiwan is largely dependent on the signals the U.S. sends. And since China is increasingly confident in its own military, the signals the U.S. sends must likewise be ground in military capability, not policy, says Mastro.  

If China believes there will be little or no intervention or support from the U.S., it is likely to follow a graduated plan of attack, using economic blockages and targeted military action to bring about capitulation. If, however, it appears the U.S. will intervene, China is much more likely to move quickly and escalate violence and force rapidly to maximize damage before a full U.S. defense response can be coordinated.

Policy Recommendations

To effectively counter China on Taiwan, Mastro recommends crafting policy that creates doubt over China’s ability to successfully absorb Taiwan through military means. To do this, the United States needs to focus forces and develop operational plans that credibly off-set China’s goals while not triggering a panicked response from Beijing that could escalate into rapid conflict.

Mastro also urges the allocation of more resources toward intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), base development, and firepower in the Asia-Pacific region. Investing in these signals U.S. commitment to determent and the capacity to follow through if need be.

Finally, Mastro urges additional research into U.S. war termination behavior. Any involvement in Taiwan must be as limited and without the possibility for escalating levels of violence and long term unsustainable, unwinnable commitments. In preparing to potentially fight a war, she reminds policymakers that they need to know how to end one as well.

A recording of the full hearing is available courtesy of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.