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China is making a risky bet in the Middle East. By focusing on economic development and adhering to the principle of noninterference in internal affairs, Beijing believes it can deepen relations with countries that are otherwise nearly at war with one another—all the while avoiding any significant role in the political affairs of the region. This is likely to prove naive, particularly if U.S. allies begin to stand up for their interests.

In meetings I attended earlier this month in Beijing on China’s position in the Middle East, sponsored by the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center, Chinese officials, academics, and business leaders expressed a common view that China can avoid political entanglement by promoting development from Tehran to Tel Aviv. China may soon find, however, that its purely transactional approach is unsustainable in this intractable region—placing its own investments at risk and opening new opportunities for the United States.

Over the past three years, China has charted an ambitious future in the Middle East by forging “comprehensive strategic partnerships” with Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. This is the highest level of diplomatic relations China can provide, and Beijing believes these four countries anchor a neutral position that will prove more stable over the long term than that of the United States. China has also made massive investments in infrastructure throughout the region, including in Israel, where China is now the second-largest trading partner behind the United States.

China’s interests in the Middle East are both structural and strategic. Structurally, China needs the natural resources of the region, whereas the United States—now the world’s largest oil producer—does not. China is also seeking new markets to absorb its excess industrial capacity, and sees the Middle East poised for growth after decades of wars, woeful infrastructure, and popular discontent. Strategically, together with Russia, China is taking advantage of the uncertainty produced by ever-shifting U.S. policies, including zero-sum prescriptions for Iran and Syria that are unlikely to produce desired outcomes anytime soon. Regional governments in turn have welcomed China’s embrace, and its offer of investment without pressure to politically reform or respect human rights.

China’s President Xi Jinping previewed this more assertive Middle East strategy in a landmark address in Cairo three years ago. There, he declared that China does not seek a “sphere of influence” in the region—even while sinking nearly $100 billion in investments there through ports, roads, and rail projects. He alleged China rejects “proxy” contests—even while concluding a strategic partnership with Iran, the main sponsor of proxies in the region. And he warned against “all forms of discrimination and prejudice against any specific ethnic group and religion”—even while reportedly forcing 1 million Muslims into reeducation camps in China’s Xinjiang province.

Such contradictions can be maintained only so long as traditional U.S. allies in the region now welcoming Chinese investment allow them to be maintained. These U.S. allies do not shy from asserting their broader interests with Washington or expressing disagreement where policies diverge, and it is time they do the same with Beijing.

As the United States questions Chinese investment and intentions, particularly in the areas of technology and ports such as Israel’s Haifa, it can also challenge traditional allies as to whether they are granting China a free ride on what remains a largely U.S.-led security architecture. Such an arrangement should be as unacceptable to American partners in the region as it is to Washington. At the very least, these partners, together with Washington, can demand that Beijing utilize its emerging influence—particularly with Tehran and Damascus—to pursue measures that promote longer-term stability.

Read the rest at The Atlantic.

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Abstract: President Trump may talk about the Middle East differently than Obama did. But the two seem to share the view that the United States is too involved in the region and should devote fewer resources and less time to it. The reduced appetite for U.S. engagement in the region reflects, not an ideological predilection or an idiosyncrasy of these two presidents, but a deeper change in both regional dynamics and broader U.S. interests. Despite this, the United States exists in a kind of Middle Eastern purgatory—too distracted by regional crises to pivot to other global priorities but not invested enough to move the region in a better direction. This worst-of-both-worlds approach exacts a heavy price. It sows uncertainty among Washington’s Middle Eastern partners, which encourages them to act in risky and aggressive ways. It deepens the American public’s frustration with the region’s endless turmoil, as well as with U.S. efforts to address it. It diverts resources that could otherwise be devoted to confronting a rising China and a revanchist Russia. And all the while, by remaining unclear about the limits of its commitments, the United States risks getting dragged into yet another Middle Eastern conflict. 

 
It is time for Washington to put an end to wishful thinking about its ability to establish order on its own terms or to transform self-interested and shortsighted regional partners into reliable allies—at least without incurring enormous costs and long-term commitments. That means making some ugly choices to craft a strategy that will protect the most important U.S. interests in the region, without sending the United States back into purgatory. Karlin and Wittes will outline the choices before the next U.S. president and their view of a realistic, sustainable strategy for the United States in the Middle East. 
 
Tamara Wittes' Biography: Tamara Cofman Wittes is a senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. Wittes served as deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs from November of 2009 to January 2012, coordinating U.S. policy on democracy and human rights in the Middle East during the Arab uprisings. Wittes also oversaw the Middle East Partnership Initiative and served as deputy special coordinator for Middle East transitions.

 

Wittes is a co-host of Rational Security, a weekly podcast on foreign policy and national security issues. She writes on U.S. Middle East policy, regional conflict and conflict resolution, the challenges of global democracy, and the future of Arab governance. Her current research is for a forthcoming book, Our SOBs, on the tangled history of America’s ties to autocratic allies.

 

Wittes joined Brookings in December of 2003. Previously, she served as a Middle East specialist at the U.S. Institute of Peace and director of programs at the Middle East Institute in Washington. She has also taught courses in international relations and security studies at Georgetown University. Wittes was one of the first recipients of the Rabin-Peres Peace Award, established by President Bill Clinton in 1997.

 

Wittes is the author of "Freedom’s Unsteady March: America’s Role in Building Arab Democracy" (Brookings Institution Press, 2008) and the editor of "How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of the Oslo Peace Process" (USIP, 2005). She holds a bachelor's in Judaic and Near Eastern studies from Oberlin College, and a master's and doctorate in government from Georgetown University. She serves on the board of the National Democratic Institute, as well as the advisory board of the Israel Institute, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and Women in International Security.

 

 

Mara Karlin's Biography: Mara Karlin, PhD, is Director of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). She is also an Associate Professor at SAIS and a nonresident senior fellow at The Brookings Institution. Karlin has served in national security roles for five U.S. secretaries of defense, advising on policies spanning strategic planning, defense budgeting, future wars and the evolving security environment, and regional affairs involving the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. Most recently, she served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development.  Karlin has been awarded Department of Defense Medals for Meritorious and Outstanding Public Service, among others. She is the author of Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States (University of Pennsylvania Press; 2018).

Tamara Wittes Senior fellow, Center for Middle East Policy Brookings
Mara Karlin Senior fellow,Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence SAIS and Brookings
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Abstract: My research investigates the formal institutionalization of inter-governmental cooperation among the three major Northeast Asian powers – China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea—in the face of a continued North Korean threat. How much of a shadow, if any, has North Korea’s nuclear weapons cast over the development of multilateralism in the region? Since 1999, the Northeast Asian region has seen intensifying institutionalization of cooperation among its major powers. In a region where the realist logic of state-centric nationalism, sovereignty, and balance of power still prevails, this new development of trilateral cooperation among the former and potential adversaries deserves serious scholarly investigation. What started as economic and functional cooperation, trilateral cooperation has since been substantially expanded to include political and security agendas at the highest level of government. What explains the emergence and endurance of trilateral cooperation and to what extent has containing the North Korean nuclear crisis shaped its institutional trajectory and outcomes? By examining the evolution of trilateral cooperation, I address some critical gaps in our understanding of formal institution building and the economic-security nexus in one of the most dynamic regions in the world.

 

Speaker's Biography: Yeajin Yoon is a 2018-2019 MacArthur Nuclear Security Pre-doctoral Fellow at CISAC and a doctoral candidate in the Blavatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford. Her dissertation examines the evolution of trilateral cooperation among the most militarily and economically dominant states in Northeast Asia, namely, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, and considers when and how their relations become implicated in the North Korean nuclear crisis.

 

Prior to entering academia, Yeajin travelled extensively across Asia and worked with national governments, international organisations, and NGOs in the region. She led the development of the inaugural issue of the 'Oxford Government Review’ and helped facilitate a Track II dialogue on wartime history issues in Asia at Stanford University. Previously, she worked as a founding member of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat, the official intergovernmental organisation for China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea and managed a development fund focused on the ASEAN region at the Korean Foreign Ministry.

 

Yeajin received a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science with Honors from Stanford University and a Master of Public Policy degree from Oxford University.

Yeajin Yoon MacArthur Nuclear Security Pre-doctoral Fellow CISAC, Stanford University
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Abstract: How do nuclear-armed states coerce their adversaries in wars with limited aims without using nuclear weapons? I develop a theory of strategic substitution to explain why states use space, cyber and conventional missile weapons instead of nuclear weapons to maximize leverage against their adversaries. I also explain how they select space, cyber, and conventional missile force postures, defined as weapons and plans for using them. Threats to use space, cyber and conventional missile weapons are more credible sources of strategic leverage against adversaries in wars that do not threaten a state’s survival. I demonstrate the plausibility of the theory using China’s cyber force posture. China developed space, cyber and conventional missile weapons to solve a common problem: giving Beijing the leverage it could not gain from its nuclear weapons in a future war over Taiwanese independence involving the United States. Using original Chinese-language written sources and interviews conducted during extensive fieldwork, I show that Chinese leaders pursued cyber weapons to maximize their strategic leverage after the United States bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999. As China’s vulnerability to cyber attacks grew during the 2000s, its appetite for risk in using cyber weapons declined, resulting in a change to its military cyber force posture in 2014.

Speaker Bio: Fiona Cunningham is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at CISAC. Her research interests lie at the intersection of technology and conflict, with an empirical focus on China. She received her PhD in September 2018 from the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where she was a member of the Security Studies Program. Her dissertation explained China’s development of space, cyber and conventional missile force postures as substitutes for using nuclear weapons to coerce adversaries. Her research is based on extensive fieldwork, including a year-long dissertation research fellowship at the Renmin University of China, Beijing, in 2015-6. She was a Pre-Doctoral Fellow in the Cyber Security Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, in 2017-8. Fiona’s research has been supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation, China Confucius Studies Program, and the MIT Center for International Studies. Her research on China's nuclear strategy has been published in the quarterly journal, International Security. Fiona holds a Bachelor of Arts in Politics and International Relations from the University of New South Wales and a Bachelor of Laws from the University of Sydney, both with first-class honors. She was a research associate at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney from 2009 until 2012, where she focused on extended nuclear deterrence in East Asia and nuclear nonproliferation. Fiona speaks Mandarin Chinese and French.

Fiona Cunningham Postdoctoral Fellow CISAC, Stanford University
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Abstract: China's economic growth over the last thirty years has positioned it to project political and economic power across the world.  In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping officially launched the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative, later re-branded as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with the goal of economically connecting China to the countries of the Greater Middle East through a new infrastructural network of roads and maritime ports. The Chinese government has reportedly already spent $250 billion on these projects and will spend up to $1 trillion more in the next decade, much of it in Muslim-majority countries.  This project seeks to answer a number of questions about the economic, political and cultural implications of the BRI.  What does the potential rise of a global trading bloc dominated by the authoritarian regimes of China and the Greater Middle East mean for the liberal economic order?  How will the BRI impact the advancement of human rights in the Greater Middle East?  What types of political tensions might arise between China and BRI target countries because of Chinese state economic investments?  And how is a “rising China” viewed by the citizenries of countries in the Greater Middle East?  

 

Bio: Lisa Blaydes is a Professor of Political Science at Stanford University.  She is the author of Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt (Cambridge University Press, 2011).  Professor Blaydes received the 2009 Gabriel Almond Award for best dissertation in the field of comparative politics from the American Political Science Association for this project.  Her articles have appeared in the American Political Science Review, International Studies Quarterly, International Organization, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Middle East Journal, and World Politics. During the 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 academic years, Professor Blaydes was an Academy Scholar at the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies.  She holds degrees in Political Science (PhD) from the University of California, Los Angeles and International Relations (BA, MA) from Johns Hopkins University.

 

Lisa Blaydes Professor of Political Science Stanford University
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This article argues that China’s rise and its growing military power have intensified the Sino-Indian security dilemma. For a long time after the 1962 war, India’s military posture along the India–China border was mostly defensive in nature and could be characterized as imposing “deterrence by denial.” However, over the last decade, China’s growth trajectory coupled with rapid modernization of its military called into question the efficacy of this approach. India now feels much more vulnerable to China’s increasing military power both on the land frontier as well as in the maritime domain. The increasing intensity of this security dilemma has informed a consequent shift in India’s military strategy vis-à-vis China to one of “deterrence by punishment.” Theoretically, this article examines how changes in the severity of a security dilemma can lead to changes in military strategy. While doing so it explains India’s current military strategy to deal with the challenge posed by China.

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Abstract: Over the past decade, fears about the decline of the United States relative to other countries (especially China) have become a prominent feature of American political discourse. While anxiety about losing power on the world stage has been a recurrent phenomenon in the United States since the 1950s, the present bout of pessimism – combining reactions to the disastrous Iraq War, the 2008 financial crisis, and most recently the rise of Donald Trump – makes this the deepest and most serious crisis of confidence in postwar American history. This project explores the domestic political and strategic consequences of anxiety about lost or eroding national status by combining insights from social theory and social psychology. I use evidence from historical cases of decline (including Spain after 1898, France after 1945 and the United Kingdom after 1945) as well as survey experiments to investigate hypotheses about the heterogenous ways in which different individuals and groups react to relative national decline, and how these responses combine to influence the declining state’s politics and foreign policy. 

Speaker bio: Steven Ward is a Junior Faculty Fellow at CISAC for the year 2017-2018 and an Assistant Professor in the Government Department at Cornell University. He holds an MA in Security Studies and a PhD in Government from Georgetown University. He is the author of Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers (Cambridge University Press, 2017). His work has appeared in Security Studies and International Studies Quarterly.

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Abstract: China’s participation in venture deals financing is at a record level of 10-16% of all venture deals (2015-2017) and has grown quite rapidly in the past seven years.  Technologies where Chinese firms are investing are foundational to future innovation:  artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, augmented/virtual reality, robotics and blockchain technology. Moreover, since these technologies are dual use--designed for commercial use but also equally applicable for military applications, these are some of the same technologies of interest to the U.S. Defense Department.  

Investing is itself only a piece of a larger story of massive technology transfer from the U.S. to China. China has a long-term, systematic effort to attain global leadership in many industries, partly by transferring leading-edge technologies from around the world.

U.S. military superiority since World War II has relied on both U.S. economic scale and technological superiority. If we allow China access to these same technologies concurrently, then not only may we lose our technological superiority but we may even be facilitating China’s technological superiority. 

Speaker bio: Michael Brown is a White House Presidential Innovation Fellow in the U.S. Defense Department. He is the co-author of a Pentagon study on China’s participation in the U.S. venture ecosystem which served as key input for the proposed Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) being reviewed with bipartisan support by both the House and Senate.

Michael is the former CEO of Symantec Corporation, the global leader in cybersecurity and the world’s 10th largest software company with revenues of $4 billion and more than 10,000 employees worldwide. During his tenure as CEO, Michael led a turnaround as the company developed a new strategy focusing on its security business.

Michael is the former Chairman & CEO of Quantum, a leader in the computer storage industry specializing in backup and archiving products. After leaving Quantum, Michael served as Chairman of EqualLogic, a storage array company. 

He serves on the Board of Trustees of the Berklee College of Music in Boston, received his BA degree in economics from Harvard University in 1980 and his MBA degree from Stanford University in 1984.  

Michael Brown U.S. Department of Defense
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Abstract: Sustaining strategic stability vis-a-vis Russia and China is a long-standing U.S. national security goal. Meeting this goal is growing more challenging due to tectonic geopolitical and technological changes. On the geopolitical side, new dynamics and new uncertainties are created by China’s emergence as an increasingly capable and assertive great power, Russia’s regional revanchism and political operations, and America’s uncertainty about its role in the world amidst its divisive domestic politics. On the technology side, advances in military capabilities for cyberspace, outer space, missile defense, long-range strike, and a range of AI-related areas including autonomous systems and big data analytics, are changing the dynamics of crisis management and conflict escalation. At the extreme, such technological advances could undermine confidence in one or more side's nuclear second-strike capabilities, thereby provoking arms racing in the near-term, and potentially “use or lose” dynamics in the longer-term. After outlining the dimensions of this growing set of challenges, Dr. Miller will offer a number of specific recommendations for U.S. policy, military force posture, and engagement with Russia and China.

Speaker Bio: Dr. James N. Miller is President of Adaptive Strategies, LLC, which provides consulting on strategy development and implementation, international engagement, and technology issues. He is a senior fellow at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab and Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs. He serves on the Defense Science Board, for which he recently co-chaired a task force report on cyber deterrence, the Board of Directors for the Atlantic Council, and the Board of Advisors for the Center for a New American Security. As Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from May 2012 to January 2014, Dr. Miller served as the principal civilian advisor to Secretaries Leon Panetta and Chuck Hagel on strategy, policy, and operations, and as DoD’s Deputy for National Security Council deliberations. He served as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from April 2009 to May 2012, and previously in numerous leadership positions in government, academia, non-profits, and the private sector over a thirty-year career in national security. He received a B.A. degree in economics from Stanford University, and Master’s and Ph.D. degrees from Harvard’s JFK School of Government.  

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John W. Lewis, a Stanford political scientist who pioneered new ways of thinking about U.S.-China relations and launched some of the first Asian study programs in higher education, died Monday at his home on the Stanford campus. He was 86.

John W. Lewis

 

 

Lewis was a prolific scholar and one of the preeminent China specialists of his generation. His deep commitment to using insights from academic research to inform policy deliberations and solve important problems related to international relations and security led him to establish several centers and institutes at Stanford. These institutions supported collective undertakings involving scholars and officials from all over the globe and inspired dozens of graduate students to follow Lewis’ lead to make a tangible difference toward a more peaceful world.

He founded and directed the Center for East Asian Studies from 1969 to 1970, the Northeast Asia-United States Forum on International Policy (now the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center), from 1983 to 1990, and, along with theoretical physicist Sidney Drell, co-founded Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) in 1983, serving as a co-director until 1991. Stanford’s Center for International Security and Arms Control, CISAC’s precursor, was founded by Lewis and Drell in 1970. Lewis also led CISAC’s Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region.

Expert on Asia

Lewis, the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, Emeritus, and a senior fellow at CISAC and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), joined the Stanford faculty in 1968 after teaching for seven years at Cornell University, coming to campus as an expert on China at the apex of public unrest regarding the Vietnam War. As a teacher, he helped lead an interdisciplinary course on nuclear arms and disarmament and engaged in simulated arms control talks with students.

In addition to his work on China, Lewis was a pioneer in dealing with North Korea. He visited the North in 1986 and numerous times thereafter, always with the deep conviction that it was vitally important to listen and learn.  He opened doors long closed by inviting North Korean, South Korean and U.S. officials to meet at Stanford in the early 1990s, and afterwards hosted official North Korean delegations.

He was invited to visit the North Korean nuclear center at Yongbyon after the collapse of the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework in 2002.  This and subsequent visits with Stanford colleagues provided virtually the only direct information on developments at the site, said Thomas Fingar, a Shorenstein APARC Fellow at FSI.

Sig Hecker, a CISAC senior fellow and the former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, recalls traveling to North Korea with Lewis in January 2004, a significant time in the country’s nuclear program.

“I would never have gone to North Korea without John,” Hecker said. “He had developed a relationship that allowed us to establish an effective means of communication during the times our governments were not talking. I had worked closely with John on North Korea ever since. He was incredibly knowledgeable and had an intensity that motivated everyone around him.”

Passion for peace

Lewis was extremely active in his retirement, visiting his CISAC office in Encina Hall daily, writing books, giving lectures and archiving his materials. While recovering from a recent fall, Lewis was constantly on the phone with colleagues and continued to collaborate until he lost his ability to speak, said his daughter, Amy Tich, BA ’85.

Above all, he was an advocate of peace, education and talking with – and learning about – the nature of one’s perceived rivals, such as China and North Korea, instead of allowing misinformation and misunderstandings to spread. The word “cooperation” in the title of CISAC emanates from this belief.

How ironic, said Tich, that her father’s death came at a time when relations between the U.S. and North Korea over the North’s nuclear tests are filled with tension.

“He had amazing relationships all across Asia,” Tich said. “He believed in what he was doing to the core of his being. He wanted world peace, to save the world from nuclear war.”

John’s son, Stephen Lewis, AB ’80, MS ’80, MBA ’84, said, “He lived a remarkable life. He made enormous strides in Korean relations and Chinese relations. And he did it with a sense of humor and humility that earned him the right to push because only from pushing through issues do you get answers.”

A Renaissance scholar

Lewis was the Renaissance scholar who bridged the gap between the academic and policy worlds. In the 1970s, he was a major player in the restoration of academic exchanges with China and established ties between U.S. and Chinese academic and governmental institutions that continue today.

In the 1980s, he built enduring ties with the Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Moscow that enhanced understanding and collaboration among Americans, Russians, and Chinese.  He launched a project to gather medical expertise at Stanford to deal with North Korea’s severe drug-resistant tuberculosis problem, a project that took him twice to Mongolia to explore the possibility of a regional effort against TB.

Lewis was never satisfied with simply having a problem discussed, said Fingar. He ended every meeting with assembled experts on North Korean issues with a prodding, “A useful discussion. Now, what can we do?”

Lewis helped American business executives, academics, government officials and military officers establish contacts and networks in China. He also led two congressional delegations to Asia. In recognition of his impact, Lewis was invited to serve on the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences; the Joint Committee on Contemporary China of the Social Science Research Council; and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations.

The Stanford scholar also did consulting work for the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the U.S. Department of Defense, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress.

Born in King County, Washington, in 1930, Lewis gained his first exposure to international issues and institutions as a teenage page at the San Francisco meeting that established the United Nations. His interest in China was inspired by the stories and achievements of missionary relatives who built schools for Chinese girls. After graduating from Deep Springs College (California) in 1949, Lewis earned  his bachelor’s degree (1953), master’s degree (1958) and doctorate (1962) at UCLA. His service as a gunnery officer in the U.S. Navy (1954-1957) kindled his interest in security issues and Korea.

Publications, research

Lewis wrote and co-authored numerous influential books on Asia and international security, including Leadership in Communist China (1963); and  The United States in Vietnam (1967) (with George Kahin); and China Builds the Bomb (1988).

“John’s numerous books about Chinese decision-making regarding nuclear weapons and the Korean War were path-breaking,” said Scott Sagan, a professor of political science and senior fellow at CISAC and FSI. “His work permitted us to see behind ‘the bamboo curtain’ and understand Mao [Zedong] and his successors with more clarity than was possible before.”

Lewis received numerous letters from colleagues and former students in his final days and Tich read all of them to him. Among the praise bestowed on Lewis was his “ability to inspire in me and others profound curiosity and dedication to scholarship,” that he provided “a model of how to bring values to bear on scholarship and global citizenship,” and “[He] represented the perfect mix of academic research and real-time involvement with the world.”

CISAC co-director and FSI Senior Fellow Amy Zegart remembers Lewis’ generosity and enthusiasm.

“I can still remember knocking on John’s door as a young grad student 20 years ago and sheepishly asking if he might be willing to conduct a directed reading course with me about China’s foreign policy,” Zegart said. “He said ‘yes’ immediately. His generosity of spirit and commitment to teaching still infuse CISAC today, and will shape Stanford students for generations to come. It is a true honor to co-direct the center that John and Sid Drell created.”

Lewis is survived by Jacquelyn Lewis, his wife of 63 years; his children Stephen Lewis, Amy Tich and Cynthia Westby; and five grandchildren, Brian, BA ’15, Taryn, Kylie, Katie and Rhys.

In keeping with his life-long commitment to teaching students and training successors, the family requests that anyone wishing to honor Professor Lewis do so by contributing to the John and Jackie Lewis Fund at Stanford University, which supports funding for Stanford graduate students and postdoctoral fellows  doing research on matters related to Asia. Donations to the fund should be made out to Stanford University and sent to the John and Jackie Lewis Fund, in care of Scott Nelson, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, 616 Serra Street, Stanford, California, 94305.

In an oral history interview with the Stanford Historical Society, Lewis recounts his earlier days on campus and the impact of his career. Videos of an 80th birthday celebration for Lewis can be found here.

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