This paper deals with defense conversion (broadly interpreted) in the newly independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union (FSU), with emphasis on the situation in Russia. Our premise is that economic progress is a sine qua non for political stability and the growth of democratic institutions, and hence for international security. Therefore it is in the best interests of all countries, and primarily the United States, to assist the economic reforms in the NIS. We further believe that the efficient use of a considerable portion of the assets of the military-industrial complex is necessary if the economic reforms are to succeed.

In this paper we analyze some of the major barriers to conversion, and the incentives and problems involved in providing external assistance for this conversion, as well as steps that can only be accomplished internally. The paper includes a description of a project on conversion in the Soviet Union and later in Russia, undertaken in early 1990, at the Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC). The work has included interactions between Soviet and Russian industrialists, government officials, and scholars with their counterparts, as well as with members of the legal and financial communities, in the United States. The report also contains a case study of conversion and privatization at one enterprise, the Saratov Aviation Plant. The report concludes with recommendations (summarized below) to both industry and government in the United States and in the NIS. This work has been supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Since this paper was drafted many of our recommendations have been adopted through policy statements; however, in many cases, realization of these policies is still subject to final congressional action, administrative implementation, IMF negotiations with the governments of the NIS, and legislation by the NIS.

Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) started a project in early 1990 following a proposal from Marshal Akhromeyev,specialadvisor to President Gorbachev and Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.  The intent was to bring a delegation of Soviet defense executives, government officials and academicians to the United States. The objectives of the project were to study and assi§t the process of demilitarization through the diversion of military production assets, broadly interpreted (facilities, personnl., technology, etc.), and to building a civilian industry and infrastructure. In spite of changes in the project agenda, the objectives remain the same. These objectives are being addressed by informing the debate in the Russian and American
governments as well as in the international financial institutions, recommending innovative conversion efforts, interacting directly with Russian defense enterprises and American companies interested in cooperative business activities, and participating in scholarly analyses through publications and topical conferences.

Challenging the literatures on war termination, civil war, and revolution--which typically dismiss the possibility of negotiated settlement--Stephen Stedman examines the problem of negotiations during civil wars and demonstrates that third party mediation can help resolve such conflicts.

Stedman analyzes four international attempts to mediate a settlement to the Zimbabwean civil war of the 1970s and compares the three failed negotiations--the 1974-1975 Kenneth Kaunda/John Vorster "detente" exercise, the Henry Kissinger mediation that led to the Geneva conference of 1976, and the Anglo-American initiatives of David Owen and Cyrus Vance in 1977-1978--with the successful 1979 Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia, chaired by Lord Carrington. Drawing on primary sources not available previously, his discussion of the factors that distinguish the failures from the successful attempt is a major contribution to conflict resolution theory, particularly with reference to the work of William Zartman. A final chapter considers the lessons of the Zimbabwe experience for South Africa today.

The problem of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war has been couched largely in terms of superpower confrontations during a crisis. Whether the focus is on the major powers, or on developing nations with ballistic missiles and probable nuclear weapons capability, stability in those who handle weapons and effective safeguards on use are essential preventive measures. The United States and the USSR have been careful to guard against unauthorized launch. All nuclear nations have been concerned with retaining ultimate control of nuclear weapons in civilian hands; with monitoring the reliability and stability of the forces that handle the weapons; and with preventing weapons from coming into the possession of outsiders. In 1986, an analysis of the sources of human instability in those who handle nuclear weapons concluded that thousands of unstable individuals were involved in "minding our missiles."1 The present paper serves as an update on the problem and links it to potential areas of increasing risk as the world changes.

A conference was held at Stanford in May 1992 on possible cooperation between the United States and Russia on early warning of ballistic missile attack. Included in this volume is a briefing paper that was prepared immediately after that meeting.

After eight years of marathon negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union are finally close to concluding a strategic-arms-reduction treaty (START). At the 1990 Washington summit, U.S. president George Bush and Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev signed a communique concerning the reduction of strategic nuclear arms. Although the agreement is not the long-awaited START, the two presidents reaffirmed their determination to have the treaty completed and ready for signature by the end of 1990. The marked progress toward nuclear disarmament by the two superpowers has once again caused vast repercussions. While hailing progress, many people show more concern for the implications of the treaty for the future of arms control.

The world is facing truly breathtaking changes, in particular from the socialist countries. The traditional rigidity of communist regimes and the preeminence of the communist parties in these countries are breaking down. Strong voices of nationalism within the Soviet Union are challenging the very integrity of the union itself. Thus, a bipolar world--where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), led by the United States, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), led by the Soviet Union, represent both .an ideological schism and a superpower confrontation--is no longer the basis or even a dominant force for threatened conflict.

The recognition is growing that such factors as economic strength, abundance of basic resources, productivity, and the health and morale of the population are in many respects stronger bases of national security than are military forces. This recognition conflicts sharply with the concept of national security as defined in the Dictionary of Military Terms (issued by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff) as "a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations."

In view of all these developments, the realization that military power and national security are not synonymous is becoming more prevalent in the United States.  More attention is focusing on internal threats from deficiencies such as those in education, from erosion of the country's infrastructure, drugs, and problems of the environment. This attention, in turn, has deflected public concern and attention from military issues. The decreased concern not only has diminished the priority given to military preparedness but also, unfortunately, has lessened the concern with arms control.

This paper addresses the steps that the United States should take to insure the continuation of its position of influence and involvement in world commerce and geopolitics in light of the developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.  The developments are both positive--prodemocracy movements, lessened tensions--and negative, the latter suggesting that there may well be a period in which pent-up ethnic, ideological, and nationalistic pressures could give rise to local conflicts and regional disputes throughout the world, not just in Eastern Europe.

The national security strategy of the United States since World War II has changed frequently during the course of eight administrations and two wars. But it has also had an underlying consistency, driven by three major factors: the Cold War, the United States' position as leader of the Western world, and the economic strength of the United States. In the 1990s, however, U.S. national security strategy is likely to be very different as the Cold War abates, the United States' role with allies evolves from one of dominance to one of senior partnership, and the U.S. economy is stressed by actions to reduce the budget and trade deficits.