A solution to the nuclear dilemma has eluded mankind since the creation of nuclear weapons.  A visionary attempt by the United States to eliminate the threat at the beginning of the nuclear age (the "Baruch Plan" for the international control of atomic energy) fell victim to the Cold War.  However, in this new geopolitical era, the UN Security Council finally has the opportunity to function as its founders intended, and it may now be appropriate to reconsider the idea of a security regime that would bring all nuclear weapons under international control.

The internationalization of nuclear security would have to be implemented over a number of years through a systematic step-by-step process.  This paper suggests the following three-phase approach: in Phase I, a new international security regime would be established; in Phase II, a UN-owned international nuclear deterrent force (INDF) would be created; and finally, in Phase III, all national nuclear arsenals would be eliminated in favor of the INDF.

With the ending of the Cold War, regional conflicts have come increasingly to the fore.  U.S. foreign policy goals in such areas continue to involve a mix of U.S. self-interest (as perceived by governing elites, Congress, and sometimes the electorate directly) and a desire to see conflicts in the world resolved more peacefully.  Both of these factors have led and will probably continue to lead to U.S. military interventions in some of these conflicts.

This paper addresses the issue of what role--if any--U.S. nuclear weapons should play in these interventions.  We focus on the following questions: given a military regional confrontation between the United States and a regional power, under what circumstances if any should nuclear weapons be used?  What arguments militate for and against their use? Can one come to an overall policy recommendation in this regard?

We are well aware that the best way to deal with military confrontations is to prevent them. To some degree, military confrontations represent a failure of policy.  Nevertheless, these confrontations do occur, and on occasion, the use of nuclear weapons has been and may again be contemplated.  The paper reviews some such possible occasions.

While the breakup of the Soviet Union received much publicity, few attempts have been made to throroughly analyze the attempt to create a successor alliance--the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This lack of attention may be explained by the poor performance of the CIS to date.  But it can hardly be accepted.  Presently at a crossroads, the Commonwealth has three basic options for the future: complete dissolution, consolidation along the originally envisaged guidelines, or some kind of transformation, each with unique and far-reaching consequences for both the newly independent states (NIS) and the world. Clearly, the final decision lies with the ex-Soviet republics. But the West seems to be in a position to effectively influence the republics' choice.

This paper discusses three different but closely related issues: What future exists for the CIS, if any? What are the current Western, specifically American, attitudes toward the Commonwealth? And what is the best course for the West to follow?

The prevention of nuclear proliferation is intimately related to stringent restraints on the supply of fissionable material available for weapons. We review the practices of the United States in providing security and control of bomb-grade material and the problems that have been encountered. We then consider the challenges to security and control of nuclear weapons material posed by the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the Former Soviet Union (FSU).

During the most recent Russian-American summit in Vancouver, Canada in April 1993, President Clinton announced a major new initiative to assist Russia's transition to a market economy. In discussing how to aid the process of Russia's economic reform in ways of mutual benefit to both the United States and Russia, both President Yeltsin and President Clinton underscored the importance of promoting the conversion and privatization of state enterprises of the Russian military-industrial complex.

While most agree that conversion and privatization of these enterprises are laudable goals, few have discussed concrete methods of achieving these ends at the level of individual enterprises. By focusing on the actual experiences of one Russian enterprise that has both converted to almost 100% civilian production and, at the same time, become a private company, this report seeks to expand the discussion of the means and models for achieving conversion and privatization of the Russian military industrial complex.

This report covers work on conversion and privatization in the former Soviet Union that has been conducted over the past two years by the Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) at Stanford University. In it, we explore the process of conversion and privatization through employee ownership. The report contains one chapter each on the major issues surrounding conversion and privatization, followed by a detailed explanation of the employee ownership method of privatization. The report concludes with the description and analysis of a case study of privatization through employee ownership: the Saratov Aviation Plant.

This paper examines technical and institutional possibilities for improving the ability of the international safeguards regime to prevent or slow the spread of nuclear weapons. It relies strongly on the experience of the recently uncovered Iraqi nuclear-weapons program and the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations in the discovery of the program's extent and scope.

The Iraqi program and its exposure following the Gulf War surprised and disturbed much of the international community. However, the shock generated by the extent and the size of an effort that had been suspected but remained grossly underestimated and misunderstood has given a strong political impetus to the will of the international community for strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

This paper makes a number of suggestions based on a review of the Iraqi effort and on an assessment of possible future attempts by other nations to acquire nuclear weapons.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the emergence of 15 independent states on its territory mark the end not only of the Soviet system itself but also of a centuries-long process of state-building that created the Russian empire. In the process of serving and extending this empire, the Soviet state unwittingly stimulated a process of nation-building among its constituent peoples. which ultimately contributed to its collapse. The papers presented in this volume are an attempt to analyze and comment on the origins, evolution, and demise of protracted experiment.

This book is essentially a series of case histories of U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations, as seen from the American side. It describes the processes of governmental decisionmaking for arms control in Washington, D.C., and the techniques for joint U.S.-Soviet decisionmaking at the negotiating table.

As general counsel of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and member of U.S. delegations to disarmament conferences for eight years, the author was in a unique position to assess the difficulties of fashioning an arms control treaty that could pass muster within the executive branch of the U.S. government, be approved by U.S. allies, be successfully negotiated with the Soviets, and then win the approval of the U.S. Senate. This process will be even more complex now that the United States will face at least four nuclear powers from the former U.S.S.R.

The book has three purposes. The first is to add to the recorded history of the following negotiations: the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, the ABM Treaty of 1972 and its companion SALT Interim Agreements, and the 1987 INF Treaty. The author asks in each case, What did the president and his assistants do (or fail to do) to negotiate a successfulu agreement?

The second purpose is to use the case book approach, common in law schools and business schools, as a teaching device for those who wish to learn how the American government made decisions about arms control negotiations, how U.S.-Soviet negotiators reached decisions, and what the results of the decisions have been.

The book's third purpose is to generalize about what works and what does not work in the complex world of arms control negotiations, including information on the impact of negotiating committees and comparisons of the process for negotiating arms control treaties with that for achieving arms limits through action and reaction, without written agreement. The concluding chapter looks to the future: What changes will occur in the arms control process given the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union?

Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) has undertaken a project to work with elements of the Soviet defense industry to help them convert production from military to civilian uses. In this project we refer to conversion as the use of defense industry facilities, personnel, and/or technology for the production of nondefense products and services. One aspect of this work is to facilitate cooperation between U.S. and Soviet companies. Representative Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), asked the Center to initiate this project. The Institute of U.S.A. and Canada Studies (ISKAN) of the Soviet Academy of Sciences is coordinating the Soviet Union's participation.

In recent years issues in international security have been increasingly influenced by economic factors. This is evident in the defense budgets of the major powers as well as in arms transfers to regions such as the Middle East. Furthermore, arms control has taken on a broader meaning, involving unilateral cuts and confidence-building measures to supplement negotiated structural arms-control agreements.

The principal objective of this project is to assist the Soviet defense industry in their defense conversion activities by:

• Analyzing the conversion problem in the Soviet Union and, if appropriate, extracting lessons from the U.S. experience.
• Assisting the Soviets in contacting and exploring cooperative ventures with appropriate U.S. companies.
• Stimulating discussions among Soviet defense experts and U.S. government officials and academics on appropriate changes to trade policy.