Though fairly stable over the past decade, the Asian-Pacific area is entering a fluid stage, heralding important changes. Whether these changes will be conducive to a more peaceful, stable, and prosperous Asia-Pacific, or ominous of the approach of new chaos and conflict
in the region, is of concern to many. This paper attempts to highlight the opportunities as well as challenges that the region will face in the next ten to fifteen years and explores the possibility of creating a more propitious strategic framework, in which the level of military confrontation between the superpowers would be reduced, economic integration and political cooperation among the Asian-Pacific states enhanced, and potential crises removed.

The strategic situation in the Asian-Pacific area can be viewed from two perspectives--from that of relations among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, and that of the regional balance of the Asian states.  Although these two perspectives are distinct from each other, they are often overlapping and interactive.

Soviet theoreticians reject the concept of a national strategy or a grand strategy above military strategy, reasoning that the national strategy or grand strategy of the United States and other Western countries is simply their anti-Soviet stance. They further maintain that military strategy includes political, economic, scientific and technological, and moral factors. Realization of national military objectives (that is, national power) requires unification of these factors. Thus it is not necessary to have a national strategy or grand strategy beyond military strategy.

The Soviets hold that military doctrine and military policy, rather than national strategy or grand strategy, are above military strategy. In fact, the Western notion of national strategy or grand strategy and the Soviet concept of military doctrine or military policy are similar in content. The distinction derives from the fact that the Soviet Union is a Communist country, where the Party leads everything. The Party's policy is the government's policy, and the decisions and resolutions passed at a Party congress are guiding principles not only for the government, but for all spheres of daily life.

The Korean Peninsula is one of the areas of acute political instability and conflict in the Asian-Pacific region. This is partly but not exclusively because of the unsettled problems between the two parts of Korea. The international environment could be more conducive to an inter-Korean dialogue, to national reconciliation, and to reunification. Without interfering in the internal affairs of the Korean nation, the United States and the Soviet Union, and other major powers of the region, could create more-favorable conditions settling the Korean problem, understanding always that the principal aspects of the problem are internal and must be solved by the two Korean states themselves.

It is the American view that Japan has been totally dependent on the United States for its national security, and that this favorable condition has enabled the Japanese to dedicate themselves fully to economic development with no significant military burden. The competitive edge of many U.S. industries, including those of steel, shipbuilding, electrical appliances, motorcycles, office equipment, automobiles, and computers, has eroded considerably since the 1960s, and Japan has taken all the blame for the downfall. The U.S. semiconductor industry is on the verge of falling behind because of aggressive Japanese sales policies.  Moreover, Japan has for years protected its domestic industries so the U.S. industries have struggled in vain to penetrate the Japanese market.  Some U.S. critics argue that the disputes over a huge trade imbalance between the two countries can best be explained by these unfair Japanese advantages. The invisibility of the role of Japanese contribution toward western security has also intensified irritation in the U.S. Congress. The recent controversy over the FS-X (fighter supporter) project of the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) evolved out of these circumstances. The details of and epilogue to this controversy are discussed in this paper.

The neutron bomb is a controversial weapon. Indeed, the public disclosure by the United States of its development in 1977 has provoked sharp and widespread debate that is likely to continue in the future. Although the United States has manufactured and stockpiled neutron bombs, in order to mollify public opposition in Europe it announced in 1981 that these weapons would not be deployed overseas at that time. France has developed and tested a neutron bomb successfully, but it has not yet decided whether to produce and deploy it. The Soviet Union claims that, although it has tested a neutron bomb, it has never started production of that weapon.

What about China? There is little information about the neutron bomb in open literature, yet Chinese Defense Minister Zhang Aiping said recently at a memorial service for China's leading nuclear scientist, Deng Jiaxian, that Deng made important contributions to the theory of atomic and hydrogen bombs and their successful testing as well as major breakthroughs in the principles of new nuclear weapons and their research and testing. What kind of new nuclear weapons? Do they include the neutron bomb? Minister Zhang Aiping did not mention this weapon. Maybe China is not developing the neutron bomb now, but at least we can say that China, as a nuclear country, has the ability to develop it and is interested in it. Does China need neutron bombs? This report reviews U.S. and French plans for deployment of the neutron bomb and, further, evaluates the practicality of neutron bombs for China from the perspective of China's politics, strategy, geography, and technical and economic capabilities.

On October 30, 1984, a workshop met at the Stanford Center for International Security and Arms Control to examine near-term prospects for and alternative approaches to strategic defense. This report provides the results of that examination and thus represents the consensus of the signatories on a limited set of high-priority objectives and activities in strategic defense.

An earlier study by the Center gave a critical assessment of the President's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). One of its recommendations was an unspecified, treaty-consistent research and development (R&D) program in antiballistic missile (ABM) defense at "a level not very different from recent amounts." Because such an effort is also proposed herein, the present report may in that one sense be seen as a logical complement to the earlier study. However, not all of the members of this workshop endorse all of the conclusions of that study. Also, the present report is limited to the ABM research and development the United States should be pursuing in the near term (5-10 years).

This study by an eminent scientist, a former U.S. arms control official and a specialist on Soviet defense policy at Stanford, is strongly critical of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, popularly known as "Star Wars," whether it is viewed as transcending deterrence through a nearly foolproof defense or, as more recently argued, as enhancing deterrence through a partial defense. The authors review the proposed technologies, as well as the countermeasures by which offensive systems could offset defensive systems, and question the technological feasibility and the cost assumptions. They confirm the findings of other reports. But the principal value of this one is in its discussion of the political effects upon the Soviet Union, U.S. allies, and arms control negotiations. Strategic stability would be impaired, it is argued, if in the absence of a major new arms control agreement both sides built up their offensive forces while simultaneously developing their new defense capabilities. The impact upon European and Asian allies would be decoupling, pushing them into new nuclear programs and to questioning American guarantees. One need not agree with the conclusions of this study to recognize its merits. A most useful contribution to what will surely be a growing debate.

--Foreign Affairs

This article will consider whether the principles of the Geneva Protocol have become so widely accepted that they apply to the United States even though it is not a party. It will analyze the effect of existing reservations to the Protocol, discuss the United States use of tear gases and herbicides in Vietnam in light of its provisions, and recommend that the Protocol be approved by the Senate. This article will first describe the international agreements dealing with poison gas and germ warfare, and the reasons which prevented the United States from becoming a party to them.

When the United States was the only nuclear power in the world, we thought one was too many. Efforts since then to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries have resulted in widespread agreement this year on a nonproliferation treaty. This commentary will describe the background of the treaty, summarize its main provisions, and discuss some questions of interpretation which have arisen.