Nuclear policy
-

Abstract: The development and maintenance of a nuclear weapons arsenal is primarily about managing risk trade-offs. However, there is no integrated method for performing the high-level risk analysis that would allow for the more explicit examination of those trade-offs, or the testing of assumptions and alternatives. Quantitative risk analytic methods can provide powerful insights to policy and decision makers by explicitly examining estimates of consequences, disparate uncertainties, interdependencies, and trade-offs. Even the initial process of framing a formal risk analysis can provide increased clarity and valuable insights. I will present the current status of my efforts to construct a first version of a quantitative risk analytic method and the associated models. I will also discuss some of the challenges that must be addressed to fully implement those models, and my plans for further development. 

About the Speaker: Jason C. Reinhardt is a national security systems analyst, and is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in Risk Analysis from Stanford University’s Department of Management Science and Engineering Engineering Risk Research Group, focusing on nuclear weapons arsenal management. Specifically, he is developing quantitative risk models to examine the trade-offs faced by nuclear armed nations in the process of disarmament. He is also pursuing research aimed at modeling and quantifying the catastrophic risks posed by near earth asteroid encounters. Other research interests include game theoretic applications to risk analysis and management, as well as adversary models. While at CISAC, he hopes to engage subject matter and policy experts to strengthen his modeling and analysis of nuclear weapon arsenal risk.

Prior to beginning his current studies, Jason managed a group of experts at Sandia National Laboratories that focused on technical studies to guide policy and decision makers across government. He joined Sandia National Laboratories in August of 2002, and has worked on a diverse set of projects both as an engineer and as an analyst, including the development of instrumentation for in-situ atmospheric measurement, embedded systems design, borders security analyses, and nuclear counter-terrorism strategy development.

He has worked extensively with the Department of Homeland Security on nuclear matters, and has also worked with the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, and within the national laboratory enterprise on a diverse array of national security projects. He has participated in the planning and hosting of international conferences and engagements, briefed congressional representatives, and served as a subject-matter expert on the topics of border security and nuclear and radiological defense.

Jason holds a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from the Purdue School of Electrical Engineering at Indianapolis, and a M.S. in Electrical Engineering from Stanford University.

 

 

Encina Hall (2nd floor)

0
Affiliate
jasonreinhardtoriginal.jpg

Jason C. Reinhardt is a national security systems analyst, and is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in Risk Analysis from Stanford University’s Department of Management Science and Engineering Engineering Risk Research Group, focusing on nuclear weapons arsenal management. Specifically, he is developing quantitative risk models to examine the trade-offs faced by nuclear armed nations in the process of disarmament. He is also pursuing research aimed at modeling and quantifying the catastrophic risks posed by near earth asteroid encounters. Other research interests include game theoretic applications to risk analysis and management, as well as adversary models. While at CISAC, he hopes to engage subject matter and policy experts to strengthen his modeling and analysis of nuclear weapon arsenal risk.

Prior to beginning his current studies, Jason managed a group of experts at Sandia National Laboratories that focused on technical studies to guide policy and decision makers across government. He joined Sandia National Laboratories in August of 2002, and has worked on a diverse set of projects both as an engineer and as an analyst, including the development of instrumentation for in-situ atmospheric measurement, embedded systems design, borders security analyses, and nuclear counter-terrorism strategy development.

He has worked extensively with the Department of Homeland Security on nuclear matters, and has also worked with the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, and within the national laboratory enterprise on a diverse array of national security projects. He has participated in the planning and hosting of international conferences and engagements, briefed congressional representatives, and served as a subject-matter expert on the topics of border security and nuclear and radiological defense.

Jason holds a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from the Purdue School of Electrical Engineering at Indianapolis, and a M.S. in Electrical Engineering from Stanford University.

Jason Reinhardt MacArthur Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow Speaker CISAC
Seminars
Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

 

Stanford political science professor Scott Sagan, a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, has been honored with a prestigious award from the National Academy of Sciences for his pioneering work addressing the risks of nuclear weapons and the causes of nuclear proliferation.

“Sagan's work has become an integral part of the nuclear debate in the United States and overseas,” the NAS said in a statement. “He has shown, for example, that a government's decision to pursue nuclear weapons can be prompted not only by national security concerns but also because of domestic political interests, parochial bureaucratic infighting, or concerns about international prestige.”

The William and Katherine Estes Award recognizes research in any field of cognitive or behavioral science that advances the understanding of issues relating to the risk of nuclear war. Sagan and other NAS award winners will be honored in a ceremony on April 26 during the academy’s 152nd annual meeting.

The academy noted that Sagan has developed theories about why different types of political regimes behave differently once they acquire “the bomb.”

“Sagan and his colleagues have also investigated U.S. public attitudes about nuclear weapons and found that few Americans actually believe that there is a taboo against their use in conflicts,” the NAS said. “The possession of nuclear weapons also raises the risk of nuclear weapons accidents, and Sagan has shown that even though there has never been an accidental nuclear war, there have been many more close-calls and near-accidents than was previously known.”

Sagan and co-authors Daryl G. Press and Benjamin A. Valentino, examined the taboos, traditions and non-use of nuclear weapons in this article in the American Political Science Review. He continues to work on an original survey experiment that examines the public attitudes about the “unthinkable” use of the nuclear bomb.

Siegfried Hecker – one of the world’s leading experts on plutonium science and a senior fellow at FSI – said that he has learned greatly from Sagan over the years as colleagues and former co-directors of CISAC. The two represent the center’s foundational spirit of combing the social and hard sciences to build a safer world.  

“The beauty of Scott’s work is that he has combined rigorous political science thinking with a practical knowledge of the limits of humans and organizations to deal with the complexities and dangers of nuclear weapons,” Hecker said. “Scott’s work has convinced me that there is real science in the political science of nuclear weapons. It is appropriate that this honor comes from the National Academy of Sciences.”

Sagan said he is honored to follow in the footsteps of previous recipients of the William and Katherine Estes Award, calling them “some of my intellectual heroes.”

Among those who have won the award are Thomas C. Schelling, Alexander L. George, Robert Jervis, Robert Powell and Graham Allison.

Allison, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, called Sagan's honor a "well-deserved recognition of a scholar who has illuminated the intersection of organizational behavior and nuclear danger."

The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit institution that was established under a congressional charter signed by President Abraham Lincoln in 1863. It recognizes achievement in science and provides science, engineering, and health policy advice to the federal government and other organizations.

Hero Image
perry sagan
Former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, left, and Political Science Professor Science Professor Scott Sagan talk during a break in Perry's Stanford class, "Living at the Nuclear Brink." | ©Light at 11B
All News button
1
-

Due to the combination of a great response and our space constraints, this event is now full. We regret that we cannot accept any more RSVPs.

Lunch and seating are reserved for our registered guests.

 

Abstract: On April 5, 2009, President Obama stated his intent to seek "...the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons". He is not the first US President to state such a desire (President Reagan, among others), and he acknowledged that the goal "will not be reached quickly--perhaps not in my lifetime". President Obama proposed reducing the number and role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy as key steps toward achieving this goal.

While such a world is appealing, nuclear weapons remain woven into the fabric of US national security strategy as the ultimate guarantor of US and Allied security. Originally constructed by the US to end a war, the unique physical and psychological power of nuclear weapons rapidly made them a political tool to prevent or constrain conflict in the ensuing decades of the Cold War. United States foreign policy was underpinned by deterrence and assurance concepts that were both based on nuclear weapons and that defined their primary roles.

To be sure, the strategic context for nuclear weapons has changed since the end of the Cold War and the threat of sudden massive nuclear attack has receded. Significant reductions have been made to the deployed US nuclear force, the weapon stockpile, and the very specialized industrial base that supports it. Modifications have been made to employment concepts. New concepts of tailored deterrence have emerged that include highly capable US conventional forces, limited missile defenses, and space and cyberspace capabilities. 

But nuclear weapons continue to influence the security relationships and behaviors between major nations, and the primary deterrence and assurance role of US nuclear weapons remains at the foundation of US national security. Recent global events remind us that other nations continue to value the influence their nuclear weapons provide and, absent a viable replacement, US nuclear weapons will be needed for a very long time to come. Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent will be a challenge that has to be met.   

 

About the Speaker: General C. Robert "Bob" Kehler is the 2014-2015 Lee Lecturer at CISAC.

Prior to his retirement in December 2013, he was the Commander of United States Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.  In that role he was directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense and President for the plans and operations of all U. S. forces conducting global strategic deterrence, nuclear alert, global strike, space, cyberspace and associated operations.  While in command, he crafted and implemented critical elements of policies and plans to deter strategic attacks against the U.S. and its key allies, and led a joint team of over 60,000 military and civilians to 100% mission success in multiple, high-stakes global operations.  He also integrated Department of Defense (DOD) activities for global missile defense, combating weapons of mass destruction, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.  His forces directly supported combat operations in Southwest Asia and North Africa.

General Kehler’s military career spanned almost 39 years of service that included important operational and staff assignments.  He was one of a very few officers to command at the squadron, group, wing, major command, and combatant command levels, and he had a broad range of operational experience in Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), space launch, space control, space surveillance and missile warning units.  Before taking command of Strategic Command, General Kehler commanded Air Force Space Command where he organized, trained, and equipped over 46,000 professionals conducting mission-ready nuclear missile, space, and cyberspace operations.  In that role, he designed the Air Force’s inaugural blueprint, operating concept, organizational structure, and personnel program to meet rapidly growing cyberspace challenges. 

His staff assignments included tours with the Air Staff, Strategic Air Command, Air Force Space Command, and the Joint Staff.  He was also assigned to the Secretary of the Air Force’s Office of Legislative Liaison where he was the point man on Capitol Hill for matters regarding the President’s ICBM Modernization Program.  As Director of the National Security Space Office, General Kehler integrated the activities of a number of DOD and Intelligence Community organizations on behalf of the Undersecretary of the Air Force and Director, National Reconnaissance Office. 

He entered the Air Force in 1975 as a Distinguished Graduate of the Pennsylvania State University R.O.T.C. program, has master’s degrees from the University of Oklahoma in Public Administration and the Naval War College in National Security and Strategic Studies, and completed executive level programs at Carnegie-Mellon University, Syracuse University, and Harvard University.

General Kehler’s military awards include the Defense Distinguished and Superior Service Medals, the Distinguished Service Medal (2 awards), Legion of Merit (3 awards), and the French Legion of Honor (Officer).  He wears Command Space and ICBM Operations Badges.  His other honors include the Thomas D. White Space Award (recognizing outstanding contributions to space) and the H. H. Arnold Award (for the most significant contribution by a military member for national defense), both presented by the Air Force Association. 

General Kehler serves as a Trustee of the Mitre Corporation, is on the Board of Directors of the Inmarsat Corporation, and is Chairman of the Board of BEI Precision Systems and Space Company.  He is a Distinguished Alumnus of the Pennsylvania State University, where he also serves as a member of the Advisory Board for Outreach and Online Education.  A Senior Fellow of the National Defense University and an Associate Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, he has testified before numerous Congressional Committees and has spoken widely on matters of national security.  His articles have appeared in The Naval War College Review and Joint Forces Quarterly.  Time permitting; he enjoys playing the guitar, golf, and target shooting.

Encina Hall (2nd floor)

0
Affiliate
robert_kehler.png

*Please contact Tracy Hines (tmhines23@stanford.edu) for any inquires regarding General Kehler.

Prior to his retirement on January 1, 2014, General Kehler was the Commander of United States Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.  In that role he was directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense and President for the plans and operations of all U. S. forces conducting global strategic deterrence, nuclear alert, global strike, space, cyberspace and associated operations.  While in command, he crafted and implemented critical elements of policies and plans to deter strategic attacks against the U.S. and its key allies and led a joint team of military members and civilians to 100% mission success in multiple, high-stakes global operations.  He also integrated Department of Defense (DOD) activities for global missile defense, combating weapons of mass destruction, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.  His forces directly supported combat operations in Southwest Asia and North Africa.

General Kehler’s military career spanned almost thirty-nine years of service that included progressively important operational and staff assignments.  He commanded units at the squadron, group, wing, major command, and combatant command levels, and had a broad range of operational experience in Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, space launch, space control, space surveillance and missile warning.  Before taking command of Strategic Command, General Kehler commanded Air Force Space Command (predecessor to U.S. Space Force) where he organized, trained, and equipped airmen conducting mission-ready nuclear missile, space, and cyberspace operations.  His command designed the Air Force’s inaugural blueprint, operating concept, organizational structure, and personnel program to meet emerging cyberspace challenges. 

His staff assignments included tours with the Air Staff, Strategic Air Command, Air Force Space Command, and the Joint Staff.  He was also assigned to the Secretary of the Air Force’s Office of Legislative Liaison where he was the point man on Capitol Hill for matters regarding the President’s ICBM Modernization Program.  As Director of the National Security Space Office, General Kehler integrated the activities of a number of DOD and Intelligence Community organizations on behalf of the Undersecretary of the Air Force and Director, National Reconnaissance Office. 

General Kehler entered the Air Force in 1975 as a Distinguished Graduate of the Pennsylvania State University R.O.T.C. program, has master’s degrees from the University of Oklahoma in Public Administration and the Naval War College in National Security and Strategic Studies, and completed executive level programs at Carnegie-Mellon University, Syracuse University, and Harvard University.

Since his retirement, General Kehler has continued to apply his expertise as a consultant, corporate director and trustee, and senior advisor and fellow to a number of prominent public, private, and educational institutions. He writes and speaks on matters of national security. Bob and his late wife have two adult sons and two grandsons. Time permitting, he enjoys playing the guitar and golf.

General C. Robert Kehler USAF (ret.), Lee Lecturer Speaker
Seminars
Paragraphs

CISAC's Siegfried Hecker and Abbas Milani note in this article for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that for merely working in their field of expertise, Iranian nuclear scientists face perils and pressures that are nothing less than Shakespearean. The question for them is, in a very real sense, "To be or not to be." In the course of the last four decades, these scientists have faced intimidation and severe punishment, including prison terms, at the hands of their own government. In recent years, at least five Iranian nuclear scientists have been the target of assassination attempts often attributed to Israeli intelligence. Regardless of their source, all such threats against scientists are morally indefensible. They offend the scientific spirit, working against the free exchange of ideas that is necessary for humanity to advance. The authors assert, these threats against scientists in Iran undermine global peace, targeting experts whose international collaboration is required to deal effectively with the nuclear risks facing the world today. Simply put, killing nuclear scientists makes reducing the threat of nuclear war harder, not easier.

 

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Commentary
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Authors
Siegfried S. Hecker
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

 

The threats, turmoil, and media circus surrounding the Hollywood satire "The Interview," in which bungling American journalists assassinate North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, have put the country in the international spotlight again. Often forgotten amid all this comedy, though, is the very unfunny fact that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has been relentlessly expanding for a decade, and poses a real and deadly threat to the rest of Northeast Asia.

Senior Fellow Siegfried Hecker writes in this Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists piece that North Korea today may possess a nuclear arsenal of roughly 12 nuclear weapons, half likely fueled by plutonium and half by highly enriched uranium.

And in this related Q&A, David Straub, a Korea expert at FSI's Walter Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, answers questions about the Sony hacking after North Korea condemned "The Interivew."
Hero Image
interview
All News button
1
Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

 

China is building more nuclear power plants than any other country today, with 21 plants up and running, 28 under construction and another 58 planned for development. The world’s most populous country is anxious to reduce its reliance on air-polluting fossil fuels and focus on alterative sources for a growing middle-class that is consuming more energy.

This rapid expansion in the number of nuclear power plants and associated nuclear fuel-cycle operations, such as fuel fabrication, possible fuel recycling and waste disposal, pose enormous nuclear safety and security challenges. Safety concerns were exacerbated by the 2011, tsunami-induced Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in Japan.

Security concerns also stem from the fact that nuclear materials must be safeguarded to stay out of the hands of non-state actors and the facilities protected from potential terrorist attacks. These issues are of great concern to Chinese and Americans, so it stands to reason that China and the United States should want to join forces.

Four CISAC scholars – including veterans of Track II diplomacy, Siegfried Hecker and Chaim Braun – are working behind the scenes trying to get both sides to do just that.

The four traveled in October to China for meetings with Chinese scientists and policy analysts to discuss new approaches to nuclear security at a weeklong conference in Hangzhou and a one-day workshop in Beijing. The conference hosted top international nuclear energy and security experts. It was one in a continuing series featuring CISAC scholars and colleagues from several Chinese nuclear institutes and think tanks.

“We’re certainly back on a very positive slope with the Chinese,” said Hecker, a senior fellow at CISAC who first began visiting his counterparts in China in 1994 as head of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. “They are very keen to foster continued cooperation on all things nuclear. It’s important in terms of national security – and it’s of great benefit to both sides.”

The Chinese have been a nuclear weapon state for decades, but are relative latecomers to nuclear electricity. While it only produces some 3 percent of the world’s nuclear energy today, China is on its way to become a world leader in nuclear power production and technology exports by 2020.

“The Chinese are taking a really pragmatic view of nuclear power,” said Jason Reinhardt, a MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow at CISAC and national security systems analyst at Sandia National Laboratories. He traveled with Hecker and Braun to attend the conference, along with Larry Brandt, a visiting scholar at the center.

“All of us are better off if countries like China and Russia and the U.S. work together on nuclear proliferation and terrorism issues,” Reinhardt said. “So part of that is just going over there and seeing what they want to do and how they want to collaborate.”

 

Reinhardt is working on his Ph.D. at Stanford in decision and risk analysis with advisor Elisabeth Paté-Cornell, a professor of engineering and CISAC affiliated faculty member. He believes systems analysis can provide insights to improve capabilities to counter nuclear terrorism, facilitate nuclear agreements and reduce the risks of nuclear accidents.

“I think that the way policies are formed and the way technical information is used to inform policies is very different in China, as a matter of history and culture,” Reinhardt said. “So I’m trying to create a compelling story as to why systems analysis is a great way to collaborate between countries.”

Reinhardt said China and the United States have different priorities and approaches to nuclear security, with Beijing placing a high priority on preventing radiological and power plant attacks. The United States has done much since 9/11 to protect its nuclear power plants. Washington’s concerns are focused more on terrorist attacks with nuclear bombs and the potential of radiological, dirty bomb attacks. 

 

What is systems and risk analysis with regard to nuclear security?

Systems analysis is a structured scientific approach to tough problems, used to inform decision-making, Reinhardt said. One of the best sets of tools available – particularly when there is a lot of uncertainty – is decision and risk analysis.

And nuclear security is rife with uncertainty. What might an attack look like? Who are the attackers? What would the consequences be? How might the attackers change their strategy given our investments in countermeasures?

The questions are many and the connections complex. Risk analysis can borrow from probability theory, game theory and economics to bring some order to this chaos and provide insights that can inform policymakers.

“Systems analysis is using science and engineering techniques to answer policy questions for government,” said Reinhardt, whose work at Sandia includes projects with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security focusing on countering nuclear terrorism, promoting international engagement, and strengthening border security.

“We talk about concepts and taxonomies and ways to organize thinking, then mathematical models to help explore trade-offs – and then there are physical models and we go out in the field and experiment to try and get smarter,” Reinhardt said. “All of these help us understand the implications of proposed policies.”

 

Image
china dinner

 

Reinhardt gave a presentation in China in which he proposed a joint study to develop a common framework. Moving forward, the study would primarily be academically focused in an effort to inform policymakers – not to set policy.

“I said that building a common framework for analysis and exercising those together would be a really powerful tool for creating collaboration at a very high level,” he said. “The United States and China have cooperated in areas of nuclear security in the past. These new efforts will build on that success and take them to a new cooperative level.”

He suggested they begin to work together to create a model that would:

 

  1. Develop a list of potential attack scenarios, compile a list of potential perpetrators, and estimate probabilities of attack;
  2. Compare the efficacies of different types counterterrorism measures to ward off radiological terrorism attacks;
  3. Determine which countermeasures can and should be the focus of collaborative technical research;
  4. And determine the next steps to develop Chinese and U.S. collaborations on countermeasures.    

 

The CISAC team will follow up with their Chinese colleagues during a visit in February and work to bring a young Chinese researcher to the center during the first half of the academic year.

“They’re trying to understand what they can implement to reduce internal and regional nuclear risks,” he said. “This requires that you first consider how to understand, assess, and measure these risks. Doing that together, I think we can come up with some answers that are valuable to both countries.”

 

A Growing Focus on Nuclear Power and Climate Change

The meetings in China came just as Washington and Beijing announced a landmark pact to significantly cut greenhouse gas emissions by the world’s two largest consumers of energy. China is increasingly turning to nuclear power to address the adverse consequences of fossil fuels. As China expands its research and dependence on nuclear power – which in turn will cut down on greenhouse gas emissions – CISAC intends to help the Asian powerhouse protect its nuclear energy resources from potential accidents and deliberate attacks.

 

Image
chaim china

 

Braun, a consulting professor at CISAC and an expert on nuclear proliferation smuggling rings and power plants around the world, also attended the conference and was invited along with Hecker to visit the Qinshan Nuclear Station about 50 miles southwest of Shanghai.

“For me, the visit to Qinshan’s Phase 3 plant was especially exciting, as I worked on the early phases of the construction of Qinshan Phase 3 while at Bechtel,” said Braun, who earlier in his career belonged to the Bechtel Power Corporation’s Nuclear Management Group and led studies on plant performance and maintenance.

Braun said Qinshan Phase 3 is now used as an experimental station to explore reprocessed uranium recycling and experiment with an alternate nuclear fuel, namely thorium.

According to the Pew Charitable Trusts, China leads the global clean-energy race, and last year attracted $54.2 billion in investment for alternative energies. That includes exporting safe, reliable nuclear technology to other countries that want to do the same.

“Russia and China are the two most important technological relationships we should be building right now,” Reinhardt said. "Any prospects for the future of arms control and reductions are all predicated on continued relationships with Russia and China.”

 

Hero Image
china power plant
A view shows the 4th unit of Tianwan Nuclear Power Plant under construction after its ground-breaking ceremony in Lianyungang, Jiangsu province Sept. 27, 2013. | Reuters
All News button
1
Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

 

Suraya Omar first became intrigued by nuclear technology as a Stanford undergrad and CISAC honors student. Today she’s helping build nuclear engines for the U.S. Navy.

Omar’s fascination began in the popular MS&E course, Technology and National Security, taught by CISAC’s Siegfried Hecker and William J. Perry, the former head of the Los Alamos National Lab and U.S. secretary of state, respectively.

“I loved the class,” said Omar, who graduated with a BS in materials science and engineering in 2012 and a MS&E master’s degree in 2013. “The nuclear-related topics were interesting because it's a powerful technology and interesting from an engineering standpoint – but crazy complex from a safety and security perspective.”

Omar serves in the U.S. Navy as an engineer in the Naval Reactors Headquarters (NR) in Washington, D.C. The NR provides program management and technical expertise to the Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program, which builds nuclear propulsion plants for aircraft carriers and submarines. The NR oversees everything from their design to installment and operation.

Building nuclear engines, more than most things, requires stringent attention to minute details. That’s where Omar comes in.

“When the engineer responsible for an item receives a request for approval, they send that to all the sections that have a stake in that decision,” Omar said. “So my workday involves reading a lot of incoming proposals and background material, then asking questions, such as: `Is the recommended material appropriate for the application? Are there corrosion or structural concerns?’ and then discussing with other engineers and making recommendations.”

Omar says this also entails a lot of contact with the national nuclear laboratories to discuss upcoming and ongoing test programs “or get a more detailed technical perspective.”

The Naval Reactors Headquarters is one of the more prestigious components of the U.S. Navy, due to its polished reputation for implementing efficient management practices and maintaining a rigorous technical culture. Congress and presidential administrations often tap NR staffers for consultation and higher office; their skills and training also make NR engineers highly sought after by private enterprise.

Omar credits CISAC with inspiring her to follow a career in nuclear engineering. The prestigious honors program has taken Stanford seniors from more than 21 different majors and programs since its inception in 2000. More than 150 students have graduated from the yearlong program, which launches in Washington, D.C. with a two-week policy brainstorming college, and culminates with a thesis that deals with a major international security issue.

 

suraya graduation Suraya Omar during the CISAC Honors Graduation ceremony in June 2012.

 

Omar, who was advised by Hecker, wrote her thesis about “Critical Concerns: Evaluating the safety of North Korea’s new light water reactor.”

“Besides solidifying my interest in nuclear applications, participating in the CISAC thesis program helped me quickly recognize areas I don’t completely understand when doing research, and taught me how to be scrupulous in pursuing those questions thoroughly,” she said.

While she was completing her MS degree at Stanford, she joined the Nuclear Propulsion Officer Candidate Program and interviewed with NR in Washington, D.C. just after graduation. Today she holds the rank of Ensign (O-1), a junior commissioned officer in the United States Navy.

Omar is committed to Naval Reactors Headquarters until 2019 and enjoys being part of the community.

“Since so many big and small decisions come through NR, we deal with a lot of minutiae,” she said. “But it’s always encouraging to remember that our decisions have a direct impact on the fleet, and that it’s the diligent attention to detail that has ensured safe naval nuclear operations since the beginning of the program,” she said.

Nonetheless, she has her eye to the future.

“I may stay on after 2019, but I'm also interested in pursuing something in strategic diplomacy or nuclear security and safety on a more global level,” she said.

 

Joshua Alvarez was a CISAC Honors Student for the 2011-2012 academic year.

Hero Image
suraya nr portrait
CISAC Honors Alumna 2012 Suraya Omar in front of the U.S. Naval Reactors Headquarters in Washington, D.C., where she is a nuclear engineer. | Joshua Alvarez
All News button
1
Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

 

American deterrence, though traditionally centered on the nuclear triad, is becoming ever more integrated and dependent on other technologies in space and the cyber world, Admiral Cecil D. Haney, commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, told a Stanford audience.

Haney, appointed to lead USSTRATCOM by President Barack Obama last year, made a daylong visit to Stanford on Tuesday, holding seminars and private meetings with faculty, scholars and students at the Hoover Institution and the Center for International Security and Cooperation. His seminar at CISAC focused on strategic deterrence in the 21st century.

Admiral Haney has made it USSTRATCOM’s goal, in accordance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 2010 START Treaty, to reduce America’s nuclear weapons stockpile. But he sees a world where maintaining a deterrent is still necessary.

“As we work to continue our nation’s goal of reducing the role of our nation’s nuclear weapons, we find other nations not only modernizing their strategic capabilities but also promoting them,” he said. Russia, Iran, and China attracted particular concern. Haney declined to estimate how much the U.S. can reduce its stockpile without hurting its deterrent posture.

While the nuclear triad is still the foundation of American deterrence, space and cyberspace technology are now fully integrated with nuclear platforms, making cyber and space security indispensable.

“Deterrence is more than just the triad,” said Haney. “We are highly dependent on space capabilities, more so than ever before. Space is fully integrated in our joint military operations as well as in our commercial and civil infrastructure. But space today is contested, congested, and competitive.” 

Haney said there are more than 20,000 softball-sized objects orbiting Earth.

 

Image
dsc 9384

 

“Only about 1,000 of those objects are satellites, the rest is debris, increasing threats to our operational satellites as they travel at speeds exceeding 17,000 mph,” he said. The Joint Space Operation Center receives an average of 30 collision alerts per day.

Damage to some of our satellites could have devastating impacts on our economy, communications and infrastructure. Rival nations also pose space security challenges.

According to the U.S. government, China recently tested an anti-satellite missile. This follows a 2007 test when China successfully destroyed one of its satellites, and consequently created a cloud of debris that still poses a threat to international satellites.

“Keeping assured access to the space domain is a full-time job,” Haney said.

Likewise cybersecurity. America’s increasing reliance on cyberspace for both military and civilian purposes has created security vulnerabilities that can be exploited by both state and non-state actors. Haney cited the recent attacks on J.P. Morgan and Sony, Russia and China’s attacks on regional rivals, and non-state terror groups.

“We have benefited enormously from advanced computer capabilities, but it has opened up threat access to our critical infrastructure,“ Haney said. “As we confront terrorist groups we all know that they are not only using cyber for recruiting and messaging – but also to seek weapons of mass destruction.”

In a Q&A session after his talk during the CISAC seminar, a variety of concerns were raised about the USSTRACOM mission, including triad modernization, the ongoing personnel issues that have been in the news, and missile defense.

FSI Senior Fellow Scott Sagan asked about the recent spate of personnel problems at U.S. nuclear silos. Haney said a full review of personnel and procedures, ordered by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, was completed and changes have been enacted.

“We are trying to positively reinforce our workforce and I am getting a lot of positive feedback from operators,” Haney said. “We are having monthly conversations that include operational officers. When I visit sites I don’t just meet with commanders, I have meals with smaller groups of lower-ranking personnel.”

Haney previously served as commander of the Pacific Fleet. A graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, he has personal experience with America’s nuclear deterrent as he served in submarines armed with nuclear ballistic missiles, which, in addition to land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and strategic bombers, make up part of the United States’ nuclear triad.

USSTRATCOM is one of nine unified commands that have control of forces from all four branches of the U.S. military. The command’s well-known responsibility is command and control of America’s nuclear arsenal, a role it inherited from the Cold War-era Strategic Air Command. Since its establishment in 1992, USSTRATCOM has been assigned additional responsibilities, most notably cyberspace and outer space.

 

You can listen to the audio of his presentation here.

 

Joshua Alvarez was a CISAC Honors Student during the 2011-2012 academic year.

 

Hero Image
dsc 9057
Rod Searcey
All News button
1
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

 

CISAC's Siegfried Hecker is working on a book about his 20-year collaboration with Russian nuclear scientists.

In this New York Times "Room for Debate" commentary, he argues that abandoning cooperation between Moscow and Washington will diminish security and exacerbate other common concerns, such as nuclear terrorism and proliferation. And in this NPR All Things Considered interview, the former head of the Los Alamos National Laboratory says there has been extraordinary cooperation between American and Russian scientists in securing loose nuclear materials and upgrading former Soviet nuclear test sites. But the United States is making it harder for Russian scientists to get visas to come here - and Moscow likewise is not cooperating.
 
"Hopefully, the book will demonstrate to both governments it was absolutely essential for us to work together over these past 20 years - and that we're not done," Hecker tells NPR's Michele Keleman. Yet, Hecker concedes, this cooperation has all but ended in the wake of the disputes over Ukraine and Crimea.
 
 
And you can read about Hecker's two-decade collaboration with his Russian counterparts in this story.

 

Hero Image
obama putin
President Barack Obama, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend a plenary session during the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Beijing, Nov. 11, 2014. | Reuters
All News button
1
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

Siegfried Hecker, a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute and Research Professor of Management Science and Engineering, has been awarded the National Academy of Engineering's Arthur M. Bueche Award "for contributions to nuclear science and engineering and for service to the nation through nuclear diplomacy."

The award recognizes an engineer who has shown dedication in science and technology, as well as active involvement in determining U.S. science and technology policy. Bueche was a world-renowned chemist who helped pioneer engineered plastics at General Electric Research and led one of the most innovative industrial research centers in the world.

"He was also an astute student of science and technology policy and one of our country's most effective advisors," Hecker said of Bueche upon accepting the award on Sept. 28 during the NAE's annual meeting in Washington, D.C. Hecker,  CISAC co-director from 2007-2012, is an internationally recognized expert in plutonium science, global threat reduction and nuclear security.

You can read the NAE's full announcement here.

Hecker talked about the significance of working with Russian scientists at the end of the Cold War and what he has learned during his 49 trips to the former Soviet states.

"The bottom line is that 22 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, nothing really terrible has happened in the Russian nuclear complex - contrary to the expectations of most people in the West," said Hecker, who is currently working on a book about his diplomacy with Russia. "Critical to the success of our cooperation was what Bueche called the `international bonding' that technology provides."

But he noted that the relationship between Moscow and Washington are worse than at any time since the Gorbachev era. While he and his Russian colleagues have made great progress together over the last two decades, that their work is far from done.

"Indeed, the need for scientists and engineers to cooperate internationally is more important than ever. It is especially important in all things nuclear," he told the audience. "Since nuclear energy can electrify the world or destroy the world, the consequences of doing things right or doing them wrong are enormous. What we have learned over the years is that nuclear cooperation is essential - it promotes the benefits of nuclear energy - be it electricity, nuclear medicine or research. Nuclear isolation breeds suspicion and conflict."

Hecker noted he has also visited nuclear facilities and developed relationships with key scientists and engineers in the UK, France, China, India, North and South Korea, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and has held substantive discussions with nuclear specialists from Pakistan and Iran.

"Dialogue and cooperation are essential," he said. "The same holds true for other major societal issues such as energy, climate change, water and natural resources, infectious diseases, the future of the Internet. These challenges are truly international, and solutions are often prevented by political and ideological differences. That is why institutions like the NAE and the National Academies are crucial."

 

Hero Image
sig portrait
All News button
1
Subscribe to Nuclear policy