Stanford University

Nuclear policy

Nuclear Dynamics in South Asia

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About the Speaker: Lieutenant General (retired) Khalid Kidwai is advisor to Pakistan’s National Command Authority and pioneer Director General of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, which he headed for an unprecedented 15 years. He is one of the most decorated generals in Pakistan and was awarded the highest civil award Nishan-i-Imtiaz, as well as Hilal-i-Imtiaz and Hilal-i-Imtiaz (Military). Winner of the Sword of Honor at Pakistan’s Military Academy, he later saw frontline combat action in erstwhile East Pakistan and was a prisoner of war in Pakistan’s 1971 war with India. General Kidwai conceived, articulated, and executed Pakistan’s nuclear policy and deterrence doctrines into a tangible and robust nuclear force structure. General Kidwai is also the architect of Pakistan’s civilian Nuclear Energy Program and National Space Program.

Encina Hall (2nd floor)

Khalid Kidwai advisor to Pakistan’s National Command Authority Speaker
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Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence

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It is striking that, prior to this paper, no risk analyses existed of nuclear deterrence – a strategy whose failure would destroy much of our nation. This paper explains how risk analysis can be applied both to estimate the risk of deterrence failing and to reduce that risk. A preliminary analysis indicates that the current level of risk is unacceptable.

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The Bent of Tau Beta Pi
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Martin Hellman
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How Risky Is Nuclear Optimism?

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This article argues that Congress should authorize and fund a National Academies risk analysis of nuclear deterrence. It also explains how risk analysis is able to tease much more information out of the available data – which clearly does not yet involve a failure of nuclear deterrence – than might first appear possible.

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Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
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Martin Hellman
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The UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent and the Chevaline Program: An Overview

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Abstract: Chevaline was the codename given to a highly-secret program begun in 1970 to improve the performance of the UK's force of Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles in order to give them the capability to overcome Soviet ABM defenses deployed around Moscow. After much technical difficulty, delays in project timescale and cost escalation the new system was finally introduced in 1982, but it had already attracted major criticism for the expenditure involved, claims of project mismanagement, the rationale that underpinned its development, and its concealment from proper parliamentary scrutiny. This lecture will explore the background to the program, why it ran into so many problems, and how it became one of the most controversial episodes in post-war British defense policy. An understanding of the problems confronted by the attempt to improve Polaris illuminates a number of key themes and issues that are of relevance to policymakers concerned with strategic weapons programs and project management.

About the Speaker: Matthew Jones’ current research focuses on British nuclear history during the Cold War. He has also written on many different aspects of US and British foreign and defense policy in the 20th century, and has a long-standing interest in empire and decolonization in South East Asia. Jones’ first book, Britain, the United States and the Mediterranean War, 1942-44 (Macmillan, 1996), examined strains in the Anglo-American relationship by strategic issues and command problems in the Mediterranean theater. His book, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961-1965: Britain, the United States, Indonesia, and the Creation of Malaysia (Cambridge University Press, 2002), looks at the federation of Malaysia during British decolonization in the early 1960s. After Hiroshima: The United States, Race, and Nuclear Weapons in Asia, 1945-1965 (Cambridge University Press, 2010) addresses US nuclear policies in Asia in the period of the Korean War, confrontation with China, and early engagement in Vietnam. His current project on UK nuclear policy encompasses the development of nuclear strategy within NATO, the Anglo-American nuclear relationship, and European responses to strategic arms control. In 2008, Jones was appointed by the Prime Minister to become the Cabinet Office official historian of the UK strategic nuclear deterrent and the Chevaline program, a commission that will lead to the publication of a two-volume official history exploring British nuclear policy between 1945 and 1982. Jones’s journal articles have appeared in Diplomatic History, Historical Journal, Journal of Cold War Studies, and English Historical Review. He gained his DPhil in Modern History at St. Antony’s College, Oxford, in 1992.

Encina Hall (2nd floor)

Matthew Jones Professor of International History Speaker London School of Economics and Political Science
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Persistent supporter: China and Pakistan's nuclear weapons program

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Abstract: Why do states provide nuclear weapons support to other states? This paper analyzes this question by examining China’s nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. Based on an original framework for explaining nuclear weapons support, I argue that two main factors drove China’s decision. First, China did not have to worry about cascade effects because India had already crossed the nuclear threshold. Second, Pakistan had major strategic value to China, and enjoyed a reputation for being a reliable partner. By arming Pakistan, China could maintain a favorable power balance in the region and prevent India from dominating South Asia. 

The paper also criticizes existing supply-side theories of nuclear proliferation. These theories also describe the strategic incentives for helping other states to develop nuclear weapon, but they have largely overlooked the disincentives. I also challenge some of the case-specific literature. This literature claims that China halted its support of Pakistan from the mid-1990s because it finally recognized the dangers of nuclear proliferation. In contrast, I argue that China has continued, albeit more subtly, to support Islamabad’s weapons program.

About the Speaker: Henrik Hiim is a Stanton Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow at MIT. His main research interests are Chinese foreign policy, East Asian security, and nonproliferation and arms control. His dissertation examines the evolution of China’s approach to nuclear nonproliferation, with a special emphasis on policies towards North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan. Henrik holds an M.A. in Political Science from the University of Oslo. He has also studied at Renmin University and Huazhong Normal University in China. During spring 2013, he was a visiting scholar at the School of International Studies at Beijing University. Henrik has worked as a journalist for several Norwegian newspapers.

Encina Hall (2nd floor)

Henrik Hiim Stanton Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow Speaker Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation

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Abstract: How do states pursue nuclear weapons? This paper develops a typology of strategies of nuclear proliferation, a theory for why states select one strategy over others, and conducts a preliminary test of the theory against the record of nuclear proliferators. Knowing how states pursue nuclear weapons provides important areas of leverage for nonproliferation policies. 

About the Speaker: Vipin Narang is an Associate Professor of Political Science at MIT and member of MIT’s Security Studies Program. He received his Ph.D. from the Department of Government, Harvard University in May 2010, where he was awarded the Edward M. Chase Prize for the best dissertation in international relations. He holds a B.S. and M.S. in chemical engineering with distinction from Stanford University and an M. Phil with Distinction in international relations from Balliol College, Oxford University, where he studied on a Marshall Scholarship. He has been a fellow at Harvard University’s Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, a predoctoral fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and a junior faculty fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. His research interests include nuclear proliferation and strategy, South Asian security, and general security studies. His work has been published in several journals including International Security, Journal of Conflict Resolution, and International Organization. His book "Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era" was published by Princeton University Press in 2014.

Encina Hall (2nd floor)

Vipin Narang Associate Professor of Political Science at MIT Speaker Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Nuclear Dominoes, U.S. Nonproliferation Policy, and the NPT

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Abstract: What explains why the United States abandoned nuclear sharing schemes like the Multilateral Force in the 1960s, ultimately adopting a universalistic nonproliferation policy and the NPT? This paper argues that increased fears of nuclear domino effects caused by the 1964 Chinese nuclear tests were a crucial motivating factor, convincing policymakers that proliferation could not be contained to allied states and therefore had to be opposed across the board. As evidence for this claim, I draw heavily on archival evidence from the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. The paper demonstrates that when nuclear domino effects were perceived to be relatively weak in the 1950s and early 1960s, the United States favored expanding nuclear sharing arrangements; when fears of nuclear domino effects increased post-1964, this caused policymakers to turn away from these policies and conclude the NPT.

About the Speaker: Nicholas Miller is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University. His research focuses primarily on the causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation. He is currently working on a book manuscript that combines archival sources and quantitative analysis to examine the historical development and efficacy of U.S. nonproliferation policy. His work has been published in the American Political Science Review, International Organization, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, and Security Studies. He received his PhD in Political Science from MIT in 2014.

 


Nuclear Dominoes, US Nonproliferation Policy, and the NPT
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Nuclear Dominoes, US Nonproliferation Policy, and the NPT
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Encina Hall (2nd floor)

Nicholas Miller Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Watson Institute for International Studies Speaker Brown University
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Analytic Methods for Minimum Risk Nuclear Capabilities

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Abstract: The development and maintenance of a nuclear weapons arsenal is primarily about managing risk trade-offs. However, there is no integrated method for performing the high-level risk analysis that would allow for the more explicit examination of those trade-offs, or the testing of assumptions and alternatives. Quantitative risk analytic methods can provide powerful insights to policy and decision makers by explicitly examining estimates of consequences, disparate uncertainties, interdependencies, and trade-offs. Even the initial process of framing a formal risk analysis can provide increased clarity and valuable insights. I will present the current status of my efforts to construct a first version of a quantitative risk analytic method and the associated models. I will also discuss some of the challenges that must be addressed to fully implement those models, and my plans for further development. 

About the Speaker: Jason C. Reinhardt is a national security systems analyst, and is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in Risk Analysis from Stanford University’s Department of Management Science and Engineering Engineering Risk Research Group, focusing on nuclear weapons arsenal management. Specifically, he is developing quantitative risk models to examine the trade-offs faced by nuclear armed nations in the process of disarmament. He is also pursuing research aimed at modeling and quantifying the catastrophic risks posed by near earth asteroid encounters. Other research interests include game theoretic applications to risk analysis and management, as well as adversary models. While at CISAC, he hopes to engage subject matter and policy experts to strengthen his modeling and analysis of nuclear weapon arsenal risk.

Prior to beginning his current studies, Jason managed a group of experts at Sandia National Laboratories that focused on technical studies to guide policy and decision makers across government. He joined Sandia National Laboratories in August of 2002, and has worked on a diverse set of projects both as an engineer and as an analyst, including the development of instrumentation for in-situ atmospheric measurement, embedded systems design, borders security analyses, and nuclear counter-terrorism strategy development.

He has worked extensively with the Department of Homeland Security on nuclear matters, and has also worked with the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, and within the national laboratory enterprise on a diverse array of national security projects. He has participated in the planning and hosting of international conferences and engagements, briefed congressional representatives, and served as a subject-matter expert on the topics of border security and nuclear and radiological defense.

Jason holds a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from the Purdue School of Electrical Engineering at Indianapolis, and a M.S. in Electrical Engineering from Stanford University.

 

 

Encina Hall (2nd floor)

Jason Reinhardt

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Jason C. Reinhardt is a national security systems analyst, and is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in Risk Analysis from Stanford University’s Department of Management Science and Engineering Engineering Risk Research Group, focusing on nuclear weapons arsenal management. Specifically, he is developing quantitative risk models to examine the trade-offs faced by nuclear armed nations in the process of disarmament. He is also pursuing research aimed at modeling and quantifying the catastrophic risks posed by near earth asteroid encounters. Other research interests include game theoretic applications to risk analysis and management, as well as adversary models. While at CISAC, he hopes to engage subject matter and policy experts to strengthen his modeling and analysis of nuclear weapon arsenal risk.

Prior to beginning his current studies, Jason managed a group of experts at Sandia National Laboratories that focused on technical studies to guide policy and decision makers across government. He joined Sandia National Laboratories in August of 2002, and has worked on a diverse set of projects both as an engineer and as an analyst, including the development of instrumentation for in-situ atmospheric measurement, embedded systems design, borders security analyses, and nuclear counter-terrorism strategy development.

He has worked extensively with the Department of Homeland Security on nuclear matters, and has also worked with the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, and within the national laboratory enterprise on a diverse array of national security projects. He has participated in the planning and hosting of international conferences and engagements, briefed congressional representatives, and served as a subject-matter expert on the topics of border security and nuclear and radiological defense.

Jason holds a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from the Purdue School of Electrical Engineering at Indianapolis, and a M.S. in Electrical Engineering from Stanford University.

Jason Reinhardt MacArthur Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow Speaker CISAC
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Sagan honored with prestigious NAS award

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Stanford political science professor Scott Sagan, a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, has been honored with a prestigious award from the National Academy of Sciences for his pioneering work addressing the risks of nuclear weapons and the causes of nuclear proliferation.

“Sagan's work has become an integral part of the nuclear debate in the United States and overseas,” the NAS said in a statement. “He has shown, for example, that a government's decision to pursue nuclear weapons can be prompted not only by national security concerns but also because of domestic political interests, parochial bureaucratic infighting, or concerns about international prestige.”

The William and Katherine Estes Award recognizes research in any field of cognitive or behavioral science that advances the understanding of issues relating to the risk of nuclear war. Sagan and other NAS award winners will be honored in a ceremony on April 26 during the academy’s 152nd annual meeting.

The academy noted that Sagan has developed theories about why different types of political regimes behave differently once they acquire “the bomb.”

“Sagan and his colleagues have also investigated U.S. public attitudes about nuclear weapons and found that few Americans actually believe that there is a taboo against their use in conflicts,” the NAS said. “The possession of nuclear weapons also raises the risk of nuclear weapons accidents, and Sagan has shown that even though there has never been an accidental nuclear war, there have been many more close-calls and near-accidents than was previously known.”

Sagan and co-authors Daryl G. Press and Benjamin A. Valentino, examined the taboos, traditions and non-use of nuclear weapons in this article in the American Political Science Review. He continues to work on an original survey experiment that examines the public attitudes about the “unthinkable” use of the nuclear bomb.

Siegfried Hecker – one of the world’s leading experts on plutonium science and a senior fellow at FSI – said that he has learned greatly from Sagan over the years as colleagues and former co-directors of CISAC. The two represent the center’s foundational spirit of combing the social and hard sciences to build a safer world.  

“The beauty of Scott’s work is that he has combined rigorous political science thinking with a practical knowledge of the limits of humans and organizations to deal with the complexities and dangers of nuclear weapons,” Hecker said. “Scott’s work has convinced me that there is real science in the political science of nuclear weapons. It is appropriate that this honor comes from the National Academy of Sciences.”

Sagan said he is honored to follow in the footsteps of previous recipients of the William and Katherine Estes Award, calling them “some of my intellectual heroes.”

Among those who have won the award are Thomas C. Schelling, Alexander L. George, Robert Jervis, Robert Powell and Graham Allison.

Allison, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, called Sagan's honor a "well-deserved recognition of a scholar who has illuminated the intersection of organizational behavior and nuclear danger."

The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit institution that was established under a congressional charter signed by President Abraham Lincoln in 1863. It recognizes achievement in science and provides science, engineering, and health policy advice to the federal government and other organizations.

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Former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, left, and Political Science Professor Science Professor Scott Sagan talk during a break in Perry's Stanford class, "Living at the Nuclear Brink."
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The Enduring Role of US Nuclear Weapons

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Due to the combination of a great response and our space constraints, this event is now full. We regret that we cannot accept any more RSVPs.

Lunch and seating are reserved for our registered guests.

 

Abstract: On April 5, 2009, President Obama stated his intent to seek "...the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons". He is not the first US President to state such a desire (President Reagan, among others), and he acknowledged that the goal "will not be reached quickly--perhaps not in my lifetime". President Obama proposed reducing the number and role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy as key steps toward achieving this goal.

While such a world is appealing, nuclear weapons remain woven into the fabric of US national security strategy as the ultimate guarantor of US and Allied security. Originally constructed by the US to end a war, the unique physical and psychological power of nuclear weapons rapidly made them a political tool to prevent or constrain conflict in the ensuing decades of the Cold War. United States foreign policy was underpinned by deterrence and assurance concepts that were both based on nuclear weapons and that defined their primary roles.

To be sure, the strategic context for nuclear weapons has changed since the end of the Cold War and the threat of sudden massive nuclear attack has receded. Significant reductions have been made to the deployed US nuclear force, the weapon stockpile, and the very specialized industrial base that supports it. Modifications have been made to employment concepts. New concepts of tailored deterrence have emerged that include highly capable US conventional forces, limited missile defenses, and space and cyberspace capabilities. 

But nuclear weapons continue to influence the security relationships and behaviors between major nations, and the primary deterrence and assurance role of US nuclear weapons remains at the foundation of US national security. Recent global events remind us that other nations continue to value the influence their nuclear weapons provide and, absent a viable replacement, US nuclear weapons will be needed for a very long time to come. Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent will be a challenge that has to be met.   

 

About the Speaker: General C. Robert "Bob" Kehler is the 2014-2015 Lee Lecturer at CISAC.

Prior to his retirement in December 2013, he was the Commander of United States Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.  In that role he was directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense and President for the plans and operations of all U. S. forces conducting global strategic deterrence, nuclear alert, global strike, space, cyberspace and associated operations.  While in command, he crafted and implemented critical elements of policies and plans to deter strategic attacks against the U.S. and its key allies, and led a joint team of over 60,000 military and civilians to 100% mission success in multiple, high-stakes global operations.  He also integrated Department of Defense (DOD) activities for global missile defense, combating weapons of mass destruction, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.  His forces directly supported combat operations in Southwest Asia and North Africa.

General Kehler’s military career spanned almost 39 years of service that included important operational and staff assignments.  He was one of a very few officers to command at the squadron, group, wing, major command, and combatant command levels, and he had a broad range of operational experience in Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), space launch, space control, space surveillance and missile warning units.  Before taking command of Strategic Command, General Kehler commanded Air Force Space Command where he organized, trained, and equipped over 46,000 professionals conducting mission-ready nuclear missile, space, and cyberspace operations.  In that role, he designed the Air Force’s inaugural blueprint, operating concept, organizational structure, and personnel program to meet rapidly growing cyberspace challenges. 

His staff assignments included tours with the Air Staff, Strategic Air Command, Air Force Space Command, and the Joint Staff.  He was also assigned to the Secretary of the Air Force’s Office of Legislative Liaison where he was the point man on Capitol Hill for matters regarding the President’s ICBM Modernization Program.  As Director of the National Security Space Office, General Kehler integrated the activities of a number of DOD and Intelligence Community organizations on behalf of the Undersecretary of the Air Force and Director, National Reconnaissance Office. 

He entered the Air Force in 1975 as a Distinguished Graduate of the Pennsylvania State University R.O.T.C. program, has master’s degrees from the University of Oklahoma in Public Administration and the Naval War College in National Security and Strategic Studies, and completed executive level programs at Carnegie-Mellon University, Syracuse University, and Harvard University.

General Kehler’s military awards include the Defense Distinguished and Superior Service Medals, the Distinguished Service Medal (2 awards), Legion of Merit (3 awards), and the French Legion of Honor (Officer).  He wears Command Space and ICBM Operations Badges.  His other honors include the Thomas D. White Space Award (recognizing outstanding contributions to space) and the H. H. Arnold Award (for the most significant contribution by a military member for national defense), both presented by the Air Force Association. 

General Kehler serves as a Trustee of the Mitre Corporation, is on the Board of Directors of the Inmarsat Corporation, and is Chairman of the Board of BEI Precision Systems and Space Company.  He is a Distinguished Alumnus of the Pennsylvania State University, where he also serves as a member of the Advisory Board for Outreach and Online Education.  A Senior Fellow of the National Defense University and an Associate Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, he has testified before numerous Congressional Committees and has spoken widely on matters of national security.  His articles have appeared in The Naval War College Review and Joint Forces Quarterly.  Time permitting; he enjoys playing the guitar, golf, and target shooting.

Encina Hall (2nd floor)

C. Robert “Bob” Kehler

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*Please contact Tracy Hines (tmhines23@stanford.edu) for any inquires regarding General Kehler.

Prior to his retirement on January 1, 2014, General Kehler was the Commander of United States Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska.  In that role he was directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense and President for the plans and operations of all U. S. forces conducting global strategic deterrence, nuclear alert, global strike, space, cyberspace and associated operations.  While in command, he crafted and implemented critical elements of policies and plans to deter strategic attacks against the U.S. and its key allies and led a joint team of military members and civilians to 100% mission success in multiple, high-stakes global operations.  He also integrated Department of Defense (DOD) activities for global missile defense, combating weapons of mass destruction, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.  His forces directly supported combat operations in Southwest Asia and North Africa.

General Kehler’s military career spanned almost thirty-nine years of service that included progressively important operational and staff assignments.  He commanded units at the squadron, group, wing, major command, and combatant command levels, and had a broad range of operational experience in Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, space launch, space control, space surveillance and missile warning.  Before taking command of Strategic Command, General Kehler commanded Air Force Space Command (predecessor to U.S. Space Force) where he organized, trained, and equipped airmen conducting mission-ready nuclear missile, space, and cyberspace operations.  His command designed the Air Force’s inaugural blueprint, operating concept, organizational structure, and personnel program to meet emerging cyberspace challenges. 

His staff assignments included tours with the Air Staff, Strategic Air Command, Air Force Space Command, and the Joint Staff.  He was also assigned to the Secretary of the Air Force’s Office of Legislative Liaison where he was the point man on Capitol Hill for matters regarding the President’s ICBM Modernization Program.  As Director of the National Security Space Office, General Kehler integrated the activities of a number of DOD and Intelligence Community organizations on behalf of the Undersecretary of the Air Force and Director, National Reconnaissance Office. 

General Kehler entered the Air Force in 1975 as a Distinguished Graduate of the Pennsylvania State University R.O.T.C. program, has master’s degrees from the University of Oklahoma in Public Administration and the Naval War College in National Security and Strategic Studies, and completed executive level programs at Carnegie-Mellon University, Syracuse University, and Harvard University.

Since his retirement, General Kehler has continued to apply his expertise as a consultant, corporate director and trustee, and senior advisor and fellow to a number of prominent public, private, and educational institutions. He writes and speaks on matters of national security. Bob and his late wife have two adult sons and two grandsons. Time permitting, he enjoys playing the guitar and golf.

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