In this session from DARPA’s 60th anniversary symposium, D60, Dr. Valerie Browning, director of the agency’s Defense Sciences Office (DSO); keynote speaker Dr. Vincent Tang, program manager for DSO; and a panel of notable experts, including CISAC's Siegfried Hecker, explore the challenges and opportunities for combatting WMD use and preventing proliferation in the emerging global landscape.
Moderator Dr. Valerie Browning – DARPA, DSO
Keynote Dr. Vincent Tang – DARPA, DSO
Panelists Mr. Peter Bergen – Journalist, Dr. Siegfried Hecker – Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University The Honorable Andrew “Andy” Weber – Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs
Steven Pifer is an affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation as well as a non-resident senior fellow with the Brookings Institution. He was a William J. Perry Fellow at the center from 2018-2022 and a fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin from January-May 2021.
Pifer’s research focuses on nuclear arms control, Ukraine, Russia and European security. He has offered commentary on these issues on National Public Radio, PBS NewsHour, CNN and BBC, and his articles have been published in a wide variety of outlets. He is the author of The Eagle and the Trident: U.S.-Ukraine Relations in Turbulent Times (Brookings Institution Press, 2017), and co-author of The Opportunity: Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Arms (Brookings Institution Press, 2012).
A retired Foreign Service officer, Pifer’s more than 25 years with the State Department focused on U.S. relations with the former Soviet Union and Europe, as well as arms control and security issues. He served as deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs with responsibilities for Russia and Ukraine, ambassador to Ukraine, and special assistant to the president and senior director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia on the National Security Council. In addition to Ukraine, he served at the U.S. embassies in Warsaw, Moscow and London as well as with the U.S. delegation to the negotiation on intermediate-range nuclear forces in Geneva. From 2000 to 2001, he was a visiting scholar at Stanford’s Institute for International Studies, and he was a resident scholar at the Brookings Institution from 2008 to 2017.
Pifer is a 1976 graduate of Stanford University with a bachelor’s in economics.
Abstract: The purpose and force of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty hinges on a legal distinction between "nuclear weapons states" and "non-nuclear weapons states." But rather than being a self-evident distinction based entirely on material differences, the distinction is constructed and negotiated—not just by the conventionally powerful but by disempowered states. This article argues that the NPT is a discursive resource for states that the treaty does not legitimate. The NPT’s power comes from the legal categories it institutionalizes and perpetuates. In order to understand the origins and effects of dividing the terrain of nuclear politics into nuclear and non-nuclear states, I analyze the meeting documents of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) which negotiated the treaty from 1962-1969. I find that the “non-nuclear” states used the designation as an identity that set them apart from nuclear states. Using these categories like identities is not without political consequence—for example, India’s unique diplomatic approach toward the NPT shapes both the discourses it advances and policies it pursues. In contrast to existing approaches that examine the distinction primarily through material terms, this article turns to state practice to reveal how being nuclear or non-nuclear is used as a legitimating tool in nuclear politics. The article also shows that, while most approaches to international law presume that the law either constrains state power or has no effect on it, the case of the nuclear/non-nuclear distinction illustrates that international law does matter, but perhaps not in the way assumed by IR realists or institutionalists.
Speaker Bio: Sidra Hamidi is a Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at CISAC. She completed her PhD in Political Science from Northwestern University in 2018. Her research explores the role of identity and discourse in contemporary and historical nuclear politics. Specifically, she studies the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear states in technical, legal, and normative contexts. She locates the politics of this distinction in the diplomatic practices of Israel, India, and Iran. She completed her MA in International Relations from the University of Chicago. Her commentary has appeared in The Washington Post, Duck of Minerva, and E-IR. She is also interested in international relations theory and political science conceptualization and methodology.
Q&A with Rodney C. Ewing, co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and a Professor in the School of Earth, Energy and Environmental Sciences. Written with Nicole Feldman.
With the Trump-Kim Summit fresh in our minds, Americans are ready to confront nuclear challenges that have been on hold for decades. What many may not realize is that one of the biggest challenges is on the home front. Since the Manhattan Project officially began in 1942, the United States has faced ever-increasing stores of nuclear waste. In Part Three of our series on the consequences of nuclear war, expert Rodney C. Ewing tells us how the U.S.’s failure to implement a permanent solution for nuclear waste storage and disposal is costing Americans billions of dollars a year.
Where does our nuclear waste come from, and what is being done with it?
Broadly speaking, there are two types of nuclear waste.
The first is spent fuel from nuclear reactors used to generate electricity. Those reactors have left us with about 80,000 metric tonnes of used spent fuel, and we don’t have a way forward for the disposal of this waste. It’s stored at more than 75 sites in 35 states around the country, so many of us have some in our state, including California.
The second category is the waste generated by our nuclear weapons complex. That defense waste has accumulated since the earliest days of the Manhattan Project. The highly-radioactive waste from chemical processing is mainly stored in very large metal tanks. They are located at the Savannah River site in South Carolina, the Hanford site in Washington State, at Idaho National Laboratory in Idaho, and Nuclear Fuel Services site at West Valley in New York State.
I think it’s discouraging that we continue to release radioactivity to the environment because after more than 40 years we still have not developed a successful plan for going forward.
What’s wrong with what’s happening now?
This waste is problematic because the volume is large, many hundreds of thousands of cubic meters. The tanks in Hanford and Savannah River are way beyond their design lifetimes, so they’re corroding and some have leaked. The radioactive fluid is being released to the environment. The rates are not high, but I think it’s discouraging that we continue to release radioactivity to the environment because after more than 40 years of effort we still have not developed a successful plan for going forward.
The spent fuel from commercial power plants is much smaller, some 80,000 metric tonnes, but the total amount of radioactivity is roughly 20 to 30 times greater than defense waste. Today, it’s the spent fuel that demands the most attention as an immediate problem, particularly financially.
How much is nuclear waste costing American taxpayers?
The two categories of waste are separated in the budget. At the moment, the budget for the Department of Energy is about $30 billion. Of that budget, about $12 billion is for the nuclear weapons programs. That leaves us $18 billion to use for all things related to energy — nuclear power, fossil fuel, wind, and solar. About $6 billion, one third, is used to deal with the legacy high-level waste from the Manhattan Project. We as taxpayers pay $6 billion every year to address that problem, a huge cost that we will incur for many decades into the future. The projected total cost of clean-up after the Manhattan Project is well over $300 billion. That’s more than the original cost of the weapons programs and the actual total will be even higher. That’s just the defense waste.
What about the waste from nuclear energy? Is that clean-up cost also high?
In short, very. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 created a tax on electricity generated by nuclear power plants. This tax would accumulate into the Nuclear Waste Fund for us to build a geologic repository — a mined facility deep within the earth — to safely dispose of the waste. What’s happened to that?
The fund has a balance of more than $40 billion. It’s controlled by Congress on an annual basis, and congressional budget rules make it very difficult to use those funds. It’s not a lockbox where the money goes and waits to be spent. Instead, it’s been applied against our national debt, so even though the fees have been collected, they haven’t been used for their intended purpose.
We pay about half-a-billion dollars a year to the utilities for their simply keeping the fuel because there’s no place for it to go.
The Department of Energy was to take ownership of this fuel on January 1, 1998, but they didn’t because there was no geologic repository. Now the utilities who have the fuel have to continue to deal with it onsite. They have sued the federal government for its failure to take ownership of the fuel, so now we pay about half-a-billion dollars a year to the utilities for their simply keeping the fuel because there’s no place for it to go. The projected cost of this penalty, let’s say, is something on the order of many tens of billions of dollars, depending on how long the spent fuel has to remain at the reactor sites. The cost of doing nothing over time will be equivalent to what we charge the rate payers, $40 billion over time. That doesn’t even include compensation to workers in defense facilities, soldiers exposed during atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, and so on.
Clearly, the financial cost to taxpayers is high. What about the cost to the environment?
For the spent fuel, the volume — 80,000 metric tons — sounds like a lot, but compared to Gigatonnes of carbon emitted by burning fossil fuels, its volume is not so great. It’s well-contained, but there are some difficulties with how it’s stored. In some cases, the used fuel is kept in pools. Those pools have filled, and they weren’t meant for extended storage. We should be trying to get that fuel into what are called dry casks: obelisks concrete and metal.
Are there other challenges people may not be aware of?
What people don’t realize is that it is actually a serious technical challenge.
It’s very common for people to say there are no technical problems, that it’s just political. They say, “We know how to do it. It’s just a difficult public. Strict regulations. No one will let us solve this problem.”
I think what people don’t realize is that it is actually a serious technical challenge. The half-lives of some of these elements stretch into tens, if not hundreds of thousands of years. We’re asked to design solutions that will last as long as the risk. That’s not something we usually do. The technical and scientific challenge for nuclear waste is, whatever our solution, that we will never see whether we were correct or not. Designing a system where you don’t have feedback is very difficult.
What will happen if we don’t find a solution?
There will not be an immediate catastrophe; I don’t expect anything to explode. There will be environmental contamination, but the biggest problem is financial. We’re spending $6 billion a year trying to deal with the problem, and we’ll continue to spend $4.5 to $5 billion a year without solving the problem. That $5 billion could go to education or research. Imagine if instead of working on waste, we were working on solving our future energy needs.
What’s the best way for us to move forward?
At Stanford, over a two-year period we had a series of meetings to ask just this question: how does the U.S. break out of its gridlock situation and move ahead? We brought in international experts, members of the public, really quite an extraordinary effort, over 75 speakers in five meetings. We have a number of recommendations. We need a new, single purpose nuclear waste management organization. We need a new process for engaging not only the scientific and technical communities, but also the public. We need a new regulatory framework that recognizes the challenges of predicting repository performance over hundreds of thousands of years. Most importantly, we need to realize that dealing with nuclear waste is not only a technical issue, but also requires careful attention to social issues. It is very important to design an approach that engages local communities, states, and tribes. This report, Reset of U.S. Nuclear Waste Management Strategy and Policies, will be released this summer.
Note: This interview by Changsop Pyon originally appeared in Korean at SisaIN.
SisaIN: You suggested that the best way for denuclearization is to convert N. Korea's nuclear and missile programs for civilian use rather than total denuclearization. Is it because 'total denuclearization' or 'complete denuclearization' as agreed between Trump and Kim Jung Un is impossible to achieve under any circumstances?
Hecker: Total or complete denuclearization will be difficult to achieve because North Korea will likely insist on retaining a peaceful nuclear program (such as nuclear medicine and nuclear electricity) and peaceful space program to launch satellites. Elimination of the military programs may be possible, but it will require a phased approach that will take years. In addition, verification of the elimination of the military programs will be almost impossible unless North Korea is prepared to cooperate.
SisaIN: You suggested a 10-year road map on denuclerization marked by “halt, roll back and eliminate’ North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. Assuming this process would be going on, what would be the incentives or compensations for the US to give to North Korea? Completion of peace treaty and normalization, in addition to economic assistance and sanctions relief during the 10-year time frame?
Hecker: An agreement with Pyongyang should be structured to achieve denuclearization and normalization. It should be agreed in the beginning that denuclearization would occur in phases to halt, roll back and eventually eliminate the nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons program. As we indicated in our ten-year roadmap, that will take time. Our proposed approach of conversion from military to civilian nuclear programs constitutes an important step toward normalization. Additional steps toward normalization, such as some sanctions relief, potential assistance with energy supply, and an end-of-war declaration will have to be phased with Pyongyang taking significant steps to roll back its weapons program.
SisaIN: The Trump administration is putting a high priority on verification of N. Korea’s nuclear weapons and programs under the banner of ‘FFVD (final, fully verified denuclearization). You introduced the new concept of 'cooperative conversion' for the best chance of the verifiable denuclearization of N. Korea's nuclear programs. 'Cooperative' in the sense that S. Koreans and Americans are working together with their N. Korean scientists and engineers to eliminate the nuclear weapons. Is this 'cooperative conversion' possible without them building mutual trust first?
Hecker: We believe that ‘cooperative conversion’ will allow the two sides to build trust. In other words, it would be the nuclear program that would now catalyze building trust, whereas in the past it has been the greatest source of conflict. With American and South Korean technical personnel on the ground working closely with North Korean nuclear experts to advance civilian programs, they will be able to learn much more about the nature and extent of the North’s entire program and see facilities that might otherwise escape them.
SisaIN: Can any agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons without cooperation be verified?
Hecker: Without cooperation, we also see no way that the elimination of all nuclear weapons and weapons programs can be verified. The magnitude of the North’s nuclear and missile programs and the closed nature of the country will make verification of complete denuclearization virtually impossible. It will not be possible for inspectors, especially in an adversarial environment, to get unfettered access to all of North Korea’s facilities to verify that it has not secretly kept a few nuclear weapons, a few kilograms of plutonium, or one or more covert uranium centrifuge facilities. But cooperation on converting Pyongyang’s nuclear infrastructure will help.
SisaIN: As you admitted, this civilian nuclear and space programs would be highly controversial in the US because of North Korea's possible retention of nuclear capability. The United States had the bitter experience with this back in 2002, when James Kelley confronted the North with the evidence of its secret nuclear program in violation of 1994 Agreed Framework. So, how can the US make sure the North would not make the same mistake again?
Hecker: We believe the situation in October 2002 was more complex than just stating that North Korea cheated. It is true that the North was covertly pursuing uranium enrichment while freezing the plutonium complex in Yongbyon. However, Pyongyang can also accuse Washington of not keeping its Agreed Framework and October 2000 Joint U.S.-North Korea Communiqué commitments to normalize relations. Although there were some difficult times during the Clinton administration years of the Agreed Framework, these difficulties were resolved by the end of 2000. However, the Bush administration was determined to end the Agreed Framework in 2001 and 2002. Adding North Korea to the Axis of Evil, for example, was certainly not in keeping with the U.S. government’s commitment to normalize relations. Consequently, it is no surprise that Pyongyang views Washington’s promises to normalize as insincere as Washington views Pyongyang’s promises to denuclearize.
Military to civilian conversion actions will certainly have to be monitored by international inspections. Converting programs and facilities cooperatively will also give U.S. and South Koreans much better access to allow more complete verification. Moreover, we believe that it is important that the conversion activities be allowed to proceed sufficiently far that Pyongyang would have too much to lose should it back out of its agreement. In other words, the more North Korea would benefit from nuclear conversion and from other normalization actions, the greater a price it would have to pay to break out. Consequently, the more reason it will have to keep agreements.
SisaIN: Regarding N. Korea's retention of its nuclear capability, there is the issue of what to do with their thousands of nuclear scientists and engineers among other things. As long as they are physically inside North Korea, can the Kim Jung Un regime use them anytime to restart their nuclear programs?
Hecker: Civilian conversion would help to take care of this problem. The energies of the nuclear scientists and engineers would be focused on doing good things for their country – such as nuclear medicine and nuclear electricity, along with helping to dismantle the military complex and clean up the complex. During my various visits to Yongbyon, I had such discussions with their nuclear officials. They expressed a strong desire to have their technical personnel contribute to peaceful uses of atomic energy.
SisaIN: You described the 10-year road map as an 'interim' step short of completed nuclearization, designed to "reduce the nuclear threat significantly." Does it mean that the current denuclearzation talks should focus on reducing North Korea's nuclear threat significantly, not complete denuclearization?
Hecker: The road map integrates the short and long term actions to reduce the greatest military threats first and then eliminate all of the military threats in the longer term. Cooperative conversion would allow complete military denuclearization while providing assistance with civilian nuclear and space programs.
SisaIN: The Trump administration wants some sort of specific and fast denuclearization such as getting their nuclear warheads or nuclear weapons out of North Korea, etc. Is this possible? If not, what would be your idea for 'fast' denuclearization that could satisfy the US demands?
Hecker: First, taking nuclear weapons out of North Korea is too dangerous. They should be verifiably disassembled in North Korea by the same North Korean technical experts that assembled them in order to avoid an accidental nuclear detonation. Once safely disassembled, all components besides the plutonium or highly enriched uranium bomb fuel can be disposed of quite readily. Plutonium and highly enriched uranium should be either shipped out of the country or otherwise verifiably disposed.
As for fast denuclearization, what is important is to begin to roll back the nuclear weapons program. First, make sure that it does not get worse – so no more nuclear tests, no more long-range missile tests and no more production of plutonium or highly enriched uranium. With our concept of civilian conversion, the North should be encouraged to speed up the timetable we laid out in our roadmap. In other words, some of the North’s actions in the roadmap should be front-loaded. North Korea has already done some of that by closing the nuclear test site. Several other actions such as making the 5 MWe reactor permanently inoperable could follow quickly. These actions would reduce the military threat and could speed up the timetable.
SisaIN: When you observe President Trump's current denuclearization negotiation with North Korea, what do you think is the best possible realistic goal he can achieve during his term?
Hecker: Following the opening created by the initiatives of President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong-il, President Trump has already taken the most important step to meet with Chairman Kim at the Singapore summit and move the Korean peninsula away from the brink of war. If his administration supports civilian conversion over the next two years, he could dramatically reduce the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear program and create the conditions that will help to bring an end to seven decades of enmity on the Korean Peninsula – it would be a historic achievement.
STANFORD, Calif. — When President Trump abruptly canceled the summit with North Korea last week, it overshadowed the closing of North Korea’s nuclear test site just a few hours before. Although it is not irreversible, blowing up the site’s tunnels, sealing the entrances and removing test site facilities and equipment was nevertheless a serious step toward denuclearization. What possessed North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to take this step now?
Immediate denuclearization of North Korea is dangerous to both North Korean and American interests, say Stanford scholars in a new research report. Instead, they advocate for phased denuclearization to take place over 10 years or more, allowing the United States to reduce the greatest risks first and address the manageable risks over time.
Following the announcement that the United States had canceled a planned summit with North Korea, Stanford scholars discuss the future of diplomacy and denuclearization on the Korean peninsula.
What led to the U.S. canceling the planned summit with North Korea? Could a meeting realistically be rescheduled? Stanford scholars discuss the issues. (Image credit: Getty Images)
This post was originally published by the Stanford News Service. The following is an extended version, including comments by APARC Visiting Scholar, Daniel Sneider.
President Donald Trump was scheduled to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on June 12 to discuss efforts for denuclearization and a peace plan for the region. What led to the U.S. canceling the planned talks? Could a meeting realistically be rescheduled? Can the U.S. diplomatically negotiate denuclearization when there are clearly different approaches to what disarmament looks like?
To address these questions, Stanford News Service talked to five Stanford scholars about the issues:
What led to the summit’s cancellation?
Auslin: The real problem was the rushed nature of the summit. The lure of an unprecedented first-time meeting between the U.S. president and the North Korean dictator meant that there was a short window in which the two sides could resolve key issues before the leaders sat down together. And after nearly 70 years of hostility and failed negotiations, negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang would have been extraordinarily difficult in any case. At the core, however, the two sides needed to agree on the fundamental question of the definition of denuclearization, let alone its timetable and the sequence of U.S. aid, before the two principals met. As the time drew near, North Korea tried to force the U.S. into recognizing its own definition of denuclearization and timetable.
Hecker: Two weeks ago, matters looked very good, especially after Secretary [of State Mike] Pompeo’s second visit to Pyongyang. After he returned, he said the U.S. and North Korea had similar visions of the future. Then, during the past week, high-level Trump administration officials painted a very different vision for North Korea’s future by pushing for a Libya model of denuclearization. Not surprisingly, visions of Muammar Gaddafi’s mutilated body did not go over well in Pyongyang. North Korean officials wrote scathing rebuttals that appeared to lead to a race as to who would cancel the summit first. President Trump won that race.
Shin: The summit fell through because two sides failed to narrow the gap on how to get to denuclearization of North Korea. Trump was obsessed with a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement, known also as CVID, and the principle of “denuclearization first, then economic rewards,” but Kim wanted a gradual, step-by-step approach. Trump was probably under pressure from Republican conservatives that he could not settle for a “bad” deal – which would mean anything less than CVID. At the working level, the U.S. was probably not ready for talks to happen in two weeks. Trump might have used North Korea’s recent verbal attacks as an excuse to cancel the June summit.
Sneider: The summit fell apart because the gap between the positions of the United States and North Korea became so evident that it could no longer be credibly claimed that this meeting was going to lead to the North Koreans giving up their nuclear weapons capability.
Stephens: President Trump surprised everyone, including his own staff, some weeks ago by suddenly and seemingly impulsively agreeing to a summit with the North Korean leader. His letter to Kim Jung Un this morning withdrawing from the June 12 summit had the same feeling of hasty improvisation. He took umbrage, understandably, at the tone and substance of recent North Korean statements, though they were not exceptional by Pyongyang’s historical standards. He also seemed to realize, belatedly, the huge gap between U.S. expectations of “complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization” of North Korea and Pyongyang’s vague pledge to negotiate, as a nuclear weapons state itself, the eventual denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Is a delayed summit likely?
Auslin: Trump left open the possibility of a future meeting, but only if Kim ratchets down the rhetoric and insults. It is just as likely that Pyongyang will increase its threatening words, and possibly even undertake aggressive acts, to try and blackmail the U.S. back to the negotiating table. If the two sides can quietly continue high-level talks aimed at agreeing on a definition of denuclearization and a timetable, along with U.S. aid – admittedly, difficult objectives – then a delayed summit is possible.
Sneider: I don’t see much chance for a summit to be rescheduled, although I don’t entirely rule it out provided the United States is willing to accept something less than what it has previously demanded.
Shin: Trump has now handed the ball over to Kim, and whether the two can get back on the path to diplomacy will depend on how Kim reacts to Trump’s statement. If he reacts with merely provocative words and no actions, chances are that the talks can still happen in the near future. But if Kim cancels all the behind-the-scenes, working-level talks and negotiations altogether, we are expecting another long period of no communication between the two countries or even a rise of tension and conflict.
How can the U.S. diplomatically negotiate denuclearization when there are different objectives at stake?
Auslin: That has always been the great problem in negotiating with Pyongyang. It has little incentive to give up its nuclear weapons, even with security guarantees from the United States. Three U.S. presidents have failed in negotiations, and the Kim regime has steadily progressed in developing both a nuclear weapons capability and a ballistic missile capability. The Trump administration gambled that threat of a U.S. attack, combined with “maximum pressure,” would create a breakthrough that eluded previous administrations, but Pyongyang reverted to form by making increasing demands in the past week. Right now, the U.S. has failed to figure out the right mix of pressure and accommodation that gets the North to the table, absent pre-emptive U.S. concessions. However, it does not need to continually remind Kim of the fate of Muammar Gaddafi, overthrown in Libya in 2011, to try to strong-arm it into talks.
Hecker: There actually appeared to be a partial reconciliation of views during the past week with some in the Trump administration, including the president, acknowledging that denuclearization will take time and most likely will have to occur in a phased manner. I have promoted for some time what I call a “halt, roll back and eventually eliminate” approach. It will take years, but there was some hope that North Korea would front-load some of its steps in rolling back its nuclear program, as it did in destroying a nuclear test site yesterday.
Shin: Trump was mistaken if he thought he could handle and directly deal with North Korea by himself. He needs help from all involved stakeholders such as China, South Korea, etc. Diplomacy is different from doing business.
Stephens: By working closely with allies, through both pressure and engagement, and by doing the heavy diplomatic preparation and lifting that was missing this time around.
What does this mean for relations between North Korea and South Korea?
Shin: It will certainly create a big dilemma for South Korea. It has declared that a new era has begun with North Korea and promised to improve inter-Korean relations by all means. So, it will be difficult for South Korea to rejoin the U.S.’s maximum pressure campaign. At the same time, inter-Korean relations, especially in the economic sector, cannot be improved without the support from the U.S. and ease of sanctions.
Hecker: South Korean President Moon just released a statement saying it was regretful and disconcerting that the summit was canceled. He made it clear that North-South reconciliation must proceed, commenting that “[We] hope that the leaders resolve problems through direct and close dialogue.”
Stephens: South Korea is in a very difficult position. They were blindsided by Trump’s letter to Kim. They will be eager to get Pyongyang and Washington back into dialogue. Again, much will depend on Pyongyang.
Who do you think lost the most with the summit’s cancellation: Trump? Kim? Moon?
Auslin: Moon is the big loser, having declared a new era of peace and bet everything on a durable peace process. North Korea looks like its usual, disruptive, untrustworthy self, which in turn makes Moon appear naive. Now, the North may well try to pressure the South into unilateral concessions to get the “peace” process back on track; these could include aggressive acts against South Korean interests. For his part, Trump has made clear he won’t play Charlie Brown to Kim’s Lucy with the football.
Hecker: The world lost a chance for moving away from the brink of war on the Korean Peninsula. I believe it was the greatest shock to President Moon, who worked so hard to create the conditions for the summit.
Shin: It will be Moon>Trump>Kim in the order of who loses the most. Moon’s aggressive efforts in the recent months to mediate between Kim and Trump didn’t pay off after all.
Stephens: Kim has lost the least and has the most leverage at the moment.
Sneider: The South Korean government of Moon Jae-in is obviously stunned by this development, particularly after Moon’s meeting in the White House earlier this week where the President gave no such indication apparently. They will try desperately to restore diplomatic engagement between Washington and Pyongyang, and may meet again with the North soon. But this is a crisis for South Korea’s strategy.
What realistically will happen next?
Sneider: I would predict a rise of tensions as both leaders will feel the need to look and act tough — as the President has already shown in his White House statement today.
Auslin: North Korean aggression against South Korea is not out of the question, as a way to try to force everyone back to the table. Increased rhetoric from the North against Trump and America is also very likely. Behind the scenes, however, if the administration can quietly continue talks with high-ranking North Koreans to try and reach agreement on what denuclearization means and a possible timetable, then the two sides could return to the idea of a summit, possibly by the end of the year.
Hecker: Hopefully the leaders will take the time afforded by this pause to work at the lower levels to move closer to creating the conditions for a successful summit.
Shin: We can expect some periods of crisis and conflicts again, however long it will last. There is still room for hope that the talks will be resumed, but it will now depend on how North Korea reacts.
Stephens: President Trump appears to want to leave the door open for a summit. The most optimistic scenario would be an interest in both Washington and Pyongyang to keep a channel open for talks. South Korea will want to get the parties to reengage.
