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Three CISAC scientists have joined 26 of the nation’s top nuclear experts to send an open letter to President Obama in support of the Iran deal struck in July.

“The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) the United States and its partners negotiated with Iran will advance the cause of peace and security in the Middle East and can serve as a guidepost for future non-proliferation agreements,” the group of renowned scientists, academics and former government officials wrote in the letter dated August 8, 2015.

“This is an innovative agreement, with much more stringent constraints than any previously negotiated non-proliferation framework.”

CISAC senior fellow and former Los Alamos National Laboratory director Sig Hecker is a signatory to the letter, along with CISAC co-founder Sid Drell, and cybersecurity expert and CISAC affiliate Martin Hellman.

Six Nobel laureates also signed, including FSI senior fellow by courtesy and former Stanford Linear Accelerator director Burton Richter.

The letter arrives at a crucial time for the Obama administration as it rallies public opinion and lobbies Congress to support the Iran agreement.

You can read the full letter along with analysis from the New York Times at this link.

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About the Event 

Estimates of fatalities in a nuclear war range from none to Earth’s population. We can confidently state if there is never a nuclear explosion, there will be no fatalities. But what is the most probable loss? Fatalities from explosions in populated areas could be in the hundreds of millions, exceeding those from fallout radiation by a factor of ten. However, fatalities from environmental changes and the breakdown of society, which together may collapse global agriculture, could exceed those from blast by another factor of ten, approaching the population of the planet. Fatalities from blast, burns and prompt radiation are relatively easy to compute, but those from environmental changes are difficult to predict. We know that physically similar, but more extreme, environmental insults occurred 66 million years ago due to an asteroid impact and caused the extinction of about 75% of the known species. Toon will go through the chain of complex issues that need to be addressed to compute the environmental changes, their uncertainties and their impacts on humans: likely targets; fuel loads; fire ignition; smoke production, composition, lofting and rainout; climate response to stratospheric smoke; and agricultural responses to climate changes. A recent U.S. National Academy of Science panel recommended that multiple agencies fund research to reduce the uncertainties. For example, new satellite based global measurements of building types and volumes can provide improved fuel loads. Measurements of smoke from burning buildings, now non-existent, could determine smoke composition. New aircraft data on smoke from wildfires could inform lofting. However, no federal agency has developed a research program, just as they have avoided doing for the past 40 years. Thousands of scientific papers have been written about the extinction of the dinosaurs, but tens about our possible fate from a nuclear conflict. NASA is searching for asteroids that might hit us and planning how to stop them. But nuclear stockpiles are increasing, more countries seek nuclear weapons, and new and more terrifying weapons are being built.

About the Speaker

Brian Toon studies radiative transfer, aerosol and cloud physics, and parallels between Earth and planets. He led NASA airborne missions studying volcanic clouds, ozone holes, and cloud-climate impacts. Toon published about 400 refereed scientific papers, and co-authored Earth in Flames. He received the American Physical Society's Leo Szilard Award for work on nuclear winter and was recognized by the UN Environmental Program for contributions to the Nobel Peace Prize winning IPCC reports. Additionally, he won the American Geophysical Union’s Roger Revelle Medal, the American Meteorological Society’s Carl-Gustaf Rossby Medal, and the 2022 Future of Life Award for reducing the risk of nuclear war.

Please join us for refreshments in the Oksenberg Conference Center following the conclusion of the lecture from 5:00 - 6:00 PM.  All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

James D. Fearon
James Fearon
Brian Toon
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About the event: Why do adversaries sometimes cooperate to restrain their military competition? Why do they design arms control agreements with intrusive verification in some cases but rely on minimal transparency in others? Amidst ongoing international competition, arms control remains rare despite potential mutual benefits, and agreements vary dramatically in their approaches to monitoring. This book reveals how uncertainty from domestic political changes - such as leadership transitions or social unrest - can enable arms control. It identifies two paths to agreement: during periods of uncertainty, states that previously relied on informal understandings hedge by establishing lightly-monitored agreements, while those that anticipated deception take calculated risks through agreements with intensive verification. Through comprehensive data analysis and rich case studies, Jane Vaynman challenges conventional wisdom about uncertainty in international relations while offering insights for policymakers. As states confront challenges from nuclear competition to emerging technologies, understanding when arms control becomes viable is more vital than ever.

About the speaker: Dr. Jane Vaynman is an Assistant Professor of Strategic Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University. Dr. Vaynman’s work focuses on security cooperation between adversarial states, the design of arms control agreements, and the effects of technology on patterns of international cooperation and competition. From 2022-2024, she served as a senior advisor in the Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability at the U.S. Department of State. Her prior academic appointments include the Department of Political Science at Temple University and the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. She was also previously a Lightning Scholar at Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania, a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and a Fulbright Fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center. Dr. Vaynman received her Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University and B.A. in international relations from Stanford University.

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William J. Perry Conference Room

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February 2026 saw the end of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, known as New START, the last nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and Russia. Without limitations on nuclear weapons, what comes next? Can scientists step in, as they did in years past, to help stop the risk of nuclear war?

There are now three major nuclear powers—the United States, Russia, and China—and six smaller nuclear-armed states (France, the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea). With the New START Treaty no longer in force, there is an opportunity for leaders of these nuclear states to create new treaties. US President Trump has said that he wants to do this and has plans to meet with China’s President Xi Jinping in 2026; he is also likely to meet Russia’s President Vladimir Putin during the year. These encounters may set nuclear negotiations back on course. But as Trump and his administration are swept into new crises in Venezuela and Iran, nuclear arms control could remain unresolved and stagnate for the remainder of his term.

Continue reading at science.org

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Rose Gottemoeller
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President Donald Trump told the New York Times in January that he wants to negotiate a better treaty than New START, a message he repeated on February 5, the day the treaty went out of force. Karoline Leavitt, the White House spokesperson, added, “The president wants to have our nuclear experts work on a new improved and modernized treaty that can last long into the future. And that’s what the United States will continue to discuss with the Russians.”

All of this is welcome. Many have complained that New START does not limit nonstrategic nuclear weapons, nor does it limit so-called Russian exotic weapon systems. It was not designed to do so. The United States’ goal has always been to take up nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the next negotiations, as called for in the resolution of ratification of New START. As for the exotic systems, they appeared on the scene after New START entered into force, and of course, they must be accounted for in any new treaty.

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Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, after mysteriously disappearing from the public eye for a few weeks, reemerged November 9 to give an interview to Russian news service RIA Novosti. He took a question about whether Moscow has proposed a meeting with Washington to discuss President Vladimir Putin’s offer to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) limits for one year beyond February 5, 2026, when the treaty goes out of force. With an exasperated edge, his specialty, Lavrov answered,

The constructive initiative put forward by President Vladimir Putin in the post-New START context speaks for itself. It contains no hidden agenda and is perfectly clear for understanding. Its practical implementation would not require any special additional efforts. Therefore, we do not consider it necessary to hold in-depth discussions on this proposal.… So far, there has been no substantive response from Washington.

Continue reading at armscontrol.org.

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Rose Gottemoeller
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Not so long ago, Vladimir Putin took a step that astonished me: he called for extending the limits of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New Start) for one year beyond February 5, 2026, when it is due to go out of force. 

It was Putin who pulled the plug on implementing the treaty in February 2023, blaming Joe Biden for assisting Kyiv and not respecting Russia’s security interests. Now he seems to be having second thoughts, telling his Security Council that discarding the beneficial aspects of the treaty would be a mistake. 

Keeping the New Start limits in place will give additional time to President Donald Trump, who is enthusiastic about limiting nuclear weapons, to figure out what he wants to do not only with the Russians, but also with the Chinese, who are quickly building nuclear weapons in a way that has everyone worried.

Continue reading at ft.com.

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Putin’s surprising call to extend the New Start treaty is a chance for atomic powers to make the world safer

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Rose Gottemoeller
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About the book:

Russian officials and experts often voice the view that the United States was hell-bent on undermining, even destroying Russia during the turbulent period of the Soviet breakup thirty years ago. The primary US goal, in this telling, was to expand NATO to Russia's borders to isolate and threaten the Russian state. Rose Gottemoeller, drawing from the historical record and her own professional experience, refutes this notion. Gottemoeller argues that, to the contrary, successive American presidents were convinced that deep cooperation with Russia is essential to international security and stability. This conviction was born during the George H.W. Bush administration and took definitive shape during the administration of Bill Clinton, when he and his Russian counterpart Boris Yeltsin agreed to develop technological cooperation that would be useful to both countries. George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin carried the conviction further, and the two countries made enormous strides on cooperation in outer space, counterterrorism, and nuclear energy over the next twenty years. While today is starkly different from the 1990s, Gottemoeller takes the lessons learned and considers what it would take—when Russia exits its horrific adventure in Ukraine and atones for the damage it has done—to resume cooperation for the sake of global security.

Click here to preorder.

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Rose Gottemoeller
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Readers of the Bulletin might be surprised that I’m not gunning for an extension of the New START arms control agreement between the United States and Russia, but I am not. My reason is simple: Today’s US political reality mandates that the next arms control treaty has to be wholly owned by President Donald Trump if it is to be successful.

Only President Trump will have the power and influence to ensure that the treaty succeeds in gaining the advice and consent of the US Senate and is ratified. He has long been interested in getting an ultimate deal with Russia, and only he can work successfully with President Vladimir Putin to get what the United States needs out of an agreement. This assumes, of course, that the current impasse over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine can be either set aside for the negotiations or overtaken by a successful peace process—which would be the best outcome for the Ukrainians and everyone else, including the Russians. And the clock is ticking with New START expiring in February.

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Readers of the Bulletin might be surprised that I’m not gunning for an extension of the New START arms control agreement between the United States and Russia, but I am not.

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Rose Gottemoeller
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On June 21, 2025, the United States executed a major military strike against Iran, targeting three of its most critical nuclear facilities: Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. The Fordow facility, deeply buried beneath a mountain near the city of Qom, has long been considered Iran’s most secure uranium enrichment site. Its depth has been estimated at 80 to 90 meters underground, with a great deal of reinforced concrete to protect it from aerial bombardment. Natanz also has a less well-protected enrichment facility; it was the target of the Stuxnet cyberattack about 15 years ago.

The US operation, called “Operation Midnight Hammer,” involved a coordinated assault using B-2 Spirit bombers and a US Navy submarine. According to Pentagon briefings, seven B-2 bombers each carried two GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOPs), 30,000-pound “bunker-buster” bombs designed to penetrate up to 200 feet of reinforced earth or concrete. In a 25-minute window, a dozen GBU-57 bombs were dropped on Fordow and two on Natanz. The submarine launched more than two dozen Tomahawk cruise missiles against surface infrastructure targets in Isfahan.

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While the attacks have likely inflicted significant damage on critical nuclear facilities in the short term, their ultimate success in halting Iran’s nuclear program is far from assured

Authors
Herbert Lin
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