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About the event: Why do individuals respond differently to violations of international law during war time depending on who commits them? This paper argues that public judgments of wartime violations involve two distinct processes: condemnation of the violation and attribution of responsibility to the actor who committed it. While condemnation evaluates the act itself, responsibility attribution requires an additional judgment about the actor, creating greater scope for political favorability to shape accountability. Jhunjhunwala tests this argument using a factorial vignette survey experiment with 1,521 Indian respondents fielded between May and July 2026. Respondents evaluate wartime violations that vary in perpetrator identity, violation severity, and whether the conduct is explicitly framed as illegal under international law. She finds that favorability reduces both condemnation and responsibility attribution, but its effect on responsibility attribution is roughly twice as large. These findings reveal an accountability gap: individuals can recognize that conduct is wrong without holding a favored actor equally responsible for it. This distinction helps explain how international law norms can generate widespread condemnation while producing uneven judgments of accountability.
 
About the speaker: Nivedita Jhunjhunwala is a US-India Security Fellow at the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and a Ph.D. Candidate in Government at the University of Texas at Austin, specializing in International Security, International Law, and Foreign Policy. Her research examines how global audiences perceive and react to international conflicts and violations of international law. She also studies state reputation and perceptions more generally in the context of the global "swing states", and the intersection of emerging technologies and politics.

William J. Perry Conference Room

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Pre-doctoral Fellow
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Alongside being a CISAC predoctoral fellow, Nivedita is a Ph.D. Candidate in Government at the University of Texas at Austin, specializing in International Relations. She has also been awarded a M.A. in Government at the University of Texas at Austin. Prior to graduate studies at UT Austin, she graduated summa cum laude from State University of New York at Oswego, majoring in Political Science and Global & International Studies. She is also a graduate fellow at the Clements Center of National Security and History.

Nivedita’s research examines how war and international law is perceived by global audiences. Specifically, she looks at how countries and citizens not involved in a foreign event, perceive and react to them. Within this agenda, she examines public opinion, foreign policy, and information dynamics of international events (like war) by focusing on India as a running case. Other research projects also examine international security more broadly, and the intersection between politics and emerging technologies.

When she's not working, Nivedita enjoys playing competitive pickleball, practicing and improving her German language skills, and creating social science short-form content for wider consumption.

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The archival record makes clear that killing large numbers of civilians was the primary purpose of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima; destruction of military targets and war industry was a secondary goal and one that “legitimized” the intentional destruction of a city in the minds of some participants. The atomic bomb was detonated over the center of Hiroshima. More than 70,000 men, women, and children were killed immediately; the munitions factories on the periphery of the city were left largely unscathed. Such a nuclear attack would be illegal today. It would violate three major requirements of the law of armed conflict codified in Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions: the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution. There could be great pressure to use nuclear weapons in future scenarios in which many American soldiers’ lives are at risk and there is no guarantee that a future US president would follow the law of armed conflict. That is why the United States needs senior military officers who fully understand the law and demand compliance and presidents who care about law and justice in war.

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Scott D. Sagan
Allen S. Weiner
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In 2013, the U.S. government announced that its nuclear war plans would be “consistent with the fundamental principles of the Law of Armed Conflict” and would “apply the principles of distinction and proportionality and seek to minimize collateral damage to civilian populations and civilian objects.” If properly applied, these legal principles can have a profound impact on U.S. nuclear doctrine. The prohibition against targeting civilians means that “countervalue” targeting and “minimum deterrence” strategies are illegal. The principle of distinction and the impermissibility of reprisal against civilians make it illegal for the United States, contrary to what is implied in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, to intentionally target civilians even in reprisal for a strike against U.S. or allied civilians. The principle of proportionality permits some, but not all, potential U.S. counterforce nuclear attacks against military targets. The precautionary principle means that the United States must use conventional weapons or the lowest-yield nuclear weapons that would be effective against legitimate military targets. The law of armed conflict also restricts targeting of an enemy's leadership to officials in the military chain of command or directly participating in hostilities, meaning that broad targeting to destroy an enemy's entire political leadership is unlawful.

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Scott D. Sagan
Allen S. Weiner
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Does the UN Charter’s use of force regime remain relevant and effective in regulating or constraining the behavior of states? This chapter answers this question in part by examining the incidence of the transnational use of force since 1945. The chapter finds that the level of transnational use of force has not significantly increased, despite the emergence of new security threats. The chapter also investigates how states engage with the Charter’s use of force regime by examining their justifications for military action. The chapter finds that states remain committed to the existing UN Charter’s legal framework. The proportion of transnational instances of the use of force for which states provide formal justifications to the Security Council has remained relatively static since 1945. The changing patterns of justificatory discourse also reveal limited reliance by states on legally contested bases for using force, suggesting an absence of state claims for the adaptation of black letter law. The one notable exception reflects evolving recognition that the right of states to exercise self-defense against nonstate actors located in other states prevails over the territorial integrity of the state where force is used. The chapter also finds increasing reliance by states on extralegal justifications, which frequently complement contested legal arguments. The use of extralegal justifications in this way suggests that even when states use force in circumstances that are difficult to reconcile with the black letter law of the Charter, they do not directly challenge the applicability of the Charter’s use of force regime.

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Lauren Sukin
Allen S. Weiner
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The prohibition on the threat of force under international law is typically understood as barring threats to resort to war in an unlawful manner, i.e., in violation of jus ad bellum rules in the U.N. Charter. Much less attention has been paid to threats to use force in an unlawful manner, i.e., in violation of jus in bello international humanitarian law (IHL) rules.

Neither Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter nor international law generally prohibits threats to use force in contravention of IHL. But for parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions or 1977 Additional Protocol I, threatening to use force in blatant or manifest violation of IHL would violate the obligation under Common Article 1 to ensure respect for those treaties.

This has important implications for nuclear deterrence, as a review of U.S. nuclear targeting policy reveals. For parties to Additional Protocol I, threats contemplating blatant or manifest violations of the rules of distinction, proportionality, and precaution would breach the duty to ensure respect for the Protocol.

Even where threats to use force in violation of international law would not be unlawful, there are sound policy reasons not to threaten to use force in violation of IHL. Such threats offer doubtful security benefits and could have the collateral effect of weakening compliance with IHL during the course of actual armed conflicts.

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Allen S. Weiner
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This Article explicates the under-conceptualized jus ad bellum proportionality principle in international law, and then assesses Israel’s compliance with proportionality during its use of force against Hamas in Gaza following the October 7, 2023, attacks. Using our proposed three-step analytical approach that we argue should guide jus ad bellum proportionality assessments, this Article finds, first, that Israel had a right of self-defense, and that Israel’s strategic objective of removing Hamas from political power and eliminating its military capabilities fell within the legitimate boundaries of self-defense. Second, however, this Article finds that Israel’s strategic objective required means that would foreseeably cause excessive damage and harm in this context, due to circumstances in Gaza that were wellknown to Israeli officials. Israel accordingly violated proportionality in pursuing this strategic objective. Third, satellite radar imagery analyses demonstrate that Israeli operations in fact caused extensive damage during the first year of the war that exceeded what was required for Israel’s self-defense, in violation of the proportionality principle. This Article concludes by discussing possible pathways for recourse under international law, and highlights the need for future rigorous analyses of proportionality in ongoing and prospective uses of force that can guide State behavior and promote compliance with international law.

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Allen S. Weiner
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This Article empirically investigates the connection between harmful narratives on social media and violent acts perpetrated against persons protected under international humanitarian law (IHL) during armed conflict, and then examines the legal implications of such a relationship. First, examining comprehensive datasets from two inter-state armed conflicts (Russia-Ukraine and Armenia-Azerbaijan) as case studies, this Article documents patterns in Telegram data indicating that more violent acts are preceded by increases in harmful narratives than decreases in such content. This suggests that harmful narratives on social media platforms may plausibly contribute to the incidence of real-world violence committed against protected persons during armed conflict. Assuming such a relationship exists, this Article then identifies the legal implications under three relevant bodies of law, arguing that creators and disseminators of such narratives may be in violation of international or domestic law because such content can foreseeably lead to violence. The Article concludes with several policy recommendations for stakeholders, including belligerents, regulating states, social media companies, and humanitarian actors, mapping out a series of actionable steps that could reduce harm against protected persons in conflict settings. Scholars and policymakers must do more to minimize the potential for harm that social media content presents in armed conflict settings.

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Allen S. Weiner
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In late November, 2025, five human rights organisations petitioned the Israeli High Court of Justice to allow for the evacuation of patients from the Gaza Strip into the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Gaza's health-care infrastructure faces near-total breakdown, with WHO reporting that only 18 of the 36 hospitals in Gaza are partially functioning.1 Essential services, including chemotherapy, intensive care, paediatric care, advanced imaging, and oncological surgery, are almost entirely inaccessible. The situation has been exacerbated by Israel's recent decision to block numerous leading international aid organisations from providing relief in the Gaza Strip on the grounds that they have refused to adhere to newly imposed requirements to list all employees by name to Israeli authorities, which has drawn significant criticism from the humanitarian sector and several of Israel's allies.2,3 According to a UN's press briefing as of mid-December, 2025, 18 500 patients, including 4096 children, are awaiting medical evacuation for treatment of conditions that cannot be treated in Gaza, including paediatric cancer and corrective surgeries.1 The petition is awaiting a High Court hearing and was not signed by the Israeli Medical Association, which argued that the issue is political. Allowing patients' access to medical treatment is a fundamental medical and humanitarian obligation, grounded in the right to health and in professional medical ethics.

Under international humanitarian law, an occupying power has a duty to act “to the fullest extent of the means available to it”, to “ensure the food and medical supplies of the population”, and to “ensur[e] and maintain…[medical] services, public health and hygiene in the occupied territory.”4,5 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has determined that Israel bears the obligations of an occupying power that are “commensurate with the degree of its effective control” in Gaza.6 The health system in the West Bank and East Jerusalem is funded by the Palestinian Authority. It is designed and committed to care for Palestinian patients at scale, both in response to urgent medical emergencies and as an integrated system capable of providing continuity of care to those who return to Gaza.

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Tom Dannenbaum
Ruth Gibson
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Motivated in part by the United States’ sprawling temporal and geographic projection of military force in the decades since 9/11, this chapter evaluates whether there is a point in armed conflict at which international law requires a state to stop fighting—or, more precisely, to cease its contributions to the conflict’s perpetuation. Morally, this is an undeniably urgent question. War involves the infliction of death, destruction, and suffering through means and methods that would be straightforwardly impermissible in any other context. At the crux of contemporary international law are intricate debates regarding the precise contours of the exceptional conditions under which it is lawful for a state to initiate war. And yet, despite similar normative stakes, there is vanishingly little jurisprudence on when it ceases to be lawful for a state to contribute to the perpetuation of a war that is ongoing. Drawing on the principles of necessity and proportionality in the jus ad bellum and human rights law, as well as underlying principles relating to the pursuit of peace, this chapter contends that international law includes the basic foundations of an obligation to cease fighting beyond a certain point. The current moment offers an opportunity to elaborate and fortify that regime with a view to shaping both public and intragovernmental discourse and providing a normative framework for political action and decision-making regarding war exit.

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Chapter from Perpetual War and International Law: Enduring Legacies of the War on Terror

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Tom Dannenbaum
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What were the effects of the US’s move from denying to accepting that the laws of armed conflict (LOAC) apply to nuclear weapons? We argue that the legalization of nuclear guidance and plans changed the US nuclear posture, which is now shaped by the principles of distinction and proportionality. However, the US interpretation of these principles is also shaped by unproven, but widely held, beliefs about the requirements of nuclear deterrence, what we call “creeds.” US nuclear and legal targeting doctrines are co-constituted: Partly to accommodate nuclear creeds, the United States contests widely accepted interpretations of distinction and proportionality, thereby keeping nuclear targets on the table that challenge LOAC. We propose three concrete shifts in how the United States could better apply distinction and proportionality to nuclear weapons: first, narrow the definition of military objectives to exclude purely political control capabilities; second, broaden the understanding of intent by renouncing civilian casualties as a secondary purpose of nuclear strikes; third, develop better models of long-term effects of nuclear use and include these effects in proportionality calculations. We argue that following LOAC more rigorously would not, as often feared, weaken nuclear deterrence. Instead, it could strengthen it.

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Scott D. Sagan
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