Abstract: In a world that is increasingly unstable, intelligence services like the American CIA and the United Kingdom's MI6 exist to deliver security. Whether the challenge involves terrorism, cyber-security, or the renewed specter of great power conflict, intelligence agencies mitigate threats and provide decisional advantage to national leaders. But empowered intelligence services require adequate supervision and oversight, which must be about more than the narrow (if still precarious) task of ensuring the legality of covert operations and surveillance activities. 

Global Intelligence Oversight is a comparative investigation of how democratic countries can govern their intelligence services so that they are effective, but operate within frameworks that are acceptable to their people in an interconnected world. The book demonstrates how the institutions that oversee intelligence agencies participate in the protection of national security while safeguarding civil liberties, balancing among competing national interests, and building public trust in inherently secret activities. It does so by analyzing the role of courts and independent oversight bodies as they operate in countries with robust constitutional frameworks and powerful intelligence services. The book also illuminates a new transnational oversight dynamic that is shaping and constraining security services in new ways. It describes how global technology companies and litigation in transnational forums constitute a new form of oversight whose contours are still undefined. As rapid changes in technology bring the world closer together, these forces will complement their more traditional counterparts in ensuring that intelligence activities remain effective, legitimate, and sustainable. To purchase the book, please click here.

About the Speakers: Samuel J. Rascoff is an expert in national security law, and serves as faculty director of the Center on Law and Security. Named a Carnegie Scholar in 2009, Rascoff came to the Law School from the New York City Police Department, where, as director of intelligence analysis, he created and led a team responsible for assessing the terrorist threat to the city. A graduate of Harvard summa cum laude, Oxford with first class honors, and Yale Law School, Rascoff previously served as a law clerk to US Supreme Court Justice David H. Souter and to Judge Pierre N. Leval of the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. He was also a special assistant with the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq and an associate at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. Rascoff’s publications include “Presidential Intelligence” (Harvard Law Review); “Counterterrorism and New Deterrence” (NYU Law Review); “Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of Counter-Radicalization” (Stanford Law Review); “Domesticating Intelligence” (Southern California Law Review), and “The Law of Homegrown (Counter-) Terrorism” (Texas Law Review).

Zachary K. Goldman is the Executive Director of the Center on Law and Security and an Adjunct Professor of Law at NYU School of Law. Previously, Zachary served as a Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the U.S. Department of Defense, and as a policy advisor in the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, where he was the subject matter expert on terrorist financing in the Arabian Peninsula and Iran sanctions. In the private sector, he was a litigator at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP in New York.

Zachary is the co-editor of Global Intelligence Oversight: Governing Security in the Twenty-First Century, an edited volume on comparative approaches to intelligence oversight, published by Oxford University Press.  He has testified before Congress and has published on national security strategy, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, and financial sanctions in outlets such as The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, Foreign Affairs, The Financial Times Chinese, the South China Morning Post, Political Science Quarterly, Cold War History, The Atlantic, The Diplomat, The National Interest, and others.

Zachary is a Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and a member of the Advisory Committee to the American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Law and National Security. He received his JD from New York University School of Law, his Masters in International Relations from the London School of Economics, and his BA from Harvard University.

Abstract: The purpose of this book project is to explain what it is about terrorism that makes it inherently difficult for the American government to formulate an effective counterterrorism policy. Why is terrorism such an intractable problem?  What are the obstacles to developing a consistent and coherent counterterrorism strategy?  The barriers that we identify flow from the issue itself, not the particular political predispositions of individual policy makers or flawed organizational processes.  We also find that scholars and policy makers face similar difficulties – the study of terrorism is often confused and contentious, and the study of counterterrorism can be even more frustrating.  

The book is co-authored by Martha Crenshaw and  Gary LaFree, Director of the National Center for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, as well as professor in the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice.

About the Speaker: Martha Crenshaw is a senior fellow at CISAC and FSI and a professor of political science by courtesy at Stanford. She was the Colin and Nancy Campbell Professor of Global Issues and Democratic Thought and professor of government at Wesleyan University in Middletown, Conn., where she taught from 1974 to 2007. She has written extensively on the issue of political terrorism; her first article, "The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism," was published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution in 1972. Her recent work includes “Trajectories of terrorism: Attack patterns of foreign groups that have targeted the United States, 1970–2004,” in Criminology & Public Policy, 8, 3 (August 2009) (with Gary LaFree and Sue-Ming Yang), “The Obama Administration and Counterterrorism,” in Obama in Office: the First Two Years, ed. James Thurber (Paradigm Publishers, 2011), and “Will Threats Deter Nuclear Terrorism?” in Deterring Terrorism: Theory and Practice, ed. Andreas Wenger and Alex Wilner (Stanford University Press, 2012). She is also the editor of The Consequences of Counterterrorism (Russell Sage Foundation, 2010). In 2011 Routledge published Explaining Terrorism, a collection of her previously published work.

She served on the Executive Board of Women in International Security and is a former President and Councilor of the International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP). She coordinated the working group on political explanations of terrorism for the 2005 Club de Madrid International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security. In 2005-2006 she was a Guggenheim Fellow. Since 2005 she has been a lead investigator with the National Center for the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, funded by the Department of Homeland Security. In 2009 she was awarded a grant from the National Science Foundation/Department of Defense Minerva Initiative for a project on "mapping terrorist organizations." She serves on the editorial boards of the journals International Security, Political Psychology, Security Studies, Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, and Terrorism and Political Violence. She is currently a member of the Committee on Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture of the National Academies of Science.

At the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014, NATO leaders were clear about the security challenges on the Alliance’s borders. In the East, Russia’s actions threaten our vision of a Europe that is whole, free and at peace.  On the Alliance’s southeastern border, ISIL’s campaign of terror poses a threat to the stability of the Middle East and beyond.  To the south, across the Mediterranean, Libya is becoming increasingly unstable. As the Alliance continues to confront theses current and emerging threats, one thing is clear as we prepare for the 2016 Summit in Warsaw: NATO will adapt, just as it has throughout its 65-year history.

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In August 2013, Douglas E. Lute was sworn-in as the Ambassador of the United States to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  From 2007 to 2013, Lute served at the White House under Presidents Bush and Obama, first as the Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan, and more recently as the Deputy Assistant to the President focusing on Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.  In 2010, AMB Lute retired from the U.S. Army as a Lieutenant General after 35 years on active duty.  Prior to the White House, he served as the Director of Operations on the Joint Staff, overseeing U.S. military operations worldwide. He served multiple tours in NATO commands including duty in Germany during the Cold War and commanding U.S. forces in Kosovo.  He holds degrees from the United States Military Academy and Harvard University.

A light lunch will be provided.  Please plan to arrive by 11:30am to allow time to check in at the registration desk, pick up your lunch and be seated by 12:00 noon.

Co-sponsored by The Europe Center, the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies.

Abstract: What happens to armed organizations after they sign peace accords? Why do they remilitarize or demilitarize? This project provides an explanation for this variation in post-war trajectories based on the geography of recruitment – whether the armed groups recruited locally or non-locally. The theory’s mechanisms center on social networks, principal-agent problems, and information asymmetries. I link these factors to changes in the distribution of power and the likelihood of successful bargaining, resumed violence or consolidated peace. The empirics draw on the comparative laboratory of contemporary Colombia where 37 armed organizations signed peace accords with the government and then diverged in their post-war trajectories: half remilitarized, half demilitarized. Drawing on data from eleven surveys collected over the course of ten years, I analyze how ex-combatants were networked in geographical space over time. I then examine the implications of cohesive or eroded networks on remilitarization using organization-level data derived from intelligence agencies and municipality-level data on 29,000 violent events over the course of 46 years of war. The project then turns to process tracing in various regions of Colombia, employing over 300 in-depth interviews to illustrate the validity of the causal process. The empirics provide strong support for the theory and cast doubt on explanations centered on the political economy of violence and correlates of civil war. The project has important implications for future research on civil wars, intrastate peace processes, and state formation and outlines a series of recommendations for policy.

About the Speaker: Sarah Daly is Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Notre Dame. Her research interests include civil wars and peace-building, international security, and ethnic politics with a regional focus on Latin America. Her book manuscript, under contract with Cambridge University Press, explores the post-war trajectories of armed organizations. Her other research seeks to explain sub-national variation in insurgency onset, organized crime and state-building, recidivism of ex-combatants during war to peace transitions, state strategies towards ethnic minorities in the former Soviet Union, and the role of emotions in transitional justice regimes. Her research has been published in the Journal of Peace Research, British Journal of Political Science, Comparative Politics, Conflict, Security & Development, and in several edited volumes. Sarah has conducted field research in Colombia, Ecuador, Chile and Brazil, is a Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and has spent time at the World Bank, Organization of American States, and Peace Research Institute of Oslo. She has also served as a fellow in the Political Science Department and at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, at the Saltzman Institute of War & Peace Studies at Columbia University, and at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. Her research has been funded by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mellon Foundation/American Council of Learned Societies, Social Science Research Council, National Science Foundation, Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, Smith Richardson Foundation, Fulbright Program, United States Institute of Peace, MIT Center for International Studies, and MIT Entrepreneurship Center.

Abstract: Why and how do elite arrangements vary across authoritarian regimes? Why do some arrangements persist, while others are dissolved through coup d’état, failed coup attempts, and extensive purges? Existing political science explanations of authoritarian stability broadly emphasize three factors: individual members’ attributes, material payoffs, and formal institutions. Yet historians and country experts emphasize the centrality of social and informal ties between actors. I argue that, to understand the variation in the source and extent of coalitional breakdown, scholars must situate the holders of political and military office in their organizational and social context. Authoritarian coalitions differ in systematic ways in their members’ patterns of organizational and social relationships; these different relational configurations have distinct implications for coalitional trajectories. This paper employs original archival and interview evidence to trace the emergence and evolution of authoritarian networks in Iraq and Syria. It demonstrates that the extent of overlap between organizational and social networks explains the type of elite breakdown (and its breadth) over time. 

About the Speaker: Julia Choucair-Vizoso is a joint predoctoral fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) and the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) for 2014-2015. She is a doctoral candidate in Political Science at Yale University.

Choucair-Vizoso studies coalitional politics and elite networks in nondemocratic settings. Her dissertation examines how elites organize to enforce authoritarian rule, and how and why these organizational structures evolve. Drawing on network theory and analysis, her study examines ruling coalitions in Iraq and Syria.

Her research has been supported by fellowships from the United States Institute of Peace and Yale University’s MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies. She holds a B.S. in International Politics and an M.A. in Arab Studies from Georgetown University, and was an associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

This event is sponsored by the Center for International Security and Cooperation, the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law and the Program on Arab Reform and Democracy. 

Abstract: While non-democratic states often restrict traditional civil liberties such as speech, media, and association, the degree of Internet freedom permitted varies dramatically across states.  This paper uses a mixed-method approach to analyze global patterns of Internet policy across hybrid and authoritarian regimes, and to offer a model of key causal factors and processes influencing policy choice – particularly the choice whether to adopt restrictive policies that limit Internet use and content or to permit the development of and access to a vibrant uncensored Internet.  Large-N analysis identifies global patterns of Internet restrictions and examines how these patterns appear to be changing as Internet penetration increases.  The paper also draws on research from the Russian Federation, tracing changes in domestic Internet policy choices and their relation to political instability and control, examining a critical period of policy change in a regime that had previously stood out for its relatively unrestricted Internet. 

About the Speaker: Jaclyn Kerr is a doctoral candidate in government at Georgetown University. Her research examines the Internet policies adopted by authoritarian and hybrid regimes in their attempts to adapt to the potentially destabilizing influence of growing Internet penetration.  She holds a BAS in Mathematics and Slavic Studies, and an MA in Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies from Stanford University.  In 2013-2014, Ms. Kerr was a research fellow at the Center for the Study of New Media and Society at the New Economic School in Moscow, while conducting field research for her dissertation.  She has worked as a research assistant at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard, has been an IREX EPS Fellow at the U.S. Embassy in Kazakhstan, a Research Fellow at Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar, an IREX YLF Fellow in Saint Petersburg, Russia, and has previous professional experience as a software engineer. She joins CISAC as a Cybersecurity Predoctoral Fellow for 2014-2015.