On June 20 and 21, 2003, the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University hosted a workshop on intelligence problems facing the United States in the areas of terrorism and nuclear proliferation. The workshop, which brought together approximately 75 scholars, intelligence and policy practitioners, and scientists, was co-sponsored by the U.S. Army as part of the Eisenhower National Security Series.

The history of the October 1969 alert demonstrates that even in this high-politics arena of nuclear diplomacy, presidential orders were actively fought against, sometimes manipulated or ignored, and often honored only in part. Other orders were interpreted and implemented in a more vigorous manner that best suited the organizational interests of the military commanders doing the interpretation. The result was that many important details of the military activities undertaken in October 1969 reflected the operational interests of the military commanders and the goals of lower-level bureaucratic actors as much as the strategic objectives of the president. In this important sense, the nuclear alert was loosely coupled to the president´s orders.

Proponents of a new generation of low-yield nuclear earth-penetrating weapons (EPWs), such as modified versions of the B61-11 currently in the US stockpile, claim that such weapons could be used against deeply buried and hardened underground bunkers with "minimal collateral damage." Even a very low-yield nuclear EPW exploded in or near an urban environment will, however, cause radioactive dirt and debris and other radioactive material to fall out over several square kilometers. A nuclear EPW with a yield less than one-tenth of that of the nuclear weapon used on Hiroshima or Nagasaki could result in fatal doses of radiation to tens of thousands of victims. Biological and chemical agents stored in targeted bunkers may be dispersed into the atmosphere without being destroyed by an EPW, potentially injuring or killing unprotected civilians. The number of casualties from a nuclear EPW attack would depend on the location of the target, the density of the surrounding population, the extent of debris dispersal, and the possibility of escape or evacuation. In addition to the acute and long-term medical consequences, use of nuclear weapons would weaken existing restraints against further proliferation or use of nuclear weapons and would cross a threshold that has been maintained since 1945, when the United States detonated the first nuclear weapons over Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

What is the impact of the events of September 11 and the subsequent "war on terrorism" on nuclear issues? The "war on terrorism" is a handy political moniker for what the United States must learn to do in response to changes that have actually been taking place over several years. Some of the US responses to date have been wise. Some need a new look. Perhaps most important, in some areas, the United States and other countries have not responded and may be at a loss to respond, given the constraints on their policies. Some of these lacking responses provide the most important items on the post September 11 security agenda. In what follows, I will give one view of what these are and what to do about them.

I begin with nuclear terrorism, particularly the possibility of using nuclear weapons for terrorist purposes. The next section addresses the related issue of nuclear proliferation to state and non-state actors. The events of September 11 have given a new twist to that issue. There is a relationship between the possibility of nuclear weapons getting into terrorists' hands and the problems in Iraq, South and Central Asia, and North Korea. The following sections deals with an item that is no longer high on the US political agenda but which is tied to proliferation and terrorism and has a greater long-range potential for causing trouble, the incipient nuclear rivalries around the world. In closing, I suggest some elements of a desirable nuclear posture to deal with some of the problems outlined.

Since the Bush administration took office, and especially since excerpts of the Nuclear Posture Review were released, there have appeared in America some heated arguments about the Bush administration's changes to the Clinton administration's nuclear strategy, what consequences these changes would produce, and what influences they would exert on international and regional security. Different people have different views. The purpose of this working paper is to find solutions to these key issues. The effects of the Bush administration's nuclear strategy on China's security are also discussed.

The main viewpoint of the working paper is that the Bush administration has made the most fundamental adjustments to America's nuclear strategy since the end of the Cold War. These adjustments greatly modify U.S. nuclear deterrent strategy, the country's policy on using nuclear weapons, the triad of deterrent forces structure, and nuclear arms control policy. The new nuclear strategy would upset a balance of forces and stability regionally and around the globe. Moreover, the United States is shifting the focus of military strategy from Europe to Asia. This would exert significant influences on Asian-Pacific regional security and China's security.

This article analyzes the supply and demand sides in nuclear smuggling, as well as intermediaries between them, based on the 700 illicit trafficking incidents collected by the Stanford Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft, and Orphan Radiation Sources (DSTO) for the period 1991 to 2002. The supply side consists of people with access to nuclear and other radioactive material. It can be subdivided into civilian employees at source facilities, ranging from technicians to top managers; military personnel; and security guards. Intermediaries--traffickers and middlemen--can be categorized as amateurs, opportunist businessmen and firms, and organized crime groups. The demand side is represented by proliferating nation states, terrorist organizations, religious sects, separatist movements, and criminal groups or individuals interested in using nuclear and other radioactive material for malevolent purposes, such as murder, deliberate exposure, blackmail, and extortion.

There is justified concern that terrorists may use nuclear or other radioactive material to commit an act of terrorism. However, there are multiple barriers to be overcome by a terrorist to actually be able to deploy such a weapon. This article discusses four threat scenarios involving nuclear and other radioactive materials: radioactive dispersion with criminal intent, radiological malevolence, attack on a nuclear power plant, and nuclear weapons.

Altogether, 16 attack modes are identified with largely different logistical and technical requirements for their implementation. However, none of them should be considered as out of realm for a dedicated terror organization with a certain degree of sophistication.

This article presents an overview of the history of development and the current status of the Soviet and Russian early-warning system, which was built to provide the Soviet strategic forces with information about a missile attack in an event of a nuclear conflict with the United States. Two main components of this system are considered--the network of early-warning radars, and the space-based early-warning system, which includes satellites on highly-elliptical and geosynchronous orbits. The system appears to be capable of detecting a massive attack, but cannot be relied upon to detect individual missile launches.