International efforts to improve the security of nuclear material and facilities from theft and sabotage were intensified by the attacks of September 11. But the magnitude of the changes that are needed to protect against terrorist attacks like those of September 11 has not yet been widely appreciated, perhaps in part because of beliefs in some countries that what happened in the US on September 11 “can’t happen here.” This report will discuss the relevant features of the September 11 attacks, the recent illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials that might benefit terrorists, and the international efforts to improve physical protection after September 11.

After the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991, illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material emerged as a serious international concern. The economic and social conditions that followed the collapse left nuclear and radioactive material often poorly guarded and vulnerable to theft. In the early 1990s, Europe observed a sharp increase in nuclear smuggling incidents, as stolen nuclear and other radioactive material was brought from the former Soviet republics to Western Europe in the hope of finding a market. Since 1994, however, reported illicit trafficking incidents in Europe have declined. By contrast, since 1999 there has been an increase in such incidents in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Turkey. Analysts have long speculated that nuclear smugglers would exploit this region--known as the southern tier--as a transit corridor.

This report looks at the illicit trafficking situation in the southern tier and Turkey in an attempt to establish whether these regions have become new routes for smuggling nuclear and other radioactive material. It discusses reported incidents of illicit trafficking in these countries, assesses their responses to the threat of trafficking, and evaluates foreign assistance provided to the region to combat this smuggling. The report concludes with recommendations for improving international anti-nuclear smuggling efforts.

This report presents the highlights of a workshop entitled "Communicating Nuclear Risk: Informing the Public about the Risks and Realities of Nuclear Terrorism" held at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) of the Institute of International Studies at Stanford University on May 20, 2002.

This workshop produced several publications for use in communicating with the public: a backgrounder titled "Understanding the Risks and Realities of Nuclear Terrorism," and related fact sheets on "Dirty Bombs," "Nuclear Explosions," "Attacks on Nuclear Facilities," and "Radiation."

A portion of President Bush's 2002 nuclear posture was released or leaked recently. The posture is largely silent on international cooperation and largely negative on arms control. The main relatively new trend in the posture is that the US will be prepared to use nuclear weapons in a much wider range of circumstances than before, with a particular emphasis on tactical uses. Such an emphasis in a declaratory policy has not been seen since the days of "flexible response" forty or so years ago, when tactical nuclear weapons were deployed in Europe and elsewhere. Supporting that trend, the posture states that the infrastructure for those expanded missions will be built up, including the design and production of new nuclear weapons; and that arms control measures, such as SALT II and the CTBT, will not stand in the way.