This report outlines the changes in energy supply that will be required over the next fifty years. I describe the ultimate objective of controls on greenhouse-gas emissions and set a stabilization target for greenhouse-gas concentrations that is designed to achieve this objective. I translate this target into limits on the emission of carbon dioxide and the burning of fossil fuels over the next century, and estimate requirements for carbon-free energy supply over this period. Finally, I describe options for achieving this transformation in world energy supply and outline near-term research and development priorities.

The decade of the 1990s has seen renewed concerns over nuclear proliferation, both horizontal and vertical. While many in the arms control community focus on numbers, it is control that is the most important factor--the detonation of just one nuclear weapon would be an international catastrophe. Rather than concentrating on numbers, the regime defined herein centers on enhancing the safety and security being provided nuclear weapons and weapons-usable fissile materials. The proposal in the paper is called the Nuclear Weapons Control Treaty (NWCT) and referred to as New Court. The emphasis is on control rather than disarmament, protection from unintended or unauthorized use rather than elimination. New Court, once in place, would provide an environment in which the necessary audits and accountability for undertaking dramatic reductions in the numbers of weapons and the quantities of weapons-usable materials could be made with much greater confidence than exists today. However, it will be decades (if ever) before the number of nuclear weapons goes to zero. In the meantime, it is paramount that comprehensive safety and security be established and maintained.

There are currently more than a thousand metric tons of civilian fuel cycle plutonium, mostly in spent fuel rods, but hundreds of tons are already separated and in storage. Any of this plutonium could be fashioned into a nuclear explosive. There are no practical approaches for disposing of plutonium in periods of time less than decades. Much of the architecture and technology from New Court can be applied to the development of international monitored storage facilities (IMSF) for civil nuclear material. The paper outlines the five key requirements an international depository must satisfy: national security for the depositors and the host nation; safety and security of the material; transparency of operations; technology transfer to provide uniform global protection; and precise accurate accountability of the quantities and forms of material deposited. The synergism and conflict among the factors is briefly described. The paper also contains annexes on the current status of some key monitoring technologies and a description of an international "stored weapons standard" for protecting weapons-usable fissile material.

The Cross-Industry Working Team (XIWT), with the support of Stanford University Consortium for Research on Information Security and Policy (CRISP), sponsored a symposium on cross-industry activities aimed at improving the reliability, dependability, and robustness of the information infrastructure. The purpose of this meeting was to identify the steps required to get to a reliable and dependable information infrastructure serving the needs of society. The emphasis in the meeting was on cross-industry and potentially cross-sector (government, industry, and academia) activities to accomplish that goal. The symposium dealt with the following generic topics: organizational activities to identify and pursue critical issues, issues in data transport and communications, issues in applications and services, and potential research and development activities.

The presentations and discussions of the meeting identified several potential cross-industry activities that could further the effort toward a more reliable and trustworthy information infrastructure. These activities fell into four general categories:

• Information Exchange Activities
  
• Consensus Activities
  
• Collaborative Operational Activities
  
• Collaborative R&D Activities
  

Two specific activities were discussed in some detail.

Government Sharing of Best Practices

It was observed that many of the government agencies have undertaken extensive efforts to improve the trustworthiness of their information systems, enabling them to withstand both failures and attacks. There is an opportunity for these agencies to be exemplars for the community— sharing what they have learned in the process of trying to make their systems more robust. This was felt to be an example of how the government and industry could work together to improve the trustworthiness of the overall information infrastructure.

Collaborative Experimental Environments

A potentially very productive collaborative R&D activity was discussed, involving industry, academia, and government. Universities and university consortia are investigating new techniques for building reliable systems of unreliable components, and for dealing with large complex systems. There is a need to evaluate, validate, and assimilate such research results into the industry environment. To that end, a collaborative, multi-industry experimental environment was discussed. This environment, distributed across multiple organizations, could provide such an evaluation, validation, and assimilation opportunity.

A number of other potential cross-industry activities were also mentioned throughout the meeting, and are discussed briefly in the proceedings.

Attendees agreed (based on a follow-up survey and informal comments) that the symposium was well worthwhile, and that continued dialogue is important to achieving the shared goal of a trustworthy information infrastructure. XIWT plans on helping foster such dialogue as well as collaborative activities toward that goal.

This report reviews Chinese participation in the international negotiations for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva and provides background for China’s decision-making procedures during the negotiations.

The CTBT negotiations marked the first important international negotiations for a multilateral disarmament treaty in which China participated from beginning to end. They were the first important international negotiations in which China, as a nuclear power, had great influence. The Chinese delegation to the CD assumed a serious and responsible attitude during the entire course of the negotiations. In part to increase international confidence that it would sign the CTBT by 1996 as scheduled and in part to indicate its intent to adapt itself to the world trend toward increased international cooperation and nuclear arms reduction, China announced during the latter stage of the negotiations that it would suspend nuclear testing.

As an example of successful multilateral negotiations, the conclusion and signing of the treaty, although long postponed, is an important achievement in arms control. As the sole declared nuclear-weapon state of the Third World at that time and the last among the five nuclear-weapon states (P5) to cease nuclear testing, China’s stance toward the CTBT negotiations was the object of world attention and concern. The population of China accounts for nearly one-quarter of the world’s total; China’s positive position on the CTBT and its contributions toward this end has a major worldwide impact now and in the future.

Prior to the commencement of the CTBT negotiations in Geneva, China declared on October 5, 1993, that while supporting an early conclusion of the treaty it would “take an active part in the negotiating process and work together with other countries to conclude this treaty no later than 1996.” China kept its promise.

China pursued a fair, reasonable, and verifiable treaty with universal adherence and unlimited duration. During the negotiations, China presented many working papers, non-papers, and suggestions regarding the CTBT draft text (including a number of revisions), and dealt with a series of critical issues in the Preamble, Basic Obligations, Organization, Verification, and Entry into Force sections of the treaty. The Chinese delegation played an active role at the conference table, and contributed positively to the weekly P5 consultations that ran in parallel with the CTBT talks.

China adhered toughly to its positions on two issues in the latter stage of the CTBT negotiations. One concerned potential abuses of the on-site inspection procedures. The other was that all nuclear-test-capable states (assumed to be the P5, India, Israel, and Pakistan) must accede to the treaty in order for it to enter into full legal force. Although China was not entirely satisfied with the final draft CTBT, it accepted the treaty. It agreed to sign the CTBT in the belief that the treaty text represented the best achievable result of the negotiations of the preceding two and a half years, reflected by and large the state of the negotiations, and was in general balanced.

Signing the CTBT was in line with China’s consistent stand in support of “the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.” This was one of the major reasons China supported an early conclusion of the treaty. Of course, China’s desire to meet the trend of the modern world also motivated it to sign. Because economic development had long been Beijing’s top priority, China needed a peaceful security environment in order to devote itself completely to the modernization of the nation. To this end, its defense buildup had been steadily subordinated to national economic development. Beijing’s decision on the CTBT negotiations stemmed also from its self-defense and no-first-use nuclear policies. China had established an effective nuclear force for self-defense.

China is now making preparations for the treaty to enter into force. After the conclusion of the CTBT, China will continue efforts in pursuit of world peace, development, and cooperation. Meanwhile, China will continuously ensure the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons without nuclear testing.

Whether China can achieve its economic and political goals depends very much upon whether PRC's domestic stability can be maintained and large-scale devastating military conflict, either internally with Taiwan or externally with major foreign powers, can be avoided. This article will speculate on China's security role in the region and in the world ten to fifteen years hence, and assess China's likely intentions, capabilities, and strategies in domestic and foreign affairs, in light of the changes in China's geopolitical environment.

In July 1996, President Clinton established the Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, with a charter to designate critical infrastructures and assess their vulnerabilities, to recommend a comprehensive national policy and implementation strategy for protecting those infrastructures from physical and cyber threats, and to propose statutory or regulatory actions to effect the recommended remedies. The charter gives examples of critical infrastructures (telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil storage and transportation, banking and finance, transportation, water supply systems, emergency services, and continuity of government), and also notes the types of cyber threats of concern (electronic, radio-frequency, or computer-based attacks on the information or communications components that control critical infrastructures).

Some of the critical infrastructures are owned or controlled by the government, and hence the government can, in principle, harden and restructure these systems and control access to achieve a greater degree of robustness. However, the President's executive order recognizes that many of the critical infrastructures are developed, owned, operated, or used by the private sector and that government and private sector cooperation will be required to define acceptable measures for the adequate protection and assurance of continued operation of these infrastructures.

The Stanford Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC), as part of its ongoing Program on Information Technology and National Security, and the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) are conducting workshops to examine many of the issues connected with the work of the Commission. In addition to the questions of vulnerabilities, threats, and possible remedies, we discuss the impact on the marketplace of possible protective actions, cost in terms of capital and functionality, legal constraints, and the probable need for international cooperation.

The first of these jointly sponsored workshops was held March 10-11, 1997, and included participation by members and staff of the Presidential Commission; the Stanford community; the information technology industry; and by security specialists at infrastructure organizations, research companies, and the national laboratories. The results of this two-day meeting are summarized in the following report.

Late last year, we noted the tenth anniversary of what was probably the most remarkable of all the meetings between an American president and his Soviet counterpart, the Reykjavik Summit of October 1986. History has shown that Reykjavik was a true turning point. Three major treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union were negotiated by the end of 1992; they resulted in substantially reduced levels of nuclear weapons. That happened as the Cold War was ending and, as the Russians say, it was no coincidence. A dramatic change in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States made it possible. A readiness, both in Washington and in Moscow, to open a new chapter in their relationship prepared the way.

The world has moved on. The Soviet Union no longer exists. But can we say that the world has been freed from the incessant and pervasive fear of nuclear devastation? Not yet, as this report will show. Persuading three newly independent states to eliminate the nuclear weapons they inherited in the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major achievement. Cooperating with Russia to tighten controls over fissile materials has made a real difference in terms of international security. But illicit trafficking in nuclear materials is still a potential problem and this has happened just as a more brutal form of terrorism, more willing to engage in mass murder, has made its appearance. This threat requires a wide spectrum of responses, but at the heart of it is the need for strict controls over nuclear weapons and fissile materials from the laboratory to the missile silo and every point in between.

The idea of a safer strategic environment involving progressively less reliance on nuclear weapons is still valid and must be pursued. Abolishing nuclear weapons is a feat beyond our present capacity to achieve, but we can go much further than we have to date in eliminating these weapons. The recent U.S.-Russian summit meeting in Helsinki made a start in that direction.

The American relationship with Russia is one among many that require careful tending. It is one of the few that can be said to be vital. We can reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in the Russian-American relationship and that would open the door to many opportunities now denied us.

As a result of the rapid changes following the breakup of the Soviet bloc, there were suddenly new markets of hundreds of millions of people, covering a large portion of the earth, containing large fractions of many of the world's natural resources, possessing extensive research and production capacity, with a highly educated workforce, and utilizing many advanced technologies. Russia contained a large fraction of these factors, especially those oriented toward high technology, and hence it behooves international companies to formulate and implement strategies for doing business in Russia.

This particular study was undertaken because the quest for cooperative ventures has been a major portion of the strategy of many Russian defense enterprises and U.S. companies in addressing these changes. We deemed it important to gain a better understanding of the factors affecting companies' and enterprises' decisions regarding cooperative ventures and some of the determinants of success, as well as to analyze strategies for U.S. companies and Russian enterprises contemplating or participating in cooperative ventures.

The conclusions in this report are based on case-study interviews with companies and enterprises engaged in cooperative ventures. All of the Russian enterprises in our study, with the exception of some start-ups, had been heavily involved in military work; the American companies were from both the military and civilian sectors.

The end of the Cold War has fundamentally altered the international system, as well as the major threats to global peace and security. The ideologically driven competition between the superpowers which was the defining feature of the Cold War, with its attendant dangers of nuclear confrontation, has been replaced with a whole array of new challenges. Among the most critical is the challenge of dealing with the consequences of the collapse of the USSR.

The emergence of fifteen independent states with uncertain identities, contested boundaries, weak institutions, and enormous political and economic problems carries with it considerable potential for future instability. Although the level of both inter-state and interethnic conflict in this vast region has thus far remained relatively low, and its scope contained, the tragic conflicts in Tajikistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Chechnya, among others, are a reminder, if any is needed, that the dangers of serious escalation are very real. Moreover, the political, economic, and security environment of the entire region is critically dependent on the future evolution of Russia itself.

The rapid and unexpected demise of the Soviet system gave rise to overly optimistic expectations of Russia's rapid transition to a democratic polity, market economy, and constructive partnership with its new neighbors and with the West. It is now abundantly clear that the formulation of effective policies for dealing with this region requires a serious reassessment of these initial premises as well as the elaboration of new institutional arrangements, norms, incentives, and constraints capable of contributing to conflict prevention as well as to the more effective management of those conflicts which have already erupted in the region.

This essay by Ambassdor Maresca, presented at the Center for International Security and Arms Control in January 1995, and the varied responses it invited, are intended to stimulate further discussion of these central issues by the larger academic and policy community.

This report is an expanded version of the executive summary of a much larger report, "Defense Industry Restructuring in Russia: Case Studies and Analysis." Many people contributed to that report, and to the underlying research. In writing that report, we did not attempt to reach consensus among the authors on the interpretations to be drawn from the data.

In this study we have looked at some of the most important elements of restructuring involved in the attempt to generate a viable civilian industrial sector from the assets of the military-industrial complex. Many other reform activities must be implemented at the national level to create the environment and infrastructure necessary for the functioning of a restructured industrial sector. Although not addressed here, they are important and difficult to implement. Another issue that we have not addressed is the pandemic presence of organized crime, which is a huge financial "tax" on economic activity as well as a disincentive to entrepreneurship and investment. I join those who believe that this is the largest single problem threatening the economic stability of Russia today.