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The United States has a growing inventory of spent nuclear fuel from commercial power plants that continues to accumulate at reactor sites around the country.

In addition, the legacy waste from U.S. defense programs remains at Department of Energy sites around the country, mainly at Hanford, WA, Savannah River, SC, and at Idaho National Laboratory.

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But now the U.S. nuclear waste storage program is “frozen in place”, according to Rod Ewing, Frank Stanton professor in nuclear security at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation.

“The processing and handling of waste is slow to stopped and in this environment the pressure has become very great to do something.”

Currently, more than seventy thousand metric tons of spent nuclear fuel from civilian reactors is sitting in temporary aboveground storage facilities spread across 35 states, with many of the reactors that produced it shut down.  And U.S. taxpayers are paying the utilities billions of dollars to keep it there.

Meanwhile, the deep geologic repository where all that waste was supposed to go, in Yucca Mountain Nevada, is now permanently on hold, after strong resistance from Nevada residents and politicians led by U.S. Senator Harry Reid.

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad New Mexico, the world’s first geologic repository for transuranic waste, has been closed for over a year due to a release of radioactivity.

And other parts of the system, such as the vitrification plant at Hanford and the mixed oxide fuel plant at Savannah River , SC, are way behind schedule and over budget.

It’s a growing problem that’s unlikely to change this political season.

“The chances of dealing with it in the current Congress are pretty much nil, in my view,” said former U.S. Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM).

“We’re not going to see a solution to this problem this year or next year.”

The issue in Congress is generally divided along political lines, with Republicans wanting to move forward with the original plan to build a repository at Yucca Mountain, while Democrats support the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future to create a new organization to manage nuclear waste in the U.S. and start looking for a new repository location using an inclusive, consent-based process.

“One of the big worries that I have with momentum loss is loss of nuclear competency,” said David Clark, a Fellow at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

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“So we have a whole set of workers who have been trained, and have been working on these programs for a number of years. When you put a program on hold, people go find something else to do.”

Meanwhile, other countries are moving ahead with plans for their own repositories, with Finland and Sweden leading the pack, leaving the U.S. lagging behind.

So Ewing decided to convene a series of high-level conferences, where leading academics and nuclear experts from around the world can discuss the issues in a respectful environment with a diverse range of stakeholders – including former politicians and policy makers, scientists and representatives of Indian tribes and other effected communities.

“For many of these people and many of these constituencies, I’ve seen them argue at length, and it’s usually in a situation where a lot seems to be at stake and it’s very adversarial,” said Ewing.

“So by having the meeting at Stanford, we’ve all taken a deep breath, the program is frozen in place, nothing’s going to go anywhere tomorrow, we have the opportunity to sit and discuss things. And I think that may help.”

Former Senator Bingaman said he hoped the multidisciplinary meetings, known at the “Reset of Nuclear Waste Management Strategy and Policy Series”, would help spur progress on this pressing problem.

“There is a high level of frustration by people who are trying to find a solution to this problem of nuclear waste, and there’s no question that the actions that we’ve taken thus far have not gotten us very far,” Bingaman said.

“I think that’s why this conference that is occurring is a good thing, trying to think through what are the problems that got us into the mess we’re in, and how do we avoid them in the future.”

The latest conference, held earlier this month, considered the question of how to structure a new nuclear waste management organization in the U.S.

Speakers from Sweden, Canada and France brought an international perspective and provided lessons learned from their countries nuclear waste storage programs.

“The other…major programs, France, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Canada, they all reached a crisis point, not too different from our own,” said Ewing.

“And at this crisis point they had to reevaluate how they would go forward. They each chose a slightly different path, but having thought about it, and having selected a new path, one can also observe that their programs are moving forward.”

France has chosen to adopt a closed nuclear cycle to recycle spent fuel and reuse it to generate more electricity.

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“It means that the amount of waste that we have to dispose of is only four percent of the total volume of spent nuclear fuel which comes out of the reactor,” said Christophe Poinssot of the French Atomic and Alternative Energy Commission.

“We also reduce the toxicity because…we are removing the plutonium. And finally, we are conditioning the final waste under the form of nuclear glass, the lifetime of which is very long, in the range of a million years in repository conditions.”

Clark said that Stanford was the perfect place to convene a multidisciplinary group of thought leaders in the field who could have a real impact on the future of nuclear waste storage policy.

“The beauty of a conference like this, and holding it at a place like Stanford University and CISAC, is that all the right people are here,” he said.

“All the people who are here have the ability to influence, through some level of authority and scholarship, and they’ll be able to take the ideas that they’ve heard back to their different offices and different organizations.  I think it will make a difference, and I’m really happy to be part of it.”

Ewing said it was also important to include students in the conversation.

“There’s a next generation of researchers coming online, and I want to save them the time that it took me to realize what the problems are,” Ewing said.

“By mixing students into this meeting, letting them interact with all the parties, including the distinguished scientists and engineers, I’m hoping it speeds up the process.”

Professor Ewing is already planning his next conference, next March, which will focus on the consent-based process that will be used to identify a new location within the U.S. for a repository.

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Clifton B. Parker
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While the potential benefits of artificial intelligence are significant and far-reaching, AI’s potential dangers to the global order necessitates an astute governance and policy-making approach, panelists said at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) on May 23.

An alumni event at the Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy (MIP) program featured a panel discussion on “The Impact of AI on the Global Order.” Participants included Anja Manuel, Jared Dunnmon, David Lobell, and Nathaniel Persily. The moderator was Francis Fukuyama, Olivier Nomellini senior fellow at FSI and director of the master’s program.

Manuel, an affiliate at FSI’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and executive director of the Aspen Strategy Group, said that what “artificial intelligence is starting to already do is it creates superpowers in the way it intersects with other technologies.”

An alumna of the MIP program, Manuel noted an experiment a year ago in Switzerland where researchers asked an AI tool to come up with new nerve agents – and it did very rapidly, 40,000 of them. On the subject of strategic nuclear deterrence, AI capabilities may upend existing policy approaches. Though about 30 countries have voluntarily signed up to follow governance standards in how AI would be used in military conflicts, the future is unclear.

“I worry a lot,” said Manuel, noting that AI-controlled fighter jets will likely be more effective than human-piloted craft. “There is a huge incentive to escalate and to let the AI do more and more and more of the fighting, and I think the U.S. government is thinking it through very carefully.”
 


AI amplifies the abilities of all good and bad actors in the system to achieve all the same goals they’ve always had.
Nathaniel Persily
Co-director of the Cyber Policy Center


Geopolitical Competition


Dunnmon, a CISAC affiliate and senior advisor to the director of the Defense Innovation Unit, spoke about the “holistic geopolitical competition” among world powers in the AI realm as these systems offer “unprecedented speed and unprecedented scale.”

“Within that security lens, there’s actually competition across the entirety of the technical AI stack,” he said.

Dunnmon said an underlying security question involves whether a given AI software is running on top of libraries that are sourced from Western companies then if software is being built on top of an underlying library stack owned by state enterprises. “That’s a different world.”

He said that “countries are competing for data, and it’s becoming a battlefield of geopolitical competition.”

Societal, Environmental Implications


Lobell, a senior fellow at FSI and the director of the Center for Food Security and the Environment, said his biggest concern is about how AI might change the functioning of societies as well as possible bioterrorism.

“Any environment issue is basically a collective action problem, and you need well-functioning societies with good governance and political institutions, and if that crumbles, I don’t think we have much hope.”

On the positive aspects of AI, he said the combination of AI and synthetic biology and gene editing are starting to produce much faster production cycles of agricultural products, new breeds of animals, and novel foods. One company found how to make a good substitute for milk if pineapple, cabbage and other ingredients are used.

Lobell said that AI can understand which ships are actually illegally capturing seafood, and then they can trace that back to where they eventually offload such cargo. In addition, AI can help create deforestation-free supply chains, and AI mounted on farm tractors can help reduce 90% of the chemicals being used that pose environmental risks.

“There’s clear tangible progress being made with these technologies in the realm of the environment, and we can continue to build on that,” he added.
 


Countries are competing for data, and it’s becoming a battlefield of geopolitical competition.
Jared Dunnmon
Affiiate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC)


AI and Democracy


Persily, a senior fellow and co-director of FSI’s Cyber Policy Center, said, “AI amplifies the abilities of all good and bad actors in the system to achieve all the same goals they’ve always had.”

He noted, “AI is not social media,” even though it can interact with social media. Persily said AI is so much more pervasive and significant than a given platform such as Facebook. Problems arise in the areas of privacy, antitrust, bias and disinformation, but AI issues are “characteristically different” than social media.

“One of the ways that AI is different than social media is the fact that they are open-source tools. We need to think about this in a little bit of a different way, which is that it is not just a few companies that can be regulated on closed systems,” Persily said.

As a result, AI tools are available to all of us, he said. “There is the possibility that some of the benefits of AI could be realized more globally,” but there are also risks. For example, in the year and a half since OpenAI released ChatGPT, which is open sourced, child pornography has multiplied on the Internet.

“The democratization of AI will lead to fundamental challenges to establish legacy infrastructure for the governance of the propagation of content,” Persily said.

Balance of AI Power


Fukuyama pointed out that an AI lab at Stanford could not afford leading-edge technology, yet countries such as the U.S. and China have deeper resources to fund AI endeavors.

“This is something obviously that people are worried about,” he said, “whether these two countries are going to dominate the AI race and the AI world and disadvantage everybody.”

Manuel said that most of AI is now operating with voluntary governance – “patchwork” – and that dangerous things involving AI can be done now. “In the end, we’re going to have to adopt a negotiation and an arms control approach to the national security side of this.” 

Lobell said that while it might seem universities can’t stay up to speed with industry, people have shown they can reproduce those models’ performances just days after their releases.
 


In the end, we’re going to have to adopt a negotiation and an arms control approach to the national security side of this.
Anja Manuel
Affiiate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC)


On regulation — the European Union is currently weighing legislation — Persily said it would be difficult to enforce regulations and interpret risk assessments, so what is needed is a “transparency regime” and an infrastructure so civil entities have a clear view on what models are being released – yet this will be complex.

“I don’t think we even really understand what a sophisticated, full-on AI audit of these systems would look like,” he said.

Dunnmon suggested that an AI governance entity could be created that’s similar to how the U.S. Food and Drug Agency reviews pharmaceuticals before release.

In terms of AI and military conflicts, he spoke about the need for AI and humans to understand the rewards and risks involved, and in the case of the latter, how the risk compares to the “next best option.”

“How do you communicate that risk, how do you assess that risk, and how do you make sure the right person with the right equities and the right understanding of those risks is making that risk trade-off decision?” he asked.



The Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy program was established in 1982 to provide students with the knowledge and skills necessary to analyze and address complex global challenges in a rapidly changing world, and to prepare the next generation of leaders for public and private sector careers in international policymaking and implementation.

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At a gathering for alumni, the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy program hosted four experts to discuss the ramifications of AI on global security, the environment, and political systems.

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A vast array of critical new technologies rely on rare earth metals, a group of elements that are difficult to mine because they are so well dispersed in the earth and often contain radioactive elements such as thorium and uranium.

Over the last 20 years, demand for these elements in the U.S. has increased while domestic supply and production have fallen off. And globally, the supply chain is tightly controlled by just a few countries.

To explore the significant challenges created by this imbalanced supply chain, Gorakh Pawar, a visiting scholar at CISAC, and CISAC Co-Director Rod Ewing edited “Rare Earth Elements in Material Science,” a special theme issue of the MRS Bulletin, a journal of the Materials Research Society.

“With China's rapid rise and the reemergence of Russia as a major power, the global stage is set for multipolar competition to secure the critical materials supply chains and control the rare earth elements (REE) derived high-end products and relevant technologies,” Ewing and Pawar write in the introduction to the issue.

The issue includes six articles that delve into the material science aspects of the rare earth elements supply chain. Researchers from Australia, Germany, Korea and the US contributed articles on mineralogy, separation and extraction, mining economics and the environmental impact of rare earth element mining.

“REE recycling is no longer just a choice, but it has become necessary in a world where resources are constrained,” Pawar and Ewing write.

The MRS Bulletin includes recommendations that the US and other countries can follow to reduce dependence on China for rare earth elements.

The March issue of the MRS Bulletin can be found here

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A vast array of critical new technologies rely on rare earth metals, a group of elements that are difficult to mine because they are so well dispersed in the earth and often contain radioactive elements such as thorium and uranium.

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For spring quarter 2022, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

SEMINAR RECORDING

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to William J Perry Conference Room in Encina Hall may attend in person. 

Gorakh Pawar
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Depend on your smart phone? Enjoy a flat screen tv? How about an electric vehicle, do you drive one? These technologies—and other clean energy, information, and defense applications— all rely on rare-earth elements that could be mined in most parts of the world but are primarily processed and refined only in a limited number of countries, like China.

“Right now, the U.S. doesn’t have enough supply to fulfill the objective of the steady clean energy transition, ensure national security, and achieve long-term economic goals” said Gorakh Pawar, a staff scientist at the Idaho National Laboratory who is a visiting scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation.  The importance of rare earths mining is highlighted in the series of reports recently issued by the U.S.  Department of Energy in response to President Biden’s Executive Order "America's Supply Chains" signed in 2021.

“This means that the U.S. depends on other countries and therefore, the U.S. needs a strategic approach to resolve the major rare earth elements supply chain issues urgently,” Pawar added. 

Mountain Pass Rare Earth Mine and Processing Facility Mountain Pass Rare Earth Mine and Processing Facility, Mountain Pass, San Bernardino Co., California (Image credit: MP materials.com)

Rare-earth elements “are moderately abundant in the earth’s crust, but they need to be concentrated to be economically viable,” said Sulgiye Park, a Fellow at CISAC. “What we want is concentrated rare-earth reserves because we are going to spend a lot of money mining and processing it.”

Important deposits of rare earths exist in the U.S. and previously the U.S. was self-reliant in domestically produced rare-earth elements, but mining operations have declined over the last several decades, allowing China to command roughly 90 percent of the global market. Now, however, there are signs that domestic production is making a comeback, and CISAC scholars are both studying and providing support to accelerate this resurgence.

Pawar, Park and CISAC co-director Rod Ewing toured the Mountain Pass Rare Earth Mine and Processing Facility in southern California to learn more about its operation and to determine how their research could help support this important industry.

“We were provided with critical insights into MP Materials' strategy for securing the domestic rare earth supply chain that would significantly reduce U.S. economic dependence on foreign REE,” Ewing said.

“The substantial challenges include developing domestic supply chains for mill equipment and capacity to process rare earths, such as neodymium-praseodymium magnets,” Ewing added.

Pawar, Park and Ewing toured the mine for three hours to see the facilities, ask and answer questions. They wanted to understand the facts on the ground, supply chain issues and industry challenges in a more complete way to enhance their own research.

Open pit mine Open pit mine (Sulphide Queen deposit) at Mountain Pass. The open pit is ~600 m wide. A massive carbonatite forms the core of Mountain Pass that hosts REE mineral resources, including bastnäsite. (Image credit: Gorakh Pawar)

Before the trip, Pawar and Park relied on academic literature, open source information, news stories and press releases about rare-earth elements, like this recent White House release titled “Securing a Made in America Supply Chain for Critical Minerals,” which announced a Department of Defense grant to MP Materials, who operate the Mountain Pass mine.

“Open source is great,” Park said. “But if you have a chance to visit the site, you can learn from the people on the ground who provide a whole new perspective. “

The tour also fortified connections so that the Pawar, Park and Ewing could share their own knowledge and policy-relevant research, as well as their network of colleagues who have different areas of expertise.

CISAC was created in 1983 with the goal of bringing together experts in science and technology with experts in policy. The mission statement has always been “to generate new knowledge for a better world.” And this trip to Southern California was another opportunity to fulfill this mission.

About Idaho National Laboratory
Battelle Energy Alliance manages INL for the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy. INL is the nation’s center for nuclear energy research and development, and also performs research in each of DOE’s strategic goal areas: energy, national security, science and the environment.

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A three-person team from CISAC toured the only domestic mine producing rare earths, which are critical for the modern economy.

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As Russia and Gazprom push to complete the last kilometers of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, the Biden administration faces a dilemma. Opinion in Congress and Washington is dead set against the project, but President Biden does not want a big fight with Chancellor Merkel.

On February 18, Washington announced sanctions on the ship laying Nord Stream 2 and its owner.  They amount to little and will not placate pipeline opponents. However, a better gas transit contract for Ukraine could provide a way to move past US pipeline sanctions.

When, or if, completed, Nord Stream 2 will bring up to 55 billion cubic meters of gas per year from Russia under the Baltic Sea to Germany (in 2019, Germany consumed 95 billion cubic meters of gas). Its 1,200 kilometers are 94% complete. Of course, it needs to be 100% to work.

A geopolitical or a commercial project?

Americans and many Europeans outside of Germany see Nord Stream 2 as a geopolitical project. A purely commercial venture would have updated existing pipelines that transit Ukraine, Belarus and Poland—at a fraction of the cost of a new undersea pipe. Moreover, Nord Stream 2 will not bring new gas; it will simply divert gas from those other pipelines.

Moscow engaged in this expensive undertaking to circumvent Ukraine and deny gas transit revenues to Kyiv.  That is part of a multi-vector Russian effort to weaken its western neighbour.

Given the Kremlin’s egregious misbehaviour—the conflict in Donbas, killings and attempted killings of regime opponents, and cyber and disinformation campaigns—Nord Stream 2 offers a big target for US sanctions. Congress has happily obliged, authorising sanctions against entities that take part in construction of, provide services for, or certify the pipeline.

In a February 17 letter, a bipartisan group of Congressional representatives expressed their readiness to work with the executive branch “to counter Russian malign influence, including by ensuring Nord Stream 2 is never completed.” They will not regard the administration’s new sanctions as enough and will press for more.

Germany’s dilemma: finish the pipeline while avoiding sanctions

Berlin, hoping to finish the pipeline, seeks to persuade Washington that it will ensure that a regulatory mechanism will act to constrain any Russian market manipulation attempts; provide support to build terminals that could receive American liquified natural gas; and agree that certain Russian actions could trigger a halt to gas imports via Nord Stream 2.

These proposals will not suffice for pipeline opponents. A regulatory mechanism makes sense, but who knows now how it will work in practice? LNG terminals will not overcome the price advantage that gas shipped by pipeline enjoys. And Americans and Germans could well differ over what Russian actions should justify turning off the gas flow.

Others in Berlin suggest a moratorium to allow time to sort things out, bringing in not just the Russians, but perhaps also the Americans, Poles, Ukrainians and European Union. This idea has two variants. One would impose a moratorium now; the other envisages completing the pipeline and then pausing before actually beginning the flow of gas.

The second variant would not go down well with skeptics in Washington. What if the pipeline is completed but discussions among the parties fall into deadlock? Would Berlin and Moscow just go ahead and let the gas begin to flow?

Wanted: a creative way forward

One other measure could help resolve the question and obviate sanctions. Russia’s Gazprom is committed to sending 40 billion cubic meters of gas per year through Ukrainian pipelines through the end of 2024. If Gazprom could be persuaded to increase the amount of gas it pumps through Ukraine’s pipelines and extend the period of the contract, that would provide a tangible benefit for Kyiv.

Securing significant additional gas transit revenues for Ukraine would give the Biden administration a reason not to impose sanctions to block Nord Stream 2’s completion and ammunition to fend off criticism from those who want the pipeline to remain unfinished.

Such a deal offers a win-win-win: Kyiv could secure a needed plus-up in revenues to its state budget, while Washington and Berlin remove an obstacle from their bilateral agenda. This problem cries for a solution. US and German officials ought to have the creativity to solve it.

 

Originally for Euractiv

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If Gazprom could be persuaded to increase gas transit revenues for Ukraine, that would give the Biden administration a reason not to impose sanctions to block Nord Stream 2’s completion and ammunition to fend off criticism from those who want the pipeline to remain unfinished, writes Steven Pifer.

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In the absence of a federal geologic repository or consolidated, interim storage in the United States, commercial spent fuel will remain stranded at some 75 sites across the country. Currently, these include 18 “orphaned sites” where spent fuel has been left at decommissioned reactor sites. In this context, local communities living close to decommissioned nuclear power plants are increasingly concerned about this legacy of nuclear power production and are seeking alternative strategies to move the spent fuel away from those sites. In this paper, we present a framework and method for the socio-technical multi-criteria evaluation (STMCE) of spent fuel management strategies. The STMCE approach consists of (i) a multi-criteria evaluation that provides an ordinal ranking of alternatives based on a list of criterion measurements; and (ii) a social impact analysis that provides an outranking of options based on the assessment of their impact on concerned social actors. STMCE can handle quantitative, qualitative or both types of information. It can also integrate stochastic uncertainty on criteria measurements and fuzzy uncertainty on assessments of social impacts. We conducted an application of the STMCE method using data from the decommissioned San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) in California. This example intends to facilitate the preparation of stakeholder engagement activities on spent fuel management using the STMCE approach. The STMCE method provides an effective way to compare spent fuel management strategies and support the search for compromise solutions. We conclude by discussing the potential impact that such an approach could have on the management of commercial spent fuel in the United States.

Read the rest at Science of The Total Environment

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In the absence of a federal geologic repository or consolidated, interim storage in the United States, commercial spent fuel will remain stranded at some 75 sites across the country. Currently, these include 18 “orphaned sites” where spent fuel has been left at decommissioned reactor sites.
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Science of The Total Environment
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François Diaz-Maurin
Jerold Yu
Rodney C. Ewing
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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/VJgMJyNz3F4

 

About the Event: Join David Sanger, National Security Correspondent for the New York Times, Amy Zegart, Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies, Monica M. Ruiz, Program Fellow for the Cyber Initiative and Special Projects at the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, Alex Stamos, Adjunct Professor at the Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies, Michael McFaul, Director at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and Herb Lin, Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, for a panel discussion of The Perfect Weapon, an HBO documentary special based on the best-selling book by New York Times national security correspondent David E. Sanger, which is now available to stream on HBO Max. Directed by John Maggio, the film explores the rise of cyber conflict as a primary way in which nations now compete with and sabotage one another. Cheap, invisible and devastatingly effective, cyber weapons are the present and future of geopolitical conflict – a short-of-war pathway to exercising power. The Perfect Weapon draws on interviews with top military, intelligence and political officials for a comprehensive view of a world of new vulnerabilities, particularly as fear mounts over how cyberattacks and influence operations may affect the 2020 U.S. election, vulnerable power grids, America’s nuclear weapons arsenal, and the global networks that are the backbone of private enterprise. The film also explores how the U.S. government is struggling to defend itself from cyberattacks while simultaneously stockpiling and using the world's most powerful offensive cyber arsenal.

Watch the film trailer HERE.

 

About the Speakers: 

Dr. Herb Lin is senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University.  His research interests relate broadly to policy-related dimensions of cybersecurity and cyberspace, and he is particularly interested in the use of offensive operations in cyberspace as instruments of national policy and in the security dimensions of information warfare and influence operations on national security.  In addition to his positions at Stanford University, he is Chief Scientist, Emeritus for the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies, where he served from 1990 through 2014 as study director of major projects on public policy and information technology, and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar and Senior Fellow in Cybersecurity (not in residence) at the Saltzman Institute for War and Peace Studies in the School for International and Public Affairs at Columbia University; and a member of the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. In 2016, he served on President Obama’s Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity.  Prior to his NRC service, he was a professional staff member and staff scientist for the House Armed Services Committee (1986-1990), where his portfolio included defense policy and arms control issues. He received his doctorate in physics from MIT.

 

Dr. Michael McFaul is Director at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies in the Department of Political Science, and the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He joined the Stanford faculty in 1995.

Dr. McFaul also is as an International Affairs Analyst for NBC News and a columnist for The Washington Post. He served for five years in the Obama administration, first as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council at the White House (2009-2012), and then as U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation (2012-2014). Continue Reading >>>

 

Monica M. Ruiz is the Program Fellow for the Cyber Initiative and Special Projects at the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. In her work on the Cyber Initiative, she supports efforts to build a more robust cybersecurity field and improve policy-making. She also manages the foundation’s portfolio of Special Projects grants, part of a pool of flexible funds that allow the foundation to respond to unanticipated opportunities, explore potential initiatives, collaborate with other funders and facilitate cross-pollinating work across the foundation’s programs.

Prior to joining the foundation, Monica was the first recipient of the Boren Fellowship to travel to Estonia, where her research focused on cybersecurity issues and she studied the Russian language. Earlier in her career, she worked at U.S. Southern Command in the J9 Partnering Directorate, where she served as the military education coordinator between the Command and partners in the region.

Born in Ecuador and raised in Miami, she holds a bachelor’s degree from Florida International University and a master’s degree from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

 

David E. Sanger is a national security correspondent and  senior writer for the New York Times, a contributor to CNN and an adjunct lecturer at the Kennedy School of Government. In a 38-year reporting career for The Times, he has been on three teams that have won Pulitzer Prizes, most recently in 2017 for international reporting. His latest book, “The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage and Fear in the Cyber Age,’’ published in 2018, examined the emergence of cyberconflict as the primary way large and small states are competing and undercutting each other, changing the nature of global power. An HBO documentary based on the book will air in the Fall of 2020.

He is also the author of two Times best sellers on foreign policy and national security: “The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power,” published in 2009, and “Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power,” published in 2012. For The Times, Mr. Sanger has served as Tokyo bureau chief, Washington economic correspondent, White House correspondent during the Clinton and Bush administrations, and chief Washington correspondent. He co-teaches “Central Challenges in American National Security, Strategy and the Press” at Harvard.

 

Alex Stamos is a cybersecurity expert, business leader and entrepreneur working to improve the security and safety of the Internet through his teaching and research at Stanford University. Stamos is an Adjunct Professor at Stanford’s Freeman-Spogli Institute and a visiting scholar at the Hoover Institution.

Prior to joining Stanford, Alex served as the Chief Security Officer of Facebook. In this role, Stamos led a team of engineers, researchers, investigators and analysts charged with understanding and mitigating information security risks to the company and safety risks to the 2.5 billion people on Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp. During his time at Facebook, he led the company’s investigation into manipulation of the 2016 US election and helped pioneer several successful protections against these new classes of abuse. As a senior executive, Alex represented Facebook and Silicon Valley to regulators, lawmakers and civil society on six continents, and has served as a bridge between the interests of the Internet policy community and the complicated reality of platforms operating at billion-user scale. In April 2017, he co-authored “Information Operations and Facebook”, a highly cited examination of the influence campaign against the US election, which still stands as the most thorough description of the issue by a major technology company. Continue Reading >>>

 

Dr. Amy Zegart is a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies (FSI), professor of political science (by courtesy) at Stanford University, and a contributing editor to The Atlantic. She is also the Davies Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, where she directs the Robert and Marion Oster National Security Affairs Fellows program. From 2013 to 2018, she served as co-director of the Freeman Spogli Institute’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and founder and co-director of the Stanford Cyber Policy Program. She previously served as the chief academic officer of the Hoover Institution.

Her areas of expertise include cybersecurity, US intelligence and foreign policy, drone warfare, and political risk. An award-winning author, she has written four books. These include Bytes, Bombs, and Spies: The Strategic Dimensions of Offensive Cyber Operations (2019) coeditor with Herb Lin; Political Risk: How Businesses and Organizations Can Anticipate Global Insecurity (2018) with Condoleezza Rice; Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and Origins of 9/11 (2007), which won the National Academy of Public Administration’s Brownlow Book Award; Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (1999); and Eyes on Spies: Congress and the US Intelligence Community (Hoover Institution Press, 2011). She has also published in leading academic journals, including International Security, the Journal of Strategic Studies, and Political Science Quarterly. Continue Reading >>>

Virtual Seminar

Herb Lin, Michael McFaul, Monica M. Ruiz, David Sanger, Alex Stamos, and Amy Zegart
Panel Discussions
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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/bUXHbUj5uxE

 

About the Event: While most civil wars today are fought within Muslim-majority states and, frequently, by armed groups that self-identify as Islamic, we know little about the relationships between and amongst Islamic humanitarian law, Western (treaty-based) humanitarian law, and the rhetoric and behavior of Islamic armed groups. Our legal analysis suggests that, while there is a great deal of overlap between Western and Islamic humanitarian law, this overlap is not perfect. Our empirical analysis, which focuses on both the words and behaviors of Islamic armed groups, suggests similarly mixed results. Specifically, we find that, on average, Islamic armed groups do not appear to be more or less compliant with Western or Islamic humanitarian law than non-Islamic armed groups when it comes to civilian targeting and child soldiering. While they often appeal to Islamic humanitarian law, Islamic armed groups appear to be bound by similar political and military – rather than religious or legal – constraints to non-Islamic armed groups.

 

About the Speaker: Tanisha Fazal is Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota. Her scholarship focuses on sovereignty, international law, and armed conflict.  Fazal’s current book project analyzes the effect of improvements in medical care in conflict zones on the long-term costs of war.  She is the author of State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation (Princeton University Press, 2007), and Wars of Law: Unintended Consequences in the Regulation of Armed Conflict (Cornell University Press, 2018.

Virtual Seminar

Tanisha Fazal Professor of Political Science University of Minnesota
Seminars
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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone

 

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/M7DEG62NsVQ

 

About the Event: In recent years, small modular reactors (SMRs, i.e. nuclear reactors with electric capacities less than 300 MWelec) have received bipartisan, Congressional support on the pretense that their development will reduce the mass and radiotoxicity of commercially generated nuclear waste. However, these metrics are of limited value in planning for the safe management and disposal of this radioactive material. By analyzing the published design specifications for water-, sodium-, and molten salt-cooled SMRs, I here characterize their notional, high-level waste streams in terms of decay heat, radiochemistry, and fissile isotope concentration, each of which have implications for geologic repository design and long-term safety. Volumes of low- and intermediate-level decommissioning waste, in the form of reactor components, coolants, and moderators, have also been estimated.

The results show that SMRs will not reduce the size of a geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel, nor the associated future dose rates. Rather, SMRs are poised to discharge spent fuel with relatively high concentrations of fissile material, which may pose re-criticality risks in a geologic repository. Furthermore, SMRs—in particular, designs that call for molten salt or sodium coolants—entail increased volumes of decommissioning waste, as compared to a standard 1100 MWelec, water-cooled reactor. Many of the anticipated SMR waste challenges are a consequence of neutron leakage, a basic physical process that reduces the fuel burnup efficiency in small reactor cores. Common approaches to attenuating neutron leakage from SMRs, such as the introduction of radial neutron reflectors, will increase the generation of decommissioning waste. The feasibility of managing SMR waste streams should be performed before these reactors are licensed, and future clean energy policies should acknowledge the adverse impact that SMRs will have on radioactive waste management and disposal.

 

About the Speaker: Dr. Lindsay Krall is a MacArthur post-doctoral fellow and a geochemist at SKB. Her post-doctoral research assesses the technical credibility of recent DOE programs related to SNF management, in particular those centered around deep borehole disposal and advanced nuclear reactors.

Virtual Seminar

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Lindsay Krall was a MacArthur Postdoctoral Fellow at CISAC, 2019-2020. She couples Earth science with energy policy to study the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle, focusing on geologic repository development. She began this research in 2009, coincident with the termination of the United States’ project to develop a repository for high-level nuclear waste. After completing her bachelor's degree in Industrial and Operations Engineering at the University of Michigan in 2011, she moved to Stockholm to work at the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company. In 2017, Lindsay was awarded a Ph.D. in geochemistry by Stockholm University, and between 2017 and 2020, she was a MacArthur post-doctoral fellow, first at George Washington University and then, at CISAC. During this time, she assessed the technical viability of concepts to dispose of spent nuclear fuel in deep boreholes and she characterized the radioactive waste streams that might be generated in advanced fuel cycles and discussed their implications for geologic disposal.

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