Governance

FSI's research on the origins, character and consequences of government institutions spans continents and academic disciplines. The institute’s senior fellows and their colleagues across Stanford examine the principles of public administration and implementation. Their work focuses on how maternal health care is delivered in rural China, how public action can create wealth and eliminate poverty, and why U.S. immigration reform keeps stalling. 

FSI’s work includes comparative studies of how institutions help resolve policy and societal issues. Scholars aim to clearly define and make sense of the rule of law, examining how it is invoked and applied around the world. 

FSI researchers also investigate government services – trying to understand and measure how they work, whom they serve and how good they are. They assess energy services aimed at helping the poorest people around the world and explore public opinion on torture policies. The Children in Crisis project addresses how child health interventions interact with political reform. Specific research on governance, organizations and security capitalizes on FSI's longstanding interests and looks at how governance and organizational issues affect a nation’s ability to address security and international cooperation.

Paragraphs

In 1961, President John F. Kennedy initiated a bold new policy of engaging states that had chosen to remain nonaligned in the Cold War. In a narrative ranging from the White House to the western coast of Africa, to the shores of New Guinea, Robert B. Rakove examines the brief but eventful life of this policy during the presidencies of Kennedy and his successor, Lyndon Baines Johnson. Engagement initially met with real success, but it faltered in the face of serious obstacles, including colonial and regional conflicts, disputes over foreign aid, and the Vietnam War. Its failure paved the way for a lasting hostility between the United States and much of the nonaligned world, with consequences extending to the present. This book offers a sweeping account of a critical period in the relationship between the United States and the Third World.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Books
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Authors
Robert Rakove
Paragraphs

The history of nonproliferation failures in Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea are reviewed in the light of the nuclear agreement with Iran. The paper shows that the circumstances in each case are special and not comparable to the situation in the Iranian case. Thus, while the Iran agreement has some weaknesses, past nonproliferation failures should not be considered predictive of a future failure in this case. But there are lessons to be learned from such failures that should inform U.S. nonproliferation policy generally.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Journal Articles
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Authors
Leonard Weiss
-

Abstract: The threat of biological attack on the people of the United States and the world, whether intentional, natural or accidental, is of growing concern, both in spite of and because of significant technological advances over the past four decades. As a global leader, the United States needs a comprehensive policy approach for managing future attacks, which incorporates technologic elements from rapid detection through appropriate response. American and international responses to recent infectious disease outbreaks such as anthrax (intentional, accidental), H5N1 influenza (natural) and ebola (natural) have managed to contain these events ‐ with the paradoxical effect on policy makers, both political and administrative, of relief (“missed that bullet”, “we must be doing this right”), rather than serving as wake‐up calls. A challenge in merging technological solutions into policy lies in the rapid advances across the multiple sciences. Translation of these ongoing technologic advances for policy leaders is an essential element in effective policy development. Incorporation of technologic solutions into biosecurity policy construction, combined with motivated leadership, has the potential for enhancing future national and global responses to unprecedented biological attacks.

About the Speaker: Patrick J. Scannon, M.D., Ph.D. is XOMA's Company Founder, Executive Vice President, Chief Scientific Officer and a member of its Board of Directors. Since 1980, Dr. Scannon has directed the Company's product identification, evaluation and clinical testing programs for novel therapeutic monoclonal antibodies and proteins against infectious, oncologic, metabolic and immunologic diseases. As Chief Scientific Officer, he leads evaluations for new therapeutic antibody identification and discovery programs. 

Dr. Scannon holds a Ph.D. in organic chemistry from the University of California, Berkeley and an M.D. from the Medical College of Georgia. He completed his medical internship and residency in internal medicine at the Letterman Army Medical Center in San Francisco. A board-certified internist, Dr. Scannon is also a member of the American College of Physicians. He is the inventor or co-inventor of several issued U.S. patents, and has published numerous scientific abstracts and papers.

Dr. Scannon has served as a member of the Research Committee for Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA), the National Biodefense Science Board (NBSB, a federal advisory board for the Department of Health and Human Services), the chair of the Chem/Bio Warfare Defense Panel for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and a member of the Defense Sciences Research Council (DSRC, a research board for Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)). He has served as a Trustee of the University of California Berkeley Foundation and as a member of the University of California Berkeley Chancellor's Community Advisory Board. Dr. Scannon is currently on the Board of Directors of Pain Therapeutics, Inc.

Technology Impact on Biosecurity Policy and Practice
Download ppt
Patrick J. Scannon Founder, Executive Vice President, Chief Scientific Officer XOMA
Seminars
-

Abstract: Peter Hayes will talk about the risk of nuclear war and complexity. In a February 2015 report (Peter Hayes, "Nuclear command-and-control in the Millenials era", NAPSNet Special Reports, February 17, 2015, http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/nuclear-command-and…), he stated that “very few leaders or even strategic scholars pay attention to the new complexity of the operating environment in which national nuclear command-and-control systems operate, or the new characteristics of the command-and-control systems and their supporting CISR systems that may contribute to the problem of loss-of-control and rapid escalation to nuclear war.”

“Today, the underlying ground is moving beneath the feet of nuclear-armed states. The enormous flow across borders of people, containers, and information, and the growth of connectivity between cities, corporations, and communities across borders, is recasting the essential nature of security itself to a networked flux of events and circumstances that no agency or state can control. The meta-system of nuclear command-and control systems has emerged in this new post-modern human condition.” The report can be accessed here.

About the speaker: Peter Hayes is Honorary Professor, Center for International Security Studies, Sydney University, Australia and Director, Nautilus Institute in Berkeley, California. He works at the nexus of security, environment and energy policy problems. Best known for innovative cooperative engagement strategies in North Korea, he has developed techniques at Nautilus Institute for seeking near-term solutions to global security and sustainability problems and applied them in East Asia, Australia, and South Asia. Dr. Hayes has worked for many international organizations including UN Development Programme, Asian Development Bank, and Global Environment Facility. He was founding director of the Environment Liaison Centre in Kenya in 1975. He has traveled, lived, and worked in Asia, North America, Europe and Africa.

Encina Hall, 2nd floor

 

Peter Hayes Director Speaker Nautilus Institute
Seminars
Paragraphs

In an unusually well-documented contribution on Russian secret intelligence, David Holloway posits reasons for Stalin’s unpreparedness in 1940-1941. This, it is fair to say, has long been an obsessive object of interest and study in Russia, because it made all the difference to the course of the war that followed from June 1941. Rather than rushing into moral judgments about the régime, Holloway instead takes a cool look at what information came in to Stalin and allows for the fact that not all the incoming intelligence data were consistent. And in respect of revelations about U.S. construction of the atomic bomb, Holloway shows that Stalin once again consciously distanced himself from the findings of the intelligence services in reaching a final judgment. Whereas in the former case, it nearly led to disaster; in respect of the latter, Stalin was undoubtedly correct.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Books
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Stanford University Press
Authors
David Holloway
Paragraphs

Drawn from the third in a series of conferences at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University on the nuclear legacy of the cold war, this report examines the importance of deterrence, from its critical function in the cold war to its current role. Although deterrence will not disappear, current and future threats to international security will present relatively fewer situations in which nuclear weapons will play the dominant role they did during the cold war.

The authors highlight the ways in which deterrence has been shaped by surrounding conditions and circumstances. They look at the prospective reliability of deterrence as a tool of statecraft in the emerging international environment. And they examine the challenges of "weaponless deterrence": developing approaches to nuclear deterrence that rely not on the actual, but rather on the potential existence of nuclear weapons. In addition, they look at the ongoing debates over "de-alerting" (slowing down the capability for immediate launch and rapid nuclear escalation), the role of arms control, and the practical considerations related to verification and compliance.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Books
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Hoover Institution Press
Authors
David Holloway
Paragraphs

Nuclear weapons are so central to the history of the Cold War that it can be difficult to disentangle the two. Did nuclear weapons cause the Cold War? Did they contribute to its escalation? Did they help to keep the Cold War “cold”? We should also ask how the Cold War shaped the development of atomic energy. Was the nuclear-arms race a product of Cold War tension rather than its cause?

The atomic bomb and the origins of the Cold War:

The nuclear age began before the Cold War. During World War II, three countries decided to build the atomic bomb: Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Britain put its own work aside and joined the Manhattan Project as a junior partner in 1943. The Soviet effort was small before August 1945. The British and American projects were driven by the fear of a German atomic bomb, but Germany decided in 1942 not to make a serious effort to build the bomb. In an extraordinary display of scientific and industrial might, the United States made two bombs ready for use by August 1945. Germany was defeated by then, but President Harry S. Truman decided to use the bomb against Japan.

The decision to use the atomic bomb has been a matter of intense controversy. Did Truman decide to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order, as he claimed, to end the war with Japan without further loss of American lives? Or did he drop the bombs in order to intimidate the Soviet Union, without really needing them to bring the war to an end? His primary purpose was surely to force Japan to surrender, but he also believed that the bomb would help him in his dealings with Iosif V. Stalin. That latter consideration was secondary, but it confirmed his decision. Whatever Truman’s motives, Stalin regarded the use of the bomb as an anti-Soviet move, designed to deprive the Soviet Union of strategic gains in the Far East and more generally to give the United States the upper hand in defining the postwar settlement. On August 20, 1945, two weeks to the day after Hiroshima, Stalin signed a decree setting up a Special Committee on the Atomic Bomb, under the chairmanship of Lavrentii P. Beriia. The Soviet project was now a crash program.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Books
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Authors
David Holloway
0
CISAC Honors Student
benmittelberger_rsd16_003_0098a.jpg Class of 2016

Ben Mittelberger is a senior in computer science concentrating in information systems design and implementation. He is a current student in the CISAC Honors Program. His thesis is titled: "In Data We Trust?: The Big Data Capabilities of the National Counterterrorism Center." It focuses on the increasing size and complexity of intelligence datasets and whether or not the center is structured properly to leverage them. He is advised by Dr. Martha Crenshaw

Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

China's tight control over its economy is one reason why it is facing an economic slowdown of global implications, Stanford scholars say.

China's stock market fall is now in its third week, and share prices have lost a third of their value since mid-June, though the market is still higher than a year ago. China has the world's second-largest economy, with deep financial links to the United States.

Nicholas Hope, director of the China Program at the Stanford Center for International Development, which is part of the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, said the simple answer behind the slowdown is that "nothing grows at 10 percent forever."

However, the dropoff is sharper than the government of China expected or desires, he noted.

Hope said the deceleration is due to the effects of slow growth globally on international trade, slower progress than hoped in rebalancing the Chinese economy toward spending more on consumption and less on investment, and the inefficiency of much of Chinese investment. Another big problem is the debt load of local and regional governments.

Hope does not think the steep fall of China's stock market is comparable to the American crash of 1929 – "so long as the Shanghai market index remains comfortably above where it was a year ago."

Yet the "frighteningly sharp correction" over the past few weeks highlights the fragility of the Chinese financial system, he said. It also serves as a cautionary tale for the many small investors who speculated on high returns with borrowed money.

"Borrowed funds have financed many risky economic investments in infrastructure by subnational [regional and local] governments as well as stock purchases by unwise investors," he said. "The result threatens to be an unwanted increase in non-performing loans in the banking system as borrowers are unable to repay."

Hope believes China can overcome its problems if it adopts economic reforms aimed at fostering more private enterprise and less state control over the market. Back in 1993, China's Communist Party announced those reforms and updated them in 2013, so they are technically on the books.

"Paradoxically, current weaknesses could be a longer-term source of strength, as the shares of income and consumption in Chinese GDP rise, investment is increasingly more efficiently allocated by a transformed financial system and all factors of production – land, capital and labor – are put to more productive uses," he said.

To counteract the market drop, the government ordered state-owned companies to buy shares, hiked the amount of equities insurance companies can hold and offered more credit to finance trading. Hope said this may cause a problem.

"It is introducing considerable moral hazard by attempting to bail out small investors because of the concern over the potential for social unrest if too many of those investors lose all of their savings," he said.

Charlotte Lee, associate director of the China Program at Stanford's Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, says it is too early to tell if the market fall will diminish the credibility of the government and Communist Party in the eyes of the people. China's President, Xi Jinping, does want to maintain his popularity.

"The government's management of the economy is, however, one of the pillars of its credibility," Lee said.

She described this as a "small dent" in that credibility, as the government has many other ways it aids the Chinese people.

Opening up the economy

Stanford Professor Darrell Duffie says that it will be hard for China to maintain its past high growth rates.

"China's growth rate is still very high, but it is less high than it was because most of the giant pool of cheap and underutilized labor that China had 20 years ago has by now been put to work relatively productively," said Duffie, the Dean Witter Distinguished Professor of Finance at the Graduate School of Business.

"Additional sources of productivity gains are harder to find," he added.

Duffie is concerned about excessive leverage in China's equity markets.

"Chinese investors have borrowed a lot of money to invest in equities. This margin financing was used too aggressively. China's corporations and local governments are heavily indebted, and that will be a drag on future growth," he said.

He suggests that China would do well to continue on its current course of opening up its economy to cross-border capital flows and reducing its economy's reliance on state-owned enterprises.

If China's economy slows down, the country will decrease its demand for American goods and services, he added. American businesses that plan to operate in China should learn as much as possible about how China's economy and government works.

And Duffie advised, "Whenever possible work with trusted partners in China."

Asian power games?

With China ramping up its military in recent years, what are the risks to U.S. national security if China's economy plunges?

Amy Zegart, co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, said it is possible that a slowing economy might make China behave differently in terms of its hard and soft power.

"For all the worry about a rising China, a fragile China is bad for the United States. The Chinese Communist Party's legitimacy rests on a promise of economic prosperity. The more China's growth falters, the more party leaders will be driven to stoke the fires of nationalism to secure domestic support," said Zegart, who is also a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.

She added, "We've seen this movie before. It stars Vladimir Putin behaving recklessly abroad to win political support at home as his economy stalls."

Clifton Parker is a writer for the Stanford News Service.

Hero Image
stock market board
A stock market board illuminated with trading numbers.
Wikimedia Commons/Katrina.Tuliao
All News button
1
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

Just as they were marking the end of their undergraduate careers, 33 graduating seniors had something else to celebrate. They were recipients of the 2015 Firestone and Robert M. Golden medals and the David M. Kennedy Honors Thesis Prize.

Four of the Firestone winners had FSI scholars as their advisers, and one of those students was also awarded the Kennedy honor.

The Firestone Medal for Excellence in Undergraduate Research recognizes theses written in the social sciences, natural sciences, and engineering and applied sciences. The medalists each received an engraved bronze medal, citation and a monetary award at a ceremony in June, hosted by Harry J. Elam Jr., vice provost for undergraduate education.

The Kennedy Thesis Prize is awarded annually to the single best thesis in each of the four divisions of humanities, social sciences, natural sciences, and engineering and applied sciences. Recipients of this award have accomplished significantly advanced research in the field and have shown strong potential for publication in peer-reviewed scholarly works.

The prize was established in 2008 in recognition of David M. Kennedy, professor emeritus of history, well known for mentoring undergraduate writers. Each Kennedy winner received an engraved plaque and a monetary award, and the historian was on hand to present the prizes.

Jeremy Majerovitz was advised by Pascaline Dupas, an FSI senior fellow, for "Does Ethnic Fractionalization Matter for Development?"

Taylor Grossman was advised by Amy Zegart, an FSI senior fellow and co-director of CISAC, for "The Problem of Warning: Homeland Security and the Evolution of Terrorism Advisory Systems."

Stefan Norgaard, was advised by Larry Diamond and Francis Fukuyama for "Rainbow Junction: South Africa's Born Free Generation and the Future of Democracy." Both are FSI senior fellows, and Fukuyama is soon to take Diamond’s place as director of CDDRL. James Campbell, a history professor, also advised Norgaard.

Sanjana Parikh was advised by Phillip Lipscy, a center fellow at APARC, for "Constitutional Promises and Environmental Protection: An Assessment of National Legal Rights to Nature," international relations; advised by Phillip Lipscy, assistant professor of political science.

Laurie Rumker was advised by David Relman, an FSI senior fellow and co-director of CISAC for "Before and After the Flood: Stability and Resilience of the Human Gut Microbiota." Rumker was also advised by Stanley Falkow, professor emeritus of microbiology and immunology; and Les Dethlefsen, research associate in microbiology and immunology.

All News button
1
Subscribe to Governance