Normal Accidents' growing influence since 1984 on social science scholarship and across academic, business and governmental disciplines was not accidental. Author Charles Perrow intended to shake up the study of safety and bring organization theory into the forefront. This article examines ongoing debates about the management of technological systems, reviews the book's important seeds of theory, and discusses the theoretical and practical issues related to a world growing more complex and technologically hazardous.

Abstract

In his “Star Wars” speech, President Ronald Reagan asked the “scientific community” to develop missile defense technologies that would render the massive Soviet nuclear arsenal “impotent and obsolete.” This paper compares the voices of two communities, physics and computing, who attempted to reply to Reagan's proposal as scientists. While physicists framed Star Wars in terms of simple systems which were subject to fundamental physical laws, computer professionals framed the proposal in terms of complex systems and patterns of production. When disputes within each of these communities erupted into the public sphere, physicists were able to find a measure of consensus around an authoritative discourse of natural laws, while the computing professionals' discourse remained fragmented between theory and practice, never achieving the same level of closure. These disputes struck at the heart of professional identities, even as they raised the question of what forms of expertise could speak to a public policy culture that expects certainty from its scientists.

The September 11 terrorist attacks demonstrated that the technical competence, available resources, level of preparation and suicidal determination of contemporary terrorist groups like al Qaeda have greatly increased over the last decade. This article will consider the likelihood that sophisticated terrorist groups could successfully launch sabotage attacks against nuclear research reactors and cause radiological releases that threaten nearby populated neighborhoods. While the theft by terrorists of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from research reactors to make relatively simple gun-type nuclear explosives has been a concern for some time, the sabotage threat to research reactors—a threat which is independent of fuel enrichment—has not been widely addressed. Nuclear regulators should reassess the level of physical protection that research reactor operators provide in light of the increased terrorist threat.

Russia, once seen as America's greatest adversary, is now viewed by the United States as a potential partner. This book traces the evolution of American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union, and later Russia, during the tumultuous and uncertain period following the end of the cold war. It examines how American policymakers -- particularly in the executive branch -- coped with the opportunities and challenges presented by the new Russia.

Drawing on extensive interviews with senior U.S. and Russian officials, the authors explain George H. W. Bush's response to the dramatic coup of August 1991 and the Soviet breakup several months later, examine Bill Clinton's efforts to assist Russia's transformation and integration, and analyze George W. Bush's policy toward Russia as September 11 and the war in Iraq transformed international politics. Throughout, the book focuses on the benefits and perils of America's efforts to promote democracy and markets in Russia as well as reorient Russia from security threat to security ally.

Understanding how three U.S. administrations dealt with these critical policy questions is vital in assessing not only America's Russia policy, but also efforts that might help to transform and integrate other former adversaries in the future.

James M. Goldgeier is professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University. He is also a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Michael McFaul is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment, the Peter and Helen Bing senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, and an associate professor of political science at Stanford University.