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Whole World on Fire, by CISAC associate director for research Lynn Eden, received the 2004 Robert K. Merton Professional Award from the Science, Knowledge and Technology section of the American Sociological Association. The award was presented to Eden on Aug. 15 during the association's annual meeting in San Francisco.

The award committee cited the book's merits:

"Whole World on Fire is an ambitious undertaking that examines a critical problem using theory and methods from two fields of sociology: the sociology of science and technology and the sociology of organizations. It is a study of how organizational processes led nuclear scientists to drastically underestimate the damage of a nuclear attack. At a deeper level, it is a study in the social construction of organizational knowledge.

"The question Eden addresses is: How and why, for more than half a century, did the U.S. government fail to predict nuclear fire damage as it drew up plans to fight strategic nuclear war? Eden's research shows that U.S. efforts focused on the damage that would result from the explosion while systematically ignoring the far more damaging effects of subsequent fires. How and why could this 'ignorance' continue until today? . . .

"This book takes a position on an ongoing scientific controversy about the predictability of fire damage and on scientists' current assessments of risk. There is a debate in science and technology studies about whether we should take positions on scientific controversies--that is, on the science itself. Some scholars prefer to leave arguments about the 'science' to the scientists and instead follow the activities and political logics of the various debating parties. In this case, Eden chooses to take a stand on the truth claims of the science in question. As such, Whole World on Fire is a work of intellectual daring.

"To our knowledge, there have been few sociological studies that have penetrated the inner workings of the military establishment. Few sociologists have studied the highest reaches of the social structure, as does Eden in this study. In fact, those of us who study science and medicine usually do our research in university-based laboratories or teaching hospitals--that is, we study people who are in some senses like ourselves.

"While the book addresses a critical issue--that is, nuclear-weapons policy, it is an exemplar of how sociological concepts can illuminate important public issues. Eden's analysis can be readily applied to explaining how decision makers construct relevant and legitimate science to illuminate disasters such as the collapse of the Twin Towers. But what convinced one committee member of the book's power was a recent New York Times article describing the findings of the committee investigating the Iraq War. The Committee reported that the CIA had systematically denied the credibility of numerous reports that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction did not exist, in part because those reports were outside its organizational frame.

"Finally, we all believe that this book will have a major public impact. In addition to its accessible style and meticulous research, the book is often riveting and sometimes chilling. We had thought that by now everyone believed that survivable nuclear war is an oxymoron; that people had filled in their bomb shelters long before the close of the Cold War. That a significant portion of the military establishment still believes that a limited, winnable and survivable nuclear war is possible gave us nightmares. That Eden's book may give people nightmares is only appropriate, given the frightening scenario she presents."

Serving on the award committee were Renee Anspach, Department of Sociology, University of Michigan; Sydney Halpern, Department of Sociology, University of Illinois at Chicago; Kathryn Henderson, Department of Sociology, Texas A&M University; and Joan Fujimura (Chair), Department of Sociology and Robert F. and Jean E. Holtz Center for Science and Technology Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison.

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This special workshop was organized in honor of George Bunn -- a nonproliferation expert and pioneer and a consulting professor at CISAC -- on the occasion of his 79th birthday. Four expert panelists, who have worked with Professor Bunn, gave presentations on "The Future of Global Efforts to Secure Nuclear Weapons Materials," "Prospects for Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime," "Prospects for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," and "The Future of Space Weaponization and Arms Control."

Bechtel Conference Center

Christopher F. Chyba Moderator
Matthew Bunn Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University
Thomas Graham senior U.S. diplomat and negotiator of international arms-control agreements
Daryl Kimball executive director Arms Control Association
John Rhinelander attorney and negotiator of major arms-control agreements
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Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

(650) 725-1314
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Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Theodore and Frances Geballe Professor in the School of Humanities and Sciences
Professor of Political Science
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James Fearon is a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, where he is also the social science co-director at its Center for International Security and Cooperation. He is the Theodore and Frances Geballe Professor in the School of Humanities and Sciences and a professor of political science, as well as an affiliate at the institute's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. His research interests include civil and interstate war, ethnic conflict, the international spread of democracy and the evaluation of foreign aid projects promoting improved governance. Fearon was elected to the National Academy of Sciences in 2012 and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2002. Some of his current research projects include work on the costs of collective and interpersonal violence, democratization and conflict in Myanmar, nuclear weapons and U.S. foreign policy, and the long-run persistence of armed conflict.

Co-director, Center for International Security and Cooperation
Affiliated faculty at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
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Jim Fearon Professor of Political Science Stanford University
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Dr. Levite has served as the Principal Deputy Director General (Policy) of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) since September 1, 2002. Dr. Levite has extensive experience dealing with issues of nuclear proliferation as both a scholar and practitioner. Prior to his current position, Dr. Levite was a Visiting Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) from 2000-2002, where he also served as co-leader of the CISAC Discriminate Force project. His previous jobs include Deputy National Security Advisor (Defense Policy) and Head of the Bureau of International Security at the Israeli Ministry of Defense.

Dr. Levite will update his argument ("Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited," International Security, Winter 2002/2003) regarding government decisions to slow or stop officially sanctioned nuclear weapons programs in light of recent developments in Libya, North Korea, and Iran.

Readings attached. Limited copies available at Alice Chen's cubical, Encina Hall (C206-7).

Tea & Cookies will be served at 3:15.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Ariel Levite Principal Deputy Director General Speaker IAEC
Joe Felter Graduate Student Moderator Department of Political Science
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William J. Perry
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Any strategic vision in the war on terrorism requires broad international cooperation. But the United States and Russia appear to be headed down the path of isolation, according to an op-ed piece by William J. Perry, published May 7 in the Moscow Times.

Faced with the deadly menace posed by transnational terror organizations, the nations of the world must redouble their cooperative efforts. The tasks ahead -- to disrupt terror groups and preempt their attacks -- require intense coordination among a multitude of national intelligence, national law enforcement, and military organizations. Unprecedented cooperation among all of the nuclear powers is needed to prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of terror groups.

Yet, paradoxically, the two nations that have suffered the worst terror attacks -- the United States and Russia -- are regressing more and more to national strategies. They have been unwilling to make the extra effort to reap the benefits of real international cooperation.

I believe that the United States' strategic vision of the war on terrorism is flawed. I fear it is following the isolationist path of the United States after World War I rather than pursuing the broad international programs it successfully undertook to protect its security interests after World War II.

The terrorists posing the greatest threat to the United States and to Russia are transnational, with cells in many different countries. To support their training and operations, they raise funds in many countries and maintain these in international bank accounts. They use satellite-based television as their principal means of propaganda, the World Wide Web as their principal means of communication and international airlines as their principal means of transportation. Their efforts to get weapons of mass destruction are based on penetrating the weakest security links among the nations possessing these weapons, and their successful guerrilla operations depend on their ability to get support from sympathizers among the more than 1 billion Islamic people around the world.

An international operation is clearly needed to successfully deal with this threat. But the United States is not making full use of other nations and international institutions to dry up the terrorists' funds in international bank accounts, to gain intelligence on their planning for future attacks, to penetrate their cells so that it has a chance of preempting these attacks, to organize all nuclear powers with effective security of their nuclear weapons and fissile material, and to conduct counterinsurgency operations wherever they are needed. Dealing effectively with transnational terror groups that operate with impunity across borders requires an international operation with the full cooperation of allies and partners in Europe and Asia.

This is not "mission impossible." In 1993, the United States was able to get all of the former members of the Warsaw Pact to join up with NATO in forming the Partnership for Peace to cooperate in peacekeeping operations. In 1994, the United States with the full cooperation of Russia was able to negotiate an agreement by which all nuclear weapons were removed from Uzbekistan, Belarus and Kazakhstan and by which substantial improvements were made in the security of nuclear weapons in Russia. In 1995, the United States was able to get an agreement under which NATO took responsibility for the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, an operation that was believed at the time to be as dangerous and filled with religious and sectarian strife as Iraq today, and it was able to get dozens of non-NATO nations -- notably including Russia -- to join it in that operation.

Securing Russian cooperation required listening to Russian views and making accommodations wherever possible. As U.S. defense secretary, I had to meet with my Russian counterpart four different times before I came to understand how to structure the command in Bosnia in a way acceptable to both Russians and NATO. The general lesson from this example, which is still applicable today, was best expressed by Winston Churchill, who observed during World War II, "The problem with allies is they sometimes have ideas of their own." But in reflecting on that problem, he also said, "The only thing worse than fighting a war with allies is trying to fight a war without allies."

What lessons can we learn from Churchill today? Had the Bush administration understood better the dangers of the post-conflict phase, surely it would have worked harder to get the support of those countries before invading Iraq. In any event, after the war it would have reached out to them and tried to achieve an accommodation that would have allowed their support during the reconstruction phase.

Instead, the administration took the position that any nation that was not with the United States during the war would not have a role in the reconstruction. To compound the problem, the United States did not seek meaningful assistance from the United Nations. Today, in the light of the difficulties experienced in restoring security in Iraq, the administration is reaching out to the United Nations and requesting that it play a major role in the political reconstitution of Iraq, but it is still not working effectively with the governments of France, Germany and Russia.

Just as the United States erred in believing that it did not need more international support in Iraq, so did the Russian government err in believing that it did not need more international support as it reconstituted its government after the Soviet era. The Putin administration believed -- correctly -- that it could turn around the Russian economy without significant assistance from other countries, and it believed that it could deal most effectively with its terrorist threat without interference from other countries. It also apparently believed that moving toward a level of democracy conflicted with the controls necessary for economic recovery and for fighting its terror war. So today we see a Russia that has enjoyed a healthy 7 percent growth rate each of these past five years, but has stopped -- indeed reversed -- its move towards becoming a liberal democracy. This reversal over the long term will have profoundly negative consequences for the Russian economy and for the Russian people, and unquestionably it is setting Russia on a course that will alienate it both from the United States and the European Union.

Both the Bush administration and the Putin administration have apparently made the decision that they can achieve their goals without broad international support. Both governments have erred in that judgment. But it is not too late to correct the judgment, and I fervently hope that both of governments will do so. The most important step in that process is reviving cooperation between the United States and Russia.

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Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

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Tonya Lee Putnam

Tonya L. Putnam (J.D./Ph.D) is a Research Scholar at the Arnold A. Salzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. From 2007 to 2020 she was a member of the Political Science at Columbia University. Tonya’s work engages a variety of topics related to international relations and international law with emphasis on issues related to jurisdiction and jurisdictional overlaps in international regulatory and security matters. She is the author of Courts Without Borders: Law, Politics, and U.S. Extraterritoriality along with several articles in International Organization, International Security, and the Human Rights Review. She is also a member (inactive) of the California State Bar.

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Tonya Putnam Fellow Speaker CISAC
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Devon Curtis is a Hamburg Fellow at CISAC and a doctoral candidate in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics. Before starting her Ph.D., Devon worked as a researcher in the Privy Council Office of the Government of Canada, and at the United Nations Staff College. She has worked for the UN in the African Great Lakes region, and has also served as a consultant to a number of non-governmental organizations, including the Overseas Development Institute. Devon holds an MA and a BA in Political Science and Economics from McGill University.

Devon will discuss her dissertation research, which asks why external actors promote power-sharing as a response to internal conflict, despite power-sharing's relatively poor record in bringing about self-sustaining peace. Her work focuses on the peace process in Burundi.

Readings attached. Limited copies available at Alice Chen's cubical, Encina Hall (C206-7).

Tea & Cookies will be served at 3:15.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room, East 207, Encina Hall

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Hamburg Fellow

Devon Curtis was a 2003-2004 Hamburg Fellow at CISAC and a doctoral candidate in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics. Her dissertation looks at external actors and the promotion of power sharing agreements in ethnic conflict, focusing on the case of Burundi. Ms. Curtis also holds an MA and a BA in Political Science and Economics from McGill University. Previously, Ms. Curtis has lectured at the London School of Economics and has worked as a researcher at the Privy Council Office of the Government of Canada, the United Nations Staff College, the International Development Research Centre and the Forum of Federations. She has also served as a consultant to a number of non-governmental organizations, including the Overseas Development Institute.

Devon Curtis Fellow CISAC
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