While U.S. policy is focused on defending against a mass-effect bioterrorism attack, we may be missing a lower-tech threat of much higher probability. The path from the "street chemistry" of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to improvised chemical devices (ICDs) is very short. Whereas the path from IEDs to effectively weaponized, transgenic biological agents is a substantial leap for states and, even more so, for non-state actors. Examining the rising interest in highly portable, easily assembled improvised devices incorporating commercial and research chemicals by non-state actors, principally radical Islamists, this work considers the threat of improvised chemical terrorism within a comprehensive WMD risk framework.

Cellular prion protein (PrPC) is present in the healthy adult brain. It is a presumably essential membrane protein but its cellular function is unclear. Like Ice-9 - the fictitious water allotrope in Kurt Vonnegut's Cat's Cradle, which "taught the atoms a novel way in which to stack, lock and crystallize until the oceans turned to ice" - cellular prion protein can, in a rare event, adopt a pathogenic and 'contagious' shape, PrPSc, which causes mad cow disease or Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). New variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (vCJD) is the human malady attributed to eating beef tainted with BSE. In comparison to the UK epidemic (at the peak of which 37,280 cases of BSE were reported in the single year 1992), the emergence of four North American mad cows since May 2003 is minor yet still alarming. This work examines the USDA's response to indigenous BSE as manifested in "The Final Rule" (9 CFR 93-96, Jan 4, 2005) and questions whether current regulations are stringent enough to keep PrPSc out of cattle feed and human food.

Sheila Healy is a CISAC Science Fellow. She is currently analyzing USDA policy addressing Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) or mad cow disease. She recently finished a postdoctoral appointment in Stanley Prusiner's laboratory in the Department of Neurology at the University of California, San Francisco. There she studied the molecular and structural requirements for the conversion of cellular prion protein to its pathogenic form, the agent that causes BSE. She holds a doctoral degree in biochemistry and molecular and cellular biology from the University of Arizona.

Visions of missile defense have long centered on missile interceptors or lasers, occasionally included the radar "eyes" of a system, and usually ignored the computer "brains" that must inevitably control a system. This talk will examine the causes and consequences of the relative invisibility of computing in missile defense research and policy, examining three historical episodes: the Army's push to deploy a missile defense from 1957-63, the "Safeguard" and "Sentinel" deployment proposals of the late 1960's, and the "Star Wars" controversy of the 1980's. I argue that the problems of missile defense have been defined and tackled in ways that do not merely reflect technical realities. Rather, assessments of missile defense also reflect the social status of some scientists - and the non-status of others - as experts on missile defense. In particular, this talk will show how the contested status of computing as a profession and as a science has shaped assessments of missile defense, and conclude by considering some implications for today.

The Energy Security Initiative (ESI) is a proposal to increase the benefits offered to countries in good standing with their NPT Obligations, to compensate for all the new supply restrictions and intrusive safeguards requirements imposed on them. The NPT Balance between benefits to signatories and impositions made on them has eroded through more restrictive interpretations of the NPT. The recently implemented Additional Protocol, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the proposals to deny nuclear fuel cycle facilities to countries not yet operating them on the one hand, and the limited supply of low cost nuclear energy available to developing countries on the other hand, demonstrate the need to re-constitute the balance implied in the NPT. It is, in fact, in the self interest of the developed countries, to be able to offer an expanded menu of additional energy benefits to countries whose current scope of available benefits has shrank, while the costs of complying with all new restrictions imposed and proposed has increased. This is the purpose of the ESI, which represents a reinterpretation and expansion of a part of Article IV of the NPT.

This presentation includes a detailed description of what ESI could offer under a new reading of article IV; which countries could qualify as beneficiaries of such program, how much might the total program cost, and how to fund it. A special case dealing with small national enrichment plants in countries such as Iran or Brazil is also considered.

Chaim Braun is a vice president of Altos Management Partners, Inc., and a CISAC science fellow and affiliate. He is a member of the Near-Term Deployment and the Economic Cross-Cut Working Groups of the Department of Energy (DOE) Generation IV Roadmap study. He conducted several nuclear economics-related studies for the DOE Nuclear Energy Office, the Energy Information Administration, the Electric Power Research Institute, the Nuclear Energy Institute, Non-Proliferation Trust International, and others. Braun has worked as a member of Bechtel Power Corporation's Nuclear Management Group, and led studies on power plant performance and economics used to support maintenance services. Braun has worked on a study of safeguarding the Agreed Framework in North Korea, he was the co-leader of a NATO Study of Terrorist Threats to Nuclear Power Plants, led CISAC's Summer Study on Terrorist Threats to Research Reactors, and most recently co-authored an article with CISAC Co-Director Chris Chyba on nuclear proliferation rings. His research project this year is entitled "The Energy Security Initiative and a Nuclear Fuel Cycle Center: Two Enhancement Options for the Current Non-Proliferation Regime."

We describe VEGA, a system for analyzing the vulnerability of an electric power grid to physical attacks by terrorists, and for planning mitigation efforts. VEGA (Vulnerability of Electric Grids Analyzer) consists of a bilevel optimization model and solution algorithm, a graphical user interface and a database. The optimization model implements a Stackelberg game in which (a) a group of terrorists attacks components of a power grid ("the system") so as to maximize the amount of load that must be shed (demand for power that goes unmet), and (b) the system operator minimizes that maximum by controlling the degraded system as best possible. We illustrate the basic model using realistic data and show how it can guide a system-upgrade plan to reduce vulnerability.

Actually, we at NPS are using similar techniques to study the vulnerability to attack of a variety of infrastructure systems. This talk will discuss the common approach, and provide two examples: (a) Finding "weak spots" in the Saudi Arabian crude-oil pipeline system and (b) protecting the Washington, DC subway system from a chemical or biological attack.

Dr. Kevin Wood is professor of operations research at the Naval Postgraduate School. At NPS since 1982, he has taught courses in networks and optimization and has published research on network reliability, mathematical programming and its applications, and on interdiction. His 1993 paper "Deterministic Network Interdiction" spurred renewed interest in applying analytical techniques to network and system interdiction, and has led to a series of papers on these topics, by him and by others. He is currently applying the methodology to critical infrastructure protection in general, and electric power grids in particular: Professor Wood has long-term research support from the Office of Naval Research as well as the Air Force of Scientific Research, and has been a visiting professor at Stanford University, the National Security Agency and the University of Auckland.

Many critiques have been made of the U.S. Intelligence Community's performance in thwarting terrorist attacks (i.e. 9/11) and understanding the proliferation of WMD (i.e. Iraq). Given the reports from the 9/11 and WMD commissions as well as last year's legislation establishing the position of National Intelligence Director, what in fact are the deficiencies of the Intelligence Community and what changes have the best chance of correcting them and preventing future intelligence failures?

This seminar will feature a panel discussion by three experts on intelligence issues. They will focus their comments on the issues, challenges, and potential solutions for improving the U.S. Intelligence Community capabilities to provide timely warning and accurate assessments of future threats. They will then invite comments, questions, and discussion.

Sidney Drell is a professor of theoretical physics (Emeritus) at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. As a physicist and arms control specialist, he has been a leader in providing essential technical advice to the U.S. Government on national security issues. He is an active member of JASON, a group of distinguished scientists, and has served on a number of boards, including the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the President's Science Advisory Committee, and the Non-Proliferation Advisory Panel.

Keith Hansen is a consulting professor of international relations teaching courses on U.S. intelligence and arms control/proliferation. His 35-year government career included seven years on the National Intelligence Council, where he managed numerous national intelligence estimates and other interagency studies on strategic and nuclear issues, and where he served as the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs and Nuclear Proliferation.

Henry Rowen is Director Emeritus of the Asia/Pacific Research Center, professor of public policy and management (emeritus) at Stanford's Graduate School of Business, and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. He was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense (1989-1991), Chairman of the DCI's National Intelligence Council (1981-1983), President of RAND Corporation (1968-1972), and Assistant Director of the U.S. Bureau of the Budget (1965-1966). Most recently, he was a Member of the President's Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.

When the Soviet Union dissolved on Dec. 25, 1991, the nuclear threat changed from the Cold War concern of ending civilization as we know it to one of securing "loose nukes" in chaotic Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union. I had the opportunity to visit the secret cities of the Russian nuclear complex six weeks after the collapse and to initiate a program of scientific collaboration between U.S. and Russian nuclear scientists. Together, we made remarkable progress in reducing the threat in the early and mid-1990's because of the trust we were able to build based on mutual respect, similar objectives, and a common heritage in the great early-20th century school of European physics.

Although the number of joint U.S. - Russian cooperative threat reduction programs increased and the U.S. funding rose dramatically at the turn of the millennium, real progress slowed as U.S. and Russian objectives began to diverge, and the programs became politicized and bureaucratized. Major opportunities to reduce the long-term threat were lost. Cooperation was re-energized by the tragic events of 9/11 and the emerging threat of nuclear terrorism. Today, both Presidents Bush and Putin agree that keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists is their highest security priority. Yet, strategy and commitment on both sides appear incommensurate with the threat. I will discuss critical barriers to and opportunities for renewed cooperation to meet the threat.

Siegfried S. Hecker is currently a Senior Fellow at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Dr. Hecker was Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory from 1986-1997. He joined the Laboratory as technical staff member of the Physical Metallurgy Group in 1973, following a postdoctoral assignment there in 1968-1970 and a summer graduate student assignment in 1965. He served as Chairman of the Center for Materials Science and Division Leader of the Materials Science and Technology Division before becoming Director. From 1970 to 1973 he was a senior research metallurgist with the General Motors Research Laboratories.

Dr. Hecker received his B.S. in metallurgy in 1965 and M.S. in metallurgy in 1967 from Case Institute of Technology and his Ph.D. in metallurgy in 1968 from Case Western Reserve University.

Dr. Hecker is a member of the National Academy of Engineering, Foreign Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Fellow of the TMS (Minerals, Metallurgy and Materials Society), Fellow of the American Society for Metals, Honorary Member of the American Ceramics Society, and Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Among other awards, Dr. Hecker received the American Nuclear Society Seaborg Medal (2004), the Acta Materialia J. Herbert Hollomon Award (2004), the Case Western Reserve University Alumni Association Gold Medal (2004) and Undergraduate Distinguished Alumni Award (2001), the New Mexico Distinguished Public Service Award, (1998); was named Laboratory Director of the Year by the Federal Laboratory Consortium, (1998); received an honorary Doctor of Science degree (Honoris Causa) from Case Western Reserve University (1998); received the Department of Energy's Distinguished Associate Award, (1997); the University of California's President's Medal, (1997); the ASM Distinguished Life Membership Award, (1997); an Honorary Degree of Scientiae Doctoris, Ripon College (1997); the Navy League New York Council Roosevelt Gold Medal for Science (1996); the Aviation Week Group Laurels Award for National Security (1995); the James O. Douglas Gold Medal Award (1990); the ASM International's Distinguished Lectureship in Materials and Society, (1989); the Kent Van Horn Distinguished Alumnus Award, Case Western Reserve University (1989); an Honorary Degree of Scientiae Doctoris, College of Santa Fe, (1988); the Year's Top 100 Innovations Award from Science Digest (1985); the Department of Energy's E. O. Lawrence Award, (1984); the American Society for Metals, Marcus A. Grossman Young Author Award (1976); and the Wesley P. Sykes Outstanding Metallurgist Award, Case Institute of Technology (1965). He is a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Council on Foreign Relations, Tau Beta Pi Honorary Engineering Fraternity, Alpha Sigma Mu Honorary Metallurgical Fraternity, and the Society of Sigma Xi.

In addition to his current research activities in plutonium science and stockpile stewardship, he works closely with the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy on a variety of cooperative threat reduction programs. Dr. Hecker is also actively involved with the U.S. National Academies, serving on the Council of the National Academy of Engineering, serving as chair of the newly established Committee on Counterterrorism Challenges for Russia and the United States, and as a member of the National Academies Committee on Nuclear Nonproliferation. He is a member of ASM International and TMS, the Minerals/Metals/Materials Society, having served both in numerous local and national positions, and a member of the Materials Research Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Pacific Council. He serves on the Corporate Advisory Panel of the UK Atomic Weapons Establishment, is a member of the Advisory Group to the Cooperative Research and Development Foundation (CRDF), and previously served on the Board of Regents for the University of New Mexico.

Dr. Sarah Mendelson is a senior fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Before joining CSIS in 2001, she taught international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Dr. Mendelson received her B.A. in history from Yale University, and her Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University. She also earned a certificate from the Harriman Institute.

At CSIS, she manages several projects that explore the links between security and human rights. Her current research includes collaborative work on public opinion surveys of Russian attitudes on democracy, human rights, Chechnya and the military. She directed a collaborative study evaluating the impact of Western democracy assistance to Eastern Europe and Eurasia. In addition, she has served on the staff of the National Democratic Institute's Moscow office, and was a resident associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She has also been a fellow at CISAC and at Princeton University's Center of International Studies.

Dr. Mendelson serves on the steering committee of Human Rights Watch, the editorial board of International Security, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Program on New Approaches to Russian Security.