Over the last several years the landscape for money movement has changed dramatically. Non-state-backed digital currencies such as Bitcoin have introduced new paradigms for money movement in which transfers are public but the identities of the individuals behind the transfers are masked. Traditional currencies are being moved in novel ways as well. In the developing world, unbanked populations are engaging in an increasingly sophisticated array of financial transactions using mobile phone-based mobile money services.

These changes present both opportunities and challenges. Mobile money, for example, has become a vital tool for financial inclusion for tens of millions of people in the developing world. Yet, all mechanisms for moving (and storing) money—new and old—involve risks and the potential for misuse. This seminar, which will be structured as a highly interactive facilitated discussion, aims to explore ways to realize the benefits of technologically facilitated money movement, while also providing frameworks minimizing the risk of misuse. 

Speaker bio:

John Villasenor is a professor of electrical engineering and public policy at the University of California, Los Angeles, a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and a CISAC Affiliate. His work addresses the intersection of digital technology with public policy and the law.

About the Topic: This presentation includes a review of significant trends in the development of nuclear energy in China, from the mid1980's until the present, and related future prospects. Among the subjects covered will be: nuclear technology development based on competition/cooperation between a giant state owned enterprise and an upstart commercial utility from the south; different development goals and technology development by the two corporations; the impact of Fukushima on nuclear energy developments in China; the current status of the Chinese nuclear energy system; future growth prospects considering a range of different challenges in the industry; and nuclear technology development prospects and intellectual property issues.

About the Speaker: Chaim Braun is a consulting professor at CISAC specializing in issues related to nuclear power economics and fuel supply, and nuclear nonproliferation. Braun pioneered the concept of proliferation rings dealing with the implications of the A.Q. Khan nuclear technology smuggling ring, the concept of the Energy Security Initiative (ESI), and the re-evaluation of nuclear fuel supply assurance measures, including nuclear fuel lease and take-back. Before joining CISAC, Braun worked as a member of Bechtel Power Corporation's Nuclear Management Group, and led studies on power plant performance and economics used to support maintenance services. Prior to that, Braun worked at United Engineers and Constructors (UE&C), EPRI and Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL).

ABOUT THE TOPIC: Culture is often understood as a system of "shared understandings." But what does that mean? Amir Goldberg argues that having a shared understanding with others does not necessarily imply espousing similar beliefs or attitudes. Rather, culture prescribes which beliefs and attitudes go with one another; sharing an understanding therefore suggests being in agreement about the structures of relevance and opposition that make symbols and actions meaningful. Amir uses relational class analysis - a network-based method for analyzing survey data - to map these structures, and find groups of people who share distinctive cultural schemes. This approach lends new insights into understanding the social underpinnings of Americans' complex understandings of music, politics, economic morality, and more.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER: Professor Goldberg received bachelors' degrees in Computer Science and Film Studies from Tel Aviv University, and an MA in Sociology from Goldsmith’s College, University of London. Before pursuing a PhD in Sociology at Princeton University, he worked for several years as a software programmer, an IT consultant and a technology journalist. An Assistant Professor of Organizational Behavior in Stanford’s Graduate School of Business, his research projects all share an overarching theme: the desire to understand the social mechanisms that underlie how people construct meaning, and consequently pursue action. His work has been published in the American Journal of Sociology, and he was awarded Princeton University’s Harold W. Dodds Honorific Fellowship.

ABOUT THE COMMENTATOR: Marc Ventresca is University Lecturer in Strategic Management at Said Business School (University of Oxford), England's foremost graduate school of business. Dr. Ventresca, who earned his PhD in Sociology at Stanford, specializes in governance, entrepreneurship, market and network formation, and technology strategy.

About the Topic: The cyber security landscape has seen dramatic changes in recent years with the advent and evolution of new, growing, and ever-present adversaries. As targeted attacks and advanced adversaries continue to evolve and become increasingly sophisticated, it becomes difficult to keep pace and stay protected. Existing security technologies are incapable of identifying determined adversaries and protecting your intellectual property. Enterprises must combat these threats with targeted attack detection, prevention, and monitoring. By leveraging big data technologies and security intelligence, companies can proactively respond to advanced threats while also gaining the ability to hunt, query, and gain insight into all activity across the enterprise.

About the Speaker: Serial entrepreneur George Kurtz co-founded CrowdStrike, a cutting-edge, big data, security technology company focused on helping enterprises and governments protect their most sensitive intellectual property and national security information. Kurtz is an internationally recognized security expert, author, entrepreneur, and speaker. He has more than 20 years of experience in the security space, including extensive experience driving revenue growth and scaling small and large organizations. His entrepreneurial background and ability to commercialize nascent technologies has enabled him to drive innovation throughout his career by identifying market trends and correlating them with customer feedback, resulting in rapid growth for the businesses he has run.

His prior roles at McAfee, a $3-billion security company, include Worldwide Chief Technology O­cer and GM, as well as SVP of Enterprise. Prior to joining McAfee, Kurtz started Foundstone in October 1999 as the founder and CEO responsible for recruiting the other six founding team members. Foundstone, a world wide security products and services company, had one of the leading incident response practices in the industry, and was acquired by McAFee in October of 2004. He also authored the best-selling security book of all time, Hacking Exposed: Network Security Secrets & Solutions.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER: James Cameron, Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at CISAC for 2013-14, completed his PhD in July 2013 at the University of Cambridge. James is very interested in the contribution history can make to informing today’s debates on nuclear strategy and U.S.-Russian relations. After completing his master’s in Russian and East European Studies at the University of Oxford, he was a business consultant specializing in the former Soviet Union. 

His dissertation, “The Development of United States Anti-Ballistic Missile Policy, 1961-1972”, used the transformation of the American anti-ballistic missile (ABM) program from John F. Kennedy to Richard M. Nixon as a prism through which to examine changing patterns of presidential nuclear leadership during this period. Employing both new American and Russian sources, the thesis shows how successive occupants of the Oval Office and their most trusted advisers managed the tension between their publicly articulated nuclear strategies and their inner convictions regarding the utility of nuclear weapons during this pivotal decade of the Cold War.

ABOUT THE TOPIC: Richard Nixon did not believe in mutual assured destruction. Yet he signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 1972, which enshrined MAD as a central fact of the U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear balance. Conversely his predecessors, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, publicly defended American nuclear superiority and pushed ahead with ABM, despite their private skepticism regarding the utility of both and desire to moderate the arms race. Employing newly available evidence from declassified telephone recordings and documents, this paper attempts to account for this contradiction. It does so by placing the perpetual presidential struggle to reconcile private convictions with public demands at the center of the emergence of assured destruction and the limitation of ABM as elements of U.S.-Soviet détente through strategic arms control.

ABOUT THE TOPIC: In his talk, Jack Goldsmith will explain why he is skeptical about significant cybersecurity cooperation among military rivals, especially at the treaty level. He will, however, argue that the Snowden revelations make such cooperation more, not less, likely.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER: Jack Goldsmith is Henry L. Shattuck Professor of Law at Harvard University, where he specializes in national security law, international law, internet law, and presidential power. Goldsmith is the author of five books and numerous articles covering these topics. His recent books include: Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency After 9/11 (W.W. Norton, 2012); The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration (W.W. Norton, 2007); Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World (Oxford Press, 2006, with Tim Wu); and The Limits of International Law (Oxford Press, 2005, with Eric Posner). Prior to his time at Harvard, Goldsmith was Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel from October 2003 to July 2004 and Special Counsel to the General Counsel to the Department of Defense from September 2002 through June 2003. 

ABOUT THE SPEAKER: Daniel Altman is a Stanton Nuclear Security predoctoral fellow at CISAC for the 2013-2014 academic year. He is a doctoral candidate in the Political Science Department at MIT and a meber of the MIT Security Studies program.

His dissertation, “Red Lines and Faits Accomplis in Interstate Coercion and Crisis,” offers a framework for explaining crisis behavior and outcomes that differs from the conventional wisdom. The traditional way to understand crises is to suppose that policymakers think primarily in the form of the question, “How can we convince the other side that we are willing to fight in order to get them to back down?” This dissertation instead approaches crises as if states ask themselves, “What can we get away with unilaterally taking without starting a war?” The result is a theory of coercive conflict that explains why “vulnerable” red lines with any of four characteristics elicit faits accomplis, result in crisis defeats for the states setting them, and make war more likely. It tests this theory against the conventional wisdom with case studies of the 1948-1949 Berlin Blockade Crisis and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, as well as a quantitative analysis of interstate crises from 1918 to 2007 which makes use of original data on red lines and faits accomplis.

Daniel is working on several additional research projects on topics which include misperception as a cause of war, trade as a cause of peace, and the use of preventive force against nuclear programs.

ABOUT THE TOPIC: “Red Lines and Faits Accomplis in Interstate Coercion and Crisis” offers a framework for explaining crisis behavior and outcomes that differs from the conventional wisdom.  The traditional way to understand crises is to suppose that policymakers think primarily in the form of the question, “How can we convince the other side that we are willing to fight in order to get them to back down?”  This dissertation instead approaches crises as if states ask themselves, “What can we get away with unilaterally taking without starting a war?”  The result is a theory of coercive conflict that explains why “vulnerable” red lines with any of four characteristics elicit faits accomplis, result in crisis defeats for the states setting them, and make war more likely.  This theory is tested against the conventional wisdom with case studies of the 1948-1949 Berlin Blockade Crisis and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, as well as a quantitative analysis of interstate crises from 1918 to 2007 which makes use of original data on red lines and faits accomplis.