Science and Technology
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Pavel Podvig
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A new administration means a new opportunity to forge a U.S.-Russian missile defense cooperative in Europe. Getting there won't be easy, but it's not impossible.

What a difference eight years makes. Following the 2000 U.S. presidential election, Russian President Vladimir Putin offered a new disarmament initiative that called for reducing U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals to 1,500 warheads apiece. Although that statement was basically ignored--at the time, Washington was embroiled in the recount saga--Putin's proposal remained the official Russian position on disarmament in subsequent years.

Fast-forward to this recent president election. Instead of calling for reductions in nuclear weapons in the aftermath of Barack Obama's victory, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev threatened to move short-range ballistic missiles to the Kaliningrad region if Obama proceeds with installing missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. Thus, he quickly presented Obama with his first major foreign policy test--how to handle the issue of missile defense in Europe, the biggest irritant in U.S.-Russian relations. He also seemed determined to demonstrate that Russia is going to be a difficult and capricious partner for the new U.S. administration.

So far, the Obama team has shown great care in dealing with the thorny issue of missile defense in Europe. During the campaign, they deliberately avoided making any critical statements on the European system to avoid alienating Polish voters in battleground states such as Pennsylvania. And now that the election is over, we're hearing that they're telling the eager Polish government that their general position on missile defense--it should be deployed only "when the technology is proved to be workable"--applies to the European part of the system as well. This isn't good news for missile defense in Europe, since its technology is "workable" only in a narrow sense, if at all.

Of course, this story is far from over. If the Obama administration decides not to deploy interceptors and radar in Europe, it opens itself to a charge of yielding to Russian pressure--especially from Republicans, for whom missile defense is a signature issue. The plan to deploy missile defense in Europe also has supporters in Poland and the Czech Republic; both governments seem to believe that the presence of U.S. personnel on their soil would provide them a security guarantee far stronger than NATO membership. Finally, Russia isn't exactly interested in seeing the issue disappear: The system presents no threat whatsoever, but the controversy allows the Kremlin to score lots of rhetorical points.

Finding a solution that calms the waters and satisfies everyone won't be easy. But it's not impossible either. One thing the new administration must avoid is getting into a discussion with Russia about whether Washington has the right to deploy its military facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic, or whether Russia should have the right to veto such a decision. While a legitimate discussion, we know that it's not going to get us anywhere.

Therefore, we need to take the dispute in a different direction. Instead of arguing about the terms and conditions of missile defense deployment, Washington should accept Moscow's standing offer to use its early warning radars in Armavir and Gabala to build elements of a joint monitoring system. The offer still seems to be on the table, although Russia has been far less enthusiastic about it since the United States made clear that this joint system wouldn't replace the missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic.

The problem with those sites might seem serious, but it can be solved. A year ago, Washington considered delaying the actual deployment of the interceptors until the ballistic missile threat from Iran (or maybe some other country) becomes evident. Moscow seemed interested, but the United States withdrew the offer. It certainly could be revived now. And I believe such a compromise would satisfy missile defense supporters and skeptics alike and also buy the necessary time to make the issue less sensitive politically. History shows us that once controversy dissipates, legitimate questions can be asked about effectiveness and cost--and on these counts, the current U.S. plan for missile defense in Europe fails in any sober, independent assessment.

What would remain then is a joint U.S.-Russian project in which both countries would work together to monitor missile tests and satellite launches. It's hard to think of a better legacy of the current missile defense dispute.

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Abstract: In this age of increasing "Global Transparency," commercial satellite imagery has now made it possible for anyone to remotely peer "over the fence" and view what heretofore had been otherwise impossible...clandestine nuclear facilities (most significantly, those capable of producing fissile material suitable for use in nuclear weapons). The synergistic combination of readily available tools: personal computers, the internet, three-dimensional virtual globe visualization applications such as Google Earth, and high resolution commercial satellite imagery has gone beyond what anyone could have imaged just a few years ago. The downside of all this is that those who want to keep their clandestine nuclear facilities and associated activities from being either detected, identified, and/or monitored, are becoming more adept in their use of camouflage, concealment, and deception.

Iran is one such case where it has followed a steep learning curve of adapting to the threat that overhead observation can pose. After repeated dissident group revelations about Iran's clandestine nuclear facilities, together with confirming media broadcast of commercial satellite images of those facilities followed by verification inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); the government of Iran has become increasingly aware of this threat and gone to greater and greater lengths to try and defeat it. Iran's cover-up tactics have improved with time...from concealed infrastructure and false cover stories (Natanz)...to refurbishment and sanitization of facilities following removal of incriminating equipment (Kalaye Electric and Lashkar Abad), to the wholesale razing of facilities together with the removal of dirt and vegetation to defeat IAEA forensic environmental sampling (Lavizan).

While the international community continues to debate the issue of whether or not Iran's nuclear program is purely peaceful in nature (helping it to stay an "open case"), Iran is defiantly pursuing its goal of fissile material production. Syria, on the other hand (evidently together with North Korea), was also quite aware of the overhead observation threat, taking great pains to conceal its plutonium production reactor at Al-Kibar. Syria disguised the true function of the facility by employing minimal site security (no fences or guard towers), having minimal support infrastructure (with non visible powerlines and only buried water lines), not installing a telltale reactor ventilation stack or cooling tower, hiding the reactor building in a ravine (terrain masking), and finally camouflaging the facility with a false façade to make it appear as a byzantine fortress. Nonetheless, despite all those steps, a leak of ground-level reactor construction and interior photographs, which formed the basis for the subsequent bombing of the facility by Israel, successfully thwarted that effort (the "closed case?"). Rather than confessing the truth about al-Kibar, the Syrian government rushed to remove all traces of the destroyed reactor and supplant it with a new larger footprint building for as yet unknown purposes while continuing to claim it was previously only a disused military warehouse. The IAEA asked d Syria for permission to inspect not only the Al-Kibar site, but reportedly up to three other sites thought to be associated with it. The Syrians refused access to all but the now heavily sanitized Al-Kibar location. We must now all await the IAEA report on the findings of that singular onsite inspection.

Frank Pabian is a Senior Nonproliferation Infrastructure Analyst at Los Alamos National Laboratory who has over 35 years experience in the nuclear nonproliferation field including six years with the Office of Imagery Analysis and 18 years with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's "Z" Division.  Frank also served as a Chief Inspector for the IAEA during UN inspections in Iraq from 1996-1998 focusing on "Capable Sites." In December 2002, Frank served as one of the first US nuclear inspectors back in Iraq with UN/IAEA. While at Los Alamos, Frank has developed and presented commercial satellite imagery based briefings on foreign clandestine nuclear facilities to the International Nuclear Suppliers Group, the IAEA, NATO, and the Foreign Ministries of China and India on behalf of the NNSA and STATE.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Frank Pabian International Research, Analysis, and Development Work Force, LANL Speaker
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CISAC co-founder Sidney Drell will be honored for his contributions to science at Stanford. The presentation is the first in the Stanford Pioneers in Science series.

CISAC consulting professor and former New York Times editor and reporter Philip Taubman will introduce Professor Drell, and present his professional accomplishments and their significance.  Professor Drell will be interviewed on stage about his life, values, and reflections, with a question-and-answer session to follow.

Cubberley Auditorium
School of Education

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Affiliate
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Philip Taubman is affiliated with the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. Before joining CISAC in 2008, Mr. Taubman worked at the New York Times as a reporter and editor for nearly 30 years, specializing in national security issues, including United States diplomacy, and intelligence and defense policy and operations. He served as Moscow bureau chief and Washington bureau chief, among other posts. He is author of Secret Empire: Eisenhower, the CIA, and the Hidden Story of America's Space Espionage (2003), The Partnership: Five Cold Warriors and Their Quest to Ban the Bomb (2012),  In the Nation's Service: The Life and Times of George P. Shultz (2023), as well as co-author (with his brother, William Taubman) of McNamara at War: A New History (2025).

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Philip Taubman Commentator
Sidney D. Drell senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and professor of theoretical physics (emeritus) Speaker the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC), Stanford University
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Abstract:  Russia is the country that has the largest amount of weapon-usable fissile materials in its disposal, most of which has been produced during the cold war. In the years following the end of the cold war. Russia has undertaken significant effort to downsize its nuclear complex, leading to its serious transformation. This transformation, however, left the basic structure of the nuclear industry, most of the production facilities and most of the fissile material intact. Substantial amounts of weapon-usable fissile materials are still in storage, moved from one facility to another, or used for research and other purposes, creating security risks. Although the dangers associated with continuing presence of weapon material are generally acknowledged, the task of reducing this danger, by either eliminating the material or removing it from circulation and consolidating in a mall number of safe and secure storage sites, has proven difficult. The talk analyses the progress that Russia has made so far in consolidating its weapon-usable materials and describes the challenges that it is facing in further advancing this goal.

Pavel Podvig is a researcher at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. In 2008-09, Podvig is CISAC's acting associate director for research. Before coming to Stanford in 2004, he worked at the Center for Arms Control Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT), which was the first independent research organization in Russia dedicated to analysis of technical issues related to arms control and disarmament. In Moscow, Podvig was the leader of a major research project and the editor of the book Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (MIT Press, 2001). In recognition of his work in Russia, the American Physical Society awarded Podvig the Leo Szilard Lectureship Award of 2008 (with Anatoli Diakov). From 2000 to 2004, Podvig worked with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, and earlier with the Security Studies Program at MIT. His current research focuses on the Russian strategic forces and nuclear weapons complex, as well as technical and political aspects of nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, missile defense, and U.S.-Russian arms control process.

Podvig received his degree in physics from MIPT and his PhD in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations. Since 2001, Podvig has been a member of the Board of Directors of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. He is a member of the APS Committee on International Freedom of Scientists and is serving as the Chair of the Committee in 2008. 

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

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Pavel Podvig is an independent analyst based in Geneva, where he runs his research project, "Russian Nuclear Forces." He is also a Senior Research Fellow at the UN Institute for Disarmament Research and a researcher with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University. Pavel Podvig started his work on arms control at the Center for Arms Control Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT), which was the first independent research organization in Russia dedicated to analysis of technical issues of disarmament and nonproliferation. Pavel Podvig led the Center for Arms Control Studies project that produced the book, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (MIT Press, 2001). In recognition of his work in Russia, the American Physical Society awarded Podvig the Leo Szilard Lectureship Award of 2008 (with Anatoli Diakov). Podvig worked with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, the Security Studies Program at MIT, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. His current research focuses on the Russian strategic forces and nuclear weapons complex, as well as technical and political aspects of nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, missile defense, and U.S.-Russian arms control process. Pavel Podvig is a member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials. He has a  physics degree from MIPT and PhD in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

For a list of publications, please visit http://russianforces.org/podvig/.

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Pavel Podvig Acting Co-Director for Research and Research Associate, CISAC Speaker
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Ward Wilson is an award-winning scholar living in Trenton, NJ. He has written, studied and read extensively about nuclear weapons issues for more than twenty-five years. After training as a historian at the American University in Washington, DC with a special emphasis on philosophy, he was a Fellow at the Robert Kennedy Memorial Foundation in 1981 where he wrote about nuclear weapons issues. He has been published in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Dissent, the Chicago Tribune, Nonproliferation Review and International Security (among others). His work has been described as "some of the most original and exacting thinking being done about nuclear weapons today." In 2007 he published a ground-breaking study of the bombing of Hiroshima in International Security titled "The Winning Weapon? Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in Light of Hiroshima." The distinguished physicists Freeman Dyson has said that the article "effectively demolishes the generally-accepted myth that the atomic bombings brought World War II to an end." Wilson argues that "Much of what has been written about nuclear weapons is conceptually muddled. A great deal of work is necessary to intellectually recast the field." He advocates an approach rooted in the work of William James and Ludwig Wittgenstein that emphasizes examining the usefulness of nuclear weapons. "The only important question is ‘Are nuclear weapons useful?' If the answer is no, why keep them?" Wilson writes regularly at www.rethinkingnuclearweapons.org.

Barton Bernstein began his current position as Professor of History at Stanford University in 1965, after receiving his Ph.D. in History from Harvard University in 1964. At Stanford, he has served as the director of the History Honors Program, the International Relations program, and the International Policy Studies program. Prof. Bernstein is a member of the American Historical Association, the Conference on Peace Research in History, and has served on the Editorial Advisory Committee for the Nuclear Age Series at Stanford University. He has been awarded numerous grants and research positions, including the National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship and the Lawrence-Livermore Grant. Prof. Bernstein was a CISAC fellow during the 1985-86 academic year.  Many of Prof. Bernstein's publications and articles have received national acclaim. He co-edited, with Don Kennedy, a series in Modern American History. A beloved professor and prolific author, Prof. Bernstein's research interests include U.S. foreign policy, modern U.S. political history, and science and technology policy. His talk "Why did Japan Surrender in World War II" addresses and challenges false or outdated conceptions of Japan's role in WWII.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Ward Wilson Independent Nuclear Weapons Scholar, Trenton, NJ Speaker
Barton J. Bernstein Professor of History, Stanford University Commentator
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Abstract:  Given that even minor changes to our nuclear weapons posture have been rejected as too risky, it is surprising that the baseline risk of our current strategy had not been estimated prior to my March 2008 paper. Even though that paper uses a simplified model which only lower bounds the risk, it is estimated to be thousands of times greater than that associated with a nuclear power plant near your home. The advantages of bringing quantitative risk analysis to bear on this problem will be discussed and next steps proposed.

Martin E. Hellman is Professor Emeritus of Electrical Engineering at Stanford University and a member of the National Academy of Engineering. While best known for his invention with Diffie and Merkle of public key cryptography, he also has a strong concern for averting nuclear war. With Anatoly Gromyko, he co-edited "Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking," a book which appeared in English and in Russian late in 1987 calling for a long-term process to eliminate the nuclear threat.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

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CISAC Affiliated Faculty Member
Professor (Emeritus) of Electrical Engineering
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Martin E. Hellman is professor emeritus of electrical engineering at Stanford, a recipient (joint with Whit Diffie) of the million dollar ACM Turing Award, a member of the National Academy of Engineering, and an inductee of the National Inventors Hall of Fame. He became a CISAC affiliated faculty member in October 2012.

Hellman is best known for his invention, with Whitfield Diffie and Ralph Merkle, of public key cryptography. In addition to many other uses, this technology forms the basis for secure transactions and cybersecurity on the Internet. He also has been a long-time contributor to the computer privacy debate, starting with the issue of DES key size in 1975 and continuing with service (1994-96) on the National Research Council's Committee to Study National Cryptographic Policy, whose main recommendations were implemented soon afterward.

Prof. Hellman also has a deep interest in the ethics of technological development. With Prof. Anatoly Gromyko of Moscow, he co-edited Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking, a book published simultaneously in Russian and English in 1987 during the rapid change in Soviet-American relations (available as a free, 2.6 MB PDF download). In 1986, he and his wife of fifty years published, A New Map for Relationships: Creating True Love at Home & Peace on the Planet, a book that provides a “unified field theory” for successful relationships by illuminating the connections between nuclear war, conventional war, interpersonal war, and war within our own psyches (available as a free, 1.2 MB PDF download).
 
His current research is devoted to bringing a risk-informed framework to nuclear deterrence and critically examining the assumptions that underlie our national security.

Prof. Hellman was at IBM's Watson Research Center from 1968-69 and an assistant professor of EE at MIT from 1969-71. Returning to Stanford in 1971, he served on the regular faculty until becoming Professor Emeritus in 1996. He has authored over seventy technical papers, six US patents and a number of foreign equivalents.

More information on Professor Hellman is available on his EE Department website. His publications, many  of which can be downloaded in PDF, are on the publications page of that site.
Martin Hellman Professor Emeritus of Electrical Engineering, Stanford University Speaker
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Abstract:  In 2003, General John Gordon, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and former Deputy Director of the CIA asked his staff to do an end-to-end evaluation of U.S. biodefense posture.  As a result, Homeland Security Staff, directed by Dr. Kenneth Bernard, Special Assistant to the President, did a government-wide review of national preparedness and response to a bioterrorist attack.   The resulting assessment led in 2004 to the combined Homeland Security Presidential Directive #10 and National Security Presidetial Directive #17:  "Biodefense for the 21st Century."  Dr. Bernard will discuss the process and outcome of this policy that remains the U.S. national strategy for preventing and responding to a bioterrorist event. Accomplishments, outcomes and remaining gaps will be detailed, along with budget and policy implications for the next administration. 

Admiral Kenneth Bernard was appointed by President Bush to be Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense on the Homeland Security Council (HSC) in November 2002. Dr. Bernard chaired the Whitehouse Biodefense Policy Coordinating committee and drafted Decision Directives for President Bush on both "Biodefense for the 21st Century" and Agricultural Bioterrorism, and he was the White House point person on Project Bioshield - a $5.6 billion congressional bill that is speeding development and procurement of new countermeasures against biological, chemical and radiological terrorist threats.

In January 2001, Dr. Bernard was assigned by the U.S. Surgeon General to the office of Senator Bill Frist to work on international health issues of priority concern to both the Congress and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).   After September 11, however, he was called back to HHS to create the position of Special Adviser for National Security, Intelligence and Defense for the Department of Health and Human Services. From August 1998 to January 2001, he served on President Clinton's National Security Council (NSC) staff as Special Adviser to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Prior to joining the NSC, Dr. Bernard served as the International Health Attaché and senior representative of the U.S. Secretary of Health at the U.S. Mission to the UN in Geneva, Switzerland (1994-1998). From 1984-1989, he held positions as the Associate Director for Medical and Scientific Affairs in the Office of International Health, HHS, and as International Health Policy Adviser to the Director of the U.S. Peace Corps. He retired from the USPHS as a Rear Admiral.

He received his AB degree from the University of California, Berkeley in 1971, an M.D. from the University of California, Davis in 1975, and the DTM&H degree from the University of London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine in 1977.  He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Dr. Kenneth Bernard former Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense, Homeland Security Council Speaker
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