International Development
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THIS EVENT STARTS AT 2:40PM. Introductions will start at 2:40pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

 

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_u9n9HEq0QqmgMpVr2py4Aw

 

About the Event: At the September 2012 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his “Pivot to Asia”, ostensibly launching a reorientation of Russia’s foreign policy. Yet, has Russia truly pivoted to Asia? If so, why? Data on Russia’s economic and security ties with major Asian countries illustrate that Russia’s shift to Asia is real, especially towards China. Such a shift has been motivated by the Kremlin’s desire to reduce Russia’s economic reliance on Europe in light of Western sanctions as well as shared regional security interests and elite diplomacy between Putin and other heads of state. While Putin and the Kremlin have taken deliberate actions to support a pivot east, broader geopolitical and economic trends have been at least as consequential in pushing Russia east, such as Asia’s growing economic power. Far from starting in 2012 with Putin’s pronouncement, Moscow continually looking east is part of a historical pattern dating back several hundred years. As the global balance of power shifts towards Asia, U.S. policymakers must be cognizant of the second and third order effects U.S. foreign policy can have on the Kremlin’s ties with major powers in Asia.

 

About the Speaker: Kyle is a senior studying economics from Santa Rosa, California. Inspired by his experiences leading the Stanford U.S.-Russia Forum, his thesis examines Russia’s so-called pivot to Asia. Next year, he will be returning to Stanford to complete a Master's in Management Science & Engineering.

Virtual Seminar

Kyle Duchynski CISAC Honors Student Stanford University
Seminars
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Introductions will start at 2:40pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

 

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_C-7gXRifSDWhhfZ2yBCkTg

 

About the Event: What motivates Middle Eastern nations to develop the cybersecurity governance agencies that protect from malicious cyber activity? As the world has watched major cyber powers such as China, Russia and the United States emerge, a region often at the forefront of conversations on conventional military conflict, the Middle East, has broadly been left undiscussed in the realm of cyber policy. While this may be indicative of a lack of malicious cyber activity within the region, cyber conflict, however, is on the rise between Middle Eastern States. An original data set of over 50 significant cyber incidents since 2007 shows that the biggest perpetrators of malicious cyber activity against Middle Eastern states are state actors within the region, as opposed to extra-regional states, third-party hacking groups, terrorist organizations or political organizations. Moreover, this malicious cyber activity has had two major waves of increase that align with both the Arab Spring and the Persian Gulf Crisis. The growing threat of regional cyber conflict in tandem with political unrest and conventional military conflict suggest that Middle Eastern nations have been motivated to develop cyber defense structures in response to a growing regional threat of malicious cyber activity.

 

About the Speaker: Kate is currently studying History with a minor in Middle Eastern Languages. She has pursued her interests in both cyber policy and Middle Eastern politics through an internship at the National Security Commission on A.I. and as deputy head of Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster's research team. She has received a Fulbright award to purse a Master's in Conflict Research, Management and Resolution at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem next year.

Virtual Seminar

Kate Yeager CISAC Honors Student Stanford University
Seminars
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THIS EVENT STARTS AT 2:40PM. Introductions will start at 2:40pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

 

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_C-7gXRifSDWhhfZ2yBCkTg

 

About the Event: Why do certain Latin American countries receive substantially more Chinese investment than others? Various reports, books, and statements from officials argue that Chinese investments, notably ones from its Belt and Road Initiative, seek to augment Chinese global influence through corruption, political influence, and debt diplomacy. Since 2005, the People’s Republic of China has increased its interest in Latin America, as evidenced by its upward trend of investment with the region now receiving nearly 10% of total Chinese investment, or $200bn. Using the American Enterprise Institute’s China Global Investment Tracker, this thesis aims to identify some potential factors for the distribution of Chinese investment across different Latin American nations and test the veracity of such claims, and explain why Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela receive such high levels of investment compared to regional peers like Colombia and Mexico. The data suggests that Latin American corruption is not an influential factor in Chinese investment destinations, but rather the primary motive is more likely the potential for commodity exports like soybeans, petroleum, and copper. As China raises its economic influence in Latin America, Beijing will likely obtain greater political and diplomatic influence. The United States government must understand Beijing’s intentions in the region and compete accordingly rather than maligning the PRC’s actions in Latin America without providing a competitive alternative.

 

About the Speaker: Carter is a senior studying International Relations with specializations in international security and East and South Asia, as well as German studies. Growing up in Phoenix, Arizona, he extended his affinity for Latin America into his thesis by writing about Chinese investments across various Latin American states. After graduation, he will be moving to Bologna, Italy and Washington, DC for a Masters in International Relations at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies.

Virtual Seminar

Carter Clelland CISAC Honors Student Stanford University
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Introductions will start at 1:50pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

 

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_Uoa_Nef3RAu1JAfPRDTg2A

 

About the Event: When and under what circumstances does the US government publicly attribute state-backed cyber intrusions? Over the past decade, the US government has become increasingly willing to publicly attribute the state adversaries behind cyber incidents. Yet the timing of public attribution appears to vary significantly. Much of the existing work on public attribution of cyber incidents is theoretical – examining when states should publicly attribute – without providing a systematic study of the circumstances in which it actually takes place. This thesis seeks to fill this gap by compiling a data set of every public attribution by the U.S. government to another state from 2010-2021, in addition to data on timing. My analysis suggests that the U.S. government is not a unitary actor; instead, public attribution operates through four distinct channels – technical alerts, criminal charges, and official and unofficial policy statements. Bilateral relations between the U.S. and adversary state, U.S. domestic politics, and attribution by private sector entities have no systematic effect on the timing of public attribution. Moreover, case studies of public attribution for Iran’s Operation Ababil and Russia’s Dragonfly 2.0 campaign demonstrate that organizational factors matter more than the public discourse would suggest. As the government pursues whole-of-government strategies of “persistent engagement” and “defend forward,” this thesis suggests that policymakers must think systematically across government about when and under what circumstances to publicly attribute cyber incidents to other states.

 

About the Speaker: June is a senior studying International Relations and minoring in Computer Science. Her course of study has focused on cyber policy and international law, inspired by her experiences at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative and State Department. Her thesis extends these interests, by examining the US government's approach to public attribution in cyberspace.

Virtual Seminar

June Lee CISAC Honors Student Stanford University
Seminars
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THIS EVENT STARTS AT 1:50PM. Introductions will start at 1:50pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

 

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_Uoa_Nef3RAu1JAfPRDTg2A

 

About the Event: Russia harbors both real and imagined grievances against the West. Since the end of the Cold War, the Kremlin has accumulated a litany of complaints – spanning NATO enlargement to liberal hegemony, economic sanctions to cultural degeneracy – and amplified them with renewed fervor at home and abroad. Despite the resurgence of resentment politics in Russia, China, and Iran, few studies have examined the phenomenon of national grievance narratives. This thesis fills the gap with a study on the sources and strategic aims of Russia’s grievances against the West. An original dataset of 471 grievances, created by surveying hundreds of Russian presidential speeches, interviews, and strategic documents, charts Russia’s grievance narrative since 1991. Contrary to conventional assumptions, grievance narratives do not reflect the genuine foreign policy interests of the state. A fifth of the grievances in the dataset are neither reliable nor merely rhetorical, but rather instrumental to a revisionist Russian foreign policy. Instrumental grievances, a term this thesis introduces, are tactical complaints that state actors exploit to undermine, challenge, or gain leverage over an adversary. An in-depth case study on Russia’s long-standing grievance against NATO suggests the Russian political elite inflate national security threats to serve their geopolitical ambitions and domestic political interests. Consequently, policymakers should interpret Russia’s grievance narrative with caution and skepticism. When policymakers mistake an instrumental grievance for harmless rhetoric or, worse, genuine offense, they overlook the subversive ways that Russia exploits the grievance to deceive and undermine the West.

 

About the Speaker: Yasmin is an international student from the UK studying History and Economics at Stanford. Since visiting Russia three times and studying the language, she has developed a deep interest in the country and turned to historical analysis to help make sense of Russian foreign policy.

Virtual Seminar

Yasmin Samrai CISAC Honors Student Stanford University
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Introductions will start at 2:40pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

 

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_Y4kF9dTJTJinogbJqvNSpw

 

About the Event: How do Chinese state media partnerships impact perceptions of China in East Asia and the Pacific? Chinese state media groups form partnerships to publish content in local outlets, reaching foreign audiences through trusted sources. Previous scholars identify media partnerships as the most impactful form of Beijing’s public diplomacy, but do not investigate which factors moderate this influence. This thesis analyzes the relationship between partnerships and approval of China in 12 countries using an original dataset of 98 partnerships from 2006-2020. By recording the size of partner groups, strength of ties, and language of publication, this this investigation differentiates itself from previous studies. Partnerships are collectively associated with increasing approval and decreasing disapproval of China, but surprisingly the most influential partnerships are with small, Chinese language media groups. These results contradict the conventional logic that partnerships with larger, multilingual media would have greater impact. An interview with a Xinhua journalist and case studies of media organizations in Thailand and Australia suggest that small, Chinese language platforms are uniquely vulnerable to influence from PRC state media. Policymakers must support independent publishers to prevent the consolidation of the Chinese language media ecosystem.

 

About the Speaker: Dylan is a senior studying international relations and human rights. After researching disinformation for the Department of Defense and working for a journalism-tech startup, Dylan chose to investigate Chinese state media partnerships in East Asia and the Pacific. After graduation, he will move to D.C. and work as a Junior Fellow at the Stimson Center.

Virtual Seminar

Dylan Junkin CISAC Honors Student Stanford University
Seminars
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THIS EVENT STARTS AT 2:40PM. Introductions will start at 2:40pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

 

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_Y4kF9dTJTJinogbJqvNSpw

 

About the Event: How do U.S. and UN targeted sanctions impact the behavior and strategies of militant groups? Despite several theories on the use of sanctions to punish non-state actors, scholars have largely neglected the impact of targeted sanction application on militant group behavior. This thesis combines an original dataset of 160 U.S. and UN sanction regimes with data on the activity of over 600 militant groups to examine the relationship between sanction imposition and militant activity. The results show mixed impact of sanctions on militant activity. While UN targeted sanctions precipitate falls in militant activity, unilateral U.S. sanctions are associated with a significant increase in violence committed by sanctioned groups. Comparative analysis of two militant groups in India –The National Democratic Front of Bodoland and Hizbul Mujahideen– explores the causality of this finding. U.S. sanctions strip militant groups of international legitimacy but often fail to limit their availability to resources. As a result, U.S. sanctions reduce the incentives of non-state actors to seek international recognition and constrain the forms of violence and insurgency they employ. This thesis illustrates the importance of international cooperation in ensuring targeted sanctions effectively limit the operating capabilities of militant groups.

 

About the Speaker: Nathalie is a senior from Kansas City, Kansas, studying Economics and Political Science. Her experiences working for the World Bank and studying at Oxford have made her passionate about the intersection of economic development, human rights, and violence prevention. After graduation, she plans on conducting economic analysis for the Ludwig Institute for Shared Economic Prosperity in Washington, D.C.

Virtual Seminar

Nathalie Kiersznowski CISAC Honors Student Stanford University
Seminars
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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Seminar Recording:  https://youtu.be/L04_-G6N7Go

 

About the Event: What can wargames tell us about the ethics of decision-making under the threat of nuclear escalation? The “Cold War Game” (CWG) that took place from 1954-1956 at the RAND Corporation offers insights into the origins of deterrence and the dilemmas of contemplating the possible futures of war with rare events or little empirical data through the method of gaming. Based on extensive archival research at RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, CA, this project identifies the methodological and epistemological issues faced by early systems analysts and social scientists in attempting to link political and economic issues to traditional military wargaming in the nuclear era. The CWG sought to both quantify the non-rational or social dimensions of nuclear decision-making as well as develop psychological insights, to recognize the ways that propaganda and psychology were used as techniques of warfare alongside the quantitative and rational analytics of game theory. I argue that discussions of the ethics of nuclear weapons were sidelined throughout the Cold War for nuclear strategists and my questions examine how ethics functioned even it its absence of explicit discourse. Nevertheless, a kind of ethical restraint became implicit throughout the CWG that tempered even the most bellicose players through the process of physical play by forcing strategists to face the weight of their decisions. Differing epistemological approaches to the game from the social science division and the mathematics/economics division at RAND offers a unique empirical test to compare qualitative and quantitative approaches to wargaming operating within the same context of uncertainty in the early Cold War period. The conclusions of this study offers insights for contemporary dilemmas of AI and wargaming the future of war today. Ultimately, the project offers both an in-depth look at the origins of the political-military wargames and interjects with the larger questions of how abstraction and technostrategic language enables and constrains the acceptable discourse for decision-making in the face of nuclear brinksmanship.

 

 

About the Speaker: John R. Emery is a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Irvine and then became a Tobis Fellow at the Interdisciplinary Center for the Scientific Study of Ethics and Morality at UC Irvine. His research agenda is at the intersection of security studies, ethics of war, and science and technology studies. His previous work on drones, ethics, AI, and counter-terrorism has been published in Law & Policy, Critical Military Studies, Ethics & International Affairs, and Peace Review. His current research agenda explores issues of human-machine interaction in the U.S. national security context analyzing both historical and contemporary cases.

Virtual Seminar

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John R. Emery is an Assistant Professor of International Security at the University of Oklahoma in the Department of International and Area Studies. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Irvine. His research focuses broadly on the intersection of ethics of war, security studies and technology. His work on 1950s nuclear wargaming at the RAND Corporation and the impact of wargames on ethical intuition has been published in Texas National Security Review. Previous work on drones, ethics, counter-terrorism, and just war is published in Critical Military Studies, Ethics & International Affairs, and Peace Review. In 2017-2018 he was awarded the NSF-funded Technology, Law and Society Fellowship to undertake an interdisciplinary study of the impact of AI, Big Data, and blockchain on law and society scholarship.

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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/sFsmjTf9xUg

 

About the Event: Contemporary global politics are marked by a renewed debate over the significance and limits of state sovereignty. In the eyes of many, the COVID-19 pandemic has reasserted the importance of territorial sovereignty as well as of national identity and citizenship. Populations have become more acutely conscious of their rights and responsibilities as members of a particular political community, and their ultimate reliance upon their governments to protect them from the virus. Well before the outbreak of this pandemic, however, many scholars, policy-analysts, and state officials had already been highlighting the ‘return’ of sovereignty, often in juxtaposition to either the transnational economic forces of globalization or liberal international norms. Powerful economic and political trends (including protectionism and populism) were casting doubt on the reach and impact of liberal ideals such as free movement and economic interdependence. In part, these trends reflected a structural shift in international order in which the relative position of the United States was declining, and the standing of non-Western powers with attachment to what is loosely referred to as “Westphalian” sovereignty was increasing. Although some IR scholars have argued that today’s great powers (Russia, China and the US) are espousing and practicing a new form of “extra-legal sovereignty” (Paris 2020), the former two states - in order to garner wider support for their respective world views - regularly appeal to an understanding of sovereignty that underscores long-standing principles of territorial integrity and political independence.

This book project takes a step back, to more critically analyse the period preceding our current debate. Before we can address the question of whether and how Westphalian sovereignty has returned to shape contemporary global order, we should examine more deeply why sovereignty was alleged to have been transformed in the first place. In other words, what was the nature and reach of the post-Westphalian order that was proclaimed by so many in the first decades of the post-Cold War period?  While analysts and commentators have pointed to several manifestations of this changed understanding of sovereignty, I focus on the liberal idea of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’, which, inter alia, seemingly underpinned the articulation in 2005 of the principle of the ‘responsibility to protect’. According to this liberal understanding, sovereignty can no longer be conceived as unrivalled control over a delimited territory and the population residing within it – ‘sovereignty as authority’ – but rather as a status and set of rights which are conditional upon certain behaviours and capacities of states. Sovereignty is thus not solely the right of the state to be “undisturbed from without” but the responsibility to perform certain roles and tasks within its frontiers.

The central aim of this study is to examine the rise, contestation, and potential fate of what some have called this “revolutionary” understanding of sovereignty.  I ask three more specific questions. The first is conceptual and draws upon the history of ideas relating to sovereignty. Was the post-Cold War articulation of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ really so novel? Or was it juxtaposing itself to a very particular historical period, during which non-intervention was championed by newly decolonized states? The second set of issues is empirical. How has sovereignty been understood in the post-Cold War period, particularly through practices of intervention and state recognition? Have the key actors in international society spoken and acted in ways consistent with the liberal understanding of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’? And the final set of questions is normative. Is it desirable to understand sovereignty in this way? What are the benefits and limitations of viewing sovereignty as deeply connected with responsibility?

While the book project is organized around these three central themes, my presentation will focus in, for purposes of illustration, on the ‘responsibility to protect’ (RtoP). This chapter assesses the degree to which ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ has been widely accepted and practiced by states in their interpretation and implementation of this principle and, in so doing, seeks to both account for and analyse the nature and impact of the contestation that surrounds RtoP.  The chapter’s findings suggest that a conditional understanding of sovereignty was not necessarily shared or practiced across international society, even during the height of liberal internationalist ‘moment’ of the post-Cold War period - thereby posing a challenge not just to the proponents of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’, but also to some of its fiercest critics, who overstate its negative effects on international politics.

I begin by arguing that while the 2005 Summit Outcome Document (SOD) was a significant intergovernmental agreement that provided greater precision about the source, scope, and bearer of the responsibility to protect, its particular formulation indicates that the logic of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ was not fully embraced.  Instead, the text reflected a horizontal logic, associated with respect for sovereign equality and positive international law, rather than a vertical logic that places the international community in a position of authority over states. While the notions of sovereignty and responsibility did come together, they did so in a way that did not override or replace sovereignty in situations of humanitarian emergency, but rather aimed to reinforce sovereignty and support states in protecting their populations.

In a second step, the chapter analyses the types of contestation that have accompanied RtoP’s development, which relate both to procedural matters (such as the appropriate intergovernmental body that should ‘own’ RtoP’s development) and to substantive elements of the principle – including, most notably, the relationship between national and international responsibility. I suggest that RtoP is particularly susceptible to contestation, given its complex structure and inherently indeterminate nature. I also argue that, far from establishing an independent international authority that specifies and enforces state responsibility, the most that RtoP creates within its so-called third pillar is a responsibility to consider a real or imminent crisis involving atrocity crimes - what in legal literature is sometimes called a ‘duty of conduct’.

In the final section of the chapter, I contend that the contestation surrounding RtoP can be better understood by giving greater attention to the normative underpinnings of contemporary critiques of the principle, most notably those which stress the importance of sovereignty equality. Given that RtoP has continued to be associated – rightly or wrongly – with the use of military force, it has frequently generated sharp debate among states about the meaning of sovereignty, and efforts to assert the continuing power of the principle of non-intervention. The result of this contestation, and the reshaping of RtoP by non-Western states such as China, has been a dampening of the original cosmopolitan roots of the principle and an increased focus on maintaining strong and capable states. In short, while RtoP has created a linkage in international discourse and practice between sovereignty and responsibility, it has not given effect to the liberal understanding of sovereignty as responsibility.

 

 

 

About the Speaker: Jennifer M. Welsh is the Canada 150 Research Chair in Global Governance and Security at McGill University. She was previously Professor and Chair in International Relations at the European University Institute and Professor in International Relations at the University of Oxford, where she co-founded the Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict. From 2013-2016, she served as the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, on the Responsibility to Protect.

Professor Welsh is the author, co-author, and editor of several books and articles on humanitarian intervention, the evolution of the notion of the ‘responsibility to protect’ in international society, the UN Security Council, norm conflict and contestation, and Canadian foreign policy.

Virtual Seminar

Jennifer Welsh Research Chair in Global Governance and Security McGill University
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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/5616166186207/WN_Zdzl0PrwR7CXSPoASOs5Xg

 

About the Event: Conventional wisdom on proxy warfare exclusively focuses on explaining governments’ provision of military, logistical, and financial support to rebel groups involved in conflict abroad. In reality, foreign militant groups play a much larger role in these partnerships than recognized: foreign militants often provide government partners with intelligence, logistical support, access to their military infrastructure, and send elite units to train and supplement their state partner’s troops. Because armed non-state actors are smaller and face greater difficulties accessing resources, the fact that they provide any type of support – let alone deploying their forces to conduct joint combat operations with state armed forces abroad – is puzzling. In this presentation, I provide insights into the strategic benefits that foreign militants receive from supporting states, identify factors that influence the types of support foreign militants provide to government partners once the decision to provide support has been made, and highlight how foreign militants can constrain and influence their government partners’ future behavior. To do so, I conduct an in-depth examination of the overtime trends in the various types of support that Shia paramilitary groups from Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan provided to the Syrian regime and Russian forces throughout the course of the decade-long Syrian conflict.

 

 

About the Speaker: Melissa Carlson is currently a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Center for International Security and Cooperation’s Middle East Initiative. She received her PhD in Political Science from UC Berkeley. Her research examines cooperation between states and non-state actors in conflict, and her book manuscript explains variations in the types of support that governments and foreign militants provide to each other. Previously, Melissa has worked with the International Organization of Migration’s Missions in Jordan and Iraq to examine relations between refugees, host governments, and aid organizations.

Virtual Seminar

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Dr. Melissa Carlson is currently working with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency's Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation unit, where she promotes rigorous standards of measuring the effectiveness of the U.S.'s security cooperation and assistance programming. During her tenure at CISAC, she was a postdoctoral research and teaching fellow. She received her PhD in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley, specializing in international relations, comparative politics, and methodology. Dr. Carlson's primary research examines the factors that influence the variation and intensity of partnerships between governments and foreign militant groups with a focus on the recent conflicts in Iraq and Syria. Her book-style dissertation project finds that, when foreign militant groups and state armed forces share similar organizational characteristics, they are more likely to deploy forces to conduct joint combat operations and provide each other with advanced weapons systems. In other research, Dr. Carlson examines the factors that influence informal and secret security cooperation between states and how misinformation and rumors influence refugees' relationships with host governments, service providers, and smugglers. Her research has been published in the American Political Science Review, the Review of International Organizations, and International Studies Quarterly, among other outlets. Outside of academia, Dr. Carlson has worked as a consultant for the International Organization for Migration's Iraq and Jordan Missions.

Affiliate
CISAC Postdoctoral Fellow Stanford University
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