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Norman M. Naimark
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The Financial Times named Norman Naimark's latest book, Stalin and the Fate of Europe: The Postwar Struggle for Sovereignty, one of the best history books in 2019. The Financial Times writes "Naimark has few peers as a scholar of Stalinism, the Soviet Union and mid-20th-century Europe. Here he selects seven case studies, from Denmark and Finland to Austria and Albania, to illustrate the complexity of Stalin’s objectives after the second world war as European leaders on both sides of the emerging Iron Curtain strove to reclaim national sovereignty."

 

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Steven Pifer
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What an American-Led Peace Plan Should Look Like

For more than five years, Russian forces and their proxies have waged a bloody war against Ukrainian forces in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. The conflict has claimed more than 13,000 lives, driven almost two million people from their homes, and caused immense material damage. France and Germany have together sought to broker peace but failed to produce a durable cease-fire—let alone a political settlement....

If European efforts continue to falter, the United States should take a more active role in the peacemaking process, working with European countries to make Russia’s military engagement in Ukraine more costly and a settlement more attractive. Moreover, Washington should set forth its own peace plan—one that builds on previous diplomatic efforts but includes a UN-authorized peacekeeping mission and an interim international administration in Donbas.

 

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For more than two weeks now, a stream of current and former U.S. officials, this week including Amb. Bill Taylor, have described to Congressional committees the White House’s sordid effort to outsource American foreign policy to the president’s lawyer, Rudy Giuliani, who sought to advance the personal political interests of Donald Trump. Faced with compelling testimonies to the effect that the president subverted U.S. national interests to his own, the White House has begun to trash those officials.

Even for this White House, that is a despicable new low.

The testimonies make clear that President Trump insisted on a quid pro quo, as his Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney confirmed in an October 17 press conference (he later tried to walk it back, but watch the video of the press conference). The president wanted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to investigate a long-debunked charge about former Vice President Joe Biden, his possible opponent in the 2020 U.S. presidential election. President Trump also wanted the Ukrainians to check whether the Democratic National Committee’s e-mail servers might have ended up in, of all places, Ukraine (no one has offered evidence to suggest that they have).

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Amy Zegart
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Smoking guns are the stuff of spy movies. In real-life intelligence-gathering, they are exceptionally rare. That’s why the business of intelligence typically requires collecting and analyzing fragments of information—putting together secret nuggets with unclassified information—to try to make sense of complex reality. If nothing else, the whistle-blower who filed a complaint against President Donald Trump clearly followed his or her training. SECOND PARAGRAPH I’ve spent 20 years reading intelligence reports and researching the U.S. intelligence community. And I’m not automatically inclined to believe the worst allegations about any administration; everyone has agendas and incentives to reveal information, some more noble than others. Trump and his allies have dismissed the complaint as hearsay and accused the whistle-blower of acting on political motives. But a close reading of the whistle-blower’s lengthy complaint, which accuses Trump of “using the power of his office to solicit interference from a foreign country in the 2020 U.S. election,” yields a lot of concrete leads for investigators to follow.

Here are three things I learned:

 

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Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/nTFLMMdK9Zc

 

Abstract: What is Putin up to? In this lecture, Taylor argues that Russian foreign policy is best understood as a product of both Russian power and purpose. Purpose is understood as the worldview and mentality of Team Putin, which Taylor has defined as “The Code of Putinism” (as elaborated in his 2018 book of that name). Power and purpose combined produce a foreign policy strategy driven by Russia’s consistent attempts to “punch above its weight.” The disjuncture between this Russian mentality and foreign policy strategy and traditional US approaches to world politics explain the current low point in US-Russian relations.

 

Speaker's Biography:

Brian Taylor Brian Taylor
Brian Taylor is Professor and Chair of Political Science in the Maxwell School at Syracuse University. Taylor is the author of three books on Russian politics: The Code of Putinism (Oxford University Press, 2018); State Building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and Coercion after Communism (Cambridge University Press, 2011); and Politics and the Russian Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1689-2000 (Cambridge University Press, 2003). He received his B.A. from the University of Iowa, an M.Sc. from the London School of Economics and Political Science, and a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.   

Brian Taylor Professor and Chair of Political Science Syracuse University
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A group of more than 100 leading American Asia specialists, former U.S. officials and military officers, and foreign policy experts has signed an open letter calling on President Trump and Congress to develop a U.S. approach to China that is focused on creating enduring coalitions with other countries in support of economic and security objectives rather than on efforts to contain China’s engagement with the world.

The signatories include five FSI scholars: Shorenstein APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar, Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow David M. Lampton, FSI Senior Fellow and APARC’s China Program Director Jean C. Oi, CISAC Senior Fellow Scott D. Sagan, and FSI Senior Fellow Andrew G. Walder.

In the letter, published in the Washington Post, the signatories express their concern about the growing deterioration in U.S.-China relations and outline several elements of what they describe as a more effective U.S. policy toward China.

China’s troubling behavior in recent years, the signatories write, presents serious challenges that require a firm U.S. response. The best American strategy “is to work with our allies and partners to create a more open and prosperous world in which China is offered the opportunity to participate.”

China’s engagement in the international system is essential to the system’s survival, argue the signatories, and “efforts to isolate China will simply weaken those Chinese intent on developing a more humane and tolerant society.”

Read the full letter in the Washington Post.


The views expressed by the signatories to the open letter are their own and are not opinion or information of Stanford University or of FSI.

 

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Journalists watch a live broadcast of China's President Xi Jinping speaking during the first session of the G20 summit on June 28, 2019 in Osaka, Japan.
Journalists watch a live broadcast of China's President Xi Jinping speaking during the first session of the G20 summit on June 28, 2019 in Osaka, Japan. President Trump and Xi met at the G20 for the first time in seven months to discuss deteriorating ties between the world's two largest economies.
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Abstract: Successful use of bots and trolls as tools of its expansionist foreign policy demonstrated the Russian government's superior capability in computational propaganda. Yet the main area of application for these tools remains inside Russia: to prop up Vladimir Putin's approval ratings and deny his opponents an opportunity to reach potential voters. In this paper, we use supervised machine learning algorithms for bot detection and sentiment analysis to do a first systematic survey of bot activity in the Russian segment of Twitter. We discover a high yet fluctuating volume of bot communication and presence of both pro- and anti-government as well as neutral bots. We also identify sources of information they spread and formulate testable hypotheses about the political strategy behind bots deployment. Finally, we discuss the implications of autocrats' reliance on domestic computational propaganda for the response to their activities abroad.

 

Speaker's Biography: Sergey Sanovich received his Ph.D. in Politics at NYU. He studies how autocrats use the power of persuasion to come to, and stay in, office. His ongoing research is focused on online censorship and propaganda by authoritarian regimes; elections and partisanship in electoral autocracies; and personalization of politics in both autocratic and democratic countries. To conduct his research, Sergey collects big data from social media, digitalizes archival documents, and runs field and survey experiments both online and offline.

Sergey Sanovich Cyber Fellow CISAC, Stanford University
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Following the abrupt ending of the highly anticipated second bilateral summit between President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Hanoi, APARC and CISAC scholars evaluate the result of the summit, its implications for regional relations in Northeast Asia, and the opportunities moving forward towards the goal of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

This Q&A with Noa Ronkin features Andray Abrahamian, the 2018-19 Koret Fellow in Korean Studies at APARC, whose work with the nonprofit Choson Exchange has taken him to the DPRK nearly 30 times; Siegfried S. Hecker, top nuclear security expert, former Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Research Professor of Management Science and Engineering, Emeritus, and Senior Fellow at CISAC/FSI, Emeritus; and Gi-Wook Shin, Professor of Sociology, William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea, Director of APARC, and founding Director of the Korea Program.

Q: What is your assessment of the summit outcome? Considering Trump's decision to end the summit early, do you support that “no deal is better than a bad deal?” Do you think the summit would have been better off with even a small deal just significant enough to keep the momentum going? 
 
Abrahamian: It's a disappointment, but we don't know yet if it is a catastrophe. I think that, ideally, once it was clear that both sides were escalating towards a grand bargain no one was ready for, the U.S. and DPRK teams could have taken a break and reconvened to attempt something less ambitious. For both sides it is better domestically to go back and be able to look tough rather than concede too much, but I do wonder why there was no intermediary position available between no deal and something too big.
 
Hecker: I am disappointed, but still optimistic. Disappointed because the opportunity to take concrete steps toward denuclearization and normalization was missed. Optimistic, because Trump and Kim did not return to the ‘fire and fury’ days of 2017. They left Hanoi on good terms. I don’t believe it was a question of bad deal or no deal. Rather, it appears the two sides were actually quite close to taking important steps, but couldn’t quite get there this time. It is not clear whether time just ran out or if President Trump’s challenge to Kim Jong-un to “go bigger” moved the goal posts at the last minute. 
 
Shin: Trump made the right move. No deal is better than a small or pointless deal that could hamper future negotiations. His decision sent a warning signal to North Korea that he wouldn’t let the country continue to set the tone and pace for the negotiations. Also, he gained more domestic political slack than the alternative would have gained him. The misfortune in Hanoi may impart a new, different kind of momentum to what is destined to be a fluctuating, arduous diplomatic process.
 
Q: So what's next? What do you expect from the US and DPRK given this new dynamic? What do you think needs to be done at the working level and at the leadership level? And what do you think will be the biggest hurdle in future negotiations? 
 
Abrahamian: Both sides carefully left future talks open through their statements after the summit. If one is searching for a positive outcome, it's that the leaders perhaps now realize that much, much more will have to be agreed upon before they meet again. This should help empower working-level talks. But time is short: a U.S. election looms next year and Donald Trump faces political challenges at home. This was a missed opportunity to consolidate a relationship-building process.
 
Hecker: The American and North Korean statements following the summit paint different pictures of the final bargaining positions, but both were positive and committed to return to the bargaining table. These differences should be surmountable at the bargaining table, but it will take time and a more concerted effort. So long as North Korea ends nuclear and missile testing, we have time to come to a proper compromise, but it must clearly involve some sanctions relief for the North Korean economy. One of the biggest hurdles on the American side is to overcome internal political divisions.
 
Shin: A return to hostility is unlikely. Both sides have refrained from escalating tension and are still committed to a diplomatic solution. The negotiations will resume. The Hanoi summit served as an opportunity for a much-needed reality check, for both sides, of the lingering divergences. The biggest hurdle continues to be how to define the terms and scope of denuclearization and the U.S. corresponding measures (simultaneous and parallel actions). Now that the discrepancies have become more apparent and starker, the working-level discussions need to agree on basic yet fundamental concepts and principles, while Trump and Kim should continue the process of trust-building; confidence and trust are a must in a top-down setting.
 
Q: Are there some roles that other key players can play, such as South Korea and China? Are there any impacts of this outcome on regional relations in Northeast Asia, such as inter-Korean and China-DPRK relations? 
 
Abrahamian: Perhaps South Korea can play a bridging role again, the way it did before the Singapore summit, when Trump "pre-emptively pulled out." In that case, President Moon's intervention helped get things back on track. It is unclear if he has the political capital with either side to make that happen again, but I suspect he will try. The collapse impacts a Kim Jong-un visit to Seoul, as now it would seem to be pressure on the US, rather than operating in space the US created. China is relatively marginalized, but happy to see no secondary sanctions threats or additional testing of missiles. Japan is perhaps the most pleased of all, given how isolated it has become on North Korea issues.
 
Hecker: The Moon Jae-in administration was hoping for a more positive outcome to allow it to promote economic cooperation with the North, which I consider to be one of the most important elements of achieving a peaceful Korean Peninsula. The Hanoi outcome may require an intensified North-South dialogue to assist the North-U.S. deliberations. I am not sure how all of this will affect China-DPRK relations. I would have preferred an outcome that allows DPRK to move closer to South Korea through some sanctions relief, than to have it depend more on China through continued maximum pressure. 
 
Shin: The outcome is clearly a major setback for South Korea, as it was anticipating progress on core issues that could jumpstart inter-Korean projects. It also became unclear whether Kim would make the planned visit to Seoul anytime soon. At the same time, this might be a perfect time for South Korea to play a meaningful role. So far, the country has been seen as advocating North Korea’s position with regards to an end-of-war declaration and to a lifting or easing of sanctions. This time around, President Moon needs to convince Chairman Kim that North Korea’s bold move toward denuclearization cannot be delayed if he wishes not to lose this rare opportunity with a U.S. president who is eager to make a “big” deal.
 
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For more U.S.-DPRK diplomacy analysis and commentarty by APARC scholars, see our recent media coverage.
 
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South Koreans watch TV screen reporting on the U.S. President Donald Trump press conference at Seoul Railway Station on February 28, 2019 in Seoul, South Korea
South Koreans watch TV screen reporting on the U.S. President Donald Trump press conference at Seoul Railway Station on February 28, 2019 in Seoul, South Korea.
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NATO leaders have a lot to worry about. The U.K. government is a Brexit hot mess. Germany’s Angela Merkel, who has been holding a unified Europe together on her shoulders like Atlas, may not be able to last much longer. Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been channeling his inner authoritarian, and he’s not the only one. And then there’s President Donald Trump. Never one for subtlety, Europe’s most important ally called nato obsolete, threatened to ignore America’s treaty defense commitments to nato members that don’t pay up, slapped tariffs on European aluminum and steel, and treated nato as an irritating layover on the way to his real destination: Helsinki, where he’ll be meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. And that was before Trump actually touched down in Brussels and started berating European leaders face-to-face.

Many experts believe the chief challenge of managing President Trump’s foreign policy is keeping Trump on message. They’re wrong. Trump isn’t misspeaking when he ignores his talking points, insults allies, or congratulates Putin on winning a sham election. He’s not veering off script when he declares that North Korea is no longer a nuclear threat just because Kim Jong Un posed for a photo in Singapore. Trump is actually on message nearly every day and in every tweet. It’s just not a message that most serious national-security experts want to hear. Deep in the recesses of our brains, we experts just cannot believe that an American president would pursue so many profoundly shortsighted policies—or that he would actually believe he’s doing a good job.

Trump has a foreign-policy doctrine, all right. He’s been advancing it with remarkable speed, skill, and consistency. Its effect can be summed up in one neat slogan: Make America Weak Again.

America’s preeminence on the world stage rests on five essential sources of power: neighbors, allies, markets, values, and military might. The Trump Doctrine is weakening all of them except the military.

To be fair, America’s military might is a biggie in global politics, and Trump deserves high marks for rebuilding America’s fighting forces after years of decline in the face of growing threats. The February 2018 budget deal allowed for a $61 billion increase in military spending in 2018 with another $18 billion increase in 2019, making it the largest defense budget in U.S. history and reversing crippling defense sequestration caps from 2013—a deal designed to be so bad, Congress thought it would bring everyone to their senses but didn’t. Trump isn’t just spending more; he’s modernizing and innovating more, too. The Trump administration is committed to modernizing America’s aging nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and has called for additional research spending for cyber, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence, and space—all key areas where the U.S. is increasingly vulnerable and the country’s innovation edge is narrowing. Trump’s defense-spending policies have received overwhelming bipartisan support, a rare feat in Washington. In a complicated global landscape with Russia seeking to stretch its territorial reach and China undergoing a massive 20-year military buildup, a recommitment to investing in military strength is both welcome and necessary.

But it won’t be enough. In today’s threat environment, military power can’t go it alone. The other four sources of American power are more important now than ever. And under Trump, they are growing weaker by the day.

Friendly neighbors are underrated as a source of global power. The United States was born with good geography and successive presidents have made the most of it. For centuries, the empires and nation-states of Europe and the Middle East have lived in tough neighborhoods, with hostile powers nursing historical grievances and vying for advantages through brutal territorial conquest. By contrast, the United States has prospered in no small measure because it has been flanked by two vast oceans and two friendly neighbors that have provided a level of security other states would envy. The last time American and Canadian soldiers fought one another was in 1815. The Mexican–American War ended in 1848, and the last U.S. president to order troops into Mexican territory was Woodrow Wilson, who did so a century ago. Europe’s latest territorial aggression occurred in 2014 (when Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea). Wars are so prevalent in the Middle East, it’s hard to remember a time when there wasn’t one.

The Trump Doctrine, however, sees dangerous threats massing along America’s borders and calls for a sharp departure from the past. The Trump administration’s policies and pronouncements have sent Canadian–U.S. and Mexican–U.S. relations into tailspins, threatening longstanding ties and close cooperation on everything from defense to drug interdiction to trade. Relations in the ’hood haven’t been this bad in a century. From imposing tariffs on Canadian goods because they’re “national-security threats,” to all those comments about Mexican “rapists” and “bad hombres” flooding into U.S. cities, to the border wall, to vows to jettison the North American Free Trade Agreement that has been pivotal to economic growth across the continent, it’s little wonder the neighbors aren’t feeling so neighborly anymore. Mexican voters just elected an anti-Trump, radical leftist president in a landslide election. Canadian officials have imposed retaliatory tariffs and are now talking about how to protect their nation from the United States. It takes a special kind of stupid to make enemies out of Canadians.

Alliances are another vital source of American strength on the global stage. In Asia, the U.S. has better bilateral relations with China’s neighbors than China does, including defense treaties with Japan and South Korea. These relationships advance U.S. interests, project American power, protect global commerce, and promote peace and stability. In Europe, one of Russia’s chief aims is to split the nato alliance because Russia has so few friends of its own. Putin knows that alliances are not about spreading some woolly-eyed vision of global peace over lattes and arguing over who pays the bill. They are about the hard-nosed projection of national power in a dog-eat-dog world. The more friends you have, the more economic, diplomatic, and military might you can marshal and the more you can coerce adversaries to do what you want them to do.  

But the Trump Doctrine sees alliances as raw deals in which the U.S. pays too much and gets too little. Yes, it’s true that most nato allies have not lived up to their defense spending commitments and it’s high time they did. But the Trump Doctrine often seems to suggest that alliances should be run more like a market bazaar, where buyers and sellers haggle over everything and often get nothing—even when a lopsided deal is in everyone’s best interest. Joint-readiness drills, foreign sales of American military equipment, and relationship management cannot be boiled down to Buy the scarf with that shirt or you’ll get nothing. For alliances to work, allies have to know they have each other’s backs. And enemies have to know it, too. Just ask Putin if he’d rather have nato—with all of its “raw deals” uniting 29 nations that include economic powerhouses such as Germany and Spain and global leaders such as France and the United Kingdom—or his own allies, which consist of exactly one besieged Syrian tyrant, the six-member Collective Security Treaty Organization (whose other members are the superpowers called Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan), and, on good days, some Iranians.

The third source of American power is the country’s economy, which has become the envy of the world because it trades with the world. Thanks to falling trade barriers and rising globalization since World War II, global economic growth has hit unprecedented levels. More than a billion people have been lifted out of extreme poverty. And the U.S. has prospered. Sure, free trade creates global winners and losers, and many playing fields are not level. China has been stealing American intellectual property and doing everything it can to keep American companies down and out. Beijing isn’t even secret about it. China’s “Made in China 2025” plan declares the country’s intention to corner the market in key growth industries such as robotics and electric vehicles.

The Trump Doctrine views free trade with suspicion, the liberal international order as a rip-off to American workers, and economics as a zero-sum game in which if you win, we lose. Trump is a protectionist and proud of it. It seems he’s never met a tariff he didn’t like. First came the steel and aluminum tariffs on U.S. allies, sparking retaliatory tariffs on everything from American motorcycles to bourbon. Now Trump and China are locked in an escalating trade war that has started at $50 billion worth of goods on each side. It’s anyone’s guess when or how it will end, but this much is clear: It won’t be good.

Why would the president undermine American economic vitality? Because the Trump Doctrine is meeting 21st-century trade challenges with 20th-century tactics: tariffing the heck out of foreign products under the misguided assumption that tariffs will only affect the countries they target. Trump seems stuck in the 1970s, when most cars were made in Detroit and most TVs were made in Japan. In today’s world of global supply chains, products just aren’t made in one place anymore. The Dutch company Fairphone has just 27 employees but sources its parts from Africa, the Middle East, Europe, North America, and China. Made in America doesn’t mean what it used to. In a global-supply-chain world, tariffs don’t just hurt foreign companies and workers. They hurt American ones, too.

The fourth and most unique source of global power is American values. The United States has always been much more than a country. It’s an audacious experiment in democracy and an enduring hope for others. This “shining city upon a hill” has not always lived up to its own aspirations or expectations. But for many oppressed peoples in the far reaches of the globe, the United States has always stood for the triumph of laws over the naked abuse of authority, and for the capacity of democracy to bring freedom, peace, and prosperity to everyone, not just Americans.

The Trump Doctrine rejects these bedrock American values at home and refuses to advance them abroad. Democratic states are considered weak, authoritarian leaders are admired, moral authority counts for nearly nothing, soft power is too soft, and hard power is what gets results. In this presidency, journalists are labeled enemies and dissent is considered unpatriotic. Nobody should count on hearing stirring speeches about the march of freedom or the power of justice during the president’s trips abroad. Or seeing throngs of well-wishers in distant capitals lining up to see the president because of the noble values he represents or the sacrifices he honors in America’s military heroes, who paid the ultimate price to secure the blessings of freedom for others. The effect of the Trump Doctrine is Making America Weak Again by diminishing the role of American values, and with them our standing in the world.

International-relations scholars have long found that great powers typically fall for two reasons: imperial overstretch or rivalry with other great powers. Never in world history has a country declined because of so many self-inflicted attacks on the sources of its own power.

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