There is a growing logjam of arms control treaties waiting for approval in both the Russian State Duma and the U.S. Senate. Without decisive action, this logjam will probably prevent approval by the world's two largest military powers of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) of 1993, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996 (CTBT), amendments to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the protocols of the Treaty of Pelindaba (creating an African nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ)) and the Treaty of Rarotonga (creating a South Pacific NWFZ) before the end of the century. It will also prevent progress towards START III and further bilateral nuclear reductions.

"Claim-Making and Large-Scale Historical Processes in the Late Twentieth Century," held March 7-9, 1997, at Stanford University, was an experimental workshop to preview the dimensions on the eve of the twenty-first century that the MacArthur Foundation Consortiumon Challenges to the Study of International Peace and Cooperation, will explore over the next three years: war and institutions of violence; globalization; society and the ecosphere; and identity and social power. The idea was to examine these dimensions as large structural macro-historical processes and also to look at how these processes are immanent in the political and cultural claims made by contending actors. All of the workshop panels brought out issues of several dimensions. The first panel, on Globalization and Social Claims, looked at processes of globalization and also at society and the ecosphere. The second panel, State Formation and Claim-Making, focused on the dimensions of war and institutions of violence and also identity and social power. The third panel, Identities and Social Power, was on that dimension, largely in the context of globalization. The fourth panel, a roundtable on Claims to Sovereignty in the Former Soviet Union, was most related to the dimension of war and institutions of violence.

By the end of 1995, China had built the world's ten largest telecommunications networks and the industry was growing at a faster rate than any other sector of the booming Chinese economy. For example, the country's 40 million telephone subscribers with 50 million telephone numbers represented an average annual growth rate of nearly 100 percent over a ten-year period. Internet users served by ChinaNet jumped from 6,000 in 1995 to 53,739 in March 1997. Progress was qualitative as well, as China procured state-of-the-art fiber-optic and satellite technologies and narrowed the gap between itself and the United States and between its own urban and rural areas. The achievement can be attributed to the government's commitment to telecommunications as the key to further development--a commitment backed by preferential policies; to foreign financial and technical support; and to changing attitudes of the Chinese people themselves.

However, China faces some major problems. The gap in living standards between coastal and interior provinces is widening, as people migrate from poor villages to increasingly affluent cities. The government must focus more on developing isolated regions. Rapid development of telecommunications cannot be sustained under a government monopoly, which aids the government's economic and security interests but discourages foreign companies from investing and transferring technology. At the same time, there has been little headway in developing domestic telecommunications products. Management of the industry is chaotic in the absence of clear regulations, and a multilayered bureaucracy encourages wasted resources, duplication, red tape, and corruption. Political problems are likely to emerge as telecommunications continues to help open Chinese society and young Chinese come to embrace Western industrial culture.

Nevertheless, China is destined to become and remain the world's "super market" as long as it remains politically stable in its transition from a plannned to a market economy. Telecommunications will continue to play a key role during this transition.

The renewed American debate over ballistic missile defenses (BMD) echoes loudly in NATO, in Europe, and in France. This issue will be decisive for the future of European political organization and its security and defense. The issue will also be important for the future of relations between Europe, the United States, and Russia.

Faced with the potential threat of ballistic missiles equipped with nuclear warheads (or biological and chemical payloads) that could strike French and European territories, deterrence is sufficient and offers the greatest cost-effectiveness. In this analysis, the question of the broadening of the French and British deterrent and the political organization of a possible European anti-missile defense system will be discussed. Then, a new transatlantic strategic partnership, the robustness of which lies in counterbalancing the vulnerabilities of its members, will be described.

The development of "information warfare" presents international legal issues that will complicate nations' efforts both to execute and to respond to certain information warfare attacks, specifically those using computers, telecommunications, or networks to attack adversary information systems. Some legal constraints will certainly apply to information warfare, either because the constraints explicitly regulate particular actions, or because more general principles of international law govern the effects of those actions. Nevertheless, the novelty of certain information warfare techniques may remove them from application of established legal categories. Furthermore, the ability of signals to travel across international networks, and affect systems in distant countries, conflicts with the long-standing principle of national, territorial sovereignty.

Has the rapid ownership transformation in Russia had an impact on enterprise performance or on worker behavior and attitudes? This paper investigates this issue using data from a nationwide survey of 1,176 Russian workers conducted in April 1995. We focus on the two primary types of ownership change in Russia: the privatization of existing state-owned enterprises, and the creation (de novo) of new, private organizations. Examining such types of firm behavior as restructuring of product lines, investment in new equipment, changes in internal organization, influences on decision-making, and labor market behavior, we find large and significant differences between privatized and state- owned enterprises, and between new private and all old organizations, controlling for other firm characteristics. Differences in the labor market behavior and attitudes of workers are significant when comparing new and old firms, but less so when comparing privatized to state enterprises. Finally, we analyze the relationship between the ownership of the firm in which an individual works and her political attitudes and voting intentions, finding that employees of the privatized companies tend to be the most anti-reform group while those in new private firms are the most pro-reform.

This reader provides a well-rounded view of the conflicting debates and trends that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The authors have brought together Soviet documents and commentary as well as outstanding Western analyses dealing with developments in Soviet politics, economy, society, culture and foreign policy from 1985 through 1991.