Hoover Institution fellow and former NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller made no bones about the challenges of being a woman in foreign policy and national security.

“You have to have a tough hide,” she said at a Monday event commemorating the role of women in national security for International Womens’ Day. “There’s no way around it, because it is often not forgiving and the games that can be played both by foreign counterparts and by your own country can be really extreme.”

Read the rest at The Stanford Daily

There are strong indications that the Biden administration intends to continue strengthening U.S.-Taiwan ties. The Biden team invited Taiwan's representative Bi-khim Hsiao to the presidential inauguration, supporters of Taiwan now hold senior roles in the administration, and officials have pledged "rock-solid" U.S. commitment to Taiwan, warning that PRC military pressure against Taiwan threatens regional peace and stability. But Cross-strait deterrence is arguably weaker today than at any point since the Korean War, according to Chinese military and security expert Oriana Skylar Mastro, FSI Center Fellow at APARC.

On February 18, 2021, Mastro testified to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission at a hearing on Deterring PRC Aggression Toward Taiwan. Her testimony on the political and strategic dynamics underpinning deterrence across the Taiwan Strait is available to watch below.

[Subscribe to APARC's newsletters for the latest analysis from our experts.]

Beijing has turned to increasingly hostile and combative rhetoric and actions since the democratic election of Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen. PLA air and water operations around Taiwan, particularly in the Taiwan Strait, have increased significantly in the past year, and concern is growing that the Chinese Communist Party is imminently planning to use force to compel Taiwan to accept unification with mainland China.

Drawing on her expertise in both policy and military security, Mastro explains why deterrence in Taiwan must be based on military capabilities rather than signaling through policy.

Catalysts to Conflict

Foremost, Mastro argues that the basic circumstances of aggression towards Taiwan have changed. In years past, it was accepted that China would launch military operations against Taiwan in response to actions or policy positions taken there or in the United States. However, Mastro believes that China is now primed to force a campaign of reunification regardless of either Taiwan’s or the U.S.’s policies moving forward.

By Mastro’s assessment, China is now in a position where it could prevail in cross-strait military contingencies even if the U.S. intervenes in Taiwan’s defense. The reform overhaul and modernization of China’s military have vastly improved the quality it equipment and confidence in its capability. China now possesses offensive weaponry, including ballistic and cruise missiles, which if deployed, could destroy U.S. bases in the Western Pacific. Sophisticated cyber attacks on domestic infrastructure both in Taiwan and the United States are also a credible threat and viable form of retaliation.

As long as President Xi is confident that the PLA can successfully back a forced unification in Taiwan, Mastro argues that action of some kind against Taiwan is not a matter of if, but of when, and what severity.

Types of Escalation

Failure to reunify Taiwan is too high a political and military cost for the PRC to risk, but there is also growing agitation amongst the mainland Chinese population for a resolution on the half-baked status of the island and its governance. Mastro believes that this pressure will ensure that action will be taken on Taiwan in the next 3 to 5 years.

Since Taiwan cannot withstand a sustained, active assault from China on its own, the deciding factor in when and how China moves against Taiwan is largely dependent on the signals the U.S. sends. And since China is increasingly confident in its own military, the signals the U.S. sends must likewise be ground in military capability, not policy, says Mastro.  

If China believes there will be little or no intervention or support from the U.S., it is likely to follow a graduated plan of attack, using economic blockages and targeted military action to bring about capitulation. If, however, it appears the U.S. will intervene, China is much more likely to move quickly and escalate violence and force rapidly to maximize damage before a full U.S. defense response can be coordinated.

Policy Recommendations

To effectively counter China on Taiwan, Mastro recommends crafting policy that creates doubt over China’s ability to successfully absorb Taiwan through military means. To do this, the United States needs to focus forces and develop operational plans that credibly off-set China’s goals while not triggering a panicked response from Beijing that could escalate into rapid conflict.

Mastro also urges the allocation of more resources toward intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), base development, and firepower in the Asia-Pacific region. Investing in these signals U.S. commitment to determent and the capacity to follow through if need be.

Finally, Mastro urges additional research into U.S. war termination behavior. Any involvement in Taiwan must be as limited and without the possibility for escalating levels of violence and long term unsustainable, unwinnable commitments. In preparing to potentially fight a war, she reminds policymakers that they need to know how to end one as well.

A recording of the full hearing is available courtesy of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

Last November, the Trump administration unwisely withdrew the United States from the Open Skies Treaty. Earlier this year, the Russian government said it will take steps to follow suit. Moscow’s withdrawal in addition to Washington’s would almost certainly doom the agreement, which was designed to promote transparency and security by reducing the possibility that military activities might be misunderstood.

President Biden, however, condemned the Trump decision, and his administration may well want to rejoin the agreement. With political will, there is a chance to save it.

The Open Skies Treaty entered into force in 2002 and, following the U.S. withdrawal, has 33 state-parties, all but one (Canada) in Europe. The treaty allows parties to the treaty to make unarmed reconnaissance flights over others. Those flights collect imagery on military activities and forces, which is then shared with all parties to the treaty. Collectively, the parties conducted some 1,500 overflights between 2002 and 2019.

In May 2020, the Trump administration announced its intention to leave the treaty, citing Russian violations. While Moscow has imposed restrictions inconsistent with the treaty on flights over Russia, Washington retaliated by restricting Russian flights over the United States.

Ignoring the views of most NATO allies, who favor the treaty’s continued operation, the Trump administration formally withdrew in November. On January 15, the Russian foreign ministry issued a statement saying that Russia would begin its withdrawal process. Moscow is concerned that U.S. allies will share data they collect from flights over Russia with the United States, even though it is no longer party to the treaty.

The Russian decision is unfortunate. It starts a clock ticking that may run out before the Biden administration can decide its position on the Open Skies Treaty. Candidate Biden is on record supporting it. He criticized the Trump withdrawal decision, noting: “The United States and our allies would benefit from being able to observe — on short notice — what Russia and other countries in Europe were doing with their military forces.” Biden very likely would give greater deference to the views of U.S. allies on this question than did Trump.

The Biden administration, however, is confronted by two challenges on this. First, the new president faces an overflowing inbox and also has to get his team in place. The treaty does not top the priority list. It may take some time before the administration can reach a formal decision on whether to rejoin.

The second challenge is how to rejoin. The obvious path would entail re-signing and then ratifying the treaty. That will not work. Consent to ratification requires 67 votes in the Senate. The Democrats hold 50 seats, but, with a Republican administration just having withdrawn from the treaty, one cannot expect 17 Republican senators now to consent to rejoining. That means some other mechanism would be needed to bring the United States back in.

Clever lawyers should be able to find a way. That also, however, could require time.

Here are four steps that state-parties and Washington can take to open a path to preserving the Open Skies Treaty — with the United States and Russia remaining in the agreement:

• First, the Biden administration states that it will conduct a review on rejoining the treaty and announce its decision soon.
• Second, the United States and its NATO allies issue a joint statement saying that, as long as the United States is outside the treaty, the United States will not seek and its allies will not share data collected by NATO member overflights, and that the allies will not veto Russian Open Skies flights over U.S. military installations or activities on their territories.
• Third, the Russian government states that it will pause its process on withdrawal.
• Fourth, legal experts from the United States, Russia, and other interested state-parties meet to consider mechanisms by which the United States would rejoin the treaty. Any such mechanism would require that the United States fully carry out its obligations and responsibilities under the treaty, like any other state-party, as well as enjoy its benefits.

At a time when tensions between NATO and Russia are at the highest level since the end of the Cold War, the Open Skies Treaty offers a useful confidence- and security-building measure. It is worth preserving. With political will and some smart lawyers, it could be.

FSI Center Fellow at APARC Oriana Skylar Mastro joins NPR's Weekend Edition host Scott Simon to discuss the rising tensions between China and Taiwan and how the United States should respond.

Listen to the complete interview below. This conversation originally appeared on NPR's website.