The renewed American debate over ballistic missile defenses (BMD) echoes loudly in NATO, in Europe, and in France. This issue will be decisive for the future of European political organization and its security and defense. The issue will also be important for the future of relations between Europe, the United States, and Russia.

Faced with the potential threat of ballistic missiles equipped with nuclear warheads (or biological and chemical payloads) that could strike French and European territories, deterrence is sufficient and offers the greatest cost-effectiveness. In this analysis, the question of the broadening of the French and British deterrent and the political organization of a possible European anti-missile defense system will be discussed. Then, a new transatlantic strategic partnership, the robustness of which lies in counterbalancing the vulnerabilities of its members, will be described.

The development of "information warfare" presents international legal issues that will complicate nations' efforts both to execute and to respond to certain information warfare attacks, specifically those using computers, telecommunications, or networks to attack adversary information systems. Some legal constraints will certainly apply to information warfare, either because the constraints explicitly regulate particular actions, or because more general principles of international law govern the effects of those actions. Nevertheless, the novelty of certain information warfare techniques may remove them from application of established legal categories. Furthermore, the ability of signals to travel across international networks, and affect systems in distant countries, conflicts with the long-standing principle of national, territorial sovereignty.

Scott D. Sagan notes that the question of why states seek to build nuclear weapons has scarcely been examined, although it is crucial to efforts at preventing proliferation. He challenges the traditional realist assumption, accepted uncritically by many scholars and policymakers, that states seek to acquire or develop nuclear weapons primarily for military and strategic reasons. Sagan examines alternate explanations for the demand for nuclear weapons.

Revised and updated versions of this article also appear as "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," Current History (April 1997), pp. 151-156; as "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?" in Victor Utgoff, ed., The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order (MIT Press, 1999), p. 17-50; and as "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," in New Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security (International Security Reader, July 2004).

This paper raises the following questions: Can OSCE live up to high expectations for conflict prevention and crisis management? Is it able and equipped to meet this demanding task? Is OSCE well-suited and placed to play a central role in European security? Is the role of a "framework organization" a suitable task for OSCE? The underlying issues are about the relationship and links between OSCE and the Atlantic Aliance--whether the ambiguities of OSCE's performance can be warded off, and whether the overall performance of OSCE can be improved by cooperation with NATO.

By developing a strategic approach to the implementation of peace accords in civil war, the United Nations can better the odds for ending a war and fostering development in the long run. Recent attempts at implementation have suffered from recurring difficulties: incomplete, vague and expedient agreements; lack of coordination between implementing agencies; lack of sustained attention by the international community; incomplete fulfillment of agreements by warring parties; and the presence of 'spoilers' who seek to destroy and incipient peace. To overcome these difficulties, the UN must encourage the parties to choose political, cultural, social and economic security-building measures during the negotiation phase and systematically apply confidence-building measures to the military components of implementation. This demands a reconsideration of peace making in a civil war to include a long-term international commitment to the development of war-torn societies.

This essay surveys and seeks to explain the (re-)emergence and enforcement of international minority-rights standards in Europe after the Cold War.  The period since 1989 has seen a marked divergence between strengthening minority-rights standards at the international level and worsening conflict and repression in many states in the region.  Enforcement efforts by the CSCE/OSCE, Council of Europe, and European Union have been modest and are focused on states integrating economically and militarily into Western Europe.

On March 4 and 5, 1996, the Stanford Center for International Security and Arms Control, in conjunction with the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, convened a research planning conference on "Police Reform in States under Transition." The conference was unusual in that its primary purpose was to foster an ongoing discussion between academics working in the area of democratization and police reform, and policymakers running police reform programs in countries such as Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, South Africa, and EI Salvador. Our primary goal for the conference was to construct a research agenda that would allow continued dialogue between scholars and policymakers, and would focus on questions of theory and practice immediately applicable to policymakers in the field.

Participants in the conference included Robert Perito, Special Advisor to the Director of the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), U.S. Department of Justice; Frederick Mecke, Director, Office of International Criminal Justice, U.S. Department of State; Arnstein Overkil, Police Major General of Asker and Baerum Police Headquarters in Norway, and advisor to the Palestinian Authority on policing; Diana Gordon, Chair of the Department of Political Science at City College of New York; Louise Shelley, professor in the Department of Justice, Law and Society at American University; William Stanley from the Department of Political Science at the University of New Mexico; Jeffrey Ian Ross, a fellow at the National Institute of Justice; and faculty and staff from Stanford University and the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.

Those studying international peace and security tend to look for the origins of violence in differences, whether among economic interests, ethno-cultural groups, or clashing ideologies. Arguing from the Girardian perspective (described in an appendix to this essay), Bland argues that it is the similarity of the warring camps in Northern Ireland that underlies cycles of violence and retribution. Over the past two centuries, periods of relative calm and socioeconomic equalization in the region have been followed by outbreaks of inter-group violence and rapid social polarization.

Bland shows that symbolic displays of "marching and rising"--in which Protestant and Catholic extremists reassert their respective roles as triumphant masters and defiant rebels--are generative rather than merely symptomatic of differences and violence between the two sides. Acts of terror beget more than retaliation: they permeate the entire fabric of society and become self-perpetuating, as each person becomes a potential victim and a potential killer in the eyes of the other side. The only protection and "justice" in Northern Ireland was that offered by the very perpetrators of violence. Whereas social scientists have argued for security guarantees and constitutional engineering as solutions to internal wars, Bland shows that a "hurting stalemate" of violence and retribution can persist indefinitely as long as making peace with the enemy is unacceptable.

Bland argues that protacted inter-group conflicts are best resolved in ethical and interpersonal terms. Combatants on each side must transcend their conflict by recognizing and affirming publicly their common humanity, and by unilaterally renouncing the principle of retributive justice. To paraphrase Anwar Sadat, whom Bland cites as such a "transcender," peace is won not by signing agreements but by embracing enemies.

Given that organized violence within states is currently more widespread and destructive than war among states, many advocate expanding the concept of security to include elements of political and personal security at the domestic level. Since individuals generally look to governments to provide this security, deadly violence--whether by insurgents, polite forces, or criminal networks--can undermine the stability and legitimacy of state authorities. Unfortunately, democratization has accompanied increases in such violence in many parts of the world.

In a case study of contemporary Benin that has much broader implications, Bruce Magnusson argues that democratizing states must solve simultaneous and interrelated threats to public security in order to survive. At the level of the state, leaderships must safeguard democratic institutions from violent overthrow, particularly by disaffected militaries. At the level of society, democratic legitimacy rests on protection from criminality and from the arbitrary exercise of public and police authority. These challenges must be met jointly within a democratic constitutional framework: domestic order is key to averting military takeover, and likewise constitutionality provides the central guarantee for individual rights and civil liberties.

During the Cold War, the United States carried out a number of covert actions against elected governments in the Third World. Critics of the "democratic peace" suggest these covert operations are potential invalidations of, or at least exceptions to, the proposition that liberal democracies rarely or never wage war on one another. Democratic peace theorists, however, argue that the targets of these covert actions were not long-term, stable democracies, that covert action falls short of interstate war by Correlates of War (CoW) criteria, and that the covert nature of these operations meant that liberal norms and institutions in the United States did not have an opportunity to function. Even so, by forcing the executive to use covert means, democratic institutions may have prevented the higher level of international violence known as war, although they were not robust enough to prevent covert action. Liberal interventionist and anti-communist ideology provided policymakers with a justificatory frame for intervention which, however, did not amount to war between democracies.