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In 1920, the Irish Republican Army reportedly considered a terrifying new weapon: typhoid-contaminated milk. Reading from an IRA memo he claimed had been captured in a recent raid, Sir Hamar Greenwood described to Parliament the ease with which "fresh and virulent cultures" could be obtained and introduced into milk served to British soldiers. Although the plot would only target the military, the memo expressed concern that the disease might spread to the general population.

Although the IRA never used this weapon, the incident illustrates that poisoning a nation's milk supply with biological agents hardly ranks as a new concept. Yet just two weeks ago, the National Academy of Sciences' journal suspended publication of an article analyzing the vulnerability of the U.S. milk supply to botulinum toxin, because the Department of Health and Human Services warned that information in the article provided a "road map for terrorists."

That approach may sound reasonable, but the effort to suppress scientific information reflects a dangerously outdated attitude. Today, information relating to microbiology is widely and instantly available, from the Internet to high school textbooks to doctoral theses. Our best defense against those who would use it as a weapon is to ensure that our own scientists have better information. That means encouraging publication.

The article in question, written by Stanford University professor Lawrence Wein and graduate student Yifan Liu, describes a theoretical terrorist who obtains a few grams of botulinum toxin on the black market and pours it into an unlocked milk tank. Transferred to giant dairy silos, the toxin contaminates a much larger supply. Because even a millionth of a gram may be enough to kill an adult, hundreds of thousands of people die. (Wein summarized the article in an op-ed he wrote for the New York Times.) The scenario is frightening, and it is meant to be -- the authors want the dairy industry and its federal regulators to take defensive action.

The national academy's suspension of the article reflects an increasing concern that publication of sensitive data can provide terrorists with a how-to manual, but it also brings to the fore an increasing anxiety in the scientific community that curbing the dissemination of research may impair our ability to counter biological threats. This dilemma reached national prominence in fall 2001, when 9/11 and the anthrax mailings drew attention to another controversial article. This one came from a team of Australian scientists.

Approximately every four years, Australia suffers a mouse infestation. In 1998, scientists in Canberra began examining the feasibility of using a highly contagious disease, mousepox, to alter the rodents' ability to reproduce. Their experiments yielded surprising results. Researchers working with mice naturally resistant to the disease found that combining a gene from the rodent's immune system (interleukin-4) with the pox virus and inserting the pathogen into the animals killed them -- all of them. Plus 60 percent of the mice not naturally resistant who had been vaccinated against mousepox.

In February 2001 the American SocietyforMicrobiologists' (ASM) Journal of Virology reported the findings. Alarm ensued. The mousepox virus is closely related to smallpox -- one of the most dangerous pathogens known to humans. And the rudimentary nature of the experiment demonstrated how even basic, inexpensive microbiology can yield devastating results.

When the anthrax attacks burst into the news seven months later, the mousepox case became a lightning rod for deep-seated fears about biological weapons. The Economist reported rumors about the White House pressuring American microbiology journals to restrict publication of similar pieces. Samuel Kaplan, chair of the ASM publications board, convened a meeting of the editors in chief of the ASM's nine primary journals and two review journals. Hoping to head off government censorship, the organization -- while affirming its earlier decision -- ordered its peer reviewers to take national security and the society's code of ethics into account.

Not only publications came under pressure, but research itself. In spring 2002 the newly formed Department of Homeland Security developed an information-security policy to prevent certain foreign nationals from gaining access to a range of experimental data. New federal regulations required that particular universities and laboratories submit to unannounced inspections, register their supplies and obtain security clearances. Legislation required that all genetic engineering experiments be cleared by the government.

On the mousepox front, however, important developments were transpiring. Because the Australian research had entered the public domain, scientists around the world began working on the problem. In November 2003, St. Louis University announced an effective medical defense against a pathogen similar to -- but even more deadly than -- the one created in Australia. This result would undoubtedly not have been achieved, or at least not as quickly, without the attention drawn by the ASM article.

The dissemination of nuclear technology presents an obvious comparison. The 1946 Atomic Energy Act classifies nuclear information "from birth." Strong arguments can be made in favor of such restrictions: The science involved in the construction of the bomb was complex and its application primarily limited to weapons. A short-term monopoly was possible. Secrecy bought the United States time to establish an international nonproliferation regime. And little public good would have been achieved by making the information widely available.

Biological information and the issues surrounding it are different. It is not possible to establish even a limited monopoly over microbiology. The field is too fundamental to the improvement of global public health, and too central to the development of important industries such as pharmaceuticals and plastics, to be isolated. Moreover, the list of diseases that pose a threat ranges from high-end bugs, like smallpox, to common viruses, such as influenza. Where does one draw the line for national security?

Experience suggests that the government errs on the side of caution. In 1951, the Invention Secrecy Act gave the government the authority to suppress any design it deemed detrimental to national defense. Certain areas of research-- atomic energy and cryptography -- consistently fell within its purview. But the state also placed secrecy orders on aspects of cold fusion, space technology, radar missile systems, citizens band radio voice scramblers, optical engineering and vacuum technology. Such caution, in the microbiology realm, may yield devastating results. It is not in the national interest to stunt research into biological threats.

In fact, the more likely menace comes from naturally occurring diseases. In 1918 a natural outbreak of the flu infected one-fifth of the world's population and 25 percent of the United States'. Within two years it killed more than 650,000 Americans, resulting in a 10-year drop in average lifespan. Despite constant research into emerging strains, the American Lung Association estimates that the flu and related complications kill 36,000 Americans each year. Another 5,000 die annually from food-borne pathogens -- an extraordinarily large number of which have no known cure. The science involved in responding to these diseases is incremental, meaning that small steps taken by individual laboratories around the world need to be shared for larger progress to be made.

The idea that scientific freedom strengthens national security is not new. In the early 1980s, a joint Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security concluded security by secrecywasuntenable. Its report called instead for security by accomplishment -- ensuring strength through advancing research. Ironically, one of the three major institutions participating was the National Academy of Sciences -- the body that suspended publication of the milk article earlier this month.

The government has a vested interest in creating a public conversation about ways in which our society is vulnerable to attack. Citizens are entitled to know when their milk, their water, their bridges, their hospitals lack security precautions. If discussion of these issues is censored, the state and private industry come under less pressure to alter behavior; indeed, powerful private interests may actively lobby against having to install expensive protections. And failure to act may be deadly.

Terrorists will obtain knowledge. Our best option is to blunt their efforts to exploit it. That means developing, producing and stockpiling effective vaccines. It means funding research into biosensors -- devices that detect the presence of toxic substances in the environment -- and creating more effective reporting requirements for early identification of disease outbreaks. And it means strengthening our public health system.

For better or worse, the cat is out of the bag -- something brought home to me last weekend when I visited the Tech Museum of Innovation in San Jose. One hands-on exhibit allowed children to transfer genetic material from one species to another. I watched a 4-year-old girl take a red test tube whose contents included a gene that makes certain jellyfish glow green. Using a pipette, she transferred the material to a blue test tube containing bacteria. She cooled the solution, then heated it, allowing the gene to enter the bacteria. Following instructions on a touch-screen computer, she transferred the contents to a petri dish, wrote her name on the bottom, and placed the dish in an incubator. The next day, she could log on to a Web site to view her experiment, and see her bacteria glowing a genetically modified green.

In other words, the pre-kindergartener (with a great deal of help from the museum) had conducted an experiment that echoed the Australian mousepox study. Obviously, this is not something the child could do in her basement. But just as obviously, the state of public knowledge is long past anyone's ability to censor it.

Allowing potentially harmful information to enter the public domain flies in the face of our traditional way of thinking about national security threats. But we have entered a new world. Keeping scientists from sharing information damages our ability to respond to terrorism and to natural disease, which is more likely and just as devastating. Our best hope to head off both threats may well be to stay one step ahead.

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The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) provides that a state-party intending to withdraw from the treaty must give the UN Security Council three months' notice of its intention and provide the Security Council with its reasons for withdrawal. This provision was intended to give the Security Council an opportunity to deal with any withdrawal that might produce a threat to international peace and security.

More than two years ago, North Korea renewed its 1993 notice of withdrawal from the NPT, a notice that had been suspended a decade earlier during negotiations with the United States. That announcement left the Security Council with only a single day before North Korea would become the first country to withdraw from the NPT.

The Security Council did nothing. Indeed, it has continued to ignore North Korea's action even as Pyongyang has repeatedly stated its intention to produce nuclear weapons, sending a dangerous message to other states considering withdrawal. The once-every-five-years NPT review conference that will meet in New York this month provides a valuable opportunity to address the North Korea case and prod the Security Council to address similar cases that may emerge.

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Arms Control Today
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Despite the increasing centrality of computer software in modern weapons systems, computing remains relatively underrepresented in public debates about weapons policy. For example, in 1991, a software glitch in the Patriot missile defense system killed 28 people, yet physicists remain the most prominent technical critics of this system. This talk suggests that the different patterns of political intervention exhibited by physicists and computer experts cannot be explained by technical relevance. It suggests alternate explanations by examining the processes by which technical judgments are generated and rendered authoritative in the political arena, using insights from science and technology studies. These processes are then illustrated by comparing how computer experts and physicists intervened in political controversy about the feasibility of 'Star Wars', President Ronald Reagan's proposal to develop a missile defense that would render the massive Soviet nuclear arsenal 'impotent and obsolete.' I compare how critical groups of physicists and computer professionals attempted to persuade the public that a perfect missile shield could not be built. This analysis suggests that sharp differences in the two groups' technical frames of analysis, rhetoric, and professional organizations all contributed to the physicists' ability to demonstrate a much higher level of consensus and authority in the political arena.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

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slayton_headshot.jpg PhD

Slayton’s research and teaching examine the relationships between and among risk, governance, and expertise, with a focus on international security and cooperation since World War II. Slayton’s current book project, Shadowing Cybersecurity, examines the historical emergence of cybersecurity expertise. Shadowing Cybersecurity shows how efforts to establish credible expertise in corporate, governmental, and non-governmental contexts have produced varying and sometimes conflicting expert practices. Nonetheless, all cybersecurity experts wrestle with the irreducible uncertainties that characterize intelligent adversaries, and the fundamental inability to prove that systems are secure. The book shows how cybersecurity experts have paradoxically gained credibility by making threats and vulnerabilities visible, while acknowledging that more always remain in the shadows.

Slayton’s first book, Arguments that Count: Physics, Computing, and Missile Defense, 1949-2012 (MIT Press, 2013), shows how the rise of a new field of expertise in computing reshaped public policies and perceptions about the risks of missile defense in the United States. In 2015, Arguments that Count won the Computer History Museum Prize. In 2016, Slayton was awarded a National Science Foundation CAREER grant for her project “Enacting Cybersecurity Expertise.” In 2019, Slayton was also a recipient of the United States Presidential Early Career Award for Scientists and Engineers, for her NSF CAREER project.

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Rebecca Slayton Science Fellow CISAC
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The Energy Security Initiative (ESI) is a proposal to increase the benefits offered to countries in good standing with their NPT Obligations, to compensate for all the new supply restrictions and intrusive safeguards requirements imposed on them. The NPT Balance between benefits to signatories and impositions made on them has eroded through more restrictive interpretations of the NPT. The recently implemented Additional Protocol, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the proposals to deny nuclear fuel cycle facilities to countries not yet operating them on the one hand, and the limited supply of low cost nuclear energy available to developing countries on the other hand, demonstrate the need to re-constitute the balance implied in the NPT. It is, in fact, in the self interest of the developed countries, to be able to offer an expanded menu of additional energy benefits to countries whose current scope of available benefits has shrank, while the costs of complying with all new restrictions imposed and proposed has increased. This is the purpose of the ESI, which represents a reinterpretation and expansion of a part of Article IV of the NPT.

This presentation includes a detailed description of what ESI could offer under a new reading of article IV; which countries could qualify as beneficiaries of such program, how much might the total program cost, and how to fund it. A special case dealing with small national enrichment plants in countries such as Iran or Brazil is also considered.

Chaim Braun is a vice president of Altos Management Partners, Inc., and a CISAC science fellow and affiliate. He is a member of the Near-Term Deployment and the Economic Cross-Cut Working Groups of the Department of Energy (DOE) Generation IV Roadmap study. He conducted several nuclear economics-related studies for the DOE Nuclear Energy Office, the Energy Information Administration, the Electric Power Research Institute, the Nuclear Energy Institute, Non-Proliferation Trust International, and others. Braun has worked as a member of Bechtel Power Corporation's Nuclear Management Group, and led studies on power plant performance and economics used to support maintenance services. Braun has worked on a study of safeguarding the Agreed Framework in North Korea, he was the co-leader of a NATO Study of Terrorist Threats to Nuclear Power Plants, led CISAC's Summer Study on Terrorist Threats to Research Reactors, and most recently co-authored an article with CISAC Co-Director Chris Chyba on nuclear proliferation rings. His research project this year is entitled "The Energy Security Initiative and a Nuclear Fuel Cycle Center: Two Enhancement Options for the Current Non-Proliferation Regime."

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room, East 207, Encina Hall

Chaim Braun
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Do the nations that belong to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have a right to withdraw from it at any time they wish and for any reason? This is a key question when considering international legal constraints on nuclear proliferation, and one that will confront the States Parties when they meet in New York on May 2. This article argues that the NPT and the United Nations Charter provide limits on the right of withdrawal from the treaty by authorising the UN Security Council to take action against NPT withdrawals that could lead to threats to international peace and security.

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Dr. Sarah Mendelson is a senior fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Before joining CSIS in 2001, she taught international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Dr. Mendelson received her B.A. in history from Yale University, and her Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University. She also earned a certificate from the Harriman Institute.

At CSIS, she manages several projects that explore the links between security and human rights. Her current research includes collaborative work on public opinion surveys of Russian attitudes on democracy, human rights, Chechnya and the military. She directed a collaborative study evaluating the impact of Western democracy assistance to Eastern Europe and Eurasia. In addition, she has served on the staff of the National Democratic Institute's Moscow office, and was a resident associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She has also been a fellow at CISAC and at Princeton University's Center of International Studies.

Dr. Mendelson serves on the steering committee of Human Rights Watch, the editorial board of International Security, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Program on New Approaches to Russian Security.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room, East 207, Encina Hall

Sarah Mendelson Senior Fellow Russia and Eurasia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies
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Tonya Putnam has a J.D. from Harvard Law School and received her Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science at Stanford University in March 2005. She is currently a postdoctoral fellow at CISAC, but will be moving to the Center on Globalization and Governance at Princeton University for a postdoctoral fellowship next academic year. Her dissertation, Courts Without Borders? The Politics and Law of Extraterritorial Regulation, explores the extraterritorial reach of U.S. federal courts and regulatory institutions, and implications for the development of de facto international regulatory frameworks. Other research areas have included human rights in peace implementation missions, comparative legal responses to the threat of cybercrime and cyberterrorism, risk communication in the context of radiological terrorism (dirty bombs), and obstacles to military reform in Russia.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room, East 207, Encina Hall

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Tonya Lee Putnam

Tonya L. Putnam (J.D./Ph.D) is a Research Scholar at the Arnold A. Salzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. From 2007 to 2020 she was a member of the Political Science at Columbia University. Tonya’s work engages a variety of topics related to international relations and international law with emphasis on issues related to jurisdiction and jurisdictional overlaps in international regulatory and security matters. She is the author of Courts Without Borders: Law, Politics, and U.S. Extraterritoriality along with several articles in International Organization, International Security, and the Human Rights Review. She is also a member (inactive) of the California State Bar.

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Tonya L. Putnam
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Linda Kirschke is a predoctoral fellow at CISAC. She is a PhD candidate at Princeton University, in the Department of Politics, and her research focuses on state politics and ethnic violence. She published "Informal repression, zero sum politics and late third wave transitions" in the Journal of Modern African Studies in 2000. Drawing on the cases of Cameroon, Rwanda and Kenya, this article shows that transitions to multiparty politics place Sub-Saharan South Africa at high risk for civil violence. Kirschke was a Eurasia Title VIII Fellow at the Social Science Research Council in 2002-03, working on Russian language training. In 2003-04, she was awarded an Andrew W. Mellon Foundation Pre-Dissertation Fellowship at Columbia Universityís Council for European Studies. Kirschke has a BA in French and African studies and has worked for human rights organizations in France, London and Africa.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room, East 207, Encina Hall

Linda Kirschke Predoctoral Fellow
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Has the Bush administration used the War on Terror to consolidate power in the executive branch? Is the United States in danger of undermining civil liberties and laying the foundation for an American police state? Arguing against conventional wisdom the authors answer these questions with an emphatic No. Drawing on evidence from the USA Patriot Act, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the Transportation Security Administration, intelligence reform, and the detention of enemy combatants, the authors argue that what is most striking about US homeland security policy in the wake of 9-11 is just how weak the response of the American state has been. This outcome is contrary to both conventional wisdom and theoretical expectation. The authors argue that this puzzle is best explained by focusing on the institutional structure of US domestic politics.

Jay Stowsky is an adjunct professor at the University of California, Berkeley's School of Information Management and Systems (SIMS) and is the executive drector of UC Berkeley's Services Science Program. Previously, he directed UC Berkeley's program on Information Technology and Homeland Security at the Goldman School of Public Policy and served in the Clinton administration as senior economist for science and technology policy on the staff of the White House Council of Economic Advisers. Stowsky has also served as associate dean at UC Berkeley's Haas School of Business and as director of research policy for the University of California system. He has authored several studies of U.S. technology policy, including "Secrets to Share or Shield: New Dilemmas for Military R&D in the Digital Age," in Research Policy (Vol. 33, No. 2, March 2004) and "The Dual-Use Dilemma," in Issues in Science and Technology (Winter 1996). He is co-author, with Wayne Sandholtz, et al., of The Highest Stakes: The Economic Foundations of the Next Security System (Cambridge Oxford University Press, 1992).

Matthew Kroenig is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at UC Berkeley and a Public Policy and Nuclear Threats Fellow at the Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation. Kroenig's dissertation research explains the conditions under which states provide sensitive nuclear assistance to nonnuclear weapons states. Previously, he was a research associate with the Information Technology and Homeland Security Project and has also served in government as an intelligence analyst.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room, East 207, Encina Hall

Matt Kroenig PhD Candidate Speaker Department of Political Science, UC Berkeley
Jay Stowsky Adjunct Professor Speaker School of Information Management and Systems, UC Berkeley
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Shapiro presents research he conducted with David A. Siegel, a student in Stanford's Graduate School of Business:

A review of international terrorist activity reveals a recurring pattern of financially strapped operatives working for terrorist organizations that seem to have plenty of money. This observation is hard to square with traditional accounts of terrorist financial and logistical systems, accounts that stress the efficiency with which terrorist financial networks distribute funds while operating through a variety of covert channels. In order to explain the observed inefficiencies, we present a hierarchical model of terror organizations in which leaders must delegate financial and logistical tasks to middlemen for security reasons; however, these middlemen do not always share their leaders' interests. In particular, the temptation always exists to skim funds from any financial transaction. To counteract this problem, leaders can threaten to punish the middlemen. Because logisticians in international terrorist organizations are often geographically separated from leaders, and because they can defect to the government if threatened, violence is rarely the effective threat it is for localized groups such as the IRA. Therefore leaders must rely on more prosaic strategies to solve this agency problem; we focus on leaders' ability to remove middlemen from the network, denying them the rewards of future participation. We find that when the middlemen are sufficiently greedy, and when the organization suffers from a sufficiently strong budget constraint, that leaders will choose not to fund attacks in equilibrium because the costs of skimming are too great. Further, we show there can be important non-linearities in terrorists' response to government counter-terrorism. Specifically, we find that given constrained funding for terrorists, government efforts will yield few results until they reach a certain threshold, at which point cooperation between leaders and middlemen in terrorist groups breaks down leading to a dramatic drop in the probability of terrorist success.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room, East 207, Encina Hall

Jacob N. Shapiro
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