Security

FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.

Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions. 

-

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/8JDHuY0HMCM

 

Abstract: The motivation to develop nuclear energy waned in the latter part of the twentieth century. Technologies such as very-high-temperature gas-cooled reactors and fast-neutron liquid-metal reactors had been pursued for the purpose of recycling used nuclear fuel from water-cooled reactors, or for the purpose of supplying high-temperature process heat to the chemical industry or for hydrogen production. While both worthwhile causes, one could argue that the important missing element of all of these advanced nuclear reactor technologies was a business case: how were nuclear power plants to be profitable? With the more widely recognized need for decarbonizing energy production, the new driver for developing nuclear energy became cost. Can nuclear power be economically competitive with natural gas and coal, in order to provide an economic driver for the displacement of fossil fuel? This became the new motivation for nuclear energy development in the twenty-first century, and over the last decade the unthinkable happened: a growing and striving ecosystem of nuclear energy start-up companies. Many of these start-up companies pursue the development of liquid-fuel molten salt reactors, fueled by thorium or uranium fuel. Other start-up companies develop solid-fuel reactors cooled by salt, or even fusion reactors cooled by salt. The common feature of nuclear reactors that utilize molten salt is the operation at high-temperature and atmospheric pressure. The high temperature leads to doubled power efficiencies, compared to conventional water-cooled reactors. The atmospheric pressure leads to a safety case that is arguably easier to demonstrate, and hence that would enable a faster commercialization time.  On the other hand, there remain many technical risks and time-line uncertainties for the development of salt nuclear technologies. There remain also questions of policy, licensing, and compatibility with local industry and local culture, necessary elements for the global development of such nuclear reactors. This talk will explore some of the challenges faced by the global deployment of molten-salt and salt-cooled reactors, and some of the challenges faced by nuclear start-up companies in order to change the innovation cycle for nuclear energy technology from thirty years to a much shorter time frame.

 

 

Speaker's Biography:

Image
screen shot 2019 10 03 at 1 23 12 pm
Raluca Scarlat is an assistant professor at UC Berkeley, in the Department of Nuclear Engineering. Raluca Scarlat’s research focuses on chemistry, electrochemistry and physical chemistry of high-temperature inorganic fluids and their application to energy systems. Her research includes safety analysis, licensing and design of nuclear reactors and engineering ethics, and she has extensive experience in design and  safety analysis of fluoride-salt-cooled high-temperature reactors (FHRs) and Molten Salt Reactors (MSRs). Professor Scarlat has a Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from UC Berkeley, a certificate in Management of Technology from the Hass School of Business, and a B.S. in Chemical and Biomolecular Engineering from Cornell University. Scarlat has published articles in Electrochemical Society Journal, Journal of Fluorine Chemistry, Journal of Nuclear Materials, Nuclear Engineering and Design, Nuclear Instruments and Methods, Journal of Engineering for Gas Turbines and Power, Nuclear Technology, and Progress in Nuclear Energy.

Raluca Scarlat UC Berkeley
Seminars
-

Abstract: In 2013, the Obama Administration’s “Nuclear Employment Strategy” guidance announced that all war plans and operations would be “consistent with the fundamental principles of the Law of Armed Conflict” (LOAC). The Trump Administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review repeated this commitment. The literature on nuclear strategy and deterrence in political science however, has either ignored these legal requirements or misunderstood them. The legal literature on nuclear weapons, however, has largely ignored the technical revolution regarding improved accuracy and lower-yield nuclear weapons and the different strategic contexts in which the U.S. might contemplate nuclear use. This paper analyzes how proper application of the Law of Armed Conflict should constrain U.S. nuclear doctrine and war planning and how knowledge of strategic considerations is fundamental to proper legal analysis. We argue that the principle of proportionality can permit “counter-force” targeting— most clearly when such attacks can prevent or significantly reduce the expected damage to U.S. and allied populations with lower foreign collateral damage. We also argue that the legal requirement to take “feasible precautions” to protect non-combatants means the U.S. must use conventional weapons or the lowest yield nuclear weapons possible in any counterforce attack. Finally, we contend that the prohibition against deliberate targeting of civilians has gained the status of customary international law and that the U.S. government should therefore reverse its traditional position and reject the doctrine of “belligerent reprisal” against foreign civilians. This prohibition means that it is illegal for the United States, contrary to what is implied in the 2018 NPR and explicitly maintained by prominent U.S. Air Force lawyers, to either intentionally target civilians in reprisal to a strike against U.S. or allied civilians, or launch attacks against legitimate military targets if the intent to is cause incidental civilian harm.

 

Speaker's Biography:

Image
sagan scott 2012 photo
Scott D. Sagan is the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, the Mimi and Peter Haas University Fellow in Undergraduate Education, and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University. He also serves as Chairman of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences’ Committee on International Security Studies. Before joining the Stanford faculty, Sagan was a lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University and served as special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon. Sagan has also served as a consultant to the office of the Secretary of Defense and at the Sandia National Laboratory and the Los Alamos National Laboratory. 

Sagan is the author of Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton University Press, 1989); The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton University Press, 1993); and, with co-author Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate (W.W. Norton, 2012). He is the co-editor of Learning from a Disaster: Improving Nuclear Safety and Security after Fukushima (Stanford University Press, 2016) with Edward D. Blandford and co-editor of Insider Threats (Cornell University Press, 2017) with Matthew Bunn. Sagan was also the guest editor of a two-volume special issue of Daedalus: Ethics, Technology, and War (Fall 2016) and The Changing Rules of War (Winter 2017).

Recent publications include “Armed and Dangerous: When Dictators Get the Bomb” in Foreign Affairs (November/December 2018); “Not Just a War Theory: American Public Opinion on Ethics in Combat” with Benjamin A. Valentino in International Studies Quarterly (Fall 2018); The Korean Missile Crisis” in Foreign Affairs (November/December 2017); “Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran: What Americans Really Think About Using Nuclear Weapons and Killing Noncombatants” with Benjamin A. Valentino in International Security (Summer 2017); and “Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons” with Daryl G. Press and Benjamin A. Valentino in the American Political Science Review (February 2013).

In 2018, Sagan received the Andrew Carnegie Fellowship from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. In 2017, he received the International Studies Association’s Susan Strange Award which recognizes the scholar whose “singular intellect, assertiveness, and insight most challenge conventional wisdom and intellectual and organizational complacency" in the international studies community. Sagan was also the recipient of the National Academy of Sciences William and Katherine Estes Award in 2015, for his work addressing the risks of nuclear weapons and the causes of nuclear proliferation. The award, which is granted triennially, recognizes “research in any field of cognitive or behavioral science that advances understanding of issues relating to the risk of nuclear war.” In 2013, Sagan received the International Studies Association's International Security Studies Section Distinguished Scholar Award. He has also won four teaching awards: Stanford’s 1998-99 Dean’s Award for Distinguished Teaching; Stanford's 1996 Hoagland Prize for Undergraduate Teaching; the International Studies Association’s 2008 Innovative Teaching Award; and the Monterey Institute for International Studies’ Nonproliferation Education Award in 2009.

 

Image
weiner allen
Allen S. Weiner, JD ’89, is an international legal scholar with expertise in such wide-ranging fields as international and national security law, the law of war, international conflict resolution, and international criminal law (including transitional justice). His scholarship focuses on international law and the response to the contemporary security threats of international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and situations of widespread humanitarian atrocities. He also explores assertions by states of “war powers” under international law, domestic law, and just war theory in the context of asymmetric armed conflicts between states and nonstate armed groups and the response to terrorism. In the realm of international conflict resolution, his highly multidisciplinary work analyzes the barriers to resolving violent political conflicts, with a particular focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Weiner’s scholarship is deeply informed by experience; he practiced international law in the U.S. Department of State for more than a decade advising government policymakers, negotiating international agreements, and representing the United States in litigation before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Court of Justice, and the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.

Senior Lecturer Weiner is director of the Stanford Program in International and Comparative Law and co-director of the Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation. Before joining the Stanford Law School faculty in 2003, Weiner served as legal counselor to the U.S. Embassy in The Hague and attorney adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State. He was a law clerk to Judge John Steadman of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

 

Scott Sagan Professor of Political Science Stanford University
Allen Weiner Stanford University
Seminars
Paragraphs

About the Author: Marc Goodman has spent a career in law enforcement and technology. He was appointed futurist-in-residence with the FBI, worked as a senior adviser to Interpol, and served as a street police officer. As the founder of the Future Crimes Institute and the Chair for Policy, Law, and Ethics at Silicon Valley’s Singularity University, he continues to investigate the intriguing and often terrifying intersection of science and security, uncovering nascent threats and combating the darker sides of technology.

Read an Excerpt

CHAPTER 1
 
 
Connected, Dependent and Vulnerable
 
 
 
Technology…is a queer thing; it brings you great gifts with one hand and it stabs you in the back with the other.
-- CHARLES PERCY SNOW
 
 
 
 
Mat Honan’s life looked pretty good on-screen: in one tab of his browser were pictures of his new baby girl; in another streamed the tweets from his thousands of Twitter followers. As a reporter for Wired magazine in San Francisco, he was living an urbane and connected life and was as up-to-date on technology as anyone. Still, he had no idea his entire digital world could be erased in just a few keystrokes. Then, one August day, it was. His photographs, e-mails, and much more all fell into the hands of a hacker. Stolen in just minutes by a teenager halfway around the world. Honan was an easy target. We all are.
Honan recalls the afternoon when everything fell apart. He was play- ing on the floor with his infant daughter when suddenly his iPhone pow- ered down. Perhaps the battery had died. He was expecting an important call, so he plugged the phone into the outlet and rebooted. Rather than the usual start-up screen and apps, he saw a large white Apple logo and a mul- tilingual welcome screen inviting him to set up his new phone. How odd.
Honan wasn’t especially worried: he backed up his iPhone every night. His next step was perfectly obvious—log in to iCloud and restore the phone and its data. Upon logging in to his Apple account, he was informed that his password, the one he was sure was correct, had been deemed wrong by the iCloud gods. Honan, an astute reporter for the world’s preeminent technology magazine, had yet another trick up his sleeve. He would merely connect the iPhone to his laptop and restore his data from the hard drive on his local computer. What happened next made his heart sink.
As Honan powered up his Mac, he was greeted with a message from Apple’s calendar program advising him his Gmail password was incor- rect. Immediately thereafter, the face of his laptop—its beautiful screen— turned ashen gray and quit, as if it had died. The only thing visible on the screen was a prompt: please enter your four-digit password. Honan knew he had never set a password.
Honan ultimately learned that a hacker had gained access to his iCloud account, then used Apple’s handy “find my phone” feature to locate all of the electronic devices in Honan’s world. One by one, they were nuked. The hacker issued the “remote wipe” command, thereby erasing all of the data Honan had spent a lifetime accumulating. The first to fall was his iPhone, then his iPad. Last, but certainly not least, was his MacBook. In an instant, all of his data, including every baby picture he had taken during his daugh- ter’s first year of life, were destroyed. Gone too were the priceless photo- graphic memories of his relatives who had long since died, vanquished into the ether by parties unknown.
Next to be obliterated was Honan’s Google account. In the blink of an eye, the eight years of carefully curated Gmail messages were lost. Work conversations, notes, reminders, and memories wiped away with a click of a mouse. Finally, the hacker turned his intention to his ultimate target: Honan’s Twitter handle, @Mat. Not only was the account taken over, but the attacker used it to send racist and homophobic rants in Honan’s name to his thousands of followers.
In the aftermath of the online onslaught, Honan used his skills as an investigative reporter to piece together what had happened. He phoned Apple tech support in an effort to reclaim his iCloud account. After more than ninety minutes on the phone, Honan learned that “he” had just called thirty minutes prior to request his password be reset. As it turns out, the only information anybody needed to change Honan’s password was his billing address and the last four digits of his credit card number. Honan’s address was readily available on the Whois Internet domain record he had created when he built his personal Web site. Even if it hadn’t been, dozens of online services such as WhitePages.com and Spokeo would have pro- vided it for free.
To ascertain the last four digits of Honan’s credit card, the hacker guessed that Honan (like most of us) had an account on Amazon.com. He was correct. Armed with Honan’s full name and his e-mail and mailing addresses, the culprit contacted Amazon and successfully manipulated a customer service rep so as to gain access to the required last four credit card digits. Those simple steps and nothing more turned Honan’s life upside down. Although it didn’t happen in this case, the hacker could have just as easily used the very same information to access and pilfer Honan’s online bank and brokerage accounts.
The teenager who eventually came forward to take credit for the attack—Phobia, as he was known in hacking circles—claimed he was out to expose the vast security vulnerabilities of the Internet services we’ve come to rely on every day. Point made. Honan created a new Twitter account to communicate with his attacker. Phobia, using the @Mat account, agreed to follow Honan’s new account, and now the two could direct message each other. Honan asked Phobia the single question that was burning on his mind: Why? Why would you do this to me? As it turns out, the near decade of lost data and memories was merely collateral damage.
Phobia’s reply was chilling: “I honestly didn’t have any heat towards you . . . I just liked your [Twitter] username.” That was it. That’s all it was ever about—a prized three-letter Twitter handle. A hacker thousands of miles away liked it and simply wanted it for himself.
The thought that somebody with no “heat” toward you can obliterate your digital life in a few keystrokes is absurd. When Honan’s story appeared on the cover of Wired in December 2012, it garnered considerable atten- tion . . . for a minute or two. A debate on how to better secure our every- day technologie ensued but, like so many Internet discussions, ultimately flamed out. Precious little has changed since Honan’s trials and tribula- tions. We are still every bit as vulnerable as Honan was then—and even more so as we ratchet up our dependency on hackable mobile and cloud- based applications.
As with most of us, Honan’s various accounts were linked to one another in a self-referential web of purported digital trust: the same credit card number on an Apple profile and an Amazon account; an iCloud e-mail address that points back to Gmail. Each had information in common, including log-on credentials, credit card numbers, and passwords with all the data connected back to the same person. Honan’s security protections amounted to nothing more than a digital Maginot Line—an overlapping house of cards that came tumbling down with the slightest pressure. All or most of the information needed to destroy his digital life, or yours, is readily available online to anybody who is the least bit devious or creative.
 
 
 
Progress and Peril in a Connected World
 
In a few years’ time, with very little self-reflection, we’ve sprinted headlong from merely searching Google to relying on it for directions, calendars, address books, video, entertainment, voice mail, and telephone calls. One billion of us have posted our most intimate details on Facebook and will- ingly provided social networking graphs of our friends, family, and co- workers. We’ve downloaded billions of apps, and we rely on them to help us accomplish everything from banking and cooking to archiving baby pictures. We connect to the Internet via our laptops, mobile phones, iPads, TiVos, cable boxes, PS3s, Blu-rays, Nintendos, HDTVs, Rokus, Xboxes, and Apple TVs.
The positive aspects of this technological evolution are manifest. Over the past hundred years, rapid advances in medical science mean that the average human life span has more than doubled and child mortality has plummeted by a factor of ten. Average per capita income adjusted for infla- tion around the world has tripled. Access to a high-quality education, so elusive to many for so long, is free today via Web sites such as the Khan Academy. And the mobile phone is singularly credited with leading to bil- lions upon billions of dollars in direct economic development in nations around the globe.
The interconnectivity the Internet provides through its fundamental architecture means that disparate peoples from around the world can be brought together as never before. A woman in Chicago can play Words with Friends with a total stranger in the Netherlands. A physician in Bangalore, India, can remotely read and interpret the X-ray results of a patient in Boca Raton, Florida. A farmer in South Africa can use his mobile phone to access the same crop data as a PhD candidate at MIT. This interconnect- edness is one of the Internet’s greatest strengths, and as it grows in size, so too does the global network’s power and utility. There is much to celebrate in our modern technological world.
While the advantages of the online world are well documented and frequently highlighted by those in the tech industry, there is also a down- side to all of this interconnectivity.
Our electrical grids, air traffic control networks, fire department dis- patch systems, and even the elevators at work are all critically dependent on computers. Each day, we plug more and more of our daily lives into the global information grid without pausing to ask what it all means. Mat Honan found out the hard way, as have thousands of others. But what should happen if and when the technological trappings of our modern society—the foundational tools upon which we are utterly dependent—all go away? What is humanity’s backup plan? In fact, none exists.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Books
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Penguin Random House LLC
Authors
Authors
News Type
Q&As
Date
Paragraphs

North Korea currently has only one publicly known uranium mine—the Pyongsăn uranium mining and milling complex—that serves as a first step in the country’s pathway towards nuclear weapons.

Using a combination of multispectral imagery sourced from the European Space Agency’s Copernicus Sentinel-2 satellite and a review of geological analyses dating back to 1955, a new study from Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) in Jane’s Intelligence Review by geological sciences postdoctoral fellow Sulgiye Park (PhD ’17) and CISAC honors student Federico Derby (BS ’19) looks for evidence of uranium mining in North Korea, going beyond what is currently available in open sources in order to estimate the uranium resources and their locations in North Korea.

The peer-reviewed CISAC study has identified around 18 additional sites in North Korea where the hyperspectral signatures and geological profile combine to suggest the possibility of uranium mining. Nevertheless, CISAC and Jane’s stress that the presence of these ‘hotspots’ does not imply the presence of an active uranium mine or related facility, but rather a site that warrants further analysis.

In this Q&A with Katy Gabel Chui, researchers Sulgiye Park and Federico Derby discuss their work on the project:

How did you land on this project? What made you think to look for more mining sites?

Sulgiye Park (SP) and Federico Derby (FD): Very little is known about the front-end of North Korea’s nuclear fuel cycle, particularly when it comes to the mining and milling processes of uranium production pathway. To date, assessments of this portion of North Korea’s nuclear fuel cycle have been mostly conducted through traditional (electro-optical) satellite imagery observations---the type of imagery that you can access through Google Earth, for instance.

We wanted to get a more complete grasp of North Korea's uranium mining and processing capacity by conducting a multi-disciplinary approach that combines both the visible signatures from multi-spectral satellite imagery and a geological dataset that contains information such as mineralogy and geochemistry. The two individual methods come together at the end to provide information that encapsulates the potential regions likely to host uranium deposits and mines.

What is multispectral imaging? How would it ordinarily be used, and how did you use it for this project?

SP and FD: Traditional electro-optical satellite imagery exploits only three portions of the electromagnetic spectrum; namely, the blue, green and red bands. In general, when using the term “multispectral” within the satellite imagery community, we are usually referring to a satellite system that covers a few to tens of different bands in the electromagnetic spectrum.

Multispectral imagery is used in a wide variety of industries, to measure things like water turbidity, crop healthiness, vegetation quality, etc. For this project, we focused on using spectral fingerprints. Basically, every object – whether it be a mineral, a living thing, water, etc. – has a(n in theory unique) spectral fingerprint. Spectral fingerprints are measured as the intensity of the object’s reflectance of light at a specific wavelength. Varying across wavelengths – hence the importance of having a multispectral system that can give you access to different ranges of the electromagnetic spectrum – you ultimately get a spectral curve that is unique to the item you are studying.

The spectral fingerprints you collect on a specific image can be compared to previously collected fingerprints stored in what is usually termed a spectral library, for classification purposes. Basically, if my spectral curve of a given pixel (or set of pixels) looks super similar to that of gold (for which I obtained a reference spectral curve from a spectral library), then it is probably gold. Obviously, this matching is performed in a more rigorous manner, but you get the idea of how the process works.

In this project, we used the Pyongsan uranium mine in North Korea (arguably the only well-identified uranium mine in the country) as my reference spectral curve. Essentially, using various imaging techniques, we traversed North Korea looking for pixels whose spectral curves are similar to that of the Pyongsan uranium mine. Those are the ‘hotspots’ we identified.

What most surprised you in both your work and your findings?

SP and FD: The fascinating match between the 'hotspots' identified through satellite imagery analysis and the geologic information available in maps and reports. The majority of the 'hotspots' appeared adjacent to the limestone formation from the Ordovician period (circa 445-485 Ma) that are in contact with a specific sedimentary rocks of upper Proterozoic group. Part of the geologic characteristics of the 'hotspots' regions were similar to what had been observed in the Pyongsan (the most well-known) uranium mine of North Korea.

What was most surprising in the work itself? What was difficult in doing the work?

SP and FD: It was surprising to see how much we still don't know about North Korea despite the amount of effort that had been invested. There is no consensus reached regarding the location and the total number of uranium mines in North Korea.

One of the bigger difficulties we had was finding credible geological data and information.

What is the one thing you think someone should take away from your study?

SP and FD: That there are still many unknowns. While our study identified multiple regions with spectral signatures similar to the uranium tailing piles at Pyongsan, verification of uranium presence is still needed.

What are you working on next?

SP: I am still working on using a geologic approach to glean information on the uranium mines of North Korea. The further evaluation aims to identify a qualitative upper limit of uranium ore grade (quality) and quantity pertaining to all the suspected uranium mines in North Korea.

FD: I co-founded a startup focused on developing deep learning models for credit risk analytics (in Latin America). However, I will still keep in touch with my CISAC peers!

 

Hero Image
satellite
All News button
1
-

Livestream: This event will not be live-streamed or recorded.

 

Abstract: This study brings together social identity theory and the literature on ontological security in international relations to highlight the role of leadership processes for group formation and authoritarian legitimation. Together, these theories allow for exploring the conditions that increase the potency of identity-based politics and the specific ways political entrepreneurs can mobilize this political tool. Ontological insecurity, as I argue and show, is a condition that political entrepreneurs use and manipulate to gain political support and legitimate their rule. I illustrate this argument by looking into ‘late Putinism’ as an example of collective identity-driven politics. This study relies on an original nationwide survey experiment conducted in November 2017 in Russia to demonstrate the extent of the Russian society’s vulnerability and receptivity to insecure identity narratives. The data also allows us to start a discussion on the potential factors responsible for societal differentiation on this issue.

 

Speaker's Biography:

Gulnaz Sharafutdinova Gulnaz Sharafutdinova
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, a Reader in Russian Politics at King’s College London, is the author of Political Consequences of Crony Capitalism Inside Russia (University of Notre Dame Press, 2011) and the forthcoming monograph Through The Looking Glass: Putin’s Leadership and Russia’s Insecure Identity (Oxford University Press, 2020)Gulnaz has written numerous articles on Russian regional political economy, state-business relations, and corruption in Russia. She has published an edited volume, Soviet Society in the Era of Late Socialism, 1964-1985 (2012) and has been working on bringing social psychological approaches to understanding collective identity issues and the nature of Putinism in Russia.

 

Gulnaz Sharafutdinova Reader in Russian Politics King’s College London
Seminars
-

Livestream: This event will not be live-streamed or recorded.

 

Abstract: Despite a lull after the fall of the Soviet Union, grassroots activism in Russia is on the rise. The protests for free elections that swept across Russia in the summer of 2019 may have captured international headlines, but many other Russian grassroots groups have been actively organizing over the last decade. What types of civic movements exist in today’s Russia? What are the risks that civic activists face? How do they interact with the state or state-protected interest groups? Finally, what role could grassroots groups play in democratizing Russia? Russian activist Evgeniya Chirikova will shed light on these questions through her personal experience as an environmental activist and as a coordinator of Activatica.org, an online news platform covering grassroots activism across Russia.


Speaker's Biography:

Image
2012europe 111
Evgeniya Chirikova is a Russian environmental activist, primarily known for opposing the building of a motorway through the Khimki forest near Moscow. She also played a prominent role in the 2011-2012 Russian protests following disputed parliamentary elections in Russia. In March 2011, she received the Woman of Courage Award, handed over by US Vice President Joe Biden. In 2012, she was a winner of the Goldman Environmental Prize. In November 2012, Foren Policy named Chirikova one of its 2012 Top 100 Global Thinkers. In 2015 Chirikova organized the portal activatica.org, and she is currently organizing media support for grassroots groups.

Evgeniya Chirikova Russian Environmental Activist
Seminars
0
Jacquelyn Schneider

Jacquelyn Schneider is a Hoover Fellow at the Hoover Institution.  Her research focuses on the intersection of technology, national security, and political psychology with a special interest in cybersecurity, unmanned technologies, and Northeast Asia.

Her work has appeared in Security Studies, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Strategic Studies Quarterly, and Journal of Strategic Studies and is featured in Cross Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity (Oxford University Press, 2019).  Her current manuscript project is The Rise of Unmanned Technologies with Julia Macdonald (upcoming, Oxford University Press). In addition to her scholarly publications, she is a frequent contributor to policy outlets,  including Foreign Affairs, CFR, Cipher Brief, Lawfare, War on the Rocks, Washington Post, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, National Interest, H-Diplo, and the Center for a New American Security.  

In 2018, Schneider was included in CyberScoop’s Leet List of influential cyber experts.  She is also the recipient of a Minerva grant on autonomy (with co-PIs Michael Horowitz, Julia Macdonald, and Allen Dafoe) and a University of Denver grant to study public responses to the use of drones (with Macdonald).  She was awarded best graduate paper for the International Security and Arms Control section of the International Studies Association, the Foreign Policy Analysis section of the International Studies Association, and the Southwest Social Science Association. 

She is an active member of the defense policy community with previous positions at the Center for a New American Security and the RAND Corporation. Before beginning her academic career, she spent six years as an Air Force officer in South Korea and Japan and is currently a reservist assigned to US Cyber Command. She has a BA from Columbia University, MA from Arizona State University, and PhD from George Washington University.

Hoover Fellow at the Hoover Institution
-

Abstract: We have learned a great deal about Iraq since the fateful decision to invade the country in 2003. Given academic research on Iraqi society and politics over the past 16 years and hard won lessons from U.S. intervention in Iraq, what what are the lessons learned for contemporary U.S. policymakers? And, crucially, what role should Iraq play in current U.S. foreign policy and its regional strategy toward the Middle East?

 

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/4OBQOshr-gs

 

Speakers:

Colin H. Kahl Co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, the inaugural Steven C. Házy Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and a Professor, by courtesy, in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University.

Brett McGurk Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer at the Freeman Spogli Institute and Center for Security and Cooperation at Stanford University.

With moderator: Lisa Blaydes
Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

 

Speaker's Biography: 

Image
colin kahl
Colin H. Kahl is co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, the inaugural Steven C. Házy Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and a Professor, by courtesy, in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University. He is also a Strategic Consultant to the Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement.

From October 2014 to January 2017, he was Deputy Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor to the Vice President. In that position, he served as a senior advisor to President Obama and Vice President Biden on all matters related to U.S. foreign policy and national security affairs, and represented the Office of the Vice President as a standing member of the National Security Council Deputies’ Committee. From February 2009 to December 2011, Dr. Kahl was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East at the Pentagon. In this capacity, he served as the senior policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense for Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel and the Palestinian territories, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, and six other countries in the Levant and Persian Gulf region. In June 2011, he was awarded the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service by Secretary Robert Gates. 

From 2007 to 2017 (when not serving in the U.S. government), Dr. Kahl was an assistant and associate professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. From 2007 to 2009 and 2012 to 2014, he was also a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), a nonpartisan Washington, DC-based think tank. From 2000 to 2007, he was an assistant professor of political science at the University of Minnesota. In 2005-2006, Dr. Kahl took leave from the University of Minnesota to serve as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where he worked on issues related to counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and responses to failed states. In 1997-1998, he was a National Security Fellow at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University.

Current research projects include a book analyzing American grand strategy in the Middle East in the post-9/11 era. A second research project focuses on the implications of emerging technologies on strategic stability.

He has published numerous articles on international security and U.S. foreign and defense policy in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, International Security, the Los Angeles Times, Middle East Policy, the National Interest, the New Republic, the New York Times, Politico, the Washington Post, and the Washington Quarterly, as well as several reports for CNAS.

His previous research analyzed the causes and consequences of violent civil and ethnic conflict in developing countries, focusing particular attention on the demographic and natural resource dimensions of these conflicts. His book on the subject, States, Scarcity, and Civil Strife in the Developing World, was published by Princeton University Press in 2006, and related articles and chapters have appeared in International Security, the Journal of International Affairs, and various edited volumes.

Dr. Kahl received his B.A. in political science from the University of Michigan (1993) and his Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University (2000).

 

 

 

Image
mcgurk brett holden   official dos photo copy
Brett McGurk is the Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer at the Freeman Spogli Institute and Center for Security and Cooperation at Stanford University.

McGurk’s research interests center on national security strategy, diplomacy, and decision-making in wartime.  He is particularly interested in the lessons learned over the presidencies of George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump regarding the importance of process in informing presidential decisions and the alignment of ends and means in national security doctrine and strategy.  At Stanford, he will be working on a book project incorporating these themes and teaching a graduate level seminar on presidential decision-making beginning in the fall of 2019.  He is also a frequent commentator on national security events in leading publications and as an NBC News Senior Foreign Affairs Analyst. 

Before coming to Stanford, McGurk served as Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS at the U.S. Department of State, helping to build and then lead the coalition of seventy-five countries and four international organizations in the global campaign against the ISIS terrorist network.  McGurk was also responsible for coordinating all aspects of U.S. policy in the campaign against ISIS in Iraq, Syria, and globally.

McGurk previously served in senior positions in the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations, including as Special Assistant to President Bush and Senior Director for Iraq and Afghanistan, and then as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iraq and Iran and Special Presidential Envoy for the U.S. campaign against the Islamic State under Obama.

McGurk has led some of the most sensitive diplomatic missions in the Middle East over the last decade. His most recent assignment established one of the largest coalitions in history to prosecute the counter-ISIS campaign. He was a frequent visitor to the battlefields in both Iraq and Syria to help integrate military and civilian components of the war plan. He also led talks with Russia over the Syria conflict under both the Trump and Obama administrations, initiated back-channel diplomacy to reopen ties between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and facilitated the formation of the last two Iraqi governments following contested elections in 2014 and 2018.

In 2015 and 2016, McGurk led fourteen months of secret negotiations with Iran to secure the release of Washington Post reporter Jason Rezain, U.S. Marine Amir Hekmati, and Pastor Saad Abadini, as well as three other American citizens.

During his time at the State Department, McGurk received multiple awards, including the Distinguished Honor Award and the Distinguished Service Award, the highest department awards for exceptional service in Washington and overseas assignments.

McGurk is also a nonresident senior fellow in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

McGurk received his JD from Columbia University and his BA from the University of Connecticut Honors Program.  He served as a law clerk to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist on the U.S. Supreme Court, Judge Denis Jacobs on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2d Circuit, and Judge Gerard E. Lynch on the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

 

Colin Kahl Stanford University
Brett McGurk Stanford University
Seminars
-

Abstract: Russia’s challenge to the West includes information operations (e.g., disinformation, political propaganda, and other forms of online manipulation) aimed at destabilizing the common ground that democratic societies in Europe and the United States need in order to govern themselves.  Kate Starbird will describe two case studies of online information operations connected to Russia’s media/intelligence apparatus:  interference in the 2016 U.S. election and the campaign against the “White Helmets” in Syria.  She argues that defending against Russian online information operations will require a more nuanced understanding of the problem, in particular, moving beyond focusing on “bots” and “trolls” to looking at the collaborative nature of disinformation campaigns that target, infiltrate, shape, and leverage online communities—communities which may not recognize their role in these campaigns. 

 

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/lF4M11FkEKY

 

Speaker's Biography:

Image
thumbnail new headshot tom reese small
Kate Starbird is an Associate Professor at the Department of Human Centered Design & Engineering (HCDE) at the University of Washington (UW). Starbird’s research is situated within human-computer interaction (HCI) and the emerging field of crisis informatics—the study of the how information-communication technologies (ICTs) are used during crisis events. One aspect of her research focuses on how online rumors spread during natural disasters and man-made crisis events. More recently, she has begun to focus on disinformation and other forms of strategic information operations online. Starbird earned her PhD from the University of Colorado at Boulder in Technology, Media and Society and holds a BS in Computer Science from Stanford University.

Kate Starbird University of Washington
Seminars
-

Seminar recording: https://youtu.be/fYUK-ALGqAE

 

Abstract:  Russian influence operations during the 2016 US elections, and the investigations that followed, revealed the broad scope of Russian political warfare against Western democracies. Since then, Russian operations have targeted the UK, France, Germany, Ukraine, and others. Other state and non-state actors, motivated by politics or profit, have also learned and adapted the Kremlin’s tool-kit. With the 2020 elections a year away, what have we learned about foreign information operations? How has the transatlantic community responded and what are the threats we are likely to face?  Drawing on extensive research on transatlantic relations, disinformation, and Russian foreign policy, Dr. Polyakova will discuss the state of policy options to address disinformation, analyze Russian intentions, and highlight emerging threats.

 

Speaker’s Biography:

Image
alina polyakova
Alina Polyakova is the founding director of the Project on Global Democracy and Emerging Technology and a fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution, where she leads the Foreign Policy program’s Democracy Working Group. She is also adjunct professor of European studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University. Her work examines Russian political warfare, European populism, digital authoritarianism, and the implications of emerging technologies to democracies. Polyakova's book, "The Dark Side of European Integration" (Ibidem-Verlag and Columbia University Press, 2015) analyzed the rise of far-right political parties in Europe.  She holds a master’s and doctorate from the University of California, Berkeley, and a bachelor's in economics and sociology with highest honors from Emory University. 

Alina Polyakova Director, Project on Global Democracy and Emerging Technology The Brookings Institution
Seminars
Subscribe to Security